1-,) ORIGINAL 06/20/2023
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
Case Number: DA 23-0253
DA 23-0253
ADAM PUMMILL, an individual, and ADAM
PUMMILL and KURTIS ROBERTSON as a
member of Black Gold Enterprises, LLC, members
of, and on behalf of BLACK GOLD
ENTERPRISES, LLC,
JUN 2 0 2023
Plaintiffs and Appellees, Bowen Cit,-erivvuod
Couri
Clerk of Supreme
State of Montana
v.
JOSHUA T. PATTERSON a/k/a JOSH
PATTERSON, as an individual and d/b/a
PATTERSON ENTERPRISES, INC., also d/b/a
ROCKY MOUNTAIN EQUIPMENT, INC., p/k/a
ROCKY MOUNTAIN JCB, INC., also d/b/a ORDER
ROCKY MOUNTAIN RENTAL SPECIALISTS,
LLC, also d/b/a ROCKY MOUNTAIN
EQUIPMENT also d/b/a ROCKY MOUNTAIN
RENTAL, also d/b/a ROCKY MOUNTAIN
EQUIPMENT OF MISSOULA MONTANA,
Defendants and Appellants,
and
JIM GALIPEAU,
Receiver and Appellee.
Receiver and Appellee Jim Galipeau (Galipeau) has moved to dismiss this appeal.
Defendants and Appellants Joshua T. Patterson and Patterson Enterprises, Inc. (collectively
Patterson), oppose Galipeau's motion.
As a preliminary matter, we have amended the caption to reflect the parties on
appeal despite Patterson's assertion to the contrary. In the response to the motion to
dismiss, Patterson argues that Galipeau has no standing to seek dismissal because he is not
a party to this appeal. Patterson asserts that Galipeau fails to cite any authority for the
proposition that he may participate in this appeal when he is not a party litigant. However,
we do not fault Galipeau for this alleged deficiency as Galipeau has fully participated as if
he were a party to this litigation—not only in filing the motion that resulted in the order
Patterson seeks to appeal but also appearing as Appellee in a previous appeal in this case—
apparently with no previous objection from Patterson as to Galipeau's status as a party.
Although Patterson provides no authority in support of his argument that Galipeau
is not a proper party to this appeal, we generally agree that receivers are normally not
considered a party to a lawsuit as the receiver's role is to act as a fiduciary representing the
court and all parties in interest. The court order appointing the receiver defines the
receiver's authority. Equity Trust Co. v. Cole, 766 N.W.2d 334, 341 (Minn. Ct. App.
2009). In this case, the District Court defined the receiver's duties to include the power to
bring and defend actions in the receiver's own name, as receiver. The court authorized the
receiver to bring supplemental proceedings, and further provided, "The Receiver shall be
entitled to payment of fees from Black Gold Enterprises, LLC's estate's funds for his
service at his standard rate of $225.00 per hour, plus such other amounts as may be awarded
by the Court after a hearing upon notice to the parties and all counsel of record."
It is from a District Court order directing the payment of Galipeau's fees submitted
under the authority granted to Galipeau in the Order Appointing Receiver from which
Patterson now seeks relief on appeal. Galipeau had the express authority to request such
fees and the concomitant a,uthority to defend his request on appeal; to hold otherwise would
be to deny Galipeau due process.
As for the substance of Galipeau's motion to dismiss, he argues that the District
Court's May 2, 2023 Order Granting Receiver's Motion for Summary Judgment Regarding
Fixture Filing and Denying Defendant's Motion to Alter or Amend the Court's March 8,
2023 Order and Stay Dispersal of Funds is not properly before this Court. He maintains
no justiciable controversy exists because the court's order was interlocutory. Galipeau
2
admits M. R. App. P. 6(3)(g) provides that an aggrieved party may appeal from an order
giving directions with respect to a receivership, but he claims the order does not direct the
Receiver to do anything, but merely authorizes the payment of attorney and other
professional fees to the Receiver.
Patterson disagrees, arguing that Rule 6(3)(g) applies to any "order . . . giving
directions with respect to a receivership," not only those orders that explicitly direct a
receiver to act. Here, the District Court's order provides for the immediate payment of
nearly $250,000 from the approximately $313,000 that Patterson has on deposit with the
court. Patterson argues the court's order that the Clerk transfer these funds to Galipeau
constitutes "directions with respect to a receivership."
We agree with Patterson. In this instance, the order Patterson seeks to appeal gives
directions with respect to a receivership and it is therefore immediately appealable under
M. R. App. P. 6(3)(g).
Although Galipeau argues that such an interpretation would fail to preserve judicial
economy by making every order issued in a receivership proceeding to be immediately
appealable, his interpretation of the Rule is incorrect. First, the Rule is not so broad, but
applies only to orders that give directions with respect to the receivership. Second, M. R.
App. P. 6(3) provides that certain orders are appealable only if the order at issue is the
court's final decision on the referenced matter. Thus, our interpretation does not mean that
every order is appealable under Rule 6(3) if the case involves a receivership. Appealability
remains constrained only to such orders as meet the Rule's requirements.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the motion to dismiss is DENIED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Appellant shall prepare, file, and serve its
Opening Brief on this appeal no later than 30 days from the date of this Order.
The Clerk is cnttzt!d to provide a copy of this Order to all counsel of record.
Dated this ZÒ -day of June, 2023.
Chief Justice
3
Justices
4
Pummill v. Patterson
Combined Opinion