By the Court.
delivering the opinion.
Suit was brought in Muscogee county,-by John II. Butt and Willis Banks, merchants and partners doing business under the firm name of Butt & Banks, against William Perry, on a note of hand for $419, J-Aj.
[1.] On the trial, the plaintiffs read the note and there closed eheir case. The defendant introduced, as a witness, Alfred White, who testified that he acted as clerk for the .firm of Butt & Banks, during the time said firm did business; that Oliver P. Tillinghast was also in the store and sold goods-for cash and on a credit, and also bartered off goods for other articles ; that O. P. Tillinghast was the oldest, most experienced man about she store, and exercised the principal control in the management of the business of the concern; that he understood said Tillinghast to be a partner in the concern of .Butt & Banks; that he was present when a conversation was carried on between John Banks, Jno. H. Butt, Oliver P. Tillinghast and Willis Banks; that. John Banks said that the concern ought or could make money; that they could sell $30,000 worth of goods, and make 15 per cent, on the amount of sales, which would be $1500 a-piece. Pie also testified that the terms of said partnership, as he understood, was, that John II. Butt and Willis Banks, each, were to put into the concern three thousand dollars, and Oliver P. Tillinghast was to render services and give his personal attention to the business, and the profits, after paying the debts and all expenses, and paying back to Butt and Banks the money
On the cross-examination of White, he was asked by plaintiff’s counsel, if it was not customary for clerks to sell goods for cash and on a credit ? The defendant, by his attorney, objected to the question; but it was allowed to be propounded by the Court, and thereupon the defendant excepted.
We think the Judge was right in over-ruling the objection to the interrogatory put to Mr. White. The witness had previously proven that Mr. O. P. Tillinghast was in the store of Butt & Banks, and that he sold goods for cash and on credit; and this testimony was elicited by the defendant, to create the presumption that Tillinghast was a joint proprietor of the concern. Now, to re-but the inference of ownership, arising from this fact, the witness was asked, and we think very properly, to state whether clerics, as well as the principals in stores, were not in the habit of selling goods for cash and on credit ? Surely'this was legitimate.
The defendant next introduced, as a witness, Parris J. Tillinghast, who testified that he kept the books of the concern of Butt & Banks; that Oliver P. Tillinghast was also in the store, as a salesman; that he sold goods for cash and on a credit, and also bartered them for other articles ; that O. P. Tillinghast had the chief management of the business of the concern; that he bought cotton and goods for the concern — made out bills and sent orders for goods to distant places — carried on, also, the correspondence of said concern, in part; that ho understood O. P. Tillinghast to be a member of said firm of Butt & Banks; that, in fact, he was a member of said firm. The terms of said partnership, as he understood, was, that John II. Butt and Willis Banks, each, were to put in said concern, the sum of $53,000, and O. P. Tillinghast was to render services and give his personal attention to the business, and the profits, after payment of the expenses and debts, and refunding to Butt & Banks the capital advanced by them, was to be equally divided — -one third to O. P. Tillinghast, and the other txvo thirds to Willis Banks and John II. Butt.
Plaintiff then introduced Alexander II. Cooper, who testified that Oliver P. Tillinghast came to him as an attorney, sue out a bail-writ against--, who was indebted to the firm of Butt & Banks. Witness inquired of Tillinghasi in what capacity he would make the affidavit — as clerk, agent or how ? Tillinghast replied as agent, and he did make the affidavit as agent, for Butt & Banks.
The testimony being closed, the Court, amongst other things, charged the Jury “ That the question of partnership did noi affect the case, as the co-partnership was not liable for the individual debt of one member; that it was not important whether there was a partnership, unless there was proof that the concern had agreed to pay tile debt of Tillinghast, or had, after being informed or having knowledge of the fact, acquiesced in the agreement or arrangement made by him with the defendant, as to his private debt for board”.
To which charge, as given, counsel then and there excepted.
Counsel for the defendant requested the Court to charge the Jury, that “If.they should believe, from the testimony, that Oliver P. Tillinghast was a member of the firm of Butt & Banks, that then the plaintiffs could not recover”.
The Court refused to charge as requested, and thereupon the defendant excepted.
The defendant, by his counsel, while the plaintiff’s attorney was making the concluding argument, moved for a non-suit, on the ground' “of the non-joinder of Oliver P. Tillinghast, as- a party plaintiff”.-
To the refusal of the Court to grant said motion, and also to his expressing an opinion, as to the effect and weight of testimony, the defendant’s counsel then and there excepted.
[2.] Why complaint should be made against the presiding Judge, for expressing his opinion, as to a point -which he was forced to decide, wo cannot very well comprehend. A motion was made and insisted on, that the action be non-suited, on the ground of the non-joinder of the proper parties, as plaintiffs, tho proof showing that O. P. Tillinghast was a member of the concern of Butt & Banks. Was not the Court compelled to say whether or not tho testimony did or did not establish this fact?
[8.] Whether Tillinghast was a partner or not, we apprehend the suit was properly brought. The business was conducted in the name of Butt & Banks, and the note sued on was payable to tho firm by that name. We see no error in the refusal of tho Court to grant a non-suit, especially at the time it was asked. The application should have been for instructions to the Jury. But the important question to be settled in this, case is this : did the evidence of White and the Messrs. Tillinghast, Avhich stands uncontradicted, constitute Oliver P. Tillinghast a partner of Butt & Banks, quoad their persons ?
The sum and substance of the statements of these throe witnesses, who corroborate each other, to a tittle, is this: That Butt and Banks, each, was to contribute $>3,000 a-pioce, against which O. P. Tillinghast was to render services, and give lfis personal attention to the business, and the profits, after pay-, ing debts and expenses, and refunding the $>6,000 of stock, was to be equally divided between the three,
I asir, did O. P. Tillinghast have no interest, in common, with Butt & Banks, in the propertjr, business and responsibilities of this mercantile concern ? I will not dwell upon this point — it is too plain. Whether Mr. Tillinghast was an actual partner, as it respects Butt & Banks, or a partner only as to^ third persons, it is very certain that, under the evidence, he can never be considered as an agent, only,
But when does an actual partnership take place ? I answer — - when two or more persons agree to combino property or labor, or both, in a common undertaking, sharing profit and loss.— Or, in the terms of Mr. Smith, “ Partnership exists wherever two or more persons enter into a joint concern or undertaking, of which they are to share the profits and losses”. (Smith on Contracts, 254.) Or, in the language of 'Mr. Watson, on Partnerships, (40,) “A partnership is nothing more than a community of interest, between two or more persons, and a sharing of a profit and loss”. Or, in the still more pithy phraseology of Judge Shener, in 9 Johns. 496, “ To constitute a partnership, it needs only an agreement to share in the profit and loss”..
[4.] These principles applied to the evidence in this case, appear to* me decisive; -upon the question of partnership ; and show, notwithstanding the somewhat shadowy distinctions that are to be found in the authorities, that Tillinghast was jusf as much a partner of the concern as Butt & Banks. What was there in the contract to make him less so ? True, they contributed money, and he personal services. But none of the cases turn on that distinction. Is it because there was no stipulation, that he should share the losses as well as the- profits l
It is a remarkable fact, that Judge Story, in defining partnership, says nothing about loss. It is, says he, “‘A voluntary contract between two or more competent persons, to place their money, effects, labor, skill, or some or all of them, in lawful commerce or business, with the understanding that there shall be a 'communion of the profits thereof bettveen them”. (Story on Partnerships, 2§.) And the author cites 3 Kent’s Com. Lecture 43, p. 23, 24, 4th edition. Watson on Partnership, p. 1, 2d edition. Gen. on Partnerships. 1, 3d edition. Collyer on Partnership b. 1, ch. 1, p. 2d, 2d edition Montague on Partnership, b. 1, pt. 1, p. 1, 2d edition.
■ Can there be any doubt that Tillinghast, under this -agreement, would have been entitled to divide whatever was left, after the concern was settled, whether the profits consisted of money, notes and accounts, or merchandise, or all of these combined ? And could he not, by bill, have compelled Butt & Banks to have accounted with him for his .share ?
In listening to the reading of the numerous cases, English and American, in several discussions recently had before this Court, it has occurred to me, that in this, as some other branches of the Law, there is too much attempt at refinement; and that we would do well to come back to first principles, and not take leave, altogether, of common sense, as it respects these matters. State the present case to any plain man of reason and ordinary intelligence : that Butt, Banks & Tilling-hast agreed to engage in trade, in the City of Columbus; that the two former having funds, were to put in |3,000 each, and the latter possessing superior skill and experience in business, Was to .give his personal services and attention; and that they were to divide the nett profits equally, would he have any hesi
But whether a community of profit constitutes these persons partners, inter se, or not. it never has beén questioned in any respectable quarter, that it would undoubtedly make them answerable to third persons, to whom they have held themselves out, and with whom they have contracted as partners, and who cannot be affected by these secret contracts, as between themselves. This doctrine was fully gone into, in the case of Waugh vs. Carver, (2 H. Bl. 246,) and is there distinctly laid down by Lord Chief Justice DeG-rey, and is not now disputed. See Bond vs. Pittard, 3 M. & W., 357. And this is decisive of the case before us.
[5.] If Mr. O. P. Tillinghast, then, was a partner, as such, he had the right to make the contract rvhich he did with Mr. Perry. True, as the presiding Judge said, he could not appropriate the partnership effects to the payment of his individual debts. Still, it was competent for him, in furtherance of the partnership business, to say to Mr. Perry, buy your groceries from us, and we will take it out in whole or in part, in the board, either of ourselves or of our clerks. Such an arrangement appertained strictly to the partnership business.
[6.] Then, again, here was notice to Butt & Banks of the settlement of the accounts, for the board of Tillinghast, for the preceding years, and their acquiesence in it; for we hold, that the entries on the books of the firm, are evidence against the firm, and that all the members are presumed to be cogni
[7.] And such is the irresistible inference, from the -evidence furnished by the books of this concern, as to their ratification -of the understanding between Perry and Tillinghast, to wit: that his account for board should be set off against his dealings at the store.