IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 00-30268
PROSTAR, as Broadcast Licensee of the December 6, 1997,
De La Hoya/Rivera Program,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
JAMES ALLEN MASSACHI, JR., and TOBY IS DEAD, INC.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
For the Eastern District of Louisiana
January 17, 2001
Before KING, Chief Judge, and HIGGINBOTHAM and DUHÉ, Circuit
Judges.
PER CURIAM:
This case presents us with the task of determining the
appropriate statute of limitations for an action brought under 47
U.S.C. §§ 553 and 605. As these provisions contain no express
limitations period, the district court adopted the one-year
prescriptive period for delictual actions under Louisiana law.1
Appellant Prostar argues that the court should have applied the
three-year limitations period articulated in the federal Copyright
1
See La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 3492.
Act.2 Alternatively, Prostar requests the application of either the
ten-year limitations period for personal actions under Louisiana
law3 or the three-year period applicable to actions under Article
3494 of the Louisiana Civil Code. We find that the limitations
period governing actions under the Copyright Act is applicable and
now reverse.
I
Prostar filed suit against Appellees Massachi and Toby Is
Dead, Inc. on April 29, 1999, alleging violations of the Federal
Communications Act (FCA).4 Prostar, a Texas corporation, had
purchased the commercial sales rights to various territories,
including Louisiana, for transmission of the December 6, 1997, De
La Hoya/Rivera boxing broadcast. Investigation by Prostar allegedly
revealed that an establishment known as "Jimani Lounge and
Restaurant" had improperly intercepted and exhibited the broadcast
on December 6, 1997. Appellees contended that Prostar's suit was
time-barred, as it was filed after the one-year limitations period
set forth under Article 3492 of the Louisiana Civil Code, which
2
See 17 U.S.C. § 507.
3
See La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 3499.
4
48 Stat. 1064 (June 19, 1934) (codified as amended in
relevant part at 47 U.S.C. §§ 553, 605). Section 553 was added to
the structure of the Federal Communications Act by the Federal
Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-549, 98
Stat. 2779, 2796.
2
governs delictual actions. The district court granted Appellees'
Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings requesting dismissal.
II
Reviewing the district court's decision de novo,5 we note that
the FCA does not specify a statute of limitations for actions by
licensees such as Prostar under 47 U.S.C. §§ 553 and 6056 - "a void
5
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c); Shipp v. McMahon, 199 F.3d 256,
260 (5th Cir. 2000).
6
Neither party suggests that the two-year limitations period
articulated in 47 U.S.C. § 415 applies. This limitations period is
restricted to suits involving common carriers. See 47 U.S.C. § 415.
Prostar does not - and cannot - contend that it is a common
carrier. See 47 U.S.C. § 153(10) (defining "common carrier" or
"carrier" as "any person engaged as a common carrier for hire, in
interstate or foreign communication by wire or radio or in
interstate or foreign radio transmission of energy, except where
reference is made to common carriers not subject to this chapter;
but a person engaged in radio broadcasting shall not . . . be
deemed a common carrier"); 47 U.S.C. § 541(c) ("Any cable system
shall not be subject to regulation as a common carrier or utility
by reason of providing any cable service."); United States v.
Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 169 n.29 (1968) (finding that
cable companies are not common carriers); H.R. Rep. No. 98-934, at
29, 60 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4655, 4666, 4697
(noting the general exemption of cable companies from common
carrier regulations).
This Court does not find that 47 U.S.C. § 415 provides the
appropriate statute of limitations for 47 U.S.C. §§ 553, 605. See
Kingvision Pay Per View, Ltd. v. Boom Town Saloon, Inc., 98 F.
Supp. 2d 958, 962 n.3 (N.D. Ill. 2000); Joe Hand Promotions, Inc.
v. Lott, 971 F. Supp. 1058, 1061-62 (E.D. La. 1997); That's
Entertainment of Illinois, Inc. v. Centel Videopath, Inc., No. 93
C 1471, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19488, at *8-*20 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 9,
1993). But see CSC Holdings, Inc. v. J.R.C. Products, Inc., 78 F.
Supp. 2d 794, 802 (N.D. Ill. 1999) (assuming without deciding that
section 415 is the appropriate statute of limitations for cable
operator's action under 47 U.S.C. § 553). Given that the language
of section 415 refers only to carriers, we infer that Congress did
3
which is commonplace in federal statutory law."7 As a matter of
interstitial lawmaking, this Court must adopt the appropriate
statute of limitations from either state or federal sources. The
Supreme Court has affirmed that state law is the "lender of first
resort," and that courts generally are to adopt the closest state-
law analogue.8 However, in limited circumstances, the Court has
countenanced the application of an analogous federal law where
application of state law would "frustrate or interfere with the
implementation of national policies . . . or be at odds with the
purpose or operation of federal substantive law."9 Under such
not intend this provision to apply to non-carriers. See Russello v.
United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983) ("[W]here Congress includes
particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in
another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that
Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate
inclusion or exclusion."). Moreover, we find persuasive the
district court's reasoning in Centel Videopath that the Supreme
Court's decision in Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v.
Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350 (1991), is distinguishable. The Court in
Lampf applied the limitations period articulated in section 13 of
the Securities Exchange Act to violations of section 10b, despite
the fact that section 13 only referred to sections 11, 12(1), and
12(2) of the Act. See id. at 359-60. However, because a private
cause of action under section 10b is a judicial creation, see id.
at 359, no negative implication could be derived from section 13's
failure to refer to section 10b. See Centel Videopath, 1993 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 19488, at *17-*18.
7
Board of Regents v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478, 483 (1980). 28
U.S.C. § 1658 is inapposite, as the generic four-year limitations
period articulated therein only applies to causes of action created
after December 1, 1990. See 28 U.S.C. § 1658.
8
See North Star Steel Co. v. Thomas, 515 U.S. 29, 34 (1995).
9
Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
4
circumstances, a court must decide whether "a federal statute of
limitations for another cause of action better reflect[s] the
balance that Congress would have preferred between the substantive
policies underlying the federal claim and the policies of repose."10
The Supreme Court has emphasized the limited nature of this
exception, stating that a federal limitations period should apply
only where it "clearly provides a closer analogy than available
state statutes, and when the federal policies at stake and the
practicalities of litigation make that rule a significantly more
appropriate vehicle for interstitial lawmaking."11
Our inquiry therefore entails the following successive levels
of analysis. First, courts must "characterize the essence" of the
statute in question to determine which state cause of action is
most analogous.12 Second, courts must determine whether application
of the state limitations period would frustrate the policies
underlying the federal law or impede its practical implementation.13
If a state limitations period would not generate such adverse
consequences, then the state limitations period applies and our
10
Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 270 (1985).
11
North Star, 515 U.S. at 35; see Lampf, 501 U.S. at 355-58;
DelCostello v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 462 U.S.
151, 158-62, 171-72 (1983).
12
Staudt v. Glastron, Inc., 92 F.3d 312, 314 (5th Cir. 1996),
quoting Garcia, 471 U.S. at 268.
13
North Star, 515 U.S. at 35.
5
inquiry is concluded.14 However, if a conflict is apparent, then
courts must examine whether the federal interest in uniformity
mandates the application of an analogous federal standard. This
third level of analysis requires courts to examine whether federal
law affords a closer analogy than state law.15 We now proceed to
examine the relevance of the preceding steps to the instant case.
A
First, we must "characterize the essence" of an action under
sections 553 and 605 of the FCA.16 The legislative history
associated with section 553 and the amendments to section 605
reveals that one of Congress's principal objectives was to
discourage theft of cable services.17 To that end, Congress
articulated a variety of penalties and remedies to "protect the
revenue of television cable companies from unauthorized reception
of their transmissions."18
14
See id. at 37 (noting that, where a state analogue offers
a limitations period without frustrating consequences, "it is
simply beside the point that even a perfectly good federal analogue
exists").
15
See id. at 35; Lampf, 501 U.S. at 355-58.
16
Staudt, 92 F.3d at 314.
17
See Kingvision Pay Per View, Ltd. v. Boom Town Saloon, Inc.,
98 F. Supp. 2d 958, 961 (N.D. Ill. 2000); H.R. Rep. No. 98-934, at
83-85 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4655, 4720-22.
18
Boom Town Saloon, 98 F. Supp. 2d at 961, quoting Time/Warner
Entm't/Advance-Newhouse Partnership v. Worldwide Elec., L.C., 50 F.
6
Section 553(a)(1) provides that "[n]o person shall intercept
or receive or assist in intercepting or receiving any
communications service offered over a cable system, unless
specifically authorized to do so."19 Section 605 similarly states
that "[n]o person not being entitled thereto shall receive or
assist in receiving any interstate or foreign communication by
radio and use such communication (or any information therein
contained) for his own benefit or for the benefit of another not
entitled thereto."20 In addition, section 605 prohibits anyone
unlawfully receiving such communications from divulging or
publishing the information or transmission.21 Both sections
contemplate civil (and criminal) enforcement measures.22
We recognize that courts are divided as to whether and to what
extent section 605 even applies to actions by cable companies.23 In
amending the FCA, Congress in 1984 inserted language referring to
Supp. 2d 1288, 1293 (S.D. Fla. 1999).
19
47 U.S.C. § 553(a)(1).
20
47 U.S.C. § 605(a).
21
Id.
22
See 47 U.S.C. §§ 553(b)-(c), 605(e).
23
Compare United States v. Norris, 88 F.3d 462 (7th Cir. 1996)
(finding that section 605 does not apply to theft of cable services
carried over coaxial cable, but that it does apply to interception
of cable transmissions as they travel through the air), and CSC
Holdings, Inc. v. Kimtron, Inc., 47 F. Supp. 2d 1361 (S.D. Fla.
1999) (following Norris), with International Cablevision, Inc. v.
Sykes, 75 F.3d 123 (2d Cir. 1996) (concluding that section 605
applies to theft of cable service carried over coaxial cable).
7
"satellite cable programming" in section 605(b), which discusses
exceptions to the prohibitions articulated in section 605(a).24
However, Congress did not change the language in section 605(a) to
expressly include cable transmissions. In contrast, Congress
expressly prohibited the unlawful interception of cable
communications in section 553(a). We need not resolve this dispute
today, as the limitations period articulated in the Copyright Act
applies to actions brought under either provision.
Section 553(a)(1) provides an array of civil and criminal
remedies for unauthorized interception of cable signals. Section
553(c)(1) provides "[a]ny person aggrieved by any violation of
subsection (a)(1)" a private right of action.25 Prevailing parties
may obtain injunctive relief, damages, and attorney's fees and
costs.26 Moreover, section 553 contemplates the award of either (1)
actual damages suffered by the plaintiff, as well as recovery of
profits gained by the person violating the Act; or (2) statutory
damages of an amount not less than $250 and not more than $10,000,
"as the court considers just."27 The statute also gives courts the
discretion to increase the actual or statutory damages to up to
24
See Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-
549, § 5(a), 98 Stat. 2779, 2803-04 (codified as amended at 47
U.S.C. § 605(b)).
25
47 U.S.C. § 553(c)(1).
26
See 47 U.S.C. § 553(c)(2).
27
See 47 U.S.C. § 553(c)(3)(A)(ii).
8
$50,000 where willful violations are present.28 Conversely, the
court may reduce damages to not less than $100 where "the violator
was not aware and had no reason to believe that his acts
constituted a violation of this section."29
Section 605 also articulates criminal and civil penalties for
violations of its prohibition against the unauthorized interception
and subsequent publication of transmissions. Like section 553,
section 605(e)(3) provides aggrieved parties with the right to
obtain injunctive relief, damages, and attorney's fees and costs.30
The statute allows for both kinds of actual damages noted above, as
well as statutory damages.31 However, an aggrieved party can recover
slightly higher statutory damages (between $1,000 and $10,000) than
under section 553.32 Finally, courts have the same discretion as
under section 553 to raise or lower the damage award according to
the intent and knowledge of the violator.33 Sections 553 and 605
28
See 47 U.S.C. § 553(c)(3)(B).
29
47 U.S.C. § 553(c)(3)(C).
30
See 47 U.S.C. § 605(e)(3).
31
See 47 U.S.C. § 605(e).
32
See 47 U.S.C. § 605(e)(3)(C)(i)(II). The statute also
provides a private right of action against "[a]ny person who
manufactures, assembles, modifies, imports, exports, sells, or
distributes any electronic, mechanical, or other device or
equipment" used for the decryption of satellite cable programming
or that is intended to facilitate the conduct prohibited in section
605(a). 47 U.S.C. §§ 605(e)(4), 605(e)(3)(C)(i)(II).
33
See 47 U.S.C. §§ 605(e)(3)(C)(ii)—(iii).
9
ultimately implicate similar policy objectives and provide similar
standards and remedies.
B
In assessing the appropriate state-law analogue to the FCA
provisions at issue, we note that the parties have offered three
potential candidates from Louisiana law: (1) Article 3492 of the
Louisiana Civil Code, which governs delictual actions; (2) Article
3499, outlining the standards applicable to personal actions; and
(3) Article 3494, providing for "recovery of compensation."
Appellees contend that the one-year limitations period governing
delictual actions is the most appropriate analogue. Relying on Joe
Hand Promotions, Inc. v. Lott,34 Appellees assert that cable theft
is analogous to the tort of conversion, which is prohibited under
Article 3492.35 Louisiana law defines conversion as "an act in
derogation of the plaintiff's possessory rights, and any wrongful
exercise or assumption of authority over another's goods, depriving
him of the possession, permanently or for an indefinite time."36
Some district courts have found cable theft to be analogous to
34
971 F. Supp. 1058 (E.D. La. 1997).
35
See Charbonnet v. Spalitta, 747 So. 2d 1155, 1158 (La. Ct.
App. 5th Cir. 1999); La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 3492 (rev. cmts.,
1983) ("The notion of delictual liability includes: intentional
misconduct, negligence, abuse of right, and liability without
negligence.").
36
Charbonnet, 747 So. 2d at 1158.
10
conversion, as the defendants in such cases unlawfully
"appropriate" the plaintiff's property (i.e., the cable
transmission).37 Indeed, Prostar's own complaint described
Appellees' conduct as the "interception or tortious conversion" of
Prostar's property.38
Conversion is a closer analogy to the relevant provisions of
the FCA than Louisiana law governing "personal actions." Article
3499 of the Louisiana Civil Code provides a ten-year statute of
limitations for personal actions, which are defined as "those that
seek to enforce personal rights."39 Personal actions include, inter
alia, actions grounded on a lease; actions for the "recovery of
future things;" revocatory actions; and actions sounding in quasi-
contract.40 However, Article 3499 does not apply to tort actions.41
37
See Kingvision Pay Per View, Ltd. v. Wilson, 83 F. Supp. 2d
914, 919 (W.D. Tenn. 2000) (applying Tennessee's three-year statute
of limitations for conversion actions); Joe Hand, 971 F. Supp. at
1063 (applying Louisiana's one-year period for conversion actions);
Kingvision Pay Per View, Ltd. v. Bowers, 36 F. Supp. 2d 915, 918
(D. Kan. 1998) (applying Kansas's two-year limitations period for
conversion actions).
38
Plaintiff's Verified Complaint at 2. See Northcott
Exploration Co. v. W.R. Grace & Co., 430 So. 2d 1077 (La. App. 3d
Cir. 1983) (noting that the character of the action given by the
plaintiff in his pleadings determines the applicable prescription).
39
A.N. Yiannopoulos, 2 Louisiana Civil Law Treatise: Property
§ 242 (3d ed. 1991).
40
See id.; Burns v. Sabine River Auth., 736 So. 2d 977 (La.
App. 3d Cir. 1999).
41
See Elzy v. Roberson, 868 F.2d 793, 794 (5th Cir. 1989).
11
Prostar can not find refuge in quasi-contract, as quasi-contractual
obligation is based on the principles of unjust enrichment.42 Unjust
enrichment requires, inter alia, a showing that the plaintiff has
no other remedy at law. Where a conversion action is available, as
in the instant case, a claim of unjust enrichment is not viable.43
The claims contemplated by Article 3494 are also less
analogous to the instant action than the tort of conversion.
Article 3494 provides a three-year prescriptive period for actions
for the "recovery of compensation for services rendered, including
payment of salaries, wages, commissions, tuition fees, professional
fees, fees and emoluments of public officials, freight, passage,
money, lodging, and board."44 However, as the Louisiana Supreme
Court has observed, Article 3494 "merely provides exceptions to the
general rule stated in Article 3499 that a personal action
42
See Minyard v. Curtis Prods., Inc., 205 So. 2d 422 (La.
1967).
43
See Central Oil & Supply Corp. v. Wilson Oil Co., 511 So.
2d 19, 21 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1987). Prostar also argues that its
claim is "[a] revindicatory action brought to assert or protect the
right of ownership in movable property." Songbyrd, Inc. v.
Bearsville Records, Inc., 104 F.3d 773, 778 (5th Cir. 1997). As
this Court has noted, a revindicatory action for the recovery of
movable property is imprescriptible. See id. However, a
revindicatory action abates when the movable is no longer in the
defendant's possession. See Johnson v. Hardy, 756 So. 2d 328, 332
(La. App. 1st Cir. 1999). Prostar is suing for damages, not for the
recovery of the broadcast. Appellees can not be viewed as remaining
in "possession" of the broadcast.
44
La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 3494(1). This provision also
encompasses actions for arrearages of rent and annuities, as well
as actions on money lent. See La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 3494(2)-(3).
12
prescribes in ten years."45 We have already noted that Prostar's
claim is not analogous to a personal action. A fortiori, Prostar's
claim does not qualify as an exception to the statute governing
personal actions. Perusal of the kinds of actions listed in Article
3494 confirms our conclusion that its provisions are inapposite to
the case at bar.
C
Having determined that the tort of conversion provides the
closest state-law analogue to Prostar's claim, we must examine
whether or not Article 3492 of the Louisiana Civil Code is "at odds
with" the FCA's "purpose or operation, or frustrate[s] or
interfere[s] with the intent behind it."46 Prostar contends, first,
that application of a one-year statute of limitations would not
provide victims of cable theft with enough time to investigate,
uncover, and file claims against violators. Prostar refers to the
"ever evolving technological developments which enable signal
pirates to 'cloak' their theft or misuse such transmissions."
Prostar argues that adoption of the "relatively short" period of
one year would actually encourage piracy by making it easier for
malefactors to evade detection. While we are sympathetic to the
45
Grabert v. Iberia Parish Sch. Bd., 638 So. 2d 645, 647 (La.
1994).
46
North Star Steel Co. v. Thomas, 515 U.S. 29, 35 (1995)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
13
cable industry's concerns in this regard, we are not prepared to
say that one year is too short as a matter of law for investigation
and detection of violations. Prostar presents no evidence or
references to support its assertions that one year is insufficient.
Indeed, it concedes that a "plaintiff can readily identify that an
establishment exhibited a broadcast without paying the appropriate
license fee." Prostar states that the more difficult task is
identifying the entity or individuals involved. Again, we can not
say that one year is insufficient.47
Prostar argues that the need for national uniformity in
enforcing the FCA requires the application of a single standard. As
Prostar observes, the cable industry is a distinctly national (and
international) enterprise. In the 1984 House Report accompanying
passage of amendments to the FCA, the House committee noted that
the issues facing the cable industry were national in scope and
underscored the need for a correspondingly national enforcement
regime.48
47
The instant case is therefore distinguishable from
DelCostello v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151
(1983), in which the Supreme Court held that state-law limitations
periods of thirty and ninety days were too short for actions
brought under section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act and
the fair representation doctrine.
48
See, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 98-934 (1984), at 22, 83-85,
reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4655, 4659, 4720-22.
14
The posture of the instant case affirms the "multistate
nature" of actions brought under the FCA.49 Prostar is a Texas
corporation suing for alleged signal piracy conducted in a
Louisiana establishment. More generally, cable broadcasts are
routinely conducted on a national and international scale. Cable
piracy consequently differs from many of the cases where courts
have applied state-law limitations periods, as these typically
involved isolated events, such as a plant closing or "mass layoff"
at a single site of employment;50 the termination of an employee;51
or a wrongful arrest.52
We find that application of Louisiana conversion law to cable
piracy claims brought under 47 U.S.C. § 553 and 605 would undermine
the implementation of the FCA.53 The application of state conversion
49
See Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrew v. Gilbertson,
501 U.S. 350, 357 (1991).
50
See North Star, 515 U.S. at 36-37.
51
See Hogan v. Kraft Foods, 969 F.2d 142, 145 (5th Cir. 1992).
52
See Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 276-79 (1985).
53
We recognize that the Supreme Court has on one occasion
responded to the need for uniformity by eschewing a federal
standard and mandating the application of a single state-law cause
of action. For example, in Wilson v. Garcia, the Supreme Court held
that each state's personal injury law would furnish the appropriate
statute of limitations for claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
See Garcia, 471 U.S. at 276. However, that case involved a civil
rights claim - i.e., a wrongful arrest and alleged battery - that
was local in character. For such actions, the Court felt that
"uniformity within each state" was sufficient. Id. at 275. The
multistate character of the activity in question distinguishes the
instant case from Garcia.
15
law in each of the fifty states would result in widely varying
limitations periods.54 As Prostar notes, cable companies engage in
multistate activities and would consequently be required to "make
fifty separate decisions" in their efforts to investigate and
pursue cable piracy. A single federal standard would eliminate
these practical difficulties, facilitating resolution of the
national problems addressed by the FCA.
D
We conclude that the Copyright Act provides the appropriate
federal-law analogue to Prostar's FCA claims. Indeed, the Copyright
Act provides a "closer fit" than conversion.55 The Copyright Act and
the FCA both protect proprietary rights in the context of cable
transmissions. The Copyright Act prohibits infringement by
"[a]nyone who violates any of the exclusive rights of the copyright
owner."56 Infringement encompasses the unauthorized performance or
54
Compare, e.g., La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 3492 (articulating
a one-year prescriptive period), with R.I. Gen. Laws § 9-1-13
(2000) (imposing a ten-year statute of limitations).
55
See Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrew v. Gilbertson,
501 U.S. 350, 357 (1991). The Supreme Court has noted that
"commonality of purpose and similarity of elements will be
relevant" to determining whether federal law is more analogous than
state law. Id. at 358.
56
17 U.S.C. § 501(a). To succeed on a claim for direct
copyright infringement, a plaintiff must show: (1) ownership of the
copyrighted material, and (2) copying by the defendant. See Alcatel
USA, Inc. v. DGI Technologies, Inc., 166 F.3d 772, 790 (5th Cir.
1999).
16
display of motion pictures and other audiovisual works.57 Moreover,
the statute explicitly prohibits infringement in the context of
secondary transmissions by cable systems.58 The unauthorized access
and retransmission of cable broadcasting, which the FCA prohibits,
does not actually deprive the licensee of its license. Whereas
conversion requires the wrongful deprivation of one's possession of
property,59 the Copyright Act provides for liability when mere
copying occurs, rendering it a more appropriate analogue to the
FCA.60
In addition, both statutes have similar remedial structures.
For instance, the FCA and the Copyright Act allow for statutory and
actual damages.61 Both acts give the court discretion to increase
57
See 17 U.S.C. § 106(4)-(5). See Kepner-Tregoe, Inc. v.
Leadership Software, Inc., 12 F.3d 527, 532 (5th Cir. 1994) (noting
that copying of copyrighted computer program violates the Copyright
Act); National Cable Television Ass'n, Inc. v. Broadcast Music,
Inc., 772 F. Supp. 614, 651 (D.D.C. 1991) (holding that
transmission by cable programmers of programming containing
copyrighted music constitutes public performance of that music,
creating liability for infringement).
58
See 17 U.S.C. § 501(c)-(e).
59
See La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 3492; Charbonnet v. Spalitta,
747 So. 2d 1155, 1158 (La. Ct. App. 5th Cir. 1999).
60
This Court has stated that copyright infringement by the
unauthorized distribution of copies is not "stealing, converting,
or taking by fraud." United States v. Smith, 686 F.2d 234, 242 (5th
Cir. 1982). We have also recognized that taping copies of a
copyrighted broadcast "does not implicate a tangible item. . . . .
nothing was removed from someone's possession." Id. at 243.
61
See 17 U.S.C. § 504(b), (c); 47 U.S.C. §§ 553(c)(3)(A),
605(e)(3)(C)(i).
17
the statutory damage award for willful violations.62 Finally, both
acts also provide for the award of costs and attorney's fees.63
We refuse to interpret Congress's failure to articulate a
statute of limitations for 47 U.S.C. §§ 553 and 605 as an
inexorable command that courts apply state law. Although courts are
frequently justified in assuming that Congress "intend[ed] by its
silence that we borrow state law,"64 silence may also indicate that
Congress did not give "any express consideration to the problem of
limitations periods."65 Furthermore, Congress's failure to
subsequently amend the statute to include a limitations period may
only "betoken[] unawareness, preoccupation, or paralysis."66 Inertia
is endemic to the legislative process, rendering congressional
inaction a problematic interpretive guide.67 More fundamentally, if
62
See 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2); 47 U.S.C. §§ 553(c)(3)(B),
605(e)(3)(C)(ii).
63
See 17 U.S.C. § 505; 47 U.S.C. §§ 553(c)(2)(C),
605(e)(B)(iii).
64
North Star Steel Co. v. Thomas, 515 U.S. 29, 35 (1995)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
65
DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 158 n.12. See also International
Union v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696, 709 (1966) (White,
J., dissenting) ("[T]he silence of Congress is not to be read as
automatically putting an imprimatur on state law.").
66
Brown v. Gardner, 513 U.S. 115, 121-22 (1994), quoting Zuber
v. Allen, 396 U.S. 168, 185 n.21 (1969); see also Patterson v.
McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 175 n.1 (1989) ("Congressional
inaction cannot amend a duly enacted statute.").
67
See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Interpreting Legislative
Inaction, 87 Mich. L. Rev. 67, 98-104 (1988) (discussing the causes
18
this Court were to always find dispositive Congress's failure to
include a statute of limitations, we would apply a state statute of
limitations in every case. Such an outcome would run counter to the
Supreme Court's clear mandate that courts apply federal law in
limited circumstances.68 Because we find that such circumstances are
present in the instant case, we reject the reasoning adopted in Joe
Hand Promotions, Inc. v. Lott69 and hold that the three-year
limitations period articulated in the Copyright Act governs
Prostar's FCA claims.70 As Prostar's claims were not time-barred,
we hereby REVERSE the district court's judgment and REMAND for
further proceedings.
REVERSED.
and characteristics of legislative inertia).
68
See Kingvision Pay Per View, Ltd. v. Boom Town Saloon, Inc.,
98 F. Supp. 2d 958, 964 (N.D. Ill. 2000).
69
971 F. Supp. 1058 (E.D. La. 1997).
70
This holding is consonant with Boom Town Saloon, Inc., 98
F. Supp. 2d at 964; Entertainment by J&J, Inc. v. Tia Maria
Mexican Restaurant & Cantina, Inc., 97 F. Supp. 2d 775, 779-80
(S.D. Tex. 2000); and That's Entertainment of Illinois, Inc. v.
Centel Videopath, Inc., No. 93 C 1471, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19488,
at *19-*20 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 9, 1993).
19