Reid v. Commonwealth

Present: All the Justices

JAMES EDWARD REID,
a/k/a JAMES EDWARD REED

v. Record No. 981020 OPINION BY JUSTICE CYNTHIA D. KINSER
November 6, 1998
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF MONTGOMERY COUNTY
Ray W. Grubbs, Judge

On December 3, 1997, James Edward Reid pled guilty to

three charges: (1) capital murder of Annie V. Lester during

the commission of attempted rape and/or attempted robbery

in violation of Code § 18.2-31; (2) attempted rape in

violation of Code § 18.2-67.5; and (3) attempted robbery in

violation of Code § 18.2-58. 1 After accepting the pleas and

hearing evidence about the commission of the offenses, the

trial court found Reid guilty as charged.

During the subsequent sentencing proceedings, the

trial court heard evidence from both sides and received a

pre-sentence report. 2 The trial court then sentenced Reid

to death for the capital murder conviction and imposed two

ten-year sentences for the attempted rape and attempted

robbery convictions. In imposing the death penalty

1
Reid entered the guilty pleas pursuant to North
Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1973).
2
The trial court conducted the first part of the
penalty phase hearing on December 3, 1997, immediately
pursuant to Code §§ 19.2-264.2 and -264.4(C), the trial

court found that Reid’s conduct in committing capital

murder was “outrageously vile, horrible and inhuman in that

it involved such aggravated battery to the victim, that is

. . . qualitatively and quantitatively . . . more culpable

than the minimum necessary to accomplish an act of murder.”

On appeal, Reid contends that the trial court

disregarded certain mitigating evidence and therefore erred

in imposing the death penalty. 3 Upon consideration of the

record, briefs, and argument of counsel, we find no error

in the judgment of the trial court. Further, upon

conducting our review pursuant to Code § 17-110.1(C), we

conclude that the sentence of death in this case was not

imposed “under the influence of passion, prejudice or any

other arbitrary factor” and is not excessive or

disproportionate. Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment

of the trial court.

FACTS

_________________
after finding Reid guilty. The court reconvened the
hearing on February 20, 1998.
3
Reid is before this Court for automatic review of his
death sentence under Code § 17-110.1.
Code § 17-110.1 was repealed and replaced by § 17.1-
313, effective October 1, 1998. Because the parties
briefed and argued this case under the provisions of § 17-
110.1, and because the relevant provisions remain unchanged
in § 17.1-313, we will cite to § 17-110.1 in this opinion.

2
 “Since the Commonwealth prevailed in the trial court,

we review the evidence and all reasonable inferences

arising therefrom in the light most favorable to the

Commonwealth.” Graham v. Commonwealth, 250 Va. 79, 81, 459

S.E.2d 97, 98, cert. denied, 516 U.S. 997 (1995) (citing

Swann v. Commonwealth, 247 Va. 222, 225, 441 S.E.2d 195,

198, cert. denied, 513 U.S. 889 (1994)).

In the afternoon on October 12, 1996, Lester’s cousin

went to Lester’s house, and after finding the front screen

door open, entered the house, discovered Lester’s body on

the floor at the end of a bed, and observed debris all over

the bedroom floor. The cousin left and went to a

relative’s house to call for emergency help, but then

returned to Lester’s home and was there when the police

arrived.

Before disturbing the crime scene, the police made a

video recording of the inside of Lester’s house. The tape

was admitted into evidence, and Officer Tommy Lawson

narrated what was being seen as the trial court watched it.

Blood was present throughout Lester’s home on such items as

the kitchen floor, the back door and back door trim, the

refrigerator, a can of milk, a wig lying on the kitchen

floor, the door leading from the kitchen into a television

room, scissors lying on a chair in the television room, the

3
bed and headboard in the bedroom where Lester’s body was

found, the cord of an electric heating pad that was under

Lester’s head, and the seat of a chair beside her body.

Several items of Lester’s clothing had blood on them,

including a sweater, a slip, and a bra that was still

fastened in the back but that “[was] broken in some fashion

in the front.” The bedroom was in complete disarray with

dresser drawers on the floor and bed and clothing strewn

all around. A wine bottle was sitting on the floor at the

foot of the bed.

William Massello, the Assistant Chief Medical Examiner

for Western Virginia, performed an autopsy on Lester. He

described Lester as an elderly, slender, and “somewhat

emaciated” female. During the autopsy, Massello observed

14 stab wounds to the front of Lester’s neck and three stab

wounds to her chin, one of which went into the jugular vein

on the left side of her neck. There were also five stab

wounds to the front of Lester’s chest. Massello testified

that several of these wounds went through the chest wall

into Lester’s left lung and into her heart. In Massello’s

opinion, the most rapidly lethal wounds were four of the

stab wounds to the chest, which caused bleeding into the

chest cavity and, in turn, caused Lester to die rapidly.

According to Massello, all the stab wounds had a Z-shaped

4
or H-shaped configuration consistent with injuries caused

by two blades superimposed on one another or scissors

blades.

In addition to the stab wounds, Massello observed

multiple lacerations and bruises on Lester’s body. Some of

these injuries on the top of Lester’s head and face were

caused either by Lester’s head being struck with a blunt

instrument, or by her head striking another object such as

a door or wall. Lester had lacerations on the right and

left sides of her face and linear crush marks on the right

side of her face. 4 Finally, Lester sustained a fracture of

the hyoid bone, 5 resulting either from the force of

strangulation or from being struck in that area with an

object.

The evidence linking Reid to the commission of these

crimes consists, in part, of testimony from witnesses who

saw Reid at or in the vicinity of Lester’s house on the day

of her murder. Around 10:30 a.m. on October 12, Reid

4
Massello opined that the can of milk found in
Lester’s kitchen was the kind of instrument that could have
caused some of the injuries to Lester’s head.
5
Hyoid bone is defined as “a bone or complex of bones
situated at the base of the tongue and developed from the
second and third visceral arches, supporting the tongue and
its muscles . . . .” Webster’s Third New International
Dictionary 1111 (1993).

5
secured a ride to Lester’s house with Haywood Alexander and

Robert Smith. Reid’s stated purpose for going to Lester’s

house was to do some work there. 6 En route to Lester’s

home, Reid asked Alexander and Smith to stop at a store

where Reid purchased a bottle of wine. They then proceeded

to Lester’s house, and upon arriving there, Reid exited the

vehicle and walked around to the back of the house with his

bottle of wine. Alexander and Smith then left.

Around 4:30 p.m. on that same day, George Eanes, who

worked at Eanes Body Shop located across the street from

Lester’s house, observed Reid walking across the street

from the direction of Lester’s house. Reid approached

Eanes and asked for a ride. Eanes explained to Reid that

he was working on his vehicle and could not give him a ride

at that time. When asked at the trial to describe Reid’s

appearance, Eanes stated that “[Reid] had a lot of blood on

him and he was staggering.” 7 After seeing the blood on

Reid’s clothing, Eanes asked Reid how he got in that

6
Reid apparently had performed odd jobs for Lester on
previous occasions and enjoyed discussing the Bible with
her.
7
Reid had blood on his sleeve, shoes, pants, and front
of his coat.

6
condition. According to Eanes, Reid responded by referring

to a former lover and stating that “he did it for love.”

George W. Eanes, father of George Eanes, also saw Reid

at the body shop and confirmed that Reid appeared to have

been in a fight because he had blood all over him. Eanes’

father stated that Reid smelled like a “brewery” but that

he, nevertheless, agreed to give Reid a ride home. During

that drive, Reid explained to Eanes’ father that some

person had given him some drugs and that they had gotten

into an argument or fight.

The results of forensic tests, fingerprint analyses,

and handwriting comparisons also place Reid at Lester’s

house on the day in question. Forensic tests established

that Reid’s DNA matched a stain abstracted from a cigarette

butt found in Lester’s home. A blood stain abstracted from

the same cigarette butt was consistent with the DNA profile

of Lester and Reid. In addition, the forensic scientist

who conducted these tests testified that Lester’s DNA was

consistent with blood recovered from Reid’s jacket.

Finally, two of Reid’s fingerprints were identified in

blood found on the handset of a rotary telephone in

Lester’s bedroom, and Reid’s handwriting was found on some

papers recovered in Lester’s house.

7
 The Commonwealth presented all the foregoing evidence

during the guilt phase of Reid’s trial but also relied upon

it during the sentencing phase. In addition, the

Commonwealth presented testimony from Robert D. O’Neal, a

probation officer. O’Neal interviewed Reid while preparing

the pre-sentence report. During that interview, Reid

stated to O’Neal that he did not remember anything about

the incident. According to O’Neal, Reid believes that he

“blacked out” because he remembers being at Lester’s house

prior to the offense but does not recall anything that

transpired from that point until he awoke at home and found

blood on his clothing.

In mitigation, Reid presented evidence from three

medical experts: Dr. Pogos H. Voskanian, a forensic

psychiatrist; Dr. Stephen Herrick, a forensic psychologist;

and Dr. Randy Thomas, a clinical psychologist. Each of

these witnesses discussed Reid’s medical and psychiatric

conditions that, in their opinion, affect Reid’s ability to

form the intent to commit a crime and that have caused Reid

to experience “blackout” periods during which he is

basically out of control and engages in disorganized,

aggressive behavior toward an unlikely target.

Three factors were significant to these medical

experts in formulating their respective opinions. First,

8
Reid suffered a major head trauma as a result of an

automobile accident in 1968 and was in a coma for at least

five days. The damaged area of Reid’s brain was the left

temporal lobe and part of the frontal lobe, which affects

an individual’s personality and ability to control

impulses. Thus, Reid does not resist acting on his

impulses. Second, Reid developed a seizure disorder

shortly after the head injury. According to Dr. Voskanian,

Reid’s head trauma triggered the seizure disorder. Because

Reid has been noncompliant with taking his medication to

control the seizures, he has experienced repeated seizures

that have, in turn, progressively caused more damage to his

brain. Finally, Reid has a family history of alcoholism,

has abused alcohol since age 15, and has had numerous

admissions to both psychiatric hospitals and alcohol abuse

rehabilitation centers. Because of Reid’s brain injury, he

is more vulnerable to the effects of alcohol and likely to

become intoxicated more quickly than another person. In

addition, Reid is a binge drinker, meaning that he has not

built up a tolerance for the effects of alcohol.

Dr. Voskanian opined that Reid experiences “blackout”

episodes when he is intoxicated. During these episodes,

Reid may not remember what he did five minutes ago but

would retain his memory for established information such as

9
his name and residence. Dr. Voskanian further opined that

Reid was in “an impaired state of consciousness” when he

left Lester’s house because Reid said things that could not

be understood and did nothing to conceal his bloody

clothing.

In summary, Dr. Voskanian stated that Reid’s head

trauma, seizure disorder, long history of drinking, and

serious medical conditions, 8 could “have a significant

impact on Mr. Reid’s ability to think clearly, or perform

intentional acts.” Dr. Voskanian also opined that these

conditions could cause violent outbursts that Reid would

not remember if he were intoxicated. However, all three

medical experts believed that Reid would not be susceptible

to these violent outbursts if he were in a structured

setting where he would not have access to alcohol.

Some of Reid’s family members also testified that Reid

is a different person when he is intoxicated. His ex-wife,

sister, and mother described Reid as a kind and considerate

person when he is sober, but acknowledged that Reid has

violent episodes during periods of intoxication. They also

confirmed that Reid cannot remember what he does when he is

8
Reid underwent cardiac by-pass surgery. Several
years after the surgery, Reid again had chest pains and
suffered a myocardial infarction. Reid has also been
diagnosed with lung cancer.

10
intoxicated. For example, his ex-wife testified that Reid

once stabbed her when he was intoxicated but that he had no

recollection of the incident the next morning.

ANALYSIS

Under Code § 19.2-264.4(B), facts in mitigation that a

trial court can consider in deciding whether to impose a

sentence of death or life imprisonment may include the

following:

(ii) the capital felony was committed while the
defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or
emotional disturbance, . . . [and] (iv) at the time of
the commission of the capital felony, the capacity of
the defendant to appreciate the criminality of his
conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements
of law was significantly impaired.

On appeal, Reid argues that the trial court erred by not

considering evidence establishing these mitigating factors.

Specifically, Reid contends that the court failed to

address evidence showing Reid’s lack of planning or

premeditation, lack of memory of the incident, and behavior

subsequent to the commission of the crimes. Reid also

asserts that the trial court failed to consider the

uncontradicted medical testimony regarding his medical and

psychiatric impairments. According to Reid, this evidence

demonstrates not only that he was unaware of what he was

doing at Lester’s home on the day in question but also that

he cannot now remember anything about the incident. Thus,

11
Reid argues that his conduct in committing the murder of

Lester cannot be deemed “vile” and that the trial court,

therefore, erred by imposing a sentence of death based on

the “vileness” factor.

Reid’s arguments can be distilled into a single

complaint that the trial court must not have considered his

mitigating evidence since the court imposed the death

penalty. Reid asserts that, since his evidence was

uncontradicted and is not inherently improbable or

inconsistent, it had to be accepted as true. Once that

evidence was accepted as true, Reid contends that it

negated the trial court’s finding of “vileness.” In other

words, Reid asserts that the trial court should have given

controlling weight to his mitigating evidence. We do not

agree.

Following a 15-minute recess after the close of the

evidence in the penalty phase, the trial court announced

its sentencing decision and, in doing so, stated, “The

Court has the duty to consider all such evidence, both

favorable to you and unfavorable presented relative to this

hearing in ascertaining whether the crime of which you have

been convicted is so atrocious that the death sentence

should be imposed.” Thus, we conclude that the trial court

did, in fact, consider Reid’s mitigating evidence.

12
 We have addressed this type of complaint on at least

two previous occasions. First, in Correll v. Commonwealth,

232 Va. 454, 468, 352 S.E.2d 352, 360, cert. denied, 482

U.S. 931 (1987), the defendant argued, as does Reid, that

the mitigating evidence was of such weight that the court

could not have considered it and still sentenced him to

death. The mitigating evidence in that case established

that Correll had a troubled childhood and unfortunate home

situation. Taking the view that such evidence tended to

explain, but did not excuse, Correll’s commission of the

capital murder, we concluded that “it did not require as a

matter of law that the death penalty not be imposed.” Id.

We further stated that the fact-finder has a duty to

consider mitigating evidence along with other evidence in

determining the appropriate sentence but that the fact-

finder is “not required to give controlling effect to the

mitigating evidence.” Id. at 468-469, 352 S.E.2d at 360.

Similarly, in Murphy v. Commonwealth, 246 Va. 136,

142, 431 S.E.2d 48, 52, cert. denied, 510 U.S. 928 (1993),

we addressed the defendant’s argument that the trial court

had failed to consider fully the evidence in mitigation of

the imposition of the death penalty. As in the present

case, the trial court in Murphy stated on the record that

it had considered all the evidence. Relying on our

13
decision in Correll, we concluded that the trial court had

“maturely, carefully, and calmly deliberated the full range

of issues.” Id.

As in Correll and Murphy, the evidence upon which Reid

relies is mitigating in that it shows “extenuating

circumstances tending to explain, but not excuse, his

commission of the crime.” Correll, 232 Va. at 468, 352

S.E.2d at 360 (quoting Coppola v. Commonwealth, 220 Va.

243, 253, 257 S.E.2d 797, 804 (1979), cert. denied, 444

U.S. 1103 (1980)). The trial court was not, however,

required to give controlling weight to the mitigating

evidence. Id. at 469, 352 S.E.2d at 360.

Moreover, Reid’s mitigating evidence does not, as a

matter of law, negate the trial court’s finding of

“vileness.” Reid stabbed Lester 22 times and inflicted

other wounds on her head, face, hyoid bone, and arms.

According to the medical examiner, four of the five stab

wounds to Lester’s chest were fatal. From the presence of

blood throughout Lester’s house, it can be inferred that

Reid carried or dragged her body from the kitchen into the

bedroom. At some point, he also removed her clothes and

ransacked her bedroom.

Reid’s medical and psychiatric impairments, his

periods of “blackout,” his lack of memory regarding the

14
acts he committed at Lester’s home, and his behavior

subsequent to the incident when he made no attempt to hide

either his presence at Lester’s home or his blood-covered

clothing do not change the fact that the commission of this

crime was “outrageously . . . vile, horrible or inhuman, in

that it involved . . . aggravated battery” to Lester. Code

§§ 19.2-264.2 and -264.4(C). It was “qualitatively and

quantitatively . . . more culpable than the minimum

necessary to accomplish an act of murder.” Smith v.

Commonwealth, 219 Va. 455, 478, 248 S.E.2d 135, 149 (1978),

cert. denied, 441 U.S. 967 (1979). We have never held that

the “vileness” factor under Code §§ 19.2-264.2 and –

264.4(C) includes a requirement that a defendant’s mental

state embrace the intent to commit an “outrageously or

wantonly vile” murder, and we decline to do so now. “The

number or nature of the batteries inflicted upon the victim

is the essence of the test whether the defendant’s conduct

‘was outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman in

that it involved . . . an aggravated battery.’” Boggs v.

Commonwealth, 229 Va. 501, 521, 331 S.E.2d 407, 421 (1985),

cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1031 (1986) (quoting Code § 19.2-

264.2).

PREJUDICE AND PROPORTIONALITY REVIEW
OF DEATH SENTENCE

15
 Pursuant to Code § 17-110.1(C)(1), we are required to

determine whether the death sentence in this case was

imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice, or other

arbitrary factors. Upon careful examination of the record,

we find no evidence that any such factor was present or

influenced the trial court’s sentencing decision. Indeed,

Reid has not asserted that the imposition of the death

penalty in this case was the result of passion or

prejudice.

We must also determine whether the sentence of death

in this case is “excessive or disproportionate to the

penalty imposed in similar cases.” Code § 17-110.1(C)(2).

In conducting this review, we have inspected the records of

all capital cases presented to this Court including those

cases in which the trial court imposed a life sentence

instead of the death penalty. In complying with the

directive in Code § 17-110.1(C)(2) to compare “similar”

cases, we have given particular attention to those cases in

which the underlying felony predicates and the facts and

circumstances surrounding the commission of the crimes were

the same as those in this case. We have also focused on

cases in which the death penalty was imposed solely on the

basis of the “vileness” factor. However, our

proportionality review does not require that a given

16
capital murder case “equal in horror the worst possible

scenario yet encountered.” Turner v. Commonwealth, 234 Va.

543, 556, 364 S.E.2d 483, 490, cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1017

(1988).

Based on this review, the Court concludes that Reid’s

sentence of death is not excessive or disproportionate to

sentences generally imposed in this Commonwealth for

capital murders comparable to Reid’s murder of Lester.

See, e.g. Fry v. Commonwealth, 250 Va. 413, 463 S.E.2d 433

(1995), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1110 (1996) (11 gunshot

wounds to victim’s head, chest, and abdomen; victim dragged

down dirt road while alive); Barnes v. Commonwealth, 234

Va. 130, 360 S.E.2d 196 (1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1036

(1988) (multiple gunshot wounds); Washington v.

Commonwealth, 228 Va. 535, 323 S.E.2d 577 (1984), cert.

denied, 471 U.S. 1111 (1985) (38 stab wounds to victim);

Boggs, 229 Va. 501, 331 S.E.2d 407 (victim stabbed in two

places and struck on head and neck multiple times). As

already stated, Reid inflicted 22 stab wounds upon the

victim, four of which were lethal wounds to Lester’s chest,

in addition to multiple other injuries. Reid committed

these acts while carrying or dragging Lester’s body through

her house and removing her clothing.

17
 For these reasons, we find no error in the imposition

of the sentence of death, nor do we perceive any reason to

commute the death sentence. Therefore, we will affirm the

judgment of the trial court.

Affirmed.

18