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Reeser v. Yellow Freight System, Inc.

Court: Tennessee Supreme Court
Date filed: 1997-02-24
Citations: 938 S.W.2d 690
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               IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TENNESSEE

                             AT NASHVILLE

                                         FOR PUBLICATION
WILLIAM R. REESER, JR.,           )      Filed: February 24, 1997
                                  )
      Plaintiff-Appellee,                )     OVERTON CIRCUIT
                                  )
v.                                )      NO. 01S01-9603-CV-00042
                                  )
YELLOW FREIGHT SYSTEM,            )
INC.,                             )      Hon. Billy Joe White,
                                  )      Chancellor
      Defendant-Appellant.        )
                                                           FILED
                                                           February 24, 1997

                                                          Cecil W. Crowson
                                                         Appellate Court Clerk

For Plaintiff-Appellee:               For Defendant-Appellant:

Kelly R. Williams                     Stephen K. Beard
Livingston, TN                        Stewart, Estes & Donnell
                                      Nashville, TN




                             OPINION




AFFIRMED                                                  DROWOTA, J.
                          In this workers’ compensation action, the employer, Yellow Freight

           System, Inc., defendant-appellant, has appealed from a judgment of the Circuit

           Court of Overton County finding that the employee, William R. Reeser, Jr.,

           plaintiff-appellee, is permanently and totally disabled as a result of a stroke.

           The trial court found that conditions of the employment - stress associated with

           driving a truck through an ice storm - precipitated the employee’s stroke. The

           sole issue on appeal is the correctness of that finding.1             After carefully

           examining the record and the relevant authorities, we affirm the judgment of the

           trial court.



                          The employee, who was sixty-three years old at the time of his

           injury, worked as a long distance truck driver for the employer. He had worked

           in this capacity for the employer since 1989. On February 9, 1994, the employee

           was required to drive a truck from Nashville to St. Louis, Missouri, for the

           employer. On February 10, 1994, he returned to Nashville during a severe ice

           storm. 2 The employer canceled all trips by its drivers on February 10 because

           of the ice, but the employee was already on the return leg of his trip. Thus, the

           employee was on the road when the storm was at its worst.



                          On February 11, 1994, the employer resumed a full schedule of

           trips between Nashville and Memphis. On that date, the employee left Nashville

           at approximately 3:45 p.m. and traveled to Memphis. He arrived in Memphis

           at approximately 7:40 p.m. after the storm had ended. However, while exiting

       1
        This case was transferred to the entire Supreme Court for review and disposition by
Order dated November 26, 1996.
       2
         According to the trial court, “West Tennessee was struck by probably the worst ice storm
in history” on February 9 and 10, 1994.

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the interstate minutes from his destination, the employee lost control of his

truck, traveled across six lanes of traffic, ran through a guardrail, and went down

an embankment. When police arrived on the scene, they found the employee

lying semi-conscious on the floorboard of his truck, with bruises and cuts. The

employee was taken to a nearby hospital, and was diagnosed as having had a

stroke. The stroke has left the employee totally disabled. He cannot speak, has

substantial paralysis, seizures, and cannot take care of any personal needs. He

requires care twenty-four hours a day. The employee cannot recall anything

about the accident.



             Following the accident, the employee was treated by Dr. Michael

Deshazo, a neurologist who diagnosed the stroke. Dr. Deshazo determined that

the employee had a complete blockage of an artery leading to his brain, which

interrupted the flow of blood to the brain. This led to a “cerebrovascular

thrombotic occlusive event,” or a stroke. On the issue of causation, Dr. Deshazo

testified that the stress of driving a truck through an area that had just

experienced a major ice storm “could have played a role in precipitating” the

stroke. Dr. Deshazo opined that driving a truck was a stressful occupation,

made more so during times of hazardous driving. Dr. Deshazo conceded,

however, that the stroke could have occurred regardless of any stress the

employee may have experienced while driving, particularly since the employee

suffered from pre-existing coronary artery disease.



             Dr. William Quarles, the employee’s family physician since 1966,

also treated the employee. Dr. Quarles testified similarly to Dr. Deshazo. In



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response to a hypothetical question which asked him to assume that the

employee drove a truck “over 200 miles at night in an area that had just

underwent a terrible ice storm,” and whether this “could . . . be a stressful event

. . . that could have triggered or precipitated [the stroke],” Dr. Quarles replied,

“[t]heoretically, I think that’s true, yes.” Like Dr. Deshazo, Dr. Quarles

concluded that it was possible that the employee could have had the stroke at

most any time given his severe coronary artery disease.

             Dr. Manual Weiss, a neurological surgeon testifying for the

employer, reviewed the employee’s medical records and the deposition of Dr.

Deshazo. Dr. Weiss testified that there are two general types of strokes - one

caused by bleeding in the brain itself, and the other from a lack of blood getting

to the brain. He testified that the employee’s stroke was caused by the latter.

Dr. Weiss also stated that, in his opinion, stress was not a contributing factor.

Rather, strokes of the type suffered by the employee happen when an artery is

finally closed off after a lengthy period of increasing blockage. Dr. Weiss

concluded that the employee would have had the stroke at some point regardless

of the stress that he experienced driving in the ice storm. It is also worth noting

that, like Doctors Deshazo and Quarles, Dr. Weiss indicated that driving a truck

through an ice storm is a stressful event. However, unlike Doctors Deshazo and

Quarles, Dr. Weiss has not treated - or even met - the employee.



             After considering the evidence, the trial court found that “proof

concerning the road conditions being ‘horrendous’ is clear and convincing.”

Relying upon testimony from other truck drivers who testified that they made

the same trip as the employee on February 11 and found it unusually stressful,



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the court concluded that the conditions of employment precipitated the

employee’s stroke. Benefits were awarded accordingly.



             Our review of findings of fact by the trial court is de novo upon the

record of the trial court, accompanied by a presumption of the correctness of

those findings, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. Tenn.

Code Ann. § 50-6-225(e)(2); Lollar v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 767 S.W.2d 143,

149 (Tenn. 1989). Considerable deference must be accorded to the trial court’s

factual findings on issues related to the credibility of witnesses and the weight

to be given their testimony. Humphrey v. David Witherspoon, Inc., 734 S.W.2d

315 (Tenn. 1987).



             In order to be eligible for workers’ compensation benefits, an

employee must suffer “an injury by accident arising out of and in the course of

employment which causes either disablement or death.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-

6-102(a)(5). The phrase “arising out of” refers to causation. Braden v. Sears,

Roebuck and Co., 833 S.W.2d 496, 498 (Tenn. 1992).                The causation

requirement is satisfied if the injury has a rational, causal connection to the

work. Id. Although causation cannot be based upon merely speculative or

conjectural proof, Simpson v. H. D. Lee Co., 793 S.W.2d 929, 931 (Tenn. 1990),

absolute certainty is not required. Tindall v. Waring Park Ass’n, 725 S.W.2d

935, 937 (Tenn. 1987). Any reasonable doubt in this regard is to be construed

in favor of the employee. White v. Werthan Industries, 824 S.W.2d 158, 159

(Tenn. 1992). We have thus consistently held that an award may properly be

based upon medical testimony to the effect that a given incident “could be” the



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cause of the employee’s injury, when there is also lay testimony from which it

reasonably may be inferred that the incident was in fact the cause of the injury.

P & L Const. Co. v. Lankford, 559 S.W.2d 793, 794 (Tenn. 1978).



             We also note that there is no requirement that the accident resulting

in injury be physical in nature. Injuries are generally compensable as accidental

injuries when they are precipitated by physical exertion or strain or a specific

incident or series of incidents involving mental or emotional stress of an unusual

or abnormal nature. Bacon v. Sevier County, 808 S.W.2d 46 (Tenn. 1991). In

other words, excessive and unexpected mental anxiety, stress, tension or worry

attributable to the employment can cause injuries sufficient to justify an award

of benefits. See Jose v. Equifex, Inc., 556 S.W.2d 82, 84 (Tenn. 1977). With

these principles in mind, we review the record to determine whether the

evidence preponderates against the findings of the trial court.



             Several witnesses testified concerning road conditions on the day

that the employee suffered the stroke and wrecked his truck. Witnesses called

by the employer testified that road conditions along the route driven by the

employee were “good,” and that driving on that date was “just like any other

day.” However, even these witnesses conceded that there were parts of the

interstate between Nashville and Memphis where “you just had to slow down

and weave yourself through [fallen trees].”



             Witnesses called by the employee characterized the driving

conditions along the employee’s route as “horrendous,” “terrible,” “extremely



                                        6
hazardous,” and stated that only one lane of travel was passable on parts of the

interstate. The employee’s wife testified that on the day of the accident, the

employee told her over the telephone that driving conditions were “rough.”

When she attempted to travel from Livingston to Memphis later that evening to

see her husband after learning of the accident, she discovered that “there were

trees down all over the interstate. It was like running an obstacle course

dodging the trees.” A photograph contained in the record shows large trees

hanging over or on the interstate due to the weight of ice. Various truck drivers

testified that they had to maneuver around trees on the interstate, and stated that

they could hear trees popping and cracking around them.

             A witness who was driving the interstate to Memphis on the day

that the employee suffered the stroke testified that she saw “the big eighteen

wheelers over on their tops, on their sides. You pick a direction and one was

laying there. . . . Cars in every which direction, in the median, at the sides,

heading the wrong direction on the other side. It looked like a shooting gallery.”

A truck driver with 32 years of experience, who drove the interstate to Memphis

on the day in question, testified that the driving conditions were the worst he

had ever experienced, and that an abnormal amount of stress was involved given

the dangerous conditions. Other truck drivers testified similarly, noting that the

driving conditions presented an extremely dangerous and abnormally stressful

situation. That situation became much worse after dark - when the employee

was still on the road - because it was difficult to see trees and ice on the

interstate. A manager for the employer testified that in his eleven years of

employment he could not recall a time other than February 10, 1994 (and the

early morning hours of February 11) when drivers were called off the roadway

due to poor weather conditions.


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             In light of the foregoing evidence, we are persuaded that there is

ample evidence in the record to support the trial court’s finding that the

employee was performing the obligations of his employment in an unusual and

abnormally stressful set of circumstances. While the ice storm may have been

at its worst on February 10 and have ended by the time of the employee’s

accident on February 11, the record is clear that the employee had driven three

consecutive days through the storm or its aftermath. The employee spent part

of this time driving in darkness, when it was particularly difficult to see ice and

trees on the roadway, making a bad situation worse. We are further persuaded

that the testimony of both of the treating physicians, Dr. Deshazo and Dr.

Quarles, that stress experienced by the employee driving through the ice storm

could have precipitated his stroke, is sufficient to establish causation. Although

the evidence of causation is not overwhelming, we cannot conclude that the

evidence preponderates against the trial court’s conclusion that the employee

made the required showing that his injury arose out of his employment.



             For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the trial court is

affirmed. Costs on appeal are taxed to the defendant - appellant.


                                            _______________________________
                                            FRANK F. DROWOTA, III, JUSTICE




Concur:

Birch, C.J.,
Anderson, Reid, Holder, J.J.


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