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Ramos-Falcón v. Autoridad De Energía Eléctrica

Court: Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
Date filed: 2002-08-20
Citations: 301 F.3d 1
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3 Citing Cases

          United States Court of Appeals
                     For the First Circuit


No. 01-2182

   RICARDO RAMOS-FALCÓN; RICARDO RAMOS-HERNANDEZ; IRMA FALCÓN,

                     Plaintiffs, Appellants,

                               v.

                 AUTORIDAD DE ENERGÍA ELÉCTRICA,

                      Defendant, Appellee.


          APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

                 FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO

        [Hon. Juan M. Pérez-Giménez, U.S. District Judge]


                             Before

                      Boudin, Chief Judge,
                 Bownes, Senior Circuit Judge,
                   and Selya, Circuit Judge.



         Antonio Bauza Torres for appellants.

          Lionel E. Santa-Crispín,    Puerto   Rico   Electric   Power
Authority, for appellee.



                        August 20, 2002
          PER CURIAM.    Plaintiff-appellant Ricardo Ramos Falcón

filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the

District of Puerto Rico alleging violations of the Americans With

Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq.       Ramos Falcón

contends that defendant-appellee Autoridad de Energía Eléctrica

(PREPA) deprived him of a reasonable accommodation when it forcibly

expelled him from its parking lot.      The district court entered a

default judgment against PREPA.     Following a post-default hearing

on damages, however, the court dismissed Ramos Falcón's ADA claim.

We vacate the dismissal and remand for further proceedings on the

ground that the court failed to provide notice to Ramos Falcón that

it was taking evidence concerning the merits of his case at the

damages hearing.

                            BACKGROUND

          Plaintiff-appellants are Ricardo Ramos Falcón and his

father, Ricardo Ramos Hernandez, and mother, Irma Falcón.       Ramos

Falcón depends on a wheelchair to get around.

          In   his   complaint,   Ramos   Falcón   alleges   that   on

February 23, 1999, he entered a parking lot maintained by PREPA for

its customers in order to pay his monthly electric bill.            The

automobile in which he was riding carried his wheelchair and was

driven by his father, Ricardo Ramos Hernández. In the parking lot,

Ramos Hernández stopped the car in order to unload his son's

wheelchair. A parking lot employee ordered Ramos Hernández to move


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the car.    Father and son tried to explain to the employee why it

was necessary to park the automobile where it was.                   They asked the

employee for permission to unload the wheelchair so Ramos Falcón

could proceed to PREPA's office.

           The   employee,    in    a    violent       and   aggressive    manner,

insisted on the removal of the wheelchair and the car and pushed

the wheelchair with Ramos Falcón still seated in it.                  Ramos Falcón

was thrown to the pavement and his wheelchair landed on top of him.

As a result, he experienced severe pain and suffering, underwent

medical    treatment   and   therapy          for   two    years,    and   suffered

additional physical limitations.              Ramos Hernández alleges severe

emotional harm as a result of witnessing the events.

           The complaint alleged, inter alia, "No other reasonable

accommodations were available to Plaintiffs in order to unload

Ramos Falcón and his wheelchair from the car."

           PREPA   failed    to    answer      Ramos      Falcón's    complaint   or

otherwise appear.      Accordingly, the court entered a default on

September 7, 2000.     On January 11, 2001, the court held a hearing

on default and damages, at which it heard evidence concerning,

inter alia, two handicap parking spaces available at the PREPA

parking lot.     PREPA failed to appear for the trial.

           On January 24, 2001, PREPA filed a motion to set aside

the entry of default, which the court denied.                  On June 20, 2001,

the court dismissed Ramos Falcón's complaint on the merits.                       In


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support of this holding, it held that the existence of the two

handicap parking spaces provided "equal opportunity of enjoying the

premises or services."

                                   DISCUSSION

             After    entry   of     a   default       judgment,    Fed.   R.     Civ.

P. 55(b)(2) provides as follows:

           If, in order to enable the court to enter
           judgment or to carry it into effect, it is
           necessary to take an account or to determine
           the amount of damages or to establish the
           truth of any averment by evidence or to make
           an investigation of any other matter, the
           court may conduct such hearings or order such
           references as it deems necessary and proper
           and shall accord a right of trial by jury to
           the parties . . ..

The court also may examine a plaintiff's complaint, taking all

well-pleaded factual allegations as true, to determine whether it

alleges a cause of action.          Quirindongo Pacheco v. Rolón Morales,

953 F.2d 15, 16 (1st Cir. 1992).

           Additionally,      the    court       may     conduct   a   hearing      to

"establish the truth of any averment" in the complaint.                            Id.

However,   "[i]n     this   circuit,      we     have    stated    that    this    is

appropriate only if the court has made 'its requirements known in

advance to   the     plaintiff,     so    that    [he]    could    understand     the

direction of the proceeding and marshall such evidence as might be

available to [him].'" Id. (quoting McGinty v. Berenger Volkswagen,

Inc., 633 F.2d 226, 229 (1st Cir. 1980)).



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            In this case, the post-default hearing involved evidence

concerning, inter alia, the complaint's allegation that PREPA

provided no reasonable accommodations to unload Ramos Falcón and

his wheelchair from the car.        Central to the court's dismissal of

the ADA claim was its determination that PREPA had satisfied its

obligation to provide "equal opportunity" by making available

handicap parking spaces.         The record does not show, however, that

the district court provided adequate notice to Ramos Falcón that it

intended to address this issue at the post-default damages hearing.

In   the   absence   of   such   notice,   the   district   court   erred   in

dismissing the ADA claim. See Quirindongo Pacheco, 953 F.2d at 16.

            Accordingly, we VACATE the entry of judgment in favor of

PREPA and REMAND this matter to the district court for further

proceedings consistent with this opinion.




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