Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
Although, prior to the administration of Miranda warnings (see Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436 [1966]), the defendant was subjected to a brief period of custodial interrogation or its functional equivalent (see People v Ferro, 63 NY2d 316, 322-323 [1984], cert denied 472 US 1007 [1985]), he made no inculpatory statement, or any statement relating to his conduct in connection with the crime under investigation, until after such warnings had been properly given and waived (see People v Prater, 258 AD2d 600 [1999]). In the absence of any such preMiranda statement, there was no need to determine whether the pre- and post -Miranda sessions were part of a “single continuous chain of events” (People v Paulman, 5 NY3d 122, 130 [2005]; see People v Chapple, 38 NY2d 112, 115 [1975]; People v Prater, supra). Nor was there any evidence that the length or conditions of the defendant’s pre-interrogation detention affected the voluntariness of his subsequent Miranda waiver or statements (see People v Anderson, 42 NY2d 35 [1977]).
Accordingly, the hearing court properly denied suppression of the defendant’s statements. Prudenti, P.J., Fisher, Lifson and Angiolillo, JJ., concur.