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Preferred Mutual Insurance v. Travelers Companies

Court: Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
Date filed: 1997-10-07
Citations: 127 F.3d 136
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15 Citing Cases

                UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                    FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

                                         

No. 97-1553

             PREFERRED MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY,

                    Plaintiff, Appellant,

                              v.

                   THE TRAVELERS COMPANIES,

                     Defendant, Appellee.

                                         

         APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

              FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

        [Hon. Michael A. Ponsor, U.S. District Judge]
                                                                
          [Hon. Nancy Gertner, U.S. District Judge]
                                                              

                                         

                            Before

                    Torruella, Chief Judge,
                                                      

                Aldrich, Senior Circuit Judge,
                                                         

                  and Lynch, Circuit Judge.
                                                      

                                         

Marie Cheung-Truslow  with whom Roger  A. Emanuelson  and Lecomte,
                                                                              
Emanuelson, Motejunas & Doyle were on brief for appellant.
                                     
Michael J.  Eisele with whom  David C.  Boch and  Bingham, Dana  &
                                                                              
Gould were on brief for appellee.
             

                                         

                       October 3, 1997
                                         


          ALDRICH,  Senior Circuit  Judge.    On January  20,
                                                     

1995, an oil fire broke out in the boiler room of the Kimball

Towers condominium in Springfield, Massachusetts, that caused

extensive damage from  smoke, soot and heat.   Kimball Towers

Condominium Association  (Kimball) was  insured by  Preferred

Mutual Insurance  Company (Preferred) under a Business Owners

Special Property  Policy that  covered its  property broadly,

with a limit of $11,340,000 and an annual premium of $40,484.

With some exceptions,  the policy did not cover  steam or hot

water  boilers and their equipment.  Kimball was also insured

by Travelers Company (Travelers) under a Boiler and Machinery

Policy.    Boiler provisions  complementary  with Preferred's

have been noted.  Travelers' policy had no dollar limitation;

the annual "Provisional  Premium"1 was $875.   Preferred paid

this loss,2 in the amount of $357,279, and now sues Travelers

for this amount as the "primary insurer," or, at least, for a

share.   A condition precedent  is that Travelers  would have

been liable for the loss.  The district court held that there

was  no  such  coverage,  so  that  neither  alternative  was

correct,  and granted  summary judgment  to  Travelers in  an

extensive opinion.  See Preferred Mut. Ins. Co. v.  Travelers
                                                                         

Cos., 955 F. Supp.  9 (D. Mass. 1997).  Without  deciding, it
                

                    
                                

1.  The  elasticity   related  to   offered  extensions   not
subscribed to by Kimball, and not here relevant.

2.  No point  has been  made by it  of any loss  to Kimball's
boiler and accessory equipment.

                             -2-


assumed that  Travelers' policy's general  provisions covered

the loss -- an assumption not contested, and that we adopt --

but concluded that it fell  within the stated exclusions.  On

this basis we affirm.

                          The Facts
                                               

          On summary  judgment we  of course  take the  facts

most favorably to plaintiff Preferred, but review the court's

legal conclusions de novo.   See, e.g., Dominique v. Weld, 73
                                                                     

F.3d 1156, 1158 (1st Cir. 1996); E.E.O.C. v. Steamship Clerks
                                                                         

Union,  Local 1066,  48 F.3d  594,  602-03 (1st  Cir.), cert.
                                                                         

denied,  116 S.  Ct. 65  (1995).   Construction of  insurance
                  

contracts and application of their terms to established facts

are matters of law, ultimately  for us.  See Commercial Union
                                                                         

Ins.  Co. v. Walbrook  Ins. Co., 7 F.3d  1047, 1050 (1st Cir.
                                           

1993); Falmouth Nat'l Bank v.  Ticor Title Ins. Co., 920 F.2d
                                                               

1058, 1061 (1st Cir. 1990).

          The  fire, according to  Preferred, occurred in the

following  manner.   A  leaky  seal in  the  fuel pump,  that

supplied  oil to the  burner that heated  the boiler, allowed

oil to be propelled, with air, into the burner tube.  Here it

caught fire.  This fire caused a melt, allowing the burner to

fall,  damaging the  oil line.    This released  oil, fed  by

gravity from the storage supply, that caught fire  and burned

until ultimately extinguished by the fire department.

                             -3-


          The relevant  Travelers' policy  provisions (quoted

out of order) are these.

          A.  COVERAGE

               We  will  pay  for  direct  damage  to Covered
               Property caused by a Covered Cause of Loss.

               1.  Covered Property
                                               

                     Covered  Property,   as  used   in  this
                     Coverage Part, means any property that:

                     a.  You own;

                          . . . . .

               2.  Covered Cause of Loss
                                                    

                     A Covered Cause of Loss is an "accident"
                     to an "object."

                          . . . . .

          G.  DEFINITIONS

               1.    "Accident" means a sudden and accidental
                     breakdown of the "object" or part of the
                     "object."

                          . . . . .

               5.    "Object" means:

                     a.   Unless     excluded      in     the
                          Declarations,     the     following
                          equipment:

                          (1)    Any  boiler,  including  its
                          piping and accessory equipment.

          Interrupting,  we  read  the  policy  to  say  that

Travelers  will pay (subject to exclusions) for direct damage

to Kimball's property due to  the breakdown of the boiler and

its accessory equipment.  We consider the  burner, the burner

                             -4-


tube, the mechanical  fuel pump, and the electric  motor that

operates  it,  to be  accessory  equipment.   Leaking  was  a

breakdown, or "accident."

          B.  EXCLUSIONS

                     We will  not  pay  for  loss  or  damage
               caused directly or  indirectly by  any of  the
               following.   Such loss  or damage is  excluded
               regardless  of any other  cause or  event that
               contributes concurrently or in any sequence to
               the loss.

                          . . . . .

               4.  Other Exclusions

               Loss caused by or resulting from:

                     a.   Fire  or combustion  explosion that
                     occurs at the same time as an "accident"
                     or that ensues from an "accident."  With
                     respect  to  any   electrical  equipment
                     forming  a  part  of  an "object,"  this
                     exclusion is changed to read:

                          Fire  or   explosion  outside   the
                     "object" that occurs at the same time as
                     an   "accident"   or  ensues   from   an
                     "accident."

                          . . . . .

          The initial  paragraph unambiguously means  what it

says.  If the fire fell within the  provisions of section B4a

it  is  not  covered  even  though it  also  met  some  other

definitions.  Cf. Jussim  v. Massachusetts Bay Ins. Co.,  415
                                                                   

Mass. 24, 27-28, 610  N.E.2d 954, 955-56 (1993)  (noting that

if the  proximate cause  "is an insured  risk, there  will be

coverage even though  the final form of  the property damage,

produced by a  series of related events, appears  to take the

                             -5-


loss outside the  terms of the policy").   Preferred says the

present  issue lies in provision 4a's second sentence because

the  loss was caused  by the breakdown of  the fuel pump that

was  "electrical equipment"  because it  was  operated by  an

electric   motor.     Although  there  was   some  struggling

vocalizing  by Preferred's expert, we can not possibly agree.

We do  not rely on the much mentioned  fact that the pump and

the  motor were  by different  manufacturers,  but they  were

independent articles, connected only by the power shaft, with

no electricity reaching  the pump.  Manifestly there  must be

some purpose for the alternative clause in provision 4a, and,

equally  manifestly, electricity must play a meaningful part.

To characterize the pump as electrical is nonsense.

          Turning,   therefore,  to   4a's  first   sentence,

concededly the leak in the pump was an accident to an object.

Whether or  not  the broken  supply line  also be  considered

accessory   equipment,  the  burning   of  the   fuel  supply

unquestionably "ensue[d] from an 'accident.'"  It was plainly

excluded.

          In  this  posture  Preferred  complains  that  this

conclusion "result[s] in  coverage to the insured  which [i]s

unrealistically limited."  Support is offered by an affidavit

of  Kimball's  "property  manager,"  who   had  obtained  the

policies:

               It    has    been    my    continued
          understanding and  expectation that  fire

                             -6-


          originating  from   the  boiler   or  its
          accessory  equipment  would   be  covered
          under  Travelers'  Boiler  and  Machinery
          Policy.

          Thus we have an insurer that had received a premium

of $40,484, claiming it  was unreasonable for an  insurer who

had received a  premium of $875  not to  pay it $357,279,  in

part, if not in whole.  The lion would lie down with the lamb

-- for dinner.

          The Boiler  and Machinery policy  covered accidents

to  the  boiler  and  accessory  equipment,  and,  in  terms,

excluded "fire . . .  that ensues from an 'accident.'"  There

was  an accident, and fire ensued.   Plaintiff, who is in the

business  of writing  and  interpreting insurance  contracts,

sues therefor.  We give notice that if it wishes to object to

our assessing double costs it do so, with grounds, within ten

days of  the date hereof.  See Fed. R.  App. P. 38; Cronin v.
                                                                      

Town  of Amesbury,  81 F.3d  257, 261  (1st Cir.  1996); E.H.
                                                                         

Ashley & Co. v. Wells Fargo Alarm Servs., 907 F.2d 1274, 1280
                                                    

(1st Cir. 1990).

          Affirmed.
                              

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