UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
________________________________
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LEEBERT RAMCHARAN, )
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Plaintiff, )
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v. ) Civil Action No. 18-2759 (EGS)
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UNITED STATES DRUG )
ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION, )
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Defendant. )
________________________________ )
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff, appearing pro se, brought this action to compel disclosure of his records from
the Drug Enforcement Administration (“DEA”). See Compl. for Injunctive Relief, ECF No. 1.
Pending before the Court is Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 20. Pursuant
to the amended briefing schedule, plaintiff’s response was due by June 5, 2020. Despite the
Court’s advisements about the consequences of not responding to the instant dispositive motion,
see Mar. 3, 2020 Order, ECF No. 23, plaintiff has neither filed a response nor requested more
time to respond -- as he has done before. So, for the reasons explained below, the Court will
grant defendant’s motion and enter judgment accordingly.
I. BACKGROUND
In support of summary judgment, defendant has proffered the Declaration of Angela D.
Hertel, Acting Unit Chief of the DEA’s Freedom of Information/Privacy Act Unit, ECF No. 21-
1; Hertel’s Second Declaration, ECF No. 20-1; and the Declaration of Jill Aronica, Information
Systems Chief of the Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Forces Executive Office, ECF
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No. 22-1. The Court also considers defendant’s unrefuted Statement of Undisputed Material
Facts (“SOF”), ECF No. 20 at 3-4.
It is undisputed that on October 3, 2016, plaintiff requested “arrest records, mug shots,
investigation reports, and warrants, among other things during the period of January 1, 1979
through the date of the request.” SOF ¶ 1. On March 1, 2017, DEA informed plaintiff of “an
estimated fee of $6,880.00 to complete the request after conducting a preliminary query for the
records sought.” Id. ¶ 3. “Citing an inability to pay the estimated fee,” plaintiff first narrowed
the request “solely to DEA 6 Forms involving [him] completed between . . . 2000 and . . . 2016,”
id. ¶ 4; thereafter, he twice modified the request. See id. ¶¶ 6-7. Plaintiff’s “final modification,”
on June 21, 2018, “sought records associated with his criminal prosecution.” Id. ¶ 7. DEA’s
search located 117 responsive pages, 45 of which were released in part or in full. See id. ¶ 9.
II. LEGAL FRAMEWORK
A. Rule 56
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, summary judgment should be granted if
the moving party shows that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that it is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,
325 (1986); Waterhouse v. District of Columbia, 298 F.3d 989, 991 (D.C. Cir. 2002). In
determining whether a genuine issue of material fact exists, the court must view all facts in the
light most favorable to the non-moving party and draw all reasonable inferences in his favor.
See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986); Waterhouse,
298 F.3d at 991.
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B. FOIA
The FOIA requires agencies to disclose all requested agency records, 5 U.S.C. § 552(a),
unless one of nine specific statutory exemptions applies, id. § 552(b). “FOIA’s ‘strong
presumption in favor of disclosure places the burden on the agency’ to justify nondisclosure.”
Consumers’ Checkbook, Ctr. for the Study of Servs. v. United States HHS, 554 F.3d 1046, 1057
(D.C. Cir. 2009) (quoting Dep't of State v. Ray, 502 U.S. 164, 173 (1991)). Upon complaint,
judicial review is de novo, 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B), which means that the Court must ascertain
from its independent review of the record whether the agency has complied with its disclosure
obligations. See Assassination Archives & Research Ctr. v. C.I.A., 334 F.3d 55, 57 (D.C. Cir.
2003) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). The Court may rely on agency affidavits
or declarations that are “relatively detailed and non-conclusory.” Judicial Watch, Inc. v. U.S.
Dep't of Commerce, 375 F. Supp. 3d 93, 97 (D.D.C. 2019) (quoting SafeCard Servs., Inc. v.
S.E.C., 926 F.2d 1197, 1200 (D.C. Cir. 1991)). Ultimately, an agency’s justification for
invoking a FOIA exemption is sufficient if it appears “logical” or “plausible.” Wolf v. CIA, 473
F.3d 370, 374-75 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (citations omitted).
III. DISCUSSION
By his silence, plaintiff concedes that he “submitted 3 modifications to his initial FOIA
request,” SOF ¶ 8, and that his “narrowed” request for “the file associated with his criminal
trial,” is the subject of this lawsuit, Hertel Decl. ¶ 31. In addition, plaintiff concedes the
declarant’s statements demonstrating the adequacy of DEA’s search. See id. ¶¶ 6-9, 32-34.
The remaining question is whether the record supports summary judgment on DEA’s
withholding of 72 responsive pages in full and 36 pages in part, under FOIA exemptions 5, 6,
7(C), (7)(D), 7(E), and 7(F), codified in 5 U.S.C. § 552(b). SOF ¶ 9.
The D.C. Circuit instructs:
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Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a motion for summary
judgment cannot be “conceded” for want of opposition. The
burden is always on the movant to demonstrate why summary
judgment is warranted. The nonmoving party’s failure to oppose
summary judgment does not shift that burden. Grimes v. District of
Columbia, 794 F.3d 83, 97 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (Griffith, J.,
concurring). The District Court “must always determine for itself
whether the record and any undisputed material facts justify
granting summary judgment.” Id. (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(3)).
Winston & Strawn, LLP v. McLean, 843 F.3d 503, 505 (D.C. Cir. 2016). “[C]ourts in this district
have observed that ‘this does not mean . . . that the Court must assess the legal sufficiency of
each and every [uncontested] exemption invoked by the government in a FOIA case.’” Schaerr
v. United States Dep’t of Justice, 435 F. Supp. 3d 99, 109 (D.D.C. 2020) (quoting Shapiro v.
Dep’t of Justice, 239 F. Supp. 3d 100, 105–06 n.1 (D.D.C. 2017)). Still, a court “should state on
the record the reasons for granting or denying” a summary judgment motion. Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(a).
DEA has explained its withholdings in sufficient detail, and its justifications are
consistent with D.C. Circuit law. See Hertel Decl. ¶¶ 38-63; Aronica Decl. ¶¶ 3-5; Def.’s Mem.,
ECF No. 20 at 9-18. DEA has shown that “[a]ll responsive information was examined to
determine whether any reasonably segregable information could be released,” Hertel Decl. ¶ 64,
and that all reasonably segregable information indeed was released, see id. ¶¶ 64-66; Aronica
Decl. ¶¶ 3-5.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, defendant’s motion for summary judgment is granted. A
separate order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.
SIGNED: EMMET G. SULLIVAN
Date: September 8, 2020 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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