Powell v. Washburn

SUPREME COURT OF ARIZONA
En Banc

EDWARD POWELL and BONNIE POWELL; ) Arizona Supreme Court
ARTHUR ANDERSON and EDITH ) No. CV-05-0186-PR
ANDERSON; GERALD BREEYEAR and )
JUDITH BREEYEAR; RICHARD BREHM ) Court of Appeals
and LUCRECIA BREHM; CLIFFORD G. ) Division One
BREKHUS and LAVONNE BREKHUS; ) No. 1 CA-CV 04-0370
JESSE BRYAN and ELIZABETH BRYAN; )
HARRY GRAPE; SCOTTY GRIFFIN; ) La Paz County
EDDIE D. HAYNES; JAMES HOLMBERG ) Superior Court
and CAROLYN HOLMBERG; JOHN HONG ) No. CV2002-0093
and SUZANNE HONG; DAVID JEWELL )
and KATHLEEN JEWELL; ROBERT ) O P I N I O N
KEMBEL and JOANNE KEMBEL; ELDON )
McDANIEL; CHARLES SCHILDER and )
ALLENE SCHILDER; RONALD SKITES )
and MARJORIE A. SKITES; HOWARD )
SMITH and MARJORIE SMITH; LARRY )
SULLIVAN and BEVERLY SULLIVAN, )
)
Plaintiffs-Appellees, )
)
v. )
)
THOMAS WASHBURN, individually, )
and in his capacity as President )
of K.R.C. COMPANY, an Arizona )
corporation, and ROSE WASHBURN, )
his wife; K.R.C. COMPANY, an )
Arizona corporation; ROBERT M. )
BUMGARDNER and TERI BUMGARDNER, )
husband and wife; EARNEST and )
VERA WRIGHT, husband and wife; )
JOHN and JEAN NEVILLE, husband )
and wife; FORREST and JAN )
PHILLIPS, husband and wife; NEAL )
FIVECOAT, an unmarried man, )
)
Defendants-Appellants. )
)
__________________________________)
Appeal from the Superior Court in La Paz County
No. CV2002-0093
The Honorable Michael J. Burke, Judge
AFFIRMED

Memorandum Decision of the Court of Appeals, Div. One
1 CA-CV 04-0370, Filed April 12, 2005
VACATED
________________________________________________________________

LAW OFFICES OF JOHN CHURCHILL Parker
By John Churchill

And

LAW OFFICES OF JOHN A. SHANNON, JR. Phoenix
By John A. Shannon, Jr.
Attorneys for Powell et al.

LAW OFFICES OF ROBERT D. MCCOY Wickenburg
By Robert D. McCoy
Attorney for Washburn and K.R.C. Company

LAW OFFICES OF KEITH S. KNOCHEL, P.C. Bullhead City
By Keith S. Knochel
Attorney for Wright, Neville, Phillips and Fivecoat

LAW OFFICES OF TOBY ZIMBALIST Phoenix
By Toby Zimbalist
Attorney for Amicus Curiae National Institute of Community
Management
________________________________________________________________
R Y A N, Justice

¶1 This case requires us to interpret real property

restrictive covenants. One approach has been to construe such

covenants narrowly, to favor the free use of land. We today

adopt the approach of the Restatement (Third) of Property:

Servitudes (“Restatement”) and hold that restrictive covenants

should be interpreted to give effect to the intention of the

parties as determined from the language of the document in its

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entirety and the purpose for which the covenants were created.

¶2 In November 1988, Thomas Washburn, President of K.R.C.

Corporation, recorded the Declaration of Covenants, Conditions,

and Restrictions (“CC&Rs”) for Indian Hills Airpark, an

aviation-related planned community. The CC&Rs incorporate, by

reference, the La Paz County zoning ordinances. 1 The document

creating the CC&Rs declared that its purpose was to develop the

property “as an aviation related residential and commercial

center” and that the CC&Rs “are intended to benefit the owners

and their successors in interest who hold an ownership interest

in all or any portion of the property.”

¶3 The Airpark is zoned as a manufactured home

subdivision. At the time the CC&Rs were adopted, the zoning

ordinances permitted only three residential uses in such a

subdivision: manufactured homes, low density residential (R-1-6

district), 2 and mobile homes. La Paz County, Ariz., The Zoning

Ordinance Land Use Regulations (“Zoning Ord.”) art. VI, § 606.11

(Jan. 1983). Hangar-houses (homes incorporating an airplane

1
The relevant portion of the CC&Rs is set forth in the
appendix to this opinion.
2
An R-1-6 district is a low density residential district
with lots having an area of 6,000 square feet and a minimum
width of sixty feet. La Paz County, Ariz., The Zoning Ordinance
Land Use Regulations art. VI, § 603.04(d) (Jan. 1983).

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hangar) were added to the CC&Rs as a permissible use in 1992.

In 1996, La Paz County amended the zoning ordinances to permit

the use of recreational vehicles as residences in a manufactured

home subdivision. La Paz County, Ariz., Zoning Regulations

(“Zoning Reg.”) Appendix A, § VI (July 31, 1996); Zoning Reg.

art. III, § III-2(F) (as amended Aug. 17, 1998).3 When the CC&Rs

were adopted, the ordinances defined a recreational vehicle as

[a] vehicular type of dwelling unit thirty-
five (35) feet or less in length and eight
(8) feet or less in width primarily designed
as temporary living quarters for
recreational, camping or travel use, which
either has its own motive power or is
mounted on or drawn by another vehicle.

Zoning Ord. art. II, § 201.63.4

¶4 In August 2002, Edward Powell, along with several

other property owners in the Airpark (“Powell”), filed suit in

superior court against Thomas Washburn and others (“Washburn”)

requesting an injunction prohibiting the use of RVs as single

3
The zoning ordinances in effect when the Airpark was first
established were titled “The Zoning Ordinance Land Use
Regulations.” The current version is titled “Zoning
Regulations.” We distinguish between the two by citing those in
effect at the time of the adoption of the CC&Rs as “Zoning Ord.”
and citing the current version as “Zoning Reg.”
4
The current version of the La Paz County zoning regulations
has a more expansive definition of a recreational vehicle. See
Zoning Reg. art. II, § II-2, p. II-9. Nevertheless, the thrust
of the regulation still is aimed at “temporary living quarters.”
Id.

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family residences within the Airpark. The parties filed cross-

motions for partial summary judgment. The trial court granted

Powell’s motion, finding that the CC&Rs did not permit the use

of RVs as residences.

¶5 Washburn appealed, arguing that the trial court erred

by not interpreting the restrictive covenants strictly in favor

of the free use of land. In a memorandum decision, the court of

appeals agreed, and reversed and remanded.

¶6 Powell petitioned for review, arguing that rules of

contract construction, such as giving effect to all portions of

the contract and enforcing the intent of the parties, supersede

any policy in favor of strict construction of restrictive

covenants. Powell also argues that changes in social policy

toward equitable servitudes suggest abandoning the policy

favoring strict construction and free use of land and adopting

the Restatement rule, which requires giving effect to the intent

of the parties. He contends that under the Restatement approach

the CC&Rs forbid the use of RVs as residences in the Airpark.

¶7 We accepted review because of the widespread use of

restrictive covenants in planned communities and the

accompanying need for a clear statement of how to interpret such

covenants. We have jurisdiction under Article 6, Section 5(3),

of the Arizona Constitution, Arizona Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”)

section 12-120.24 (2003), and Arizona Rule of Civil Appellate

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Procedure (“ARCAP”) 23.

¶8 A deed containing a restrictive covenant that runs

with the land is a contract. Ahwatukee Custom Estates Mgmt.

Ass’n v. Turner, 196 Ariz. 631, 634, ¶ 5, 2 P.3d 1276, 1279

(App. 2000); Ariz. Biltmore Estates Ass’n v. Tezak, 177 Ariz.

447, 448, 868 P.2d 1030, 1031 (App. 1993). The interpretation

of a contract is generally a matter of law. Hadley v. Sw.

Props., Inc., 116 Ariz. 503, 506, 570 P.2d 190, 193 (1977);

Biltmore Estates, 177 Ariz. at 448, 868 P.2d at 1031. At oral

argument, the parties agreed there were no disputed facts

concerning the creation of the CC&Rs or the meaning of the

language used in the document; therefore, our review is de novo.

See Andrews v. Blake, 205 Ariz. 236, 240, ¶ 12, 69 P.3d 7, 11

(2003).

¶9 In Arizona, the traditional rule has been that when a

restrictive covenant is unambiguous, it is enforced so as to

give effect to the intent of the parties. Biltmore Estates, 177

Ariz. at 449, 868 P.2d at 1032 (“[T]he cardinal principle in

construing restrictive covenants is that the intention of the

parties to the instrument is paramount.”) (citing Riley v.

Stoves, 22 Ariz. App. 223, 225-26, 526 P.2d 747, 749-50 (1974));

Sky Mountain Ranch Subdiv. Prop. Owners Ass’n v. Williams, 12

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Ariz. App. 244, 246, 469 P.2d 478, 480 (1970) (“‘[T]he intent of

the parties and the object of the deed or restriction should

govern, giving the instrument a just and fair interpretation.’”)

(quoting R & R Realty Co. v. Weinstein, 4 Ariz. App. 517, 522

n.2, 422 P.2d 148, 153 n.2 (1966)).

¶10 Arizona’s rule that courts should enforce the intent

of the parties to a restrictive covenant in the absence of

ambiguity reaches back to the 1930s. In Ainsworth v. Elder,

this Court adopted an intent-based analysis (without calling it

such) when it stated that “courts should consider not only the

strict and technical meaning of the particular words of

restriction, but also the surrounding circumstances, the general

purpose of the restrictions, and the manner in which they have

been interpreted by the property owners.” 40 Ariz. 71, 74-75, 9

P.2d 1007, 1008 (1932).

¶11 This general principle of looking beyond the mere

words of a restrictive covenant to the surrounding circumstances

and the general purpose of the restriction has been repeated in

subsequent decisions. See, e.g., Duffy v. Sunburst Farms E.

Mut. Water & Agric. Co., 124 Ariz. 413, 416, 604 P.2d 1124, 1127

(1979) (“This court has previously recognized that in

determining the meaning of restrictive covenants, the

surrounding circumstances will be looked to as well as the

meaning of particular words.”) (citations omitted); Whitaker v.

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Holmes, 74 Ariz. 30, 32, 243 P.2d 462, 463 (1952) (stating that

when interpreting restrictive covenants “the courts not only

look to the meaning of the particular words but also to other

surrounding circumstances”) (citation omitted).

¶12 Arizona decisions, however, have also posited a

countervailing principle of interpreting restrictive covenants

when a court perceives that a restrictive covenant is ambiguous

or does not expressly prohibit a particular use of the property.

A number of opinions state that a court must strictly construe

the terms of the restrictive covenant in favor of the free use

of land and against the restriction. See, e.g., Duffy, 124

Ariz. at 417, 604 P.2d at 1128; Burke v. Voicestream Wireless

Corp. II, 207 Ariz. 393, 396, ¶ 13, 87 P.3d 81, 84, (App. 2004)

(stating that “[i]f the language of a restrictive covenant is

judged to be ambiguous, it should be construed in favor of the

free use of the land”) (citing Duffy, 124 Ariz. at 417, 604 P.2d

at 1128); Grossman v. Hatley, 21 Ariz. App. 581, 583, 522 P.2d

46, 48 (1974) (“Restrictive covenants are to be strictly

construed against persons seeking to enforce them and any

ambiguities or doubts as to their effect should be resolved in

favor of the free use and enjoyment of the property and against

restrictions.”) (citations omitted).

¶13 Because a restrictive covenant is a contract,

Ahwatukee Custom Estates Mgmt. Ass’n, 196 Ariz. at 634, ¶ 5, 2

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P.3d at 1279, the doctrine of strict construction has been

criticized as being too restrictive. See Restatement § 4.1 cmt.

a (2000). Rather, “the function of the law is to ascertain and

give effect to the likely intentions and legitimate expectations

of the parties who create servitudes, as it does with respect to

other contractual arrangements.” Restatement, Introductory Note

to ch. 4, at 494 (2000); see also Taylor v. State Farm Mut.

Auto. Ins. Co., 175 Ariz. 148, 153, 854 P.2d 1134, 1139 (1993)

(“When interpreting a contract . . . it is fundamental that a

court attempt to ‘ascertain and give effect to the intention of

the parties at the time the contract was made if at all

possible.’”) (quoting Polk v. Koerner, 111 Ariz. 493, 495, 533

P.2d 660, 662 (1975)). To this end, the Restatement recommends

that

[a] servitude should be interpreted to give
effect to the intention of the parties
ascertained from the language used in the
instrument, or the circumstances surrounding
creation of the servitude, and to carry out
the purpose for which it was created.

Restatement § 4.1(1). Although the Restatement rule “departs

from the often expressed view that servitudes should be narrowly

construed to favor the free use of land[,] [i]t is based in the

recognition that servitudes are widely used in modern land

development and ordinarily play a valuable role in utilization

of land resources.” Restatement § 4.1 cmt. a.

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B

¶14 We adopt the Restatement approach for interpreting

restrictive covenants for three reasons. First, § 4.1 of the

Restatement is consistent with long-standing Arizona case law

holding that enforcing the intent of the parties is the

“cardinal principle” in interpreting restrictive covenants.

Biltmore Estates, 177 Ariz. at 449, 868 P.2d at 1032; see also

Whitaker, 74 Ariz. at 32, 243 P.2d at 463; O’Malley v. Cent.

Methodist Church, 67 Ariz. 245, 247, 254-55, 194 P.2d 444, 446,

451 (1948) (holding that the intent of the parties, in light of

the terms of the deeds and the surrounding circumstances, is

central to determining both whether there is a general plan and

the meaning of the restrictions contained in the deed);

Ainsworth, 40 Ariz. at 74-75, 9 P.2d at 1008.

¶15 Second, although Arizona decisions have referred to

the policy of construing restrictive covenants strictly and in

favor of free use of land, these references have occurred

exclusively in dicta. See, e.g., Duffy, 124 Ariz. at 417, 604

P.2d at 1128 (upholding the clear and unambiguous terms of the

CC&Rs pertaining to the procedure to amend CC&Rs, even though

stating that “when the language of a restrictive covenant is

unclear, it should be construed in favor of the free use of

land”); Burke, 207 Ariz. at 396-97, ¶¶ 13, 18, 87 P.3d at 84-85

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(to same effect); Biltmore Estates, 177 Ariz. at 449-50, 868

P.2d at 1032-33 (to same effect); Carter v. Conroy, 25 Ariz.

App. 434, 436, 544 P.2d 258, 260 (1976) (to same effect);

Grossman, 21 Ariz. App. at 583, 585, 522 P.2d at 48, 50 (to same

effect); R & R Realty Co., 4 Ariz. App. at 526-27, 422 P.2d at

157-58 (to same effect).

¶16 Third, the Restatement’s approach mirrors the

contemporary judicial trend of recognizing the benefits of

restrictive covenants. See, e.g., Lookout Mountain Paradise

Hills Homeowners’ Ass’n v. Viewpoint Assocs., 867 P.2d 70, 75

(Colo. Ct. App. 1993) (“Restrictive covenants must be construed

as a whole and interpreted in view of their underlying purposes,

giving effect to all provisions contained therein.”); Markey v.

Wolf, 607 A.2d 82, 88-93 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1992) (tracing

evolution of rule from strict construction to reasonable

construction to give effect to purpose of restrictive

covenants); Griffin v. Tall Timbers Dev., Inc., 681 So. 2d 546,

551 (Miss. 1996) (“In construing covenants imposing restrictions

and burdens on use of land, the language used will be read in

its ordinary sense, and the restriction and burden will be

construed in light of the circumstances surrounding its

formulation, with the idea of carrying out its object, purpose

and intent, and the restrictions and burdens should be fairly

and reasonably interpreted according to their apparent

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purpose.”) (citation omitted); Joslin v. Pine River Dev. Corp.,

367 A.2d 599, 601 (N.H. 1976) (“The former prejudice against

restrictive covenants which led courts to strictly construe them

is yielding to a gradual recognition that they are valuable land

use planning devices.”) (citation omitted); Riss v. Angel, 934

P.2d 669, 676 (Wash. 1997) (“‘While restrictive covenants were

once disfavored by the courts, upholding the common law right of

free use of privately owned land, modern courts have recognized

the necessity of enforcing such restrictions to protect the

public and private property owners from the increased pressures

of urbanization.’”) (quoting Lakes at Mercer Island Homeowners

Ass’n v. Witrak, 810 P.2d 27, 28 (Wash. Ct. App. 1991)); Wallace

v. St. Clair, 127 S.E.2d 742, 751 (W. Va. 1962) (“Covenants

. . . are designed to be for the benefit of every lot or parcel

of land in the area affected by the restriction. Each lot or

parcel is not merely burdened by a restriction but it is also

clothed with the benefit which is enforceable against every

other lot or parcel. The burdens and benefits are reciprocal.

The reasons for the rule of strict construction do not obtain

with full force in such a situation.”).

III

¶17 In this case, the court of appeals did not find the

relevant portion of the restrictive covenants ambiguous. The

court concluded, however, that because the covenants did not

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expressly prohibit RVs as single family residences, when La Paz

County amended its zoning ordinance to permit the use of RVs as

single family residences in a manufactured home subdivision, RVs

became a permitted single family residence in the Airpark.

Citing Duffy, the court also stated that “if there is any

‘wiggle’ in determining the intended meaning of a restrictive

covenant, the outcome should favor free use of the property.

When a set of covenants does not expressly restrict a particular

use . . . a restriction by implication will not advance the free

use of property.” (Citation omitted.)

¶18 Applying the principles of the Restatement, we

conclude that although the CC&Rs neither expressly prohibit nor

permit RVs as residences, the plain intent and purpose of the

restrictions was to limit residences in the Airpark to mobile or

manufactured homes, constructed homes, or hangar-homes. We base

this conclusion on the language used in the CC&Rs and the

purpose for which the restrictions were created.

¶19 The language of the CC&Rs evidences an intent to limit

the type of single family residences permitted in the Airpark in

several ways. First, the strict controls the CC&Rs impose on

the listed types of residences and the failure to specify any

controls over any other type of residence lead to the conclusion

that the parties to the CC&Rs intended to prohibit any type of

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residence not explicitly listed in the CC&Rs.

¶20 Section two of the CC&Rs includes a list of the

permissible residential uses of the property. See Appendix. In

this section, the CC&Rs list only three types of single family

residences as a permitted use: mobile homes, 5 constructed homes,

and hangar-houses. For each type of residence listed, the CC&Rs

provide specific and detailed limits to the size and appearance

of the residence.

¶21 Mobile homes must be twenty feet or greater in width,

have at least twelve hundred square feet of living space, be no

more than one year old, and be on a permanent foundation. They

must have exteriors of fir, exterior plywood, painted hardboard,

lapsiding, or stucco. Their roofs must be tile, cedar, shake,

or composition. Similarly, constructed homes must have at least

5
When the CC&Rs were adopted, the ordinances defined a
mobile home as

A movable or portable dwelling unit over thirty-five
(35) feet in length or over eight (8) feet wide,
constructed to be towed on its own chassis and
designed so as to be installed with or without a
permanent foundation for human occupancy as a
residence which may include one or more components
that can be retracted for towing purposes and
subsequently expanded for additional capacity, or two
or more units separately towable but designed to be
joined into one integral unit, as well as a portable
dwelling composed of a single unit, except that it
does not include recreational vehicle as defined
herein. For the purposes of these regulations a
mobile home is not considered to be a house.

Zoning Ord. art. II, § 201.54 (emphasis added).

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twelve hundred square feet of living space and be compatible

with the mobile homes and other structures in the subdivision.

Further, all plans for constructed homes are subject to prior

approval of the Architectural Committee. A hangar-house must

include a hangar at least forty feet wide and thirty feet deep

and contain eight hundred square feet of living space, all under

the same roof. Finally, hangar-houses are also subject to prior

approval of the Architectural Committee.

¶22 The CC&Rs contain no catch-all language stating that

other types of residences must conform to the appearance of the

listed residences in the Airpark or that they are subject to

approval by the Architectural Committee. Thus, if other types

of residences were to be permitted under the CC&Rs, they could

have an appearance and quality completely at odds with that

required by the CC&Rs for mobile homes, constructed homes, and

hangar residences. It is quite unlikely that the parties to the

CC&Rs, having carefully specified how certain types of expressly

permitted residences must be configured, would allow all other

types of residences with no requirements whatsoever.

¶23 Second, the CC&Rs require that each of the three types

of explicitly listed residences has a hangar. For example,

mobile homes and constructed homes must have a hangar within one

year of placement of the home on the lot. And hangars are

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integral parts of hangar-houses. If residences other than those

described in the CC&Rs are permitted, apparently those homes

need not include a hangar, as no other provision in the CC&Rs

requires any non-specified type of residence have a hangar.

¶24 Thus, under the kind of literal construction of the

CC&Rs adopted by the court of appeals, other types of

residences, such as RVs, would not be required to have a hangar.

Such an interpretation would be clearly at odds with the CC&Rs’

stated purpose: “[T]o develop the property as an aviation

related residential and commercial center . . . .” (Emphasis

added.)

¶25 Third, the CC&Rs state that when they are consistent

with, but are more restrictive than, applicable law, the CC&Rs
6
will apply to the property. Thus the fact that the zoning

ordinances - applicable law – have been amended to permit RVs to

be used as a residence in a manufactured home subdivision does

not determine the ultimate permitted use under the CC&Rs. Given

our conclusion that the intent and purpose of the CC&Rs is to

preclude the use of RVs and other non-listed “residences” in the

6
Section 20 of the CC&Rs states, in part, the following:

In the event any provision of this
Declaration is consistent with, but more
restrictive than, Applicable Law, such
privision [sic] of this Declaration shall
apply to the Property.

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Airpark, the amendment to the zoning law providing for less

restrictions does not control.

¶26 An illustration in the Restatement explains the point:

Deed restrictions in Sandy Acres, a 200-lot
subdivision originally developed with
single-family homes, prohibit “apartment
houses.” A developer who has acquired 10
contiguous lots plans to construct a 10-
story condominium complex on the property.
Condominiums were unknown in the
jurisdiction when the restriction was
created. The restriction should be
interpreted to prohibit the proposed
condominium complex because it presents
density problems similar to those created by
apartment houses. The servitude will not
serve its purpose if interpreted literally.

Restatement § 4.1 cmt. i, illus. 5.

¶27 Here, the CC&Rs likewise only envisaged certain types

of residences. Although section 2 does refer to possible

amendments to the La Paz County zoning ordinances, that clause

must be read in conjunction with the CC&Rs in their entirety.

Specifically, section 2 also provides that “the use and

improvement of the Property shall be in accordance with the

covenants, conditions and restrictions herein set forth . . . .”

The subsequent restrictions plainly intend that only mobile

homes, constructed homes, and hangar-houses be used as

residences in the Airpark. None of the restrictions applicable

to such residences could be reasonably applied to RVs as they

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are defined by the La Paz County zoning ordinance or regulation.

See Zoning Ord. art. II, § 201.63; Zoning Reg. art. II, § II-2,

p. II-9. Thus, the amendment to the zoning ordinances

permitting RVs to be used as single family residences in a

manufactured home subdivision does not serve the CC&Rs’ intent

to have the Airpark development possess a particular appearance

and quality.

¶28 Accordingly, the court of appeals erred in concluding

that because “section 2 unambiguously omits any mention of RVs,”

the amendment to the zoning ordinances left “the door open to

the use of an RV” in the Airpark if it is used as a single

family residence. Such a conclusion is contrary to the intent

and the purpose of the CC&Rs.

¶29 Citing A.R.S. § 12-341.01 (2003), Powell requests an

award of attorneys’ fees. Because Powell presented the request

for the first time in his supplemental brief, we deny the

request. See ARCAP 21(c) (“If a petition . . . for review is

filed, a request for allowance of attorneys’ fees shall be made

in the petition . . . .”); see also Wagenseller v. Scottsdale

Mem’l Hosp., 147 Ariz. 370, 391, 710 P.2d 1025, 1046 (1985)

(holding that “to be timely under Rule 21(c) on petitions for

review by this court, the request for attorney’s fees must be

made either in the petition for review, the response thereto or

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by separate written motion filed and served prior to oral

argument”) (superseded by statute on other grounds).

¶30 For the foregoing reasons, we vacate the decision of

the court of appeals and affirm the trial court’s judgment.

__________________________________
Michael D. Ryan, Justice

CONCURRING:

_________________________________________
Ruth V. McGregor, Chief Justice

_________________________________________
Rebecca White Berch, Vice Chief Justice

_________________________________________
Andrew D. Hurwitz, Justice

_________________________________________
W. Scott Bales, Justice

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Appendix

2. USE OF PROPERTY: Except as otherwise set forth herein,
the use and improvement of the Property shall be in accordance
with covenants, conditions and restrictions herein set forth, in
accordance with applicable governmental law, including without
limitation, the zoning ordinances of the County of La Paz, the
Rules and Regulations of the FEDERAL AVIATION AUTHORITY as they
may be amended or expanded from time to time.

A. Lots 1 through 77 shall be single family residential
lots and subject to the following additional restrictions:

(1) No mobile home shall be less than 20 feet in
width, no more than one year old at the time of placement on the
lot.

(2) No mobile home shall be less than 1,200 square
feet of living space.

(3) All mobile homes moved onto a lot in this
subdivision shall be affixed on a permanent foundation.

(4) All mobile home units are required to have
exteriors of fir, exterior plywood, painted hardboard (masonite)
or lapsiding or stucco.

(5) All mobile homes are required to have tile, cedar,
shake or composition roofs.

(6) Within one year after placement of mobile home on
the lot the owner shall cause to be constructed on the lot a
hangar 40 feet wide by 30 feet deep, to be approved by the
Architectural Committee.

(7) Any constructed home placed on any lot within
this subdivision shall have a minimum square footage of 1,200
and be compatible with the mobile himes [sic] or other
structures in the subdivision. All plans are subject to prior
approval of the Architectural Committee.

(8) Within one year after placement of constructed
home on the lot the owner shall cause to be constructed on the
lot a hangar 40 feet wide by 30 feet deep, to be approved by the
Architectural COmmittee [sic].

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(9) No hangar shall be less than 40 feet wide by 30
feet deep and are subject to prior approval of the Architectural
Committee.

(10) A HANGAR-HOUSE shall be a minimum of 40 feet wide
by 30 feet deep of hangar space and a minimum of 800 square feet
of living space, all to be included under one roof, to be
approved by the Architectural Committee.

B. Lots A1 through A6 and Lots B1 through B11 shall be
Commercial lots and shall be subject to La Paz County Zoning
Ordinances and all terms and conditions of this Declaration
except those provisions outlined in numerical paragraph 2 A.(1)
through (11) hereinabove.

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