Reed v. American Airlines, Inc.

No. 81-288
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
1981

FRED REED,
Petitioner,

AMERICAN AIRLINES, INC.,
Respondent.

ORIGINAL PROCEEDING:
Counsel of Record:
For Petitioner:
William Boggs argued, Missoula, Montana
For Respondent:
Keller, Reynolds, Drake, Sternhagen and Johnson,
Helena, Montana
Kieth Keller argued, Helena, Montana

Submitted: December 7, 1981
Decided: February 18, 1982
Mr. J u s t i c e Frank B. M o r r i s o n , J r . , d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of
t h e Court.

T h i s c a s e i s c e r t i f i e d from U.S. D i s t r i c t Court, t h e

D i s t r i c t of Montana, Missoula D i v i s i o n . P e t i t i o n e r had

f i l e d a d i v e r s i t y a c t i o n based upon t h e a l l e g e d n e g l i g e n c e

of American A i r l i n e s , I n c . , i n t h e h a n d l i n g and s u b s e q u e n t

l o s s of p e t i t i o n e r ' s l u g g a g e i n New York C i t y . In that

c o m p l a i n t , p l a i n t i f f Reed a f f i r m a t i v e l y a l l e g e d t h a t t h e

d e f e n d a n t c o r p o r a t i o n w a s "found w i t h i n Montana." Defendant,

American A i r l i n e s , f i l e d a motion t o d i s m i s s t h e c o m p l a i n t

f o r t h e r e a s o n t h a t t h e United S t a t e s D i s t r i c t C o u r t l a c k e d

personal j u r i s d i c t i o n over t h e defendant. The c e r t i f i c a t i o n

followed.

C e r t i f i c a t i o n presents the following issues:

" ( 1 ) Was t h e d e f e n d a n t American A i r l i n e s
found i n Montana?

" ( 2 ) I f n o t , do t h e l e t t e r e d s u b d i v i s i o n s
of Rule 4 B ( 1 ) e x t e n d t h a t j u r i s d i c t i o n t o
c a s e s where t h e c l a i m d o e s n o t a r i s e o u t
of t h e d o i n g of t h e a c t s mentioned i n t h e
l e t t e r e d subdivisions?"

W e f i n d i s s u e 1 t o be d i s p o s i t i v e .

R e s o l u t i o n of t h e f i r s t i s s u e depends upon t h e f a c t s

found i n t h i s r e c o r d . W e t h e r e f o r e s e t them f o r t h i n d e t a i l .

P l a i n t i f f t r a v e l e d t o New York C i t y from M i s s o u l a ,

Montana, v i a Northwest A i r l i n e s on December 5 , 1978. Plaintiff

i n t e n d e d t o t r a n s f e r f l i g h t s and c o n t i n u e t o Nepal on

B r i t i s h Airways. During t h e p r o c e s s of t r a n s f e r , t h e p l a i n t i f f
l o s t a c a s e c o n t a i n i n g i n e x c e s s of $2,000 worth of p r o f e s s i o n a l

camera equipment. The c a s e u l t i m a t e l y a r r i v e d i n Nepal s e v e r a l

weeks l a t e r b u t was found t o be empty. The damages a t t e n d a n t

t h i s l o s s formed t h e b a s i s of p l a i n t i f f ' s c l a i m .

Except f o r a n i n f r e q u e n t c h a r t e r f l i g h t , American
~ i r l i n e s o e s n o t f l y i n t o o r o u t of Montana.
d I t h a s no
p r o p e r t y n o r p e r s o n n e l i n Montana. I t p a y s no t a x e s i n

Montana. American A i r l i n e s does s o l i c i t b u s i n e s s i n Montana

by l i s t i n g s i n 19 Montana t e l e p h o n e d i r e c t o r i e s , by t e l e v i s i o n

a d v e r t i s i n g b r o a d c a s t i n Montana, and by f u r n i s h i n g m a t e r i a l
t o t r a v e l a g e n t s i n Montana. O c c a s i o n a l l y American A i r l i n e s '

p e r s o n n e l come t o Montana t o i n s t r u c t Montana t r a v e l a g e n t s .

The a i r l i n e s h a s p r o v i d e d a s e r v i c e e n a b l i n g Montana r e s i d e n t s

t o c a l l t o l l f r e e , s c h e d u l i n g f l i g h t s on American A i r l i n e s .

D e f e n d a n t ' s b u s i n e s s o r i g i n a t i n g t h r o u g h c a l l s from Montana

d i r e c t t o American A i r l i n e s o r t h r o u g h Montana-based t r a v e l

a g e n c i e s approximated $803,000 i n 1980 and $992,000 from

March t o December of 1979.

The p l a i n t i f f i s a c i t i z e n of t h e S t a t e of Montana.

American A i r l i n e s i s a Delaware c o r p o r a t i o n p r i n c i p a l l y

d o m i c i l e d i n Texas. The conduct of which p l a i n t i f f complains

of d e f e n d a n t o c c u r r e d i n New York.

Under t h e f a c t s above s e t f o r t h , w e h o l d t h a t American

A i r l i n e s was "found w i t h i n Montana" and t h a t t h e r e i s j u r i s d i c t i o n

i n t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s ~ i s t r i c C o u r t f o r t h e ~ i s t r i c of
t t

Montana.

B e f o r e t h e a c t i v i t i e s of a f o r e i g n c o r p o r a t i o n c a n

c r e a t e a p h y s i c a l p r e s e n c e w i t h i n Montana, t h o s e a c t i v i t i e s

must be s u b s t a n t i a l , c o n t i n u o u s , and s y s t e m a t i c a s opposed

t o isolated, casual, o r incidental. The a c t i v i t i e s must

comprise a s i g n i f i c a n t component of t h e company's b u s i n e s s ,

a l t h o u g h t h e p e r c e n t a g e a s r e l a t e d t o t o t a l b u s i n e s s may be

small. See, e.g., O'Neal v . Hicks Brokerage Company ( 4 t h

Cir. 1 9 7 6 ) , 537 F.2d 1266; R a t l i f f v . Cooper L a b o r a t o r i e s ,

Inc. (4th C i r . 1 9 7 1 ) , 4 4 4 F.2d 745; Lee v . Walworth Valve

Co. (4th C i r . 1 9 7 3 ) , 482 F.2d 297.
 W e must d e c i d e where American A i r l i n e s , under t h e f a c t s

h e r e b e f o r e u s , f i t s w i t h i n t h e l e g a l framework p r o v i d e d . A

s t r i k i n g l y s i m i l a r f a c t s i t u a t i o n was p r e s e n t e d i n Ladd v .

KLM ~ o y a l u t c h i r l i n e s(S.D. N . Y .
~ ~ 1 9 7 8 ) , 456 F.Supp. 422.

I n t h a t c a s e , p l a i n t i f f b r o u g h t an a c t i o n i n F e d e r a l C o u r t i n

Tennessee and t h e c a s e was h e a r d by a f e d e r a l d i s t r i c t judge

i n New York S t a t e p u r s u a n t t o 28 U.S.C. 1407. The i s s u e was

whether t h e Tennessee c o u r t had j u r i s d i c t i o n . Defendant

a i r l i n e had i t s p r i n c i p a l p l a c e of b u s i n e s s i n t h e N e t h e r l a n d s .

I t was n o t a u t h o r i z e d t o f l y i n t o o r o u t of any p l a c e w i t h i n

Tennessee. I t was n o t a u t h o r i z e d t o do b u s i n e s s i n Tennessee

and p a i d no t a x e s i n t h a t s t a t e . The a i r l i n e had no o f f i c e

o r bank a c c o u n t i n Tennessee and d i d n o t own o r l e a s e any

property there. However, t h e a i r l i n e d i d m a i n t a i n t o l l f r e e

numbers w i t h i n t h e s t a t e and a d v e r t i s e d i n s i x major t e l e p h o n e

directories. The a i r l i n e s u p p l i e d p r o m o t i o n a l m a t e r i a l s t o

Tennessee t r a v e l a g e n t s and p e r i o d i c a l l y s e n t p e r s o n n e l i n t o

Tennessee f o r t h e p u r p o s e of i n s t r u c t i n g t h o s e t r a v e l a g e n t s .

T r a v e l a g e n c i e s i n Tennessee accounted f o r t o t a l b u s i n e s s

volume i n 1976 of $323,304. O t h e s e f a c t s , t h e c o u r t found
n

t h e d e f e n d a n t a i r l i n e t o b e p r e s e n t i n Tennessee f o r p u r p o s e

of c o n f e r r i n g i n personam j u r i s d i c t i o n .

Another s i m i l a r c a s e was d e c i d e d by a f e d e r a l d i s t r i c t

judge i n G u l l e t t v . Q a n t a s Airways, L t d . (M.D. Ten. 19751,

4 1 7 F.Supp. 490. I n t h e G u l l e t t c a s e , t h e a i r l i n e maintained

t o l l f r e e t e l e p h o n e l i s t i n g s i n major u r b a n c e n t e r s w i t h i n

t h e s t a t e ; i t p l a c e d a d v e r t i s e m e n t s i n n a t i o n a l media c i r c u l a -

t i n g i n t h e forum s t a t e ; i t s u p p l i e d t r a v e l a g e n t s l o c a t e d

i n t h e forum w i t h p r o m o t i o n a l m a t e r i a l s ; i n f r e q u e n t l y i t

s e n t i t s employees t o t h e forum s t a t e f o r p u r p o s e s of s e r v i c i n g
t h e t r a v e l a g e n t s ; t o t a l d o l l a r volume of t i c k e t s a l e s i n

t h e s u b j e c t s t a t e w a s a maximum of $91,529 f o r a t w e l v e

month p e r i o d . The a i r l i n e owned no p r o p e r t y w i t h i n t h e

s t a t e nor m a i n t a i n e d any o f f i c e s i n t h e s t a t e . under t h e s e
f a c t s , t h e F e d e r a l D i s t r i c t C o u r t h e l d t h a t t h e a i r l i n e was

p r e s e n t w i t h i n t h e s t a t e f o r p u r p o s e s of c o n f e r r i n g i n

personam j u r i s d i c t i o n .

The p l a i n t i f f r e l i e s upon North Dakota v . Newberger

(1980), 37 St.Rep. 1119, 613 P.2d 1 0 0 2 . S u i t was i n s t i t u t e d

a g a i n s t d e f e n d a n t i n t h e Missoula County D i s t r i c t C o u r t .

Defendant had promoted a r o c k c o n c e r t a t t h e U n i v e r s i t y of

North Dakota, b u t b e c a u s e of i l l n e s s of one of t h e p e r f o r m e r s ,

f a i l e d t o go ahead w i t h t h e c o n c e r t . An a c t i o n was commenced
i n M i s s o u l a , Montana, f o r t h e r e a s o n t h a t d e f e n d a n t w a s

engaged i n promoting a s u b s e q u e n t c o n c e r t a t t h e U n i v e r s i t y

of Montana and s i n c e d e f e n d a n t had c e r t a i n monies r e s u l t i n g

from t h a t promotion, p l a i n t i f f s o u g h t t o i n s t i t u t e t h e

a c t i o n i n Missoula f o r p u r p o s e s of a c q u i r i n g c o n t r o l o f

those proceeds. The c o u r t i n Newberger a t p. 1123 s a i d :

" A p p e l l a n t p u r p o s e l y a v a i l s h i m s e l f of t h e
p r i v i l e g e s and b e n e f i t s of t h e laws of t h i s
s t a t e by c o n d u c t i n g h i s b u s i n e s s of promot-
i n g r o c k c o n c e r t s i n Montana and t h r o u g h o u t
t h e Northwest. The r e c o r d r e v e a l s t h a t
a p p e l l a n t h a s promoted c o n c e r t s i n Montana
p r i o r t o t h e o n e i n Missoula a t which t h e
p r o c e e d s were a t t a c h e d . A s p a r t of h i s b u s i -
ness transactions, appellant a l s o e n t e r s in-
t o c o n t r a c t s f o r s e r v i c e s t o be p r o v i d e d i n
this state. I t i s o u t of a s i m i l a r and re-
l a t e d c o n t r a c t t h a t respondent's claim f o r
r e l i e f o r c o u r s e of a c t i o n a r i s e s . . . Fur-
t h e r , a t t h e t i m e of t h i s a c t i o n , a p p e l l a n t
was i n p o s s e s s i o n of monies o r p e r s o n a l
p r o p e r t y i n t h i s s t a t e which were a l l e g e d
t o have r i g h t f u l l y belonged t o r e s p o n d e n t .
I t w a s f o r t h i s reason t h a t respondent chose
t o f i l e t h i s a c t i o n i n Missoula.

" I t appears, therefore, t h a t appellant has
'minimum c o n t a c t s ' w i t h t h i s s t a t e ; a p p e l l a n t
was found i n Montana, t r a n s a c t s b u s i n e s s i n
Montana, had a n i n t e r e s t i n p r o c e e d s i n Mon-
t a n a which w e r e a t t a c h e d , and c o n t r a c t s f o r
s e r v i c e s t o b e p r o v i d e d i n Montana. The f a c t s
of t h i s c a s e s a t i s f y t h e r e q u i r e m e n t s of Rule
4B (1)( a ) , ( c ) and ( e ) , M.R.Civ.P."

The r e c o r d shows t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t i n Newberger m a i n t a i n e d

h i s business i n California. However, a s i n d i c a t e d i n t h e
f a c t s d e s c r i b e d a b o v e , Newberger had p h y s i c a l p r e s e n c e i n

Montana d i f f e r e n t from t h a t found i n t h e c a s e b e f o r e u s .

F u r t h e r m o r e , t h e l a n g u a g e i n Newberger i s d i c t u m a s t h e

c o u r t s a i d a t p. 1123:

" I n any e v e n t a p p e l l a n t through h i s counsel
appeared without o b j e c t i o n t o j u r i s d i c t i o n
over h i s person. H e t h e r e b y waived any ob-
j e c t i o n u n d e r r u l e 1 2 , M.R.Civ.P."

T h e r e i s no c o n t e n t i o n t h a t t r a d i t i o n a l c o n c e p t s o f

" d u e p r o c e s s " a r e o f f e n d e d by t h e a s s e r t i o n of j u r i s d i c t i o n

here. The d u e p r o c e s s r e q u i r e m e n t s a r t i c u l a t e d i n I n t e r n a t i o n a l

Shoe Co. v . S t a t e o f Washington ( 1 9 4 5 ) , 326 U.S. 310, 6 6

S.Ct. 1 5 4 , 90 L.Ed. 95, a r e s a t i s f i e d .

The q u e s t i o n h e r e i s w h e t h e r d e f e n d a n t ' s a c t i v i t i e s a r e

s o s u b s t a n t i a l , c o n t i n u o u s , and s y s t e m a t i c t h a t t h e y c o n s t i t u t e

a p h y s i c a l p r e s e n c e w i t h i n t h e S t a t e of Montana. W e hold

t h a t u n d e r t h e f a c t s i n t h i s r e c o r d t h e d e f e n d a n t , American

A i r l i n e s , was " f o u n d i n Montana" f o r p u r p o s e s o f c o n f e r r i n g

i n personam j u r i s d i c t i o n upon t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s D i s t r i c t

C o u r t f o r t h e D i s t r i c t of Montana. W e f e e l t h a t such holding

c o m p o r t s w i t h t h e t r e n d o f a u t h o r i t y and w i t h t h e s p i r i t o f

R u l e 4B (1) .

W e Concur:

Chief J u s t i c e
A 5
Mr. Justice Gene B. Daly dissenting:
I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion.
Under the law presently in effect in Montana, Ameri-
can Airlines ( A A ) cannot be considered "found within"
Montana and therefore cannot be subject to the in personam
jurisdiction of this State.
It is important, in the first instance, to emphasize
the special facts of this case. The plaintiff flew from
Montana to New York City on Northwest Airlines. he planned

to transfer to British Airways and continue to Nepal. While
at the New York airport, plaintiff alleges that somehow AA
came into possession of his camera case, refused to give it
back to him upon request, and insulted him. The plaintiff

had not traveled on AA; there was no privity of contract
between them. The plaintiff Is claim of relief, therefore,
is in no way related to AA's contacts with this state.
The issue here is how to interpret the words "found
within" as they are used in Rule 4B, M.R.Civ.P. The perti-
nent part of Rule 4B reads: "All persons found within the

state of Montana are subject to the jurisdiction of the
courts of this state." The remaining lettered subdivisions
of Rule 4B are not applicable here since they apply only
when a plaintiff's claim of relief arises out of the
activities of the nonresident defendant in the forum state.
While this Court has extended in personam jurisdiction over
nonresident defendants to its constitutional limits under
the lettered subdivisions of Rule 4B, Prentice Lumber v.
Spahn (1970), 156 Mont. 68, 474 P.2d 141, we have never done
so under the first sentence of Rule 4B. But, we have
applied the "two-step" test. The effect of the majority
opinion is to institute a change in the existing law by
extending jurisdiction under "found within" to that
allowable under due process and reducing the l.aw to a one-
step test. By this expansion of jurisdiction, the majority
has ignored both the importance of the words "found within"
and the two-step test we have used for determining in
personam jurisdiction.
The well.-established two-step test for interpreting
Rule 4B provides that the court must, as a first step, look
to whether the statute provides for the exercise of juris-
diction under the particular facts of the case, and applying
the second step, the court must determine whether it would
offend due process to assert jurisdiction. State of North
Dakota v. Newberger (1980), Mont. , 613 P.2d 1002,
1004, 37 St.Rep. 11-19, 11.21; May v. Figgins (1980), -
Mont. -, 607 P.2d 1132, 1134, 37 St.Rep. 493, 495, quoting
2 Moore's Federal. Practice q14.41-l[l] at 4-421.
The first question here, then, is whether AA is

"found within" the State of Montana, and the second question
is whether the assertion of jurisdiction offends due process
--that is, the "traditional notions of fair play and sub-
stantial justice." International Shoe v. Washington (1945),
326 U.S. 310, 31.6, 66 S.Ct. 154, 158, 90 L.Ed. 95, 102,
quoting Pllillikin v. Meyer (1940), 311 U.S. 457, 463, 61
S.Ct. 339, 343, 85 L.Ed. 278, 283. It is important to note
at this point that the "minimum contacts" test of
International Shoe and its progeny is used only to determine
whether due process has been offended.
The majority has meshed this two-step test into one
step by looking only to whether the traditional notions of
"due process" are offended by asserting jurisdiction here.
The effect of its ruling is that "found within" must be
interpreted, in the first instance, in terms of the most
liberal constructions allowed to the "minimum contacts"
test.
The major problem of applying the more liberal
"minimum contacts" test, in the first instance, is the fact
that there is no connection between plaintiff's claim of
relief and AA's contacts with this state. Plaintiff did not
buy a ticket to fly on AA and had no contact with AA prior
to the alleged conversion of his camera case in New York.
If he had bought a ticket from AA, it may have been possib1.e
to apply the more liberal "minimum contacts" interpretation
to subdivision (a) of Rule 4~$j\"transactingbusiness."
In Newberger this Court acknowledged that jurisdic-
tion over a nonresident defendant may be asserted even

though the cause of action did not arise out of the
defendant's contacts with the forum state. Neverthel.ess,
both this Court and the United States Supreme Court have
recognized that, "[tlhe contacts required upon which to base
jurisdiction, consistent with due process, would be greater
where the action is brouqht upon a claim not arising from
these contacts with the state, than where the action does
arise from the state's contacts." (Emphasis added.) May_,

supra, 607 P.2d at 1137, quoting 2 Moore's Federal Practice
714.41-1[1] at 4-414; International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 317-
318. The majority has ignored the case law that sets a
restrictive test for personal jurisdiction when the claim of
relief does not arise from the nonresident's contacts with
this state.
 By ignoring this case law, the lnajority has failed to

recognize the true issue of this case: how much more "sub-
stantial, continuous and systematic" must the nonresident's

activity be under "found within" than under the lettered
subdivisions of Rule 4B.
The majority relies upon two cases, Gullett v. Qantas
Airways Ltd. (M.D. Tenn. 1975), 417 F.Supp. 490, and Ladd v.
KLM Royal Dutch Airlines (S.D. N.Y. 1978), 456 F.Supp. 422,
to support its conclusion that AA has sufficient contacts
with this state to support the assertion of in personam
jurisdiction. The precedential value of these cases is
highly questionable here. In Gullett the plaintiffs had a
contractual relationship with Qantas Airways that gave rise
to the claim of relief, and in Ladd the New York federal

court was construing a Tennessee statute which provided for
the exercise of in personam jurisdiction over any person on
" [a]ny basis not inconsistent with the Constitution of this
State or the United States." TCA S20-235(f). Here, there
is no contractual relationship between the parties, and we
are not dealing with statutory language in any way similar
to Tennessee's statute, Tennessee being a typical one-step
state.
Only two cases give any guidance for the interpreta-
tion of "found within" as it is used in Rule 4B. McIntosh
v. Heil Company (D. Mont. 1972), 350 F.Supp. 866, speaks
directly to this point; and Newberger, 613 P.2d at 1.005,
speaks only indirectly.
In Heil, the nonresident corporation advertised in
Montana, sent agents into Montana to bid on municipal
contracts, and distributed products through a distributor
located in Billings. The corporation had no registered

agent in Montana, owned no property, and maintained no
office. Most importantly, the pl.aintiffls claim of relief

arose out of the use of one of the corporation's trucks in
wyoming, so there was no connection between the claim for
relief and the corporation's contacts with Montana. The
sole question was whether the corporation was "found within"
Montana.
In reasoning that "found within" must be distin-

guished from the test of minimum contacts and transacting
business, the District Court in Heil said:-
"In People's Tobacco Company, Ltd. v. Ameri-
can Tobacco Co., 246 U.S. 79, 38 S.Ct. 233,
62 L.Ed.587 (1918), the Supreme Court said
that 'to be found' within a district a cor-
poration must be present in the district by
its officers and agents carrying on the busi-
ness of the corporation. In United States v.
Scophony Corp. of America, 333 U.S. 795, 68
S.Ct. 855, 92 L.Ed. 1091 (1948), the Supreme
Court said that t.he word 'found' denoted the
concept of 'carrying on business' and that
the words 'transact business' had a meaning
broader than the words 'carrying on busi-
ness. ' The words ' found, ' 'doing business, '
'transaction of any business' were at the
time the Montana rules were adopted words of
art the meanings of which were known to the
bench and bar. The scholarly committee draft-
ing the Montana rules used these words, and
it is apparent that they were used as words
of art. The all-encompassing phrase 'the
transaction of any business' was used to pro-
vide a maximum protection to persons injured
by reason of activity in Montana. As to
those actions arising in other jurisdictions
or torts accruinq in other jurisdictions the
--------- used the more restrictive words
committee
'found within.'-(~rn~hasis
-- -- added.) 350
F.Supp. at 868.
'The court in -
Heil then went on to put its own
limitations on the words "found within":
"A corporation is not 'found within the state
- Montana'w hunless oite has magents ore officers
of
here uEqn------ m E ---------y--------------
o r c ss a be s r v e d or
- -
-
unless its business has been of such charac-
 ter and extent as to warrant the inference
--
that it has subjected itself- the juris-
to-
diction of the state. It is aenerallv held
- -.'
2

that such an inference cannot arise where a
corporation merely sol icits for business and
ships its products into the state and occa-
sionally sends an officer or agent into the
state for solicitation purposes. [Citations
omitted.]" (Emphasis added.) 350 F.Supp. at
868-869.
The plaintiff argues that Newberger is the main
controlling authority. In Newberger this Court found that
the defendant was "found within" this state. The defendant's
contacts with this state in Newberger, however, were much
more substantial. than those of AA in this case. In
Newberger, the defendant was "found within" Montana because
of the following activity:
"The record reveals that appellant has pro-
moted concerts in Montana prior to the one in
Missoula at which the proceeds were attached.
As part of his business transactions, appel-
lant also enters into contracts for services
to be provided in this state. It is out of a
similar and related contract that respon-
dent's claim for relief or course of action
arises. The basis of respondent's claim is,
therefore, not totally unrelated to or dis-
tinct from the activities of appellant in
this state. Further, at the time of this
action, appellant was in possession of monies
or personal property in this state which were
alleged to have rightfully belonged to
respondent . .
." 613 P.2d at 1005.
Most importantly, the nonresident defendant was actually
present in Missou1.a at the time the action was commenced.
The acts of solicitation by AA are clearly less
substantial than those contacts of the nonresident defendant
in Newberqer.
Given the higher degree of "substantial" and "con-
tinuous and systematic" activity necessary for a nonresident
corporation to be "found within" this state, it seems that
the acts of mere solicitation are not sufficient. While
International Shoe clearly held that mere solicitation would
be enough to satisfy "presence" for due process purposes, or
the one-step type of test, that is not what we are concerned
with here. It was recognized in International Shoe, itself,
that where the claim of relief is not connected with the
nonresident corporation's activity in a forum state, the
extent and quality of corporate contacts must be greater.
International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 317-318; see also prior
reference to x, P.2d
607 at 1137.
Given this greater standard of "found within," mere
solicitation does not constitute the "substantial" activity
necessary to find in personam jurisdiction where the claim
of rel-ief is in no way connected to the solicitation in the
forum state. I would, therefore, dismiss this case on the
grounds that AA is not subject to the in personam jurisdic-
tion of the State of Montana.

I concur in the foregoing dissent.

m--&k$sade
Chief Justice