The points presented are respectively these: Shall the cross-re.spondent be required, on motion under the fifty-third rule (29 Sup. Ct. xiv) to give security on the cross-libel? Shall the exceptions be sustained to the interrogatories propounded in the answer to the libel ?
[1] The libelant is a domestic corporation, and filed a libel in per-sonam against the respondent, a foreign corporation, without attachment. Later the cross-libel was filed in personam, and the cross-libelant moves now for security under the fifty-third rule. Obviously, had the cross-libel been original, no security could have been required under the second rule (29 Sup. Ct. xxxix), as the respondent could have been found. This, as it seems to me, is enough to dispose of the motion within that discretion'which the fifty-third rule gives, the libelant not having itself got any security. Had it done so, this motion would have lain as of course. Of course, if the rule only applies when the original libel is in rem (Franklin Sugar Refining Co. v. Funch [D. C.] 66 Fed. 342), this motion would not lie anyway; but I can scarcely so understand it, and the equity of the rule clearly comprehends a libel in per-sonam with attachment. That point it is not necessary to decide.
The motion is denied.
[2] The interrogatories inquire into particulars of the case alleged in the original libel. Interrogatories, so far as they call for evidence, must be confined to testimony necessary to the proof of the proponent’s case or defense, by which I mean matter pleaded in avoidance. Marquette Mfg. Co. v. Oglesby Coal Co. (D. C.) 247 Fed. 351. However,,
Therefore these exceptions are overruled.
null.
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