Pineda v. City of Houston

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 01-20189

CLAUDIA NAVARRO PINEDA, Etc; ET AL,
Plaintiffs

CLAUDIA NAVARRO PINEDA, Individually, Representative of the Estate
of Pedro Oregon Navarro; ANA ISABEL LORES as next friend of Ashley,
minor daughter of Pedro Oregon Navarro; BLANCA LIDIA VIERA, as Next
friend of Belinda, minor Daughter of Pedro Oregon Navarro; SUSANA
OREGON NAVARRO,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,
versus

CITY OF HOUSTON; ET AL,
Defendants,

CITY OF HOUSTON
Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas

May 9, 2002

Before KING, Chief Judge, and GARWOOD and HIGGINBOTHAM, Circuit
Judges.

PATRICK E. HIGGINBOTHAM, Circuit Judge:

Houston police officers shot and killed Pedro Oregon Navarro

following an unconstitutional warrantless entry into his residence.

Members of his family filed this suit asserting a § 1983 claim

against the City of Houston, as well as supplemental state claims.

The district court granted summary judgment to the City on the §
1983 claim and dismissed the supplemental claims with prejudice.

This appeal followed. We affirm the grant of summary judgment as

to the § 1983 claim and modify the order dismissing the state

claims to provide that those claims are dismissed without

prejudice.

I

On July 11, 1998, Houston police officers and members of the

Southwest Gang Task Force Pete Herrada and J.R. Willis were

patrolling in southwest Houston when they stopped a car for a

traffic violation.1 This stop led to the arrest of the driver,

Ryan Baxter, who volunteered to give information about his drug

supplier, a person called Rogelio, in exchange for lenient

treatment. The two officers contacted the other members of the

SWGTF. Sergeant Darrell Strouse and officers David Perkins, Lamont

Tillery, and David Barrera, also members of the task force, joined

Herrada and Willis. Together they devised a plan for expanding the

catch.

By the initial plan Baxter was to meet Rogelio at a local

fast-food establishment, setting up a search of his car. It didn’t

work—Rogelio did not appear. Baxter paged Rogelio again, this time

confirming that Rogelio would be at his apartment and would make

the sale there. The officers went to the apartment, but no one was

1
The facts of this case are set out in more detail in our recent decision
in United States v. Strouse, No. 00-20558, 2002 WL 433160 (5th Cir. Mar. 20,
2002).

2
home. After waiting until 1:30 a.m. on July 12, the officers

returned to the apartment and, without obtaining a search warrant,

had Baxter knock on the door. When the door opened, Baxter dropped

to the ground and the GTF officers, waiting at the foot of the

stairs, rushed into the apartment. There were several people in

the apartment, and in the commotion one of the officers apparently

shot another in the back, followed by a fusillade from the officers

killing Pedro Oregon Navarro. A pistol found near Oregon’s body

was identified as belonging to Oregon.2

II

We review the district court’s grant of summary judgement de

novo.3

A

First, the rote. Section 1983 offers no respondeat superior

liability. Municipalities face § 1983 liability “when execution of

a government’s policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or

by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent

official policy, inflicts the injury....”4 Proof of municipal

2
The plaintiffs’ opening brief states that “[a] pistol was found near Mr.
Oregon’s body, identical to one Officer Tillery carried as his second, personal
gun.” Appellants’ Brief at 9. The City, however, notes that Rogelio Oregon
Navarro testified that the pistol belonged to his brother Pedro. R. at 2226.
See also Strouse, 2002 WL 433160 at *2 (noting that Oregon possessed a gun).
3
Starkman v. Evans, 198 F.3d 173, 174 (5th Cir. 1999).
4
Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Serv., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978).

3
liability sufficient to satisfy Monell requires: (1) an official

policy (or custom), of which (2) a policy maker can be charged with

actual or constructive knowledge, and (3) a constitutional

violation whose “moving force” is that policy (or custom).5

Early cases following Monell dealt with official policies or

acts by a governing body fairly attributable as the acts of the

local government itself.6 In those cases, “there was no question

but that the objectionable conduct was city policy.”7 Treating

claimed municipal liability in the absence of a “smoking gun” we

marked two paths of proof:

1. A policy statement, ordinance, regulation or decision
that is officially adopted and promulgated by the
municipality’s lawmaking officers or by an official to
whom the lawmakers have delegated policy-making
authority; or
2. A persistent, widespread practice of city officials or
employees which, although not authorized by officially
adopted and promulgated policy, is so common and well
settled as to constitute a custom that fairly represents
municipal policy. Actual or constructive knowledge of
such custom must be attributable to the governing body of
the municipality or to an official to whom that body had
delegated policy-making authority. Actions of officers
or employees of a municipality do not render the

5
Piotrowski v. City of Houston, 237 F.3d 567, 578 (5th Cir. 2001).
6
See Monell, 436 U.S. at 658 (discussing policy of New York City that
essentially forced pregnant employees to take leaves of absence without pay);
Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 633 (1980) (finding no immunity for
city where city council released to public allegedly false statement impugning
police chief’s honesty).
7
Bennett v. City of Slidell, 728 F.2d 762, 766 (5th Cir. 1984) (en banc).

4
 municipality liable under § 1983 unless they execute
official policy as above defined.8

The plaintiffs here claim two theories of liability: (1) an

unwritten municipal custom of warrantless searches of residences in

violation of the Fourth Amendment; and (2) inadequate training.

B

1

Turning to the claim that the SWGTF engaged in a pattern of

unconstitutional searches pursuant to a custom of the City, we note

first that one act is not itself a custom.9 There must be a

“persistent and widespread practice.”10

The effort to create a triable fact issue regarding custom was

creative and took the following form. From 5,000 offense reports

produced by the City in discovery, counsel selected approximately

500 involving narcotics. These were the predicate for opinion

evidence on custom by their expert witnesses. While the opinions

offered referred to a greater number of incidents, the district

court considered only those accompanied by offense reports in the

summary judgment record. The district court relied upon 11 of the

8
Webster v. City of Houston, 735 F.2d 838, 841 (5th Cir. 1984) (en banc);
see also Board of County Comm’rs of Bryan County v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 405-07
(1997).
9
Piotrowski, 237 F.3d at 581.
10
Id.

5
reports of a warrantless entry into residences by the SWGTF.11 The

plaintiffs urged that this evidence met their summary judgment

burden.

The district court was persuaded that these 11 (of 13)

incidents for which there were offense reports in the summary

judgment record were competent summary judgment evidence of a

pattern of unconstitutional searches—enough to defeat summary

judgment for want of proof of custom.12 We are not persuaded that

this proof creates a fact issue on the issue of a pattern of

conduct.

Eleven incidents each ultimately offering equivocal evidence

of compliance with the Fourth Amendment cannot support a pattern of

illegality in one of the Nation’s largest cities and police forces.

The extrapolation fails both because the inference of illegality is

truly uncompelling—giving presumptive weight as it does to the

absence of a warrant—and because the sample of alleged

11
The experts cited to more than the 13 incidents reported by the district
court in its table. The offense reports did not accompany the experts’ citation
to those incidents and the district court therefore did not consider incidents
beyond those 13. One expert cited 33 warrantless entries into residences and the
other cited 17 in their affidavits.
12
The 13 incidents were broken down as follows. In 5 incidents the
officers reported consent as the applicable exception to the warrant requirement.
The district court accepted these incidents as competent summary judgment
evidence of unconstitutional searches. In 7 incidents “exigent circumstances”
were cited. Three of these involved pursuit, three involved the smell of burning
drugs, and one the spotting of contraband in plain view by officers. The
district court accepted these incidents as well. In the last report, there was
no Fourth Amendment interest, as the arrestee was a trespasser. See Pineda v.
City of Houston, 124 F. Supp.2d 1057, 1070-77 (S.D. Tex. 2000). The district
court did not consider one of the “exigent circumstances” incidents, because it
occurred in March 1999, after the shooting at issue in this case.

6
unconstitutional events is just too small. Opinion evidence

resting heavily on this data added little if anything. Left

without legs, the opinions were little more than suspicion, albeit

by informed persons. The weakness in the approach is apparent in

its practical effects. It requires the City to defend “cases

within cases” from historical records to justify searches conduced

without a warrant. The burdens of proof on a contested warrantless

entry of a home have little to do with the use here of the City’s

records. The district court was wisely wary. Although the

district court went further than we think the record warrants its

decision on this point was a nigh arguendo ruling; allowing it to

move to an even weaker link in the proof.

2

Even if this proof was, contrary to our view, sufficient to

create a disputed issue of fact on custom, there remains the burden

of demonstrating actual or constructive knowledge of the policy-

making official for the municipality:13

13
The plaintiffs argue that there is no distinction between proof of a
pattern of unconstitutional conduct sufficient to constitute a customary policy
and proof of constructive knowledge of such a policy. The cases do not support
this argument. See, e.g., Bennett, 728 F.2d at 768; see also Piotrowski, 237
F.3d at 578-79 (noting that liability requires actual or constructive knowledge
on the part of municipal policymaker); Webster, 735 F.2d at 842 (“Actual or
constructive knowledge of [a] custom must be attributable to the governing body
of the municipality or to an official to whom that body has delegated policy-
making authority.”). A pattern may exist without actual or constructive
knowledge because the facts of the events are concealed from policymakers.
However, the sheer numerosity of incidents can provide evidence of constructive
knowledge. See note 15.

7
 Actual knowledge may be shown by such means as
discussions at council meetings or receipt of written
information. Constructive knowledge may be attributed to
the governing body on the ground that it would have known
of the violations if it had properly exercised its
responsibilities, as, for example, where the violations
were so persistent and widespread that they were the
subject of prolonged public discussion or of a high
degree of publicity.14

The plaintiffs do not allege that the policymakers for the City, the

Police Chief and his Assistant Chiefs, had actual knowledge of the

pattern of unconstitutional searches relied upon by the district

court. Instead they argue that the pattern of unconstitutional

searches by the SWGTF is sufficient to survive summary judgment

because it was widespread enough to impute constructive knowledge

to the policymakers.

We are not persuaded. First, the weakness in proof of any

pattern of illegalities aside, the plaintiffs provided no evidence

that the incidents were the “subject of prolonged public discussion

or of a high degree of publicity.”15 Rather they urge that any

municipality that collects numerous offense reports, a small

proportion of which include warrantless searches ostensibly, from

the investigating officer’s perspective, within an exception to the

14
Bennett, 728 F.2d at 768.

15
Id.; McConney v. City of Houston, 863 F.2d 1180, 1184 (5th Cir. 1989)
(“Sufficiently numerous prior incidents of police misconduct, for example, may
tend to prove a custom and accession to that custom by the municipality’s
policymakers. Isolated instances, on the other hand, are inadequate to prove
knowledge and acquiescence by policymakers.”) (emphasis added); Spell v.
McDaniel, 824 F.2d 1380, 1391 (4th Cir. 1987) (“Constructive knowledge may be
inferred from the widespread extent of the practices, general knowledge of their
existence, manifest opportunities and official duty of responsible policymakers
to be informed, or combinations of these.”)

8
Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement, maintains not only a custom

of unconstitutional searches, but that knowledge of this should be

imputed to the municipal policymakers. This is functionally the

respondeat superior regime the Supreme Court has repeatedly

rejected.16

Second, the plaintiffs provide opinion evidence that the

offense reports and number of warrantless searches performed by the

SWGTF sent a clear signal to supervisors and policymakers that a

pattern of unconstitutional behavior existed within the SWGTF.17

Such opinions as to whether or not policymakers had constructive

knowledge do not create a fact issue, as the “experts” were unable

to muster more than vague attributions of knowledge to unidentified

individuals in “management” or the “chain of command.”18 In fact,

the offense reports were summarized and presented in digest form and

the plaintiffs’ experts failed to demonstrate how the

unconstitutionality of the reported searches could be gleaned from

these summary reports. All of this assumes that policymakers may

16
See, e.g., Bryan County, 520 U.S. at 410 (“To prevent municipal
liability ... from collapsing into respondeat superior liability, a court must
carefully test the link between the policymaker’s inadequate decision and the
particular injury alleged.”).
17
See, e.g, Affidavit of Thomas Parker, R. at 4172 (“The command staff and
operational managers and supervisors of the Houston Police Department essentially
ignored the abundant and significant warning signs of such unauthorized and
illegal enforcement tactics by members of the GTF, allowing such tactics to
become tacitly approved—though illegal and unwritten—standard operating
procedures.”); Affidavit of James Fyfe, R. at 4409 (“By my assessment ... these
involvements included apparent improper police behavior that should have been
apparent to reviewing supervisors and HPD administrators.”).
18
Fyfe Affidavit, R. at 4408; Parker Affidavit, R. at 4187.

9
not rely on the representations of police officers as to the

existence of an exception to the warrant requirement.19 These

offense reports are insufficient to establish actual knowledge of

a pattern even in the hypothetical case that the plaintiffs provided

proof that the policymakers had read the individual reports. It

follows, then, that there can be no constructive knowledge of an

unconstitutional custom from the reports passing through the “chain

of command” in summary form.20

Finally, the plaintiffs cite the First Circuit’s decision in

Bordanaro v. McLeod,21 finding knowledge where the policymaker

“utilized an extensive report review process to monitor the conduct

of his officers and to ensure their compliance with the rules of the

department.”22 That police department was vanishingly small in

comparison to the HPD, considering that the entire night watch

consisted of just five police officers.23 The case is not

comparable to the 7, or fewer, instances of unconstitutional

19
For example, the policymakers would plainly have been entitled to rely
on “consent” as an exception to the warrant requirement. This would leave only
7 incidents for which district court found the plaintiffs had presented competent
summary judgment evidence of unconstitutional searches.
20
The City notes that large police departments use other methods to
monitor police misconduct such as investigating community complaints, monitoring
changes in the number of dismissals of cases by the District Attorney, and
communication with the District Attorney. See Appellee’s Brief at 18-19.
21
871 F.2d 1151 (1st. Cir. 1989).
22
Id. at 1157.
23
Id.

10
searches out of the 500 narcotics and search-related instances in

5000 offense reports from the SWGTF.24

We conclude that the plaintiffs have failed to present a

genuine issue of material fact on their “custom of unconstitutional

residence searches” theory. We now turn to the claim of inadequate

training.

C

“It is clear that a municipality’s policy of failing to train

its police officers can give rise to § 1983 liability.”25 In order

to establish the City’s liability, the plaintiffs must show (1)

inadequate training procedures; (2) that inadequate training caused

the task force officers to shoot Oregon; and (3) the deliberate

indifference of municipal policymakers.26 As we will explain, the

plaintiffs have failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact as

to inadequate training and causation, and do not reach the question

of sufficiency of evidence of deliberate indifference.

1

The plaintiffs must raise a genuine issue of material fact with

respect to whether the training procedures for GTF officers, which

were identical to those employed for other uniformed patrol

24
These offense reports were from the period of approximately November,
1993 to December 1999.

25
Brown v. Bryan County, 219 F.3d 450, 457 (5th Cir. 2000) (citing City
of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 390 (1989)).
26
Id.; Conner v. Travis County, 209 F.3d 794, 796 (5th Cir. 2000).

11
officers, were inadequate. “In resolving the issue of a city’s

liability, the focus must be on [the] adequacy of the training

program in relation to the tasks the particular officers must

perform.”27 The inadequacy of training must be closely related to

the injury.28

The plaintiffs argue that the GTF officers were consistently

engaged in narcotics investigations that require specialized

training and that the lack of a mission statement and standard

operating procedures for the GTFs created confusion as to their

function.

According to the summary judgment record, former Police Chief

Nuchia stated publicly that “undercover narcotics work and dealing

with informants and search warrants are complex tasks, requiring

special knowledge and skills.” The plaintiffs also presented the

testimony of Chief Bradford that specialized narcotics

investigations involve confidential informants, case-related

informants, and covert and plainclothes operations. To support

their view that GTF officers were confused about their role, the

plaintiffs also provide the testimony of Kimbra Ogg, the then-

director of the Mayor’s Anti-Gang Office that (a) GTF members were

confused about their role in narcotics investigations; (b) her

belief that GTF officers were not adequately trained; (c) her fear

27
City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 390 (emphasis added).
28
Burge v. Parish of St. Tammany, 187 F.3d 452, 472 (5th Cir. 1999).

12
that zero tolerance policing put the GTF officers in confrontational

situations with citizens; and (d) that she, at least twice, voiced

her concern to HPD command staff members.

The plaintiffs have not raised a fact issue on the inadequacy

of training with this evidence. First, except as it relates to

Fourth Amendment violations and training, none of this is relevant

to the plaintiffs’ inadequate training theory. For instance Kimbra

Ogg’s testimony is devoid of references to officer misconduct and

merely repeats her vague feeling that there was a “confrontation”

for which the officers required more training. It is apparent from

her deposition that the training she is referring to relates to

sensitivity to community concerns. Additionally, Ogg admitted she

had no notion that GTF officers were conducting warrantless

searches, and thus her conclusions about training are inapposite.29

Second, even when viewed in a light most favorable to the

plaintiffs, the evidence cannot establish that the officers were

untrained in the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement and the

necessity of an exception to a warrantless search. In fact, the

manner in which the officers filled out the offense reports that the

29
See Ogg Deposition at 40 (“Generally, what would happen is: Police
officers would call, they would desire to attend some kind of gang training,
usually held by somebody outside the Houston Police Department. They would call
us, to try and help them get funding to attend these trainings. Sometimes we
were able to; sometimes we weren’t.”). Additionally, on cross-examination Ogg
admitted to having no knowledge of any pattern of Fourth Amendment violations by
GTF officers or their participation in “buy-busts.” Id. at 77-80. Finally, with
reference to the “confusion” about the role of the GTF, Ogg admitted that no GTF
officer ever told her that he was confused about whether or not he was allowed
to enter a residence without a warrant to conduct a search for narcotics. Id.
at 83-84.

13
plaintiffs rely upon for their “pattern” theory belies the notion

that the officers were untrained in basic Fourth Amendment law.

The summary judgment record cannot support the plaintiffs’

assertion that the training the SWGTF officers received was

inadequate. The plaintiffs presented no evidence regarding

additional training the SWGTF officers should have received that

would have prevented the incident here—they only repeat that

“specialized narcotics training” was required, without ever defining

the content of that statement. This conflates the issue of whether

GTF officers were performing certain types of unauthorized

investigations with whether they were properly trained in Fourth

Amendment law. The plaintiffs must create a fact issue as to the

inadequacy of the Fourth Amendment training received by GTF

officers. The plaintiffs do not allege, and do not provide

evidence, that the officers were so untrained as to be unaware that

warrantless searches of residences absent an applicable Fourth

Amendment exception, such as consent, were unconstitutional.30 And

we think that ignorance of such basic rules is most unlikely.

30
The plaintiffs cite to the HPD evaluation of the officers, which found
that their conduct “exhibited” a lack of knowledge of Fourth Amendment
procedures. See Appellants’ Brief at 41-42. The City, however, correctly notes
that this evaluation says nothing about the training that the officers received.
See Appellee’s Brief at 40 n.8.

14
 This stands in marked contrast to Brown v. Bryan County31 and

City of Canton v. Harris.32 In Bryan County the deputy who caused

the plaintiff’s injury had received no training in proper pursuit

and arrest techniques. In City of Canton the officer had received

rudimentary first-aid training, but allegedly not enough to

recognize a detainee’s serious illness. There is no evidence in the

summary judgment record to indicate that the SWGTF officers’ Fourth

Amendment instruction was deficient as to when warrantless searches

could be performed. Without this evidence plaintiffs cannot survive

summary judgment. This is nothing new:

Neither will it suffice to prove than an injury or
accident could have been avoided if an officer had had
better or more training, sufficient to equip him to avoid
the particular injury-causing conduct. Such a claim
could be made about almost any encounter resulting in
injury, yet not condemn the adequacy of the program to
enable officers to respond properly to the usual and
recurring situations with which they must deal. And
plainly, adequately trained officers occasionally make
mistakes; the fact that they do says little about the
training program or the legal basis for holding the city
liable.

Moreover, for liability to attach in this circumstance
the identified deficiency in a city’s training program
must be closely related to the ultimate injury.33

31
219 F.3d 450, 457 (5th Cir. 2000).
32
489 U.S. 378, 390 (1989).
33
City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 391 (emphasis added).

15
 The Seventh Circuit’s decision in Palmquist v. Selvik34 is

instructive. In Palmquist, police officers were allegedly not

trained to deal with “abnormally behaving” individuals. The Seventh

Circuit found that the plaintiff failed to establish inadequate

training because, while there was no special training in how to deal

with such individuals, a rule of “no special training = deficient

training” must be rejected because it “would ignore the training the

officers did receive ... [in] basic recruit training ....”35 The

plaintiffs here also have ignored the basic training the GTF

officers received.

2

This flaw in the plaintiffs’ case can also be viewed as a

failure to provide evidence of causation. The requirements of proof

of inadequacy of training and causation are, in many respects,

intertwined.36 In Palmquist, as here, the plaintiff relied upon

expert testimony that did not include any reference to the relevant

34
111 F.3d 1332 (7th Cir. 1997).

35
Id. at 1345. Cf. Brown v. Gray, 227 F.3d 1278, 1286-87 (10th Cir. 2000)
(disposing, in § 1983 case arising out of actions of off-duty police officer in
city with always-on-duty policy, of city’s argument that plaintiff had presented
no evidence that training was inadequate other than the incident (a shooting)
itself, by noting evidence of: (1) lack of distinction in officer training
between on-duty and off-duty situations; and (2) expert testimony that risks and
circumstances were different and required different training for off-duty
police.). In this case, by contrast, the plaintiffs’ merely state and re-state
that “because the City has admitted that specialized training is required for
officers in such situations [specialized narcotics investigations], there is
sufficient evidence that the training was inadequate.” Reply Brief at 21. No
butterfly will emerge from this hollow chrysalis of an argument.
36
See, e.g., Palmquist, 111 F.3d at 1345-46 (employing similar arguments
and evidence to find plaintiff’s case on inadequate training lacking with respect
to both inadequacy of training and causation).

16
training that the offending officers had actually received, a flaw

the Seventh Circuit found fatal.37 In this case, the plaintiffs’

experts do not reference the Fourth Amendment training the officers

had received prior to the shooting. Even assuming the plaintiffs

have created a genuine issue of material fact as to whether or not

GTF officers were performing narcotics investigations in violation

of HPD policy, and that GTF officers were not adequately trained to

perform such investigations,38 that does not mean that their lack of

training caused the injury to Oregon, which for these purposes we

assume was the result of a warrantless search of a residence in

violation of the Fourth Amendment. There is no competent summary

judgment evidence of any causal relationship between any shortcoming

of the officers’ training regarding warrantless searches of

residences and the injury complained of. Viewing the evidence in

the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, the record fails to put

at issue whether additional training would have avoided the

accident.

3

For the same reasons, the plaintiffs’ theory that this case

falls within the “single incident exception” fails. Charged to

37
Id. (“In fact, plaintiff’s counsel repeatedly advised the court that its
experts did not offer testimony about the training which had been received by
Sergeant Selvik and the other Bensenville officers.”).
38
This training might include that necessary for undercover work, buy-
busts, etc.

17
administer a regime without respondeat superior, we necessarily have

been wary of finding municipal liability on the basis of this

exception for a failure to train claim.39 The evidence must

establish culpability and causation within the exacting requirements

of the Supreme Court’s decisions.40 In the only case in this circuit

to apply the single incident exception to a failure to train claim,

Bryan County, we stressed the requirements of notice and

causation.41 Assuming arguendo that the plaintiffs have raised a

fact issue with respect to whether or not GTF officers were

performing specialized narcotics operations, the void in the record

remains: the summary judgment record sheds no light on any lack of

training in the application of the rules of search and seizure or

any evidence of a causal relationship between a lack of training and

the death of Oregon.

The plaintiffs’ single incident argument proves too much, as

it essentially requires, again, that any Fourth Amendment violation

be sufficient to satisfy the exception.

III

39
Cozzo v. Tangipahoa Parish Council—President Gov’t, 279 F.3d 273, 288
(5th Cir. 2002) (noting that this court has frequently rejected application of
the single incident exception). Cf. Bryan County, 219 F.3d at 460 (finding
single incident exception applicable where county had failed to provide any
training to a deputy).
40
Id. at 461.
41
Id. at 461 n.11 (distinguishing Snyder on the grounds that the holding
of that case rested on policymakers lacking notice and the absence of a causal
link).

18
 Finally, the plaintiffs appeal the dismissal of supplemental

state law claims for wrongful death under the Texas Wrongful Death

Act42 and the Texas Tort Claims Act.43 They argue that these state

law claims were considered sua sponte by the district court and that

summary judgment was improper because they were not given the

opportunity to present their case. A district court is “empowered

to enter summary judgment sua sponte”44 provided that “the losing

party has ten days notice to come forward with all of its evidence

in opposition to summary judgment.”45 The record did not disclose

the requisite notice to the plaintiffs that the district court was

considering granting summary judgment on these state claims.

Relatedly, with the focus of the parties elsewhere, the state law

claims go untreated in its thoughtful opinion.

The City advances two arguments in support of the district

court’s grant of summary judgment on the plaintiffs’ “state claims.”

First, it claims that the TWDA does not create a separate cause of

action and is merely a mechanism for granting a remedy for a

violation of § 1983 where there would otherwise be no such

violation. Second, it argues that the plaintiffs have not pled the

42
Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 71.001.
43
Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 101.021.
44
Geraghty and Miller, Inc. v. Conoco, Inc., 234 F.3d 917, 923 (5th Cir.
2001).

45
Love v. National Medical Enterprises, 230 F.3d 765, 770-71 (5th Cir.
2000).

19
requisite waiver of sovereign immunity under the TTCA.46 The

plaintiffs claim that their alternative theory of negligence on the

part of the officers, while not pled with great detail, should have

been the subject of a motion to for a more particular pleading, and

at the very least not subject to a grant of summary judgment sua

sponte. The City’s first argument fails to accommodate Rhyne v.

Henderson County,47 where we affirmed a district court’s dismissal

without prejudice of a plaintiff’s supplemental state claims in

analogous circumstances.48 We leave to the Texas courts the

question of the sufficiency of the plaintiffs’ pleading.

IV

Plaintiffs were unable to create a genuine issue of material

fact with respect to their § 1983 claims, and therefore we AFFIRM

the district court’s grant of summary judgment. Given the present

posture of the case the best course is to dismiss the supplemental

state claims. We therefore VACATE the grant of summary judgment to

the City on all state claims and MODIFY the district court’s order

by dismissing those claims without prejudice.49

46
See Red Brief at 55-57.
47
973 F.2d 386 (5th Cir. 1992).
48
Id. at 395.
49
The City notes that the plaintiffs have not briefed this issue with
respect to the survival claim brought by Susan Oregon Pineda as representative
of the Estate of Pedro Oregon. The district court noted that it was unclear
whether or not the Estate had asserted a wrongful death claim against the City.
Pineda, 124 F. Supp.2d at 1090 n.125. The plaintiffs’ briefs refer only to
wrongful death claims, and not to survival claims.

20
AFFIRMED in part, MODIFIED in part.

21