Pierce v. Pierce

No. 81-156

I N THE SUPREME COURT O F THE STATE O MONTANA
F

1981

I N RE THE MARRIAGE O F

P G Y ANN PIERCE,
E G

P e t i t i o n e r and Respondent,

-vs-

JAMES RAY PIERCE,

Respondent and A p p e l l a n t .

Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e F i r s t J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t ,
I n and f o r t h e County o f L e w i s & C l a r k , The
Honorable P e t e r G. Meloy, J u d g e p r e s i d i n g .

Counsel o f Record:

For A p p e l l a n t :

Gregory A. J a c k s o n , H e l e n a , Montana

For Respondent :

Leo J. G a l l a g h e r , Helena, Montana
J o a n Uda, Helena, Montana

S u b m i t t e d on B r i e f s : O c t o b e r 30, 1981

Decided: May 201 1982

Filed : MAY 2 0 1982 '
Mr. Justice J o h n Conway H a r r i s o n delivered the Opinion of
the Court.

James Ray P i e r c e a p p e a l s t h e j u d g m e n t e n t e r e d i n t h e

District Court of the First Judicial District, County of

L e w i s and C l a r k , St-ate of Montana, dissolving the marriage

of the appellant., establishing child custody and child

s u p p o r t a n d a w a r d i n g m a i n t e n a n c e f o r two c h i l d r e n .

T h i s C o u r t on December 8 , 1981, a f t . e r examining t h e

r e c o r d o n a p p e a l , n o t e d t h a t t h e a p p e a l was p r e m a t u r e u n d e r

Rule 5 4 ( b ) , M.K.Civ.P., and ret-urned t h e case t o t h e D i s -

t.rict C o u r t pending f i n a l judgment. Pursuant to o u r o r d e r ,

the Dist-rict Court made a Rule 54(b) certification on

December 2 3 , 1 9 8 1 , and r e t u r n e d t h e c a s e t o t h i s C o u r t f o r

f i n a l d e t e r m i n a t i o n on a p p e a l .

The a p p e l l a n t s e t s f o r t h i n h i s b r i e f two i s s u e s f o r

c o n s i d e r a t - i o n by t h i s C o u r t . W f e e l t h e proper i s s u e is a
e

combination of those posed by appellant and can be sum-

marized as w h e t h e r a s t e p f a t h e r o r f o r m e r s t e p f a t h e r , who

h a s n o b i o l o g i c a l r e l a t - i o n s h i p t o a m i n o r c h i l d and who h a s

not l e g a l l y adopted the child under the proceedings estab-

lished i n Montana's Uniform A d o p t i o n Act or a n y c o m p a r a b l e

procedures, has any standing to contest the custody of a

c h i l d i n d i s p u t e w i t h t h e c h i l d ' s b i o l o g i c a l mother.

Respondent, the mother, gave birth to a child,

C h r i s t o p h e r Wade T i c h n o r , o n J u n e 2 6 , 1977. At the t i m e of

Christopher's birth, the respondent was unmarried. She

t e s t i f i e d t h a t s h e knew t h e name o f t h e n a t u r a l f a t h e r , b u t

t h a t i t was n o t p u t on t h e b i r t h c e r t i f i c a t e , w h i c h w a s l e f t

blank. She t e s t i f i e d further that she told the doctor to

leave the bottom of the birth certificate blank so that.,

"when I want Christopher to be adopt-ed, then instead of
 ,
g o i n g t h r o u g h a n y -- t h a t w e l u s t y e t t h i s p a p e r and
h a v e it s i g n e d and n o t a r i z e d . "

Between four and six months after Christopher was

born, the respondent and the appellant, who had been

a c q u a i n t e d f o r some t i m e , b e g a n d a t i n g and s o o n c o n t e m p l a t e d

marrying. They were m a r r i e d on F e b r u a r y 2 0 , 1978, a t which

t i m e C h r i s t o p h e r was a b o u t e i g h t m o n t h s o l d . Both p a r t i e s

testified that before their marriage they discussed what

r e l a t i o n s h i p t h e c h i l d would have to the appellant, James

Ray Pierce. They both testified that they agreed and

Intended a t that time that the r e l a t i o n s h i p of p a r e n t and

c h i l d would be e s t a b l i s h e d b e t w e e n a p p e l l a n t and t h e c h i l d ,

u l t i m a t e l y through adoption, t h a t t h e c h i l d would b e a r the

P i e r c e name from and a f t e r t h e t i m e o f t h e marriage of the

parties, and t h a t , in turn, t h e a p p e l l a n t would assume t h e

r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of a f a t h e r of t h e c h i l d .

Following the marriage of the parties, the child

lived with and was supported by both parties. Appellant

assumed the role of a father during that period of time.

D u r i n g t h e m a r r i a g e t h e p a r t i e s a l s o d i s c u s s e d consummating

a formal adoption of the child by the appellant. They

t e s t i f i e d t h a t because of their limited financial resources

t h e y s o u g h t t o a c c o m p l i s h t h e a d o p t i o n b y t h e most e x p e d i -

tious, inexpensive means. Appellant testified that he

c o n t a c t e d a n a t t o r n e y a t t h e Montana S t a t e Highway D e p a r t -

ment, where he worked. Appellant told the attorney t h a t he

was t h e n a t u r a l f a t h e r o f t h e c h i l d and a s k e d how h e c o u l d

g e t h i s name p l a c e d on t h e b i r t h c e r t i f i c a t e a s t h e f a t h e r .

A s a r e s u l t o f a d v i c e g i v e n a p p e l l a n t by t h i s a t t o r n e y , b o t h

p a r t i e s e x e c u t e d a n a f f i d a v i t s t a t i n g t h a t t h e a p p e l l a n t was
the n a t u r a l f a t h e r of the child. T h i s a f f i d a v i t was n o t a -

r i z e d and e x e c u t e d b y b o t h p a r t i e s w i t h t h e s p e c i f i c i n t e n -

t i o n t h a t i t w a s a c c o m p l i s h i n g an "economic a d o p t i o n . " For

unknown reasons, the affidavit was never filed with the

Bureau o f V i t a l S t a t i s t i c s .

The p a r t i e s n e v e r b e g a n a f o r m a l a d o p t i o n u n d e r t h e

procedure set f o r t h i n Montana's Uniform A d o p t i o n A c t , and

on J a n u a r y 21, 1981, the marriage of t h e p a r t i e s was d i s -

solved. Thus, a t t h a t time, n o t even t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p of a

stepparent-stepchild existed between the appellant and

C h r i s t o p h e r Wade.

Appellant argues there was sufficient unimpeached

testimony introduced at the trial that an o r a l v a l i d con-

t r a c t t o a d o p t e x i s t e d w h i c h was e n f o r c e d and f u l l y e x e c u t e d

by b o t h p a r t i e s t h e r e b y c r e a t i n g t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p o f child

and parent between appellant and Christopher Wade Pierce.

Appellant contends that s u c h c o n t r a c t s h o u l d be e n f o r c e d by

the court, or, in the alternative, that the court should

f i n d t h a t an e q u i t a b l e a d o p t i o n e x i s t e d .

A p p e l l a n t c i t e s and r e l i e s o n a s a u t h o r i t y a Montana

case, I n Re Clark's Estate (1937), 1 0 5 Mont. 401, 74 P.2d

401, f o r t h e p r o p o s i t i o n t h a t t h e r e can b e a v a l l d e q u i t a b l e

a d o p t i o n or e n f o r c e m e n t o f a c o n t r a c t t o a d o p t i n t h e S t a t e

of Montana. H e b a s e s h i s e n t i r e case o n t h e "contract to

adopt" as a type of equitable adoption, or a n a d o p t i o n b y
estoppel. As will be noted further, however, the law o f

Montana and o t h e r j u r i s d i c t i o n s i s c l e a r t h a t s u c h t h e o r i e s

have no a p p l i c a t i o n t o a proceeding, such as t h i s , where a

s t e p f a t h e r is seeking t o e s t a b l i s h custodial r i g h t s in his

former s t e p c h i l d a g a i n s t t h e wishes of t h e c h i l d ' s mother.
 I n He C l a r k ' s E s t a t e , s u p r a , c l e a r l y d o e s n o t s u p p o r t

a p p e l l a n t ' s case. There, t h e " c h i l d " i n q u e s t i o n claimed an

a d o p t i o n i n a n e f f o r t t o c u t down t h e i n h e r i t a n c e t a x by t h e

S t a t e o f Montana. The s t e p c h i l d a r g u e d t h a t s i n c e a n " e q u i -

t a b l e a d o p t i o n " had t a k e n p l a c e , he should be t r e a t e d as a

child of the decedent for estate tax purposes, thereby

reducing the estate tax l i a b i l i t y . This Court, i n disposing

of t h a t argument, h e l d t h a t a l t h o u g h Montana d o e s r e c o g n i z e

the doctrine of equitable adoption in estate cases, the

grant of relief i n e q u i t y does n o t u n d e r t a k e to change t h e

l e g a l s t a t u s of t h e s t e p c h i l d from a c o n t r a c t c l a i m a n t t o an

" h e i r " of the decedent. T h e r e f o r e , s i n c e t h e c h i l d had n o t

l e g a l l y been adopted, h e was n o t e n t i t l e d to t h e state in-

h e r i t a n c e t a x exemption a f forded t h e c h i l d of t h e deceased.

The appellant a l s o c i t e s and r e l i e s o n a number o f

o t h e r cases o u t s i d e t h i s j u r i s d i c t i o n . Young v . Young ( T e x .

1 9 7 6 ) , 545 S.W.2d 551; S a r g e a n t v. S a r g e a n t ( 1 9 7 2 ) , 88 Nev.

223, 495 P.2d 618; In the Matter of t h e E s t a t e of Lamfrom

(1962), 90 A r i z . 363, 368 P.2d 318; In Re Grace's Estate

(1949), 88. Cal.App.2d 956, 200 P.2d 189; Chavez v. Shea

( 1 9 7 4 ) , 185 Colo. 400, 525 P.2d 1 1 4 8 ; Bower v . Landa ( 1 9 6 2 ) ,

78 Nev. 246, 371 P.2d 657; J o n e s v. Loving (Okla. 1 9 6 1 ) , 363

P.2d 512; In the Matter of the E s t a t e s of Williams (1960),

1 0 Utah2d 83, 348 P.2d 683. A l l of t h e s e cases t a l k a b o u t

equitable adoption f o r intestacy purposes o n l y and do n o t

involve t r u e custody cases.

Appellant asserts that in recent years courts have

recognized e q u i t a b l e adoption o u t s i d e of i n t e s t a c y or o t h e r

death-related situations and cites Sargeant v. Sargeant,

supra, a s authoritative. I n examining t h e S a r g e a n t case, w e
n o t e t h a t f a c t . u a l l y i t h a s no a p p l i c a t i o n h e r e . There, the

child involved w a s not the biological o r natural child of

e i t h e r of the p a r t i e s . The c h i l d came i n t o t h e i r c a r e when

he w a s four, and t h e m a r r i a g e was d i s s o l v e d when t h e c h i l d

was f i f t e e n . W e n o t e t h a t b o t h i n S a r g e a n t and i n Young v .

Young, supra, divorcing women were seeking child support

f r o m h u s b a n d s who were not the biological fathers of the

children f o r whom s u p p o r t w a s sought. In both cases, t.he

court denied support. No c a s e s have been found, n o r were

a n y c i t e d , which a w a r d e d s u p p o r t . u n d e r t h o s e c i r c u m s t . a n c e s .

I n Montana t h e l a w i s c l e a r t h a t f o r a n a d o p t i o n t o
occur, the a d o p t i v e p a r e n t or p a r e n t s m u s t f o l l o w t h e re-

quired procedures provided in Mont-ana' s Uniform Adopt-ion

Act, T i t l e 40, C h a p t e r 8 , Montana Code A n n o t a t e d . T h i s was

set. c l e a r by a recent opinion of this Court, Matter of

Guardianship of Aschenbrenner ( 1979 ) , - Mont . -, 597

P.2d 1156, 36 S t . R e p . 1282, wherein t.his Court, in dealing

w i t h t h e t e r m i n a t i o n of parental right-s o r custodial r i g h t s

of the parents, set f0rt.h the correct. procedure t-o be

followed.

Aschenbrenner involved a pet-ition for guardianship

f i l e d by g r a n d p a r e n t s , i n t h e c o n t e s t of which t h e D i s t r i c t

Court terminated a mot.her1s p a r e n t a l r i g h t s by f i n d i n g h e r

u n f i t and t h e c h i l d r e n d e p e n d e n t and n e g l e c t - e d . This Court

held:

"The c o n f u s i o n i n t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t i s
understandable. We are able t o identify at
l e a s t f i v e d i s t i n c t s t a t u t o r y schemes govern-
ing t h e t e r m i n a t i o n of p a r e n t a l r i g h t s o r t h e
c u s t o d y o f c h i l d r e n or b o t h ... T i t l e 41,
C h a p t e r 3 , MCA ( a b u s e d , n e g l e c t e d and d e p e n -
dent youth); ... T i t l e 4 0 , C h a p t e r 4, MCA
( U n i f o r m M a r r i a g e and D i v o r c e A c t ) ;
s e c t i o n s 40-6-233,
. . .
and - 2 3 4 , MCA ( r e m e d y f o r
parental abuse); ... T i t l e 40, C h a p t e r 8 ,
 MCA [adoption s t a t u t e s ] ; . . . T i t l e 72,
C h a p t e r 5, P a r t 2 ( G u a r d i a n s h i p o f M i n o r s ) "
597 P.2d a t 1 1 6 4 .
.
In that opinion, we pointed out that although the

s u b j e c t matter of these f i v e d i s t i n c t procedures overlapped

t o some e x t - e n t , e a c h m u s t b e u s e d f o r t h e purpose intended

and t h e c o r r e c t and s p e c i f i c p r o c e d u r e m u s t b e " r i g o r o u s l y

followed" i n o r d e r f o r a v a l i d judgment o r o r d e r to i s s u e .

Ot.herwise, t h e c o u r t l a c k s j u r i s d i c t . i o n , and t.he judgment. o r

o r d e r is i n v a l i d . H e n d e r s o n v. Henderson ( 1 9 7 7 ) , 1 7 4 Mont.

1, 9, 568 P.2d 1 7 7 , 1 8 1 ; M a t t - e r o f t h e G u a r d i a n s h i p o f Doney

( 1 9 7 7 ) , 1 7 4 Mont. 282, 287, 570 P.2d 575, 578.

T h i s l i n e o f c a s e s makes i t v e r y c l e a r t h a t t h e c o r -

rect p r o c e d u r e s must. b e followed and followed rigorously.

There i s good c a u s e f o r t h o s e p r o c e d u r e s . It is w e l l s e t -

t l e d i n t.he l a w t h r o u g h o u t t h i s c o u n t r y , i n c l u d i n g Montana,

that the right of a parent t o custody of his child is a

fundamental const.itutiona1 right. Aschenbrenner, supra.

Therefore, t h e c o u r t m u s t s c r u t - i n i z e v e r y c l o s e l y a n y st.ate

action that i n t e r f e r e s with that right. This Court. made

c l e a r t h a t another purpose f o r r e q u i r i n g t h e c o r r e c t proce-

dures t.o be rigorously followed is to insure that the

children involved receive the f u l l prot-ection of the laws

designed t o p r o t e c t . them. See, In Re the Guardianship of

E v a n s ( 1 9 7 8 ) , 1 7 9 Mont. 438, 587 P.2d 372.

I n t h i s c a s e we a r e asked to permit a former step-

father t o g a i n c u s t o d y r i g h t s r e g a r d i n g h i s f o r m e r s t e p s o n .

No a d o p t I o n o c c u r r e d under Montana's Uniform Adoption A c t .

No p e t i t i o n f o r a d o p t i o n w a s e v e r f i l e d . I n f a c t , no f o r m a l

s t e p s w h a t s o e v e r were t a k e n t o e f f e c t u a t e a n a d o p t i o n u n d e r

our A c t . T h u s , t h e o n l y way a p p e l l a n t c o u l d o b t a i n s t a n d i n g
to r e q u e s t c u s t o d y o f t h i s minor c h i l d is i f the parental

r i g h t s o f t h e m o t h e r r e s p o n d e n t were t e r m i n a t e d .

Under Montana law it is clear that the only way

p a r e n t a l r i g h t s c a n be t e r m i n a t e d j u d i c i a l l y , absent consent

of the biological parent-s, is under Montana's statutes

governing c h i l d abuse, neglect. or dependency, under s e c t i o n

41-3-401 et seq., MCA. Henderson v. Henderson, supra;

G u a r d i a n s h i p of Doney, supra. Our s t a t u t e s make it very

c l e a r t h a t t h e c o u n t y a t t o r n e y i s t h e p e r s o n who must file

petitions alleging abuse, neglect or dependency. See ,

s e c t i o n 41-3-401(1), MCA. Under the Henderson, Doney and

Aschenbrenner t r i l o g y , t h a t i s t h e o n l y way a n o n p a r e n t c a n

s e e k c u s t o d y o f someone e l s e ' s c h i l d .

The attempted s h o r t c u t t i n g of a l l Montana statutory

and case law governing t h e legal relationships of parents

and c h i l d r e n t o e a c h o t h e r , b y u s i n g a n " e x e c u t o r y c o n t r a c t

a d o p t i o n " t h e o r y , c a n n o t be approved i n c u s t o d y c a s e s .

One p r o b l e m a r i s e s a s a r e s u l t o f o u r h o l d i n g which

was n o t r a i s e d a s a n i s s u e o n a p p e a l . The p a r t i e s a g r e e d i n

April 1981, i n a s t i p u l a t i o n f o r i n t e r i m c u s t o d y and p r o p -

e r t y determination, that the a p p e l l a n t would have certain

visitation privileges for both children. In addition,

appellant agreed t o pay $75 a month in s u p p o r t . money for

each child from A p r i l 1981 unt.il the matter was settled

f u l l y and f i n a l l y b y t h i s Court.. The r e s u l t o f t h e judgment.

of t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t and o u r a f f i r m a n c e o f t h e same i s t h e

holding that appellant, from the day of divorce, has no

standing whatsoever to contest. t h e custody of Christopher,

n o r h a s he any o b l i g a t i o n s t o t h a t c h i l d .

Therefore, the judgment of t-he District. Court is
affirmed except for s u p p o r t money for Christopher. These

i s s u e s a r e remanded t o t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t f o r d e t e r m i n a t i o n .

J u s t ice

W concur:
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PLd-fJ?i c e
Chief J u s t
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