The only question worthy 0f not¡ce jn this case, is whether Merrifield, after the release from the defendant, was a competent witness.
The action was trover against the defendant, a constable, for taking the property on executions against the witness; the plaintiff claiming it by virtue of a previous purchase from him, but which the defendant alleged was fraudulent. Merrifield was called to prove the fraud. Aside from the question of fraud, he would seem to have been indifferent, for then, in any event of the cause, he stood responsible to the losing party, either to the purchaser or judgment creditor as the case might be. It was supposed that Bland v. Ansley et al., 2 New R. 330, is an authority against this view ; but on looking at that case it will be found that the point there was whether the property had in fact been sold to the plaintiff by the witness, and hence there was no liability over to the plaintiff admitted, if the verdict resulted for the defendant. The interest therefore was exclusively on one side. 2 Starkie, 751, Phil. ed. (n. c.) In Davis v. Dinwoody, 4 T. R. 678, a new trial was granted, not on the ground of the interest, but upon the principle that forbids husbands and wives from being witnesses for or against each other. The case, as stated by Mr. Starkie, 2 vol. 401, is calculated to mislead the reader. A note on the same page, however, sufficiently explains the text.
But assuming to be true what the witness was offered to prove, and did most effectually prove, namely, a fraudulent sale by him of the property in question to the plaintiff; could the latter now recover back the price paid, since a verdict for the defendant has, in effect, taken the property out of his hands ? In other words, did the witness stand indifferent in consequence of being legally liable over to the plaintiff, in case he failed in the suit ? If not thus liable; then his interest was exclusively in favor of the party calling' him. It is true, the witness by the sale impliedly warranted the title. 6 Johns. R. 5. But such warranty did not extend to the operation, and effect of the fraud in the sale to which the vendee was a party; he must be considered as having assumed that hazard upon himself, as
Did the release from the defendant operate to discharge the witness from his liability on the executions, so as to make him indifferent l Had it come from the party in interest, no doubt it would have had that effect. The constable, however, could not release the judgment or debt. The witness might still be called on to pay ; the judgment would or might be revived, in case of a recovery of the property taken, upon the ground that it did not belong to the defendant in the execution, and still remain an existing and operative demand.
New trial granted, costs to abide event.