Peyton, Monica M. v. DiMario, Michael F.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued February 4, 2002 Decided April 23, 2002

No. 00-5407

Monica M. Peyton,
Appellee

v.

Michael F. DiMario,
The Public Printer of the United States,
Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia
(No. 98cv00491)

Michael C. Johnson, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the
cause for appellant. With him on the briefs were Roscoe C.
Howard, Jr., U.S. Attorney, and R. Craig Lawrence, Assis-
tant U.S. Attorney.

Theodore S. Allison argued the cause for appellee. With
him on the brief was John W. Karr.

 Before: Ginsburg, Chief Judge, Edwards and Sentelle,
Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge Sentelle.

Sentelle, Circuit Judge: Monica Peyton, a former employ-
ee of the Government Printing Office ("GPO"), brought this
action against Michael F. DiMario, in his official capacity as
Public Printer of the United States, alleging employment
discrimination pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, 42 U.S.C. ss 2000e, et seq. Peyton's hostile work
environment claim and retaliation claim were tried to a jury,
which issued a verdict for Peyton and awarded her $482,000
in compensatory damages. The district court decreased the
compensatory damages award to the statutory cap of $300,000
in accordance with 42 U.S.C. s 1981a(b)(3)(D). The district
court further awarded Peyton $78,476.90 as back pay and
$377,615.72 as compensation for lost future earnings. The
Public Printer (hereinafter referred to as "GPO") appealed,
challenging only the damages and relief awarded. GPO
contends the district court abused its discretion by: (1)
awarding the statutory maximum in compensatory damages;
(2) awarding back pay for a period when Peyton was in
school; and (3) awarding future earnings that are unreason-
ably speculative. We affirm the district court as to its award
of compensatory damages and back pay. However we agree
with appellant that the future earnings awarded are unrea-
sonably speculative and remand for further proceedings.

I. Background

A. Peyton's Employment at GPO

Appellee Monica Peyton worked for GPO for 11 years
(from July 5, 1987 to August 14, 1998). She served in various
GS-5 and GS-6 positions, including supply clerk and supply
technician. In the fall of 1995 she was accepted into a 2-year
proofreader apprenticeship program. Successful completion
of the apprenticeship program leads to an appointment as a
journeyman proofreader. The apprenticeship program con-
sisted of on-the-job training as well as some classroom in-

struction. Apprentices were evaluated during each 13-week
period of the 2-year training program. GPO set specific
proofreading standards (e.g., the number of keystrokes that
must be read within an hour) and then taught the apprentices
how to meet those standards. Throughout the training pro-
gram GPO provides information to apprentices to allow them
to access their reading speed at any time and periodically
advises apprentices as to whether they are meeting expecta-
tions. Peyton's apprenticeship began in January 1996. Al-
though she apparently failed to meet the number of key
strokes per hour during one of the periods in 1996, Peyton
continued successfully in the program. Then in 1997, she
failed to meet the number of required keystrokes per hour for
the July 6-October 4 period.

According to Peyton's evidence, a superior, Charlotte Mas-
sey, made lewd comments and gestures concerning Peyton's
breasts on more than one occasion. Peyton complained to
Massey directly and Massey ranted at her and intimidated
her. Thereafter, Peyton made an informal complaint to
GPO's Equal Employment Opportunity ("EEO") office on
July 1, 1997, and a formal complaint on August 15, 1997.
Upon learning that Peyton had filed the informal complaint,
Massey engaged in a pattern of harassment, including threats
communicated directly and through co-workers. There was
physical contact between Peyton and Massey, which Peyton
characterized as a bump, or an elbowing, by Massey. Peyton
complained to her superiors that her work was being adverse-
ly affected by the hostile environment of the proof room, but
to no avail. Peyton was even told that she should drop her
complaint. Ultimately, Peyton was distressed and fearful
about approaching the head desk when Massey was assigned
to work there.

According to GPO, Peyton's failure to meet the proofread-
ing goal in 1997 resulted in her being given a 2-week delay,
then a 12-week probation to improve. Peyton in fact began
to improve. However, Peyton was misled as to when these
probationary periods actually began and was ultimately ex-
pelled from the apprenticeship program in what had been
represented to her as the fifth week of the scheduled 12-week

probation. Peyton was released from the apprenticeship
program in January 1998, though not terminated by GPO at
that time. GPO placed her in the Library Programs Service,
and ultimately she was terminated on August 14, 1998.

B. Proceedings Below

Having exhausted her administrative remedies, Peyton
filed the action below in the district court. In her complaint
(filed before she was fired), Peyton alleged sex discrimination
in the forms of quid pro quo sexual harassment and a hostile
work environment, as well as retaliation for pursuing her
rights under Title VII. Subsequently she amended her com-
plaint to allege that she was terminated from GPO as retalia-
tion. The district court granted summary judgment for GPO
on the quid pro quo claim but denied it with respect to the
hostile work environment and retaliation claims. Peyton's
hostile work environment and retaliation claims were tried to
a jury in November 1999. The jury returned a unanimous
verdict finding that Peyton proved, by a preponderance of the
evidence, each element of her claim of sex discrimination on
the basis of hostile or abusive work environment, and retalia-
tion, against GPO. The jury awarded Peyton compensatory
damages in the amount of $482,000.

The jury also sat in an advisory capacity on the issues of
damages for past lost earnings and benefits, up to the time of
trial, and damages for future lost earnings. See Fed. R. Civ.
P. 39(c). The jury returned an advisory verdict in which it
found that plaintiff had proved, by a preponderance of the
evidence, that she was entitled to damages for past lost
earnings and benefits, and to damages for future lost earn-
ings. The advisory verdict recommended $50,000 for back
pay and $840,000 for future lost earnings.

On the issues of entitlement to back pay and future lost
earnings, the district court made findings of fact. The court
agreed with the jury that Peyton "presented convincing and
credible evidence proving that her co-workers' and supervi-
sors' conduct had a material effect upon her ability to per-

form and upon her quality of life in the workplace." It found
no credible explanation for the discrepancy between the time-
frame of the probationary training period represented by
GPO to Peyton, and the period actually treated as the proba-
tionary training period by GPO. The court found the evi-
dence to establish that after being told of her probation on
December 2, 1997, until her removal from the program, "Ms.
Peyton performed above the required standards." The dis-
trict court concluded as a matter of law that "[a]s a direct and
proximate result of the retaliatory adverse employment ac-
tions taken against Ms. Peyton by officials of the GPO, Ms.
Peyton failed to be promoted to journeyman proofreader, as
of January 2, 1998, and was terminated from her employment
with the GPO as of August 14, 1998. She has suffered
compensatory damages and a loss of earnings and benefits as
a direct and proximate result of these adverse employment
actions."

C. Damages and Relief

Based on its findings, the district court awarded compensa-
tory damages and equitable relief. First, the court reduced
the amount of compensatory damages recoverable to
$300,000, the statutory maximum under Title VII for an
award against an employer with more than 500 employees.
See 42 U.S.C. s 1981a(b)(3)(D). The court "determine[d] on
the facts of this case" that $300,000 "represent[ed] a fair and
appropriate compensatory award pursuant to the statutory
cap at 42 U.S.C. s 1981a(b)(3)." In denying GPO's Rule 59(a)
and (e) motion for a new trial or, in the alternative, remittitur,
the district court rejected the argument that this award of
compensatory damages was "grossly excessive" because the
case did not present "the 'most egregious' instance of unlaw-
ful conduct meriting the 'maximum amount recoverable under
Title VII's statutory cap.' " Rather, the court determined
"that the jury could reasonably view this case as the type of
egregious, unlawful conduct that Title VII was designed to
remedy." It distinguished this case from Nyman v. FDIC,
967 F. Supp. 1562, 1572 (D.D.C. 1997), based on the physical
assault of Peyton and GPO's manipulation of "the apprentice

training rules in order to expel the plaintiff from the training
program." It concluded that the "$300,000 award neither
'shocks the conscience' nor represents a 'miscarriage of jus-
tice.' "

The court awarded back pay and future lost earnings
("front pay") as equitable relief. It calculated back pay for
three periods: January 2-August 14, 1998 (while Peyton was
still at GPO); August 14-October 11, 1998 (from termination
at GPO until employment by Bowne, Inc.); and October 11,
1998 to Trial (Peyton employed at Bowne, Inc.). It deter-
mined Peyton was entitled to an award of back pay in the
amount of $78,476.90. The court rejected arguments by
appellant GPO that Peyton inadequately mitigated her losses
during the August-October period when she was unemployed.
Noting that it is "the defendant's burden to prove that the
plaintiff's efforts to secure employment constituted inade-
quate effort to mitigate damages," the court "conclude[d] that
the defendant has failed to demonstrate that the plaintiff
inadequately mitigated her losses."

In determining that front pay was appropriate, the court
first found that it would be "futile, ill-advised, and inequitable
to order that Ms. Peyton be returned to her old position."
Relying on our decision in Barbour v. Merrill, 48 F.3d 1270,
1278 (D.C. Cir. 1995), cert. dismissed, 516 U.S. 1155 (1996),
the district court calculated projected future lost earnings. It
found that at the time of trial, Peyton earned $549.90 less per
week ($28,594.80 less per year) working for Bowne, Inc., a
private printer, than she would as a journeyman proofreader
for GPO. Because the court found that "Ms. Peyton reason-
ably expected and intended to work as a proofreader for the
GPO until she retired," it awarded her "front pay which
reflects that the plaintiff will suffer a loss of future earnings
totaling $28,594.80 per year until her projected retirement,"
discounted to the net present value. As Peyton was 34 years
old, and her retirement was projected at age 60, the district
court ultimately awarded $377,615.72 in front pay.

GPO filed the instant appeal challenging the district court's
determination of compensatory damages, back pay, and front
pay.

 II. Analysis

This Court reviews a district court's denial of a Rule 59(a)
and (e) motion for abuse of discretion. Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(a),
(e); see Langevine v. District of Columbia, 106 F.3d 1018,
1023 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (Rule 59(a)); Anyantaku v. Moore, 151
F.3d 1053, 1058 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (Rule 59(e)). This Court also
reviews equitable relief, the standard for calculating back pay
and front pay, under an abuse of discretion standard. See
Barbour, 48 F.3d at 1277-78. A "district court has wide
discretion to award equitable relief." Id. at 1278. "The
district court should fashion this relief so as to provide a
victim of employment discrimination the most complete make-
whole relief possible." Id. In reviewing for an abuse of
discretion, the Court considers "whether the decision maker
failed to consider a relevant factor, whether [the decision
maker] relied on an improper factor, and whether the reasons
given reasonably support the conclusion." Id. (citation omit-
ted). With this standard of review in mind, we consider each
of the challenged awards in turn: compensatory damages;
back pay; and future lost earnings or "front pay."

A. Compensatory Damages

GPO argues that the denial of the motion for new trial, or
remittitur, and the award of $300,000 in compensatory dam-
ages is an abuse of discretion in that a "$300,000 compensato-
ry damages award is grossly excessive given the record in
this case." Appellant relies on Nyman v. FDIC, 967 F. Supp.
at 1570-73, for the standards that should govern remittitur in
a Title VII case. In Nyman, the district court held that the
"maximum amount recoverable under the applicable cap ...
should be reserved for the most egregious cases of unlawful
conduct." 967 F. Supp. at 1572. There the district court
ordered remittitur of a $350,000 compensatory damages ver-
dict to $175,000. Id. at 1567. Appellant essentially argues
that the harm to Peyton was not serious enough to warrant
the maximum penalty under the law, particularly when com-
pared to other Title VII cases. Further, according to GPO,
appellee's approach would have us consider the "quality of the

'unlawful conduct' at issue," rather than the nature of the
harm suffered, conflating compensatory damages with puni-
tive damages-damages which are foreclosed to the plaintiff as
the defendant is a government entity. See 42 U.S.C.
s 1981a(b)(1). As to the critical inquiry of harm to the
victim, appellant contends there "simply was no significant
evidence of any prolonged, serious, or substantial harm to
appellee stemming from GPO's actions."

At the outset, we address appellant's suggestion that Pey-
ton failed to carry her burden in proving damages. Although
compensatory damages must be proven and cannot be pre-
sumed, see Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 263-64 (1978),
there has been no such presumption here. The district court
found that the jury could reasonably view this case as the
type of egregious, unlawful conduct that Title VII was de-
signed to remedy: Peyton had worked her way up the ladder
at GPO, won a desirable apprenticeship, was harassed by a
superior in the final months, was threatened, intimidated,
physically assaulted, suffered retaliation for attempting to
exercise her rights under Title VII, and was ultimately fired
for exercising her rights. The evidence supports the district
court's finding that she became depressed, angry, and suf-
fered a loss of self-esteem. She was injured.

Thus, the only question remaining is whether it was an
abuse of discretion by the district court to award the statuto-
ry maximum, $300,000 in compensatory damages, when the
jury had awarded $482,000. Of course, the district court is in
the best position to determine damages, as it heard all of the
evidence and saw all of the witnesses. This Court will only
require remittitur when (1) the verdict is beyond all reason,
so as to shock the conscience, or (2) the verdict is so inordi-
nately large as to obviously exceed the maximum limit of a
reasonable range within which the jury may properly operate.
See Jeffries v. Potomac Dev. Corp., 822 F.2d 87, 96 (D.C. Cir.
1987); Williams v. Steuart Motor Co., 494 F.2d 1074, 1085
(D.C. Cir. 1974). The district court did not abuse its discre-
tion in determining that neither test required remittitur here.

 Appellant does not contend that an award of $300,000
"shocks the conscience" in the abstract, but rather argues,
relying on the district court's opinion in Nyman, that 42
U.S.C. s 1981a(b) in essence requires a sliding scale. Thus,
only the "most egregious cases of unlawful conduct" are
entitled to the statutory maximum of $300,000, and this case
is not so egregious. First, we reject the argument that
s 1981a(b) itself ever requires a reduction below the $300,000
cap. By its plain language, 1981a(b)(3) does nothing other
than provide a cap. Nothing in the language of that section
evidences a congressional intent to specifically empower, let
alone require, a trial or appellate court to reduce a verdict in
excess of $300,000 to some lesser figure. Although appellant
offers a plethora of cases in which smaller damage figures
have been awarded, and in which remittiturs to amounts
below $300,000 have been ordered, appellant provides no
authority for the proposition that cases involving some per-
ceived or even evident degree of injury less than the most
egregious must inherently be awarded some figure lower than
the cap. It may well be that in the most egregious conceiva-
ble case a jury might award, for example, $300,000,000, which
would be reduced to $300,000. The fact that some other
hypothetical case might be only half as egregious (assuming
such comparisons can be made) would not require either the
trial or appellate court to reduce the award in that hypotheti-
cal case from $150,000,000 to $150,000.

Rather, the proper approach is to determine whether the
judgment awarded, regardless of whether it is the statutory
maximum, is supported by evidence, and does not shock the
conscience, or is not inordinately large so as to be obviously
unreasonable. Cf. Smith v. Northwest Financial Acceptance,
Inc., 129 F.3d 1408, 1416 (10th Cir. 1997). The cases that
appellant offers for purposes of comparison in which lesser
damages were awarded or approved do not convince us to the
contrary. In rejecting that line of argument, we find useful
the reasoning of a state court considering a similar question
in a different context.

 The appellant argues that a comparison of this award to
other awards for similar injuries would show that this
award is excessive. We stated in Fitzsimonds v. Cogs-
well, ... that "We are sure counsel realizes that there is
no way of obtaining uniformity in the amount juries and
trial judges may award for damages in personal-injury
cases." Because of the unique circumstances of each
case as well as the adjustments which would necessarily
have to be made for inflation, it is awkward to discuss the
size of an award through comparison with past decisions.

Mariner v. Marsden, 610 P.2d 6, 16 (Wyo. 1980). Just so
here.

All, then, that is left is to assess whether the district court
abused its discretion in granting a damage award of $300,000,
which is $182,000 less than the jury would have awarded. It
is rarely appropriate for an appellate court to reduce the trial
court's determination as to the proper amount of damages.
Thus, in reviewing a damage award, we consider whether it
would be "a denial of justice to permit it to stand." Grunen-
thal v. Long Island R. Co., 393 U.S. 156, 159 (1968) (quoting
Dagnello v. Long Island R. Co., 289 F.2d 797, 806 (2d Cir.
1961)). Given the district court's findings of fact, which are
unchallenged, we cannot say that the court abused its discre-
tion. The court found that "Ms. Peyton presented convincing
and credible evidence proving that her co-workers' and super-
visors' conduct had a material effect upon her ability to
perform and upon her quality of life in the workplace."
(emphasis added). The plaintiff convinced the jury, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that she had been the victim
of retaliation, that she was distressed and that she was fearful
about her work environment. Indeed, appellant concedes
that Peyton reported "feelings of depression and sadness
typical of plaintiffs in Title VII cases." Moreover, to the
extent that the egregiousness of GPO's conduct was consid-
ered, it was merely as a proxy to assess the distress inflicted
upon Peyton. Although we might have decided this issue
differently were it before us de novo, because we cannot say
that the district court abused its discretion, we affirm the

denial of the Rule 59(a) and (e) motion, and thus allow the
compensatory damage award to stand.

B. Back Pay

Appellant objects to the award of back pay for the August-
October 1998 period, during which, it contends, Peyton failed
to adequately mitigate her damages. It is not entirely clear
that GPO properly preserved this issue for appeal. However,
even assuming that appellant did, we find that the district
court did not abuse its discretion. The employer has the
burden of proving failure to mitigate. See, e.g., Fleming v.
County of Kane, 898 F.2d 553, 560 (7th Cir. 1990). GPO
claims that Peyton was enrolled in school during the August-
October 1998 period and did not demonstrate that she was
actively seeking work. Relying on Dailey v. Societe Gene-
rale, 108 F.3d 451, 455-58 (2d Cir. 1997), appellant contends
that Peyton's school attendance shows that she failed to
"demonstrate at least a modicum of due diligence in pursuing
full-time employment." Dailey, however, provides little sup-
port. There the Second Circuit rejected a per se rule that
full-time school attendance was incompatible with the duty to
mitigate, and rejected the defendant's claim that the plaintiff
had failed to mitigate. See id. In any event, here GPO has
failed to prove that Peyton was attending school full time,
much less that she made inadequate efforts to seek employ-
ment. As the appellant has not shown that Peyton withdrew
from the market and was not ready, willing, and able to
accept other employment, we cannot say that the district
court abused its discretion in granting back pay for the
August-October 1998 period.

C. Future Lost Earnings ("Front Pay")

Although appellee argues that the front pay issue was not
properly preserved for appeal, we agree with appellant that it
was. It is clear from the district court's Memorandum Opin-
ion filed May 24, 2000, that appellant had raised the issue of
the amount of front pay to the district court: "[T]he defen-
dant asserts ... that any front pay award in excess of a few

years is unduly speculative." Thus, the question is whether
the award of $377,615.72 in future lost earnings was an abuse
of discretion. We determine that it was.

In Barbour v. Merrill, 48 F.3d 1270 (D.C. Cir. 1995), cert.
dismissed, 516 U.S. 1155 (1996), we articulated factors to be
considered in calculating front pay. Certain considerations
"including whether an award of front pay would be 'unduly
speculative,' may in some circumstances limit the court's
discretion." Id. at 1280. "The longer a proposed front pay
period, the more speculative the damages become."
McKnight v. GM, 973 F.2d 1366, 1372 (7th Cir. 1992). Here
the award of 26 years of front pay was unduly speculative and
therefore an abuse of discretion. Contrary to the district
court's understanding, Barbour does not hold that a plaintiff's
intention to remain at her employer until retirement, even if
that intention is entirely reasonable, automatically entitles
front pay for the remainder of her work life. Rather, Barb-
our includes a list of non-exhaustive factors to consider,
including age. See Barbour, 48 F.3d at 1280. Indeed, Barb-
our specifically suggests that the district court consider the
length of time employees in similar positions stay at the
defendant employer as well as at other employers, the time
required to secure similar employment, and other factors.
Id. Moreover, on remand, the district court in Barbour only
awarded one year of front pay, which was affirmed by this
Court. See Barbour v. Merrill, 132 F.3d 1480 (D.C. Cir.
1997) (Table). Neither the district court nor appellee cites
any case which suggests that an employee's subjective intent
to remain at a job until retirement, by itself, justifies an
award of front pay for the rest of her career.

While some speculation is necessary to determine front
pay, here the appellee produced no expert testimony concern-
ing her earning potential, nor did the district court examine
what positions were available in the private sector comparable
to a journeyman proofreader position at GPO. "The plaintiff
bears the initial burden of providing the district court 'with
the essential data necessary to calculate a reasonably certain
front pay award.' " Barbour, 48 F.3d at 1279 (quoting
McKnight, 973 F.2d at 1372). However, here the district

court simply calculated the difference between pay at Bowne
and GPO, and assumed that appellee would have stayed at
Bowne for the rest of her career. In fact, Peyton had only
been working at Bowne a little over a month when the trial
began. Further, the district court took "judicial notice that
Ms. Peyton can expect to receive regular and incremental
increases in compensation as an employee of Bowne, Inc., as
she would have as an employee of the GPO." But the
evidence does not reflect how such increases would compare
between the public and private sectors. Moreover, there is
no evidence in the record that salaries at Bowne represent a
"fair sample of the market" or the industry standard in the
private sector. Nor does evidence in the record support the
finding that the GPO proofreading job provided Peyton an
"optimum and unparalleled occasion to earn a handsome
living." Appellee's assertion that the GPO position "was an
unusually high paying job" is also without basis. Indeed,
none of the citations to the Joint Appendix in her brief
support appellee's claim that her witnesses "testified about
the uncommonly high compensation for the GPO position."
Finally, appellee does not substantiate her claim that she is
not generally able to "pursue jobs in the future that will be
essentially comparable to the job she lost." In sum, we
cannot uphold the determination of front pay.

The Ninth Circuit's decision in Gotthardt v. National RR
Passenger Corp., 191 F.3d 1148 (9th Cir. 1999), does not alter
our analysis. That case involved a 59 year-old employee
approaching retirement who had been truly incapacitated by
the employer's wrongful conduct and could not enter another
career. See id. at 1156. Given those circumstances, the
Ninth Circuit upheld a front pay award that compensated
future lost earnings through the mandatory retirement age of
70: "Although an eleven-year front pay award seems gener-
ous, the district court explicitly found that Gotthardt would be
unable to work in the future, taking into account her age (59),
her educational and vocational background, and, especially,
her health." Id. at 1157. The Gotthardt court noted that
these were unique circumstances, because "front pay is in-
tended to be temporary in nature." Id. (quoting Cassino v.

Reichhold Chemicals, Inc., 817 F.2d 1338, 1347 (9th Cir.
1987)). Similarly, in Davis v. Combustion Engineering, Inc.,
742 F.2d 916, 923 (6th Cir. 1984), the Sixth Circuit upheld an
award of front pay to a 59 year-old plaintiff but noted that
front pay for a 41 year-old plaintiff until retirement age might
be unwarranted. Indeed, "[o]ther courts seem to agree that
plaintiffs in their forties are too young for lifetime front pay
awards." Stafford v. Electronic Data Systems Corp., 749
F. Supp. 781, 789 (E.D. Mich. 1990) (citing Bailey v. Contain-
er Corporation of America, 660 F. Supp. 1048 (S.D. Ohio
1986); Foit v. Suburban Bancorp, 549 F. Supp. 264, 267 (D.
Md. 1982); Monroe v. Penn-Dixie Cement Corp., 335
F. Supp. 231, 235 (N.D. Ga. 1971)).

To award Peyton front pay based on the assumption that
she will continue in an allegedly low-paying job (compared to
a journeyman proofreader at GPO) for a full career, when she
is only 34 years old and not incapacitated, is to give her a
tremendous windfall rather than to make her whole. There
is no reason to assume that if she is, in fact, qualified for a
high-paying job at GPO, she will not be able to find a high-
paying job in the future. Perhaps she will not. Perhaps
private printers systemically pay less for the work she was
training to do. However, the district court cannot make this
determination solely on the basis of appellee's one month of
experience at a private employer that may, or may not, be
representative of the private sector, doing work that may, or
may not, be comparable to the work of a journeyman proof-
reader at GPO. The record does not support such a specula-
tive conclusion. Accordingly, we vacate the district court's
award of $377,615.72 in future lost earnings, and remand for
proceedings consistent with this opinion.

III. Conclusion

The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying
the Rule 59(a) and (e) motion for a new trial, or in the
alternative, remittitur. Therefore we affirm the award of
$300,000 in compensatory damages. Nor did the district
court abuse its discretion in awarding $78,476.90 as back pay.

However, because the award of $377,615.72 in future lost
earnings was based on undue speculation, it was an abuse of
discretion, requiring reversal. We vacate the district court's
award of front pay and remand for proceedings consistent
with this opinion.