Peyton v. Com.

Present: Hassell, C.J., Lacy, Keenan, Koontz, Lemons, and Agee,
JJ., and Carrico, S.J.

TYRONE ORLANDO PEYTON
OPINION BY
v. Record No. 032464 JUSTICE LAWRENCE L. KOONTZ, JR.
November 5, 2004
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA

FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA

In this appeal, we consider whether the Court of Appeals of

Virginia erred in determining that a trial court did not abuse

its discretion in revoking the suspended sentence of a defendant

who had been placed in an alternative sentencing program

pursuant to Code § 19.2-316.2, but was unable to complete the

program due to an unforeseen medical condition.

BACKGROUND

The material facts are not in dispute. On April 3, 2001,

Tyrone Orlando Peyton was convicted of possession of cocaine

with intent to distribute in violation of Code § 18.2-248 in the

Circuit Court of Henrico County (the trial court). On July 12,

2001, the trial court sentenced Peyton to ten years in prison

and suspended seven years of that sentence. The trial court

further ordered that the Department of Corrections (the

Department) evaluate Peyton to determine his suitability for

participation in the Detention Center Incarceration Program

pursuant to Code § 19.2-316.2. Upon the favorable

recommendation of the Department and the determination by the
trial court that Peyton would benefit from the program, the

trial court suspended the balance of Peyton’s sentence and

placed him on probation conditioned upon his entry into and

successful completion of the program. On October 1, 2001, he

was transferred from local confinement to a designated

residential detention center maintained by the Department.

On January 11, 2002, Peyton began vomiting blood while at

the detention center and was taken to the hospital. At that

time, approximately one month remained for Peyton to complete

the requirements of the program. When Peyton returned from the

hospital, he continued to have abdominal pain. Peyton was

removed from the program by the Department on January 15, 2002

for “medical/psychological reasons.”

The trial court subsequently held a show cause hearing on

February 7, 2002 and determined that Peyton had violated the

terms and conditions of his suspended sentence by not completing

the program. Although the trial judge acknowledged that he did

not question the “sincerity” of Peyton’s desire to complete the

program, he stated that “I don’t think there’s anything I can

do” because the alternative sentencing program “didn’t work

out.” By order entered on February 11, 2002, the trial court

revoked the suspended sentence and imposed the original three

year active sentence, crediting Peyton with time served. By

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order entered on February 27, 2002, the trial court denied

Peyton’s motion to reconsider.

Peyton timely filed a petition for appeal in the Court of

Appeals in which he contended that the trial court abused its

discretion in revoking his suspended sentence because his

discharge from the detention center was not due to his willful

conduct or behavior. The Court of Appeals granted Peyton an

appeal.

In a decision by a divided three-judge panel, the Court of

Appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court. Peyton v.

Commonwealth, 41 Va. App. 356, 362, 585 S.E.2d 345, 348 (2003).

Initially, the majority of the panel noted that trial courts are

granted broad discretion by Code § 19.2-306 to revoke suspended

sentences and probation. It then further noted that, with

respect to the detention center program, Code § 19.2-316.2(A)(2)

requires a prospective participant to meet certain physical and

emotional requirements as a condition for acceptance and

participation in the program and that Code § 19.2-316.2(A)(4)

permits the trial judge to revoke all or part of a suspended

sentence upon a finding that a defendant has been removed from a

detention center program by the Department for “intractable

behavior” as such is defined in Code § 19.2-316.1. Id. at 358-

60, 585 S.E.2d at 346-47. Reasoning that the record supported

the conclusion that Peyton no longer met the physical and/or

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emotional requirements for participation in the detention center

program and, thus “did not have the ability to conform his

behavior to that necessary to complete the program,” the

majority of the panel held that the trial court did not abuse

its discretion when it revoked Peyton’s suspended sentence. Id.

at 361, 585 S.E.2d at 347.

The dissenting judge initially noted that while broad, the

power of a trial court to revoke a suspended sentence is not

unlimited because “[b]y well established rules of decision the

cause deemed by the court to be sufficient for revoking a

suspension must be a reasonable cause.” Id. at 362, 585 S.E.2d

at 348 (Benton, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks

omitted). Reasoning that Peyton’s failure to complete the

detention program resulted from a medical inability to continue

in the program rather than from an unwillingness or refusal to

do so, the dissenting judge concluded that Peyton’s illness was

not a reasonable cause for revocation and, thus, the trial court

abused its discretion in revoking Peyton’s suspended sentence.

Id. at 364, 585 S.E.2d at 349.

We awarded Peyton an appeal from the judgment of the Court

of Appeals.

DISCUSSION

Before considering the specific statutes applicable to the

facts of the present case, we briefly review the general

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statutory scheme relating to the suspension of sentence,

probation, and revocation that operates in conjunction with

those statutes. In essence, Code § 19.2-303 permits the trial

court, after conviction, to suspend all or part of a sentence

and to place the defendant on probation “under such conditions

as the court shall determine.” Code § 19.2-306 addresses the

trial court’s authority to respond to a violation of those

conditions by the defendant and permits it to revoke the

suspended sentence “for any cause the court deems sufficient”

that occurs within the probation period, within the period of

suspension, or, if neither is fixed, within the maximum period

for which the defendant might originally have been sentenced to

be imprisoned.

Statutes that permit the trial court to impose alternatives

to incarceration, such as probation or conditionally suspended

sentences, are highly remedial and should be liberally construed

to provide trial courts valuable tools for rehabilitation of

criminals. See, e.g., Grant v. Commonwealth, 223 Va. 680, 684,

292 S.E.2d 348, 350 (1982); Dyke v. Commonwealth, 193 Va. 478,

484, 69 S.E.2d 483, 486 (1952). Accordingly, we have held

consistently that “revocation of a suspended sentence lies in

the discretion of the trial court and that this discretion is

quite broad.” Hamilton v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 325, 326, 228

S.E.2d 555, 556 (1976). Nonetheless, we have required that

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“[t]he cause deemed by the court to be sufficient for revoking a

suspension must be a reasonable cause. . . . The discretion

required is a judicial discretion, the exercise of which

‘implies conscientious judgment, not arbitrary action.’ ”

Marshall v. Commonwealth, 202 Va. 217, 220, 116 S.E.2d 270, 273

(1960) (quoting Slayton v. Commonwealth, 185 Va. 357, 367, 38

S.E.2d 479, 484 (1946)); see also Hamilton, 217 Va. at 327, 228

S.E.2d at 556; Griffin v. Cunningham, 205 Va. 349, 354, 136

S.E.2d 840, 844 (1964).

Consistent with the above described statutory scheme, the

General Assembly has enacted additional statutes providing

alternative sentencing sanctions to the trial courts in the form

of a state-wide community based system of programs established

and maintained by the Department. Code § 53.1-67.3. One such

program consists of residential detention centers designed “to

provide a highly structured, short-term period of incarceration

for individuals committed to the Department under the provisions

of § 19.2-316.2. The program shall include components for

military-style management and supervision, physical labor in

organized public works projects, counseling, remedial education,

substance abuse testing and treatment, and community re-entry

services.” Code § 53.1-67.8.

As pertinent to the present case, before a defendant who

otherwise would have been sentenced to incarceration for a

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nonviolent felony, such as the felony for which Peyton was

convicted, can be accepted into the Detention Center

Incarceration Program, Code § 19.2-316.2(A)(1) requires that he

undergo “evaluation and diagnosis by the Department to determine

suitability for participation in the Detention Center

Incarceration Program. The evaluation and diagnosis shall

include a complete physical and mental evaluation of the

defendant.” The statute further provides that upon receipt of a

favorable recommendation by the Department and a determination

by the trial court that the defendant will benefit from the

program and “is capable of returning to society as a productive

citizen,” the court “shall impose sentence, suspend the

sentence, and place the defendant on probation . . . . Such

probation shall be conditioned upon the defendant’s entry into

and successful completion of the Detention Center Incarceration

Program.” Code § 19.2-316.2(A)(3).

Consistent with the authority granted to the trial court

under Code § 19.2-306 to respond to a violation of the

conditions of a suspended sentence by the defendant, Code

§ 19.2-316.2(A)(4) provides that:

Upon the defendant’s (i) voluntary withdrawal
from the program, (ii) removal from the program by the
Department for intractable behavior as defined in
§ 19.2-316.1, or (iii) failure to comply with the
terms and conditions of probation, the court shall
cause the defendant to show cause why his probation
and suspension of sentence should not be revoked.

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 Upon a finding that the defendant voluntarily withdrew
from the program, was removed from the program by the
Department for intractable behavior, or failed to
comply with the terms and conditions of probation, the
court may revoke all or part of the probation and
suspended sentence and commit the defendant as
otherwise provided in this chapter.

The Commonwealth does not contend, nor does the record

support, that Peyton voluntarily withdrew from the detention

center program. The Department, however, is permitted to remove

a defendant from this program for intractable behavior. In

pertinent part, Code § 19.2-316.1 defines “intractable behavior”

to mean “that behavior which, in the determination of the

Department of Corrections, . . . indicates an inmate’s

unwillingness or inability to conform his behavior to that

necessary to his successful completion of the program.” By

reference, this definition is incorporated into the provisions

of Code § 19.2-316.2(4). Stressing the term “inability,” the

Commonwealth contends that this definition of intractable

behavior does not require a finding of willfulness. Rather,

because the detention center program requires a defendant to

meet certain physical and mental requirements for acceptance

into the program, the Commonwealth contends that a defendant “is

expected to maintain that physical and emotional suitability for

the duration of the program.” Because the Department removed

Peyton from the program upon its determination that for

“medical/psychological reasons” he was unable to conform his

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behavior to that necessary for the successful completion of the

program, the Commonwealth maintains that the trial court had the

authority to revoke his suspended sentence, and the Court of

Appeals properly affirmed the trial court’s judgment to do so.

We do not disagree with the Commonwealth’s basic premise

that a defendant, such as Peyton, who receives the benefit of

having his sentence suspended and being placed on probation

conditioned upon entering and completing an alternative

sentencing program, such as a detention center program, has a

responsibility to comply with the terms and conditions of his

suspended sentence. Moreover, we agree with the Court of

Appeals’ conclusion that neither the Department nor the trial

court was required to continue Peyton in the detention center

program when Peyton at no fault of his own was no longer

physically, or mentally, suited for the program. Peyton, 41 Va.

App. at 360, 585 S.E.2d at 347. However, Peyton’s removal from

the program under such circumstances does not resolve the

question whether the trial court abused its discretion by

revoking Peyton’s suspended sentence without considering

reasonable alternatives to imprisonment.

There is surely a distinction between the willful failure

of an inmate to comply with the requirements of the detention

center program and the conditions of his suspended sentence

permitting his participation in that program and the subsequent

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inability of the inmate to do so resulting from an unforeseen

medical condition. While in either case the inmate necessarily

will be subjected to a show cause hearing at which the trial

court has the discretion to revoke all or part of the inmate’s

suspended sentence, the proper exercise of that discretion in

the latter case requires the trial court to consider all the

circumstances, including recognition that the inmate’s removal

from the program was not the result of the inmate’s behavior or

conduct.

Here, the record shows that the trial court either merely

considered Peyton’s medical condition as satisfying the

definition of intractable behavior or presumed that it had no

option but to revoke Peyton’s suspended sentence because the

detention program “didn’t work out.” Clearly, however, the

trial court revoked Peyton’s suspended sentence without

considering reasonable alternatives to imprisonment even while

expressly finding that Peyton’s failure to complete the program

was caused by his medical condition and was contrary to his

desire to continue in the program. Under those circumstances,

the trial court’s action was an abuse of discretion.

CONCLUSION

For these reasons, we hold that the Court of Appeals erred

in affirming the judgment of the trial court. We will reverse

the judgment of the Court of Appeals, and we will remand the

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case to that Court with direction to remand the case to the

trial court for further proceedings consistent with the view

expressed in this opinion.

Reversed and remanded.

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