No. 14792
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
KEITH REYNOLDS,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
BURLINGTON NORTHERN, INC.,
a corporation,
Defendants and Respondents.
Appeal from: District Court of the Eleventh Judicial District,
In and For the County of Lincoln,
Honorable Robert Holter, Judge presiding.
Counsel of Record:
For Appellant:
Murphy, Robinson, Heckathorn and Phillips, Kalispell,
Montana
I. James Heckathorn argued, Kalispell, Montana
For Respondents:
Kroschel, Peterson and Koolen, Billings, Montana
K. Kent Koolen argued, Billings, Montana
Submitted: March 27, 1980
Decided: DEC 9 - '@@
Mr. J u s t i c e D a n i e l J . Shea delivered the Opinion of the
Court.
Plaintiff, Keith Reynolds, while employed by Ksanka
Lumber Company, was severely injured when a string of
Bur l i n g t o n Northern railroad cars suddenly moved down a
s i d i n g and s t r u c k a c a b l e o v e r w h i c h h e was s t r a d d l e d . He
sued B u r l i n g t o n Northern f o r damages, and a p p e a l s f r o m a n
order of the Lincoln County District Court directing a
v e r d i c t i n f a v o r of t h e r a i l r o a d .
The pleadings are imprecise and confusing, but it
appears t h a t p l a i n t i f f sued t h e railroad on two t h e o r i e s :
First, t h a t he was a b u s i n e s s invitee in his relationship
w i t h t h e r a i l r o a d and t h a t a s s u c h , t h e r a i l r o a d owed him
t h e d u t y t o p r o v i d e a s a f e p l a c e t o work. Second, t h a t t h e
r a i l r o a d v i o l a t e d t h e F e d e r a l S a f e t y A p p l i a n c e A c t , and t h a t
h e was a member o f t h e p r o t e c t e d c l a s s u n d e r t h e A c t .
It i s n o t e n t i r e l y c l e a r what the railroad's defenses
were. I t appears, however, t h a t t h e r a i l r o a d conceded t h a t
plaintiff was a business invitee, but denied that the
r a i l r o a d owed him a s s u c h , t h e d u t y t o p r o v i d e him w i t h a
s a f e p l a c e t o work. I t a p p e a r s t h a t t h e r a i l r o a d had a two-
pronged defense in relation to t h e S a f e t y Appliance Act.
F i r s t , t h e r a i l r o a d c o n t e n d e d t h a t b e c a u s e p l a i n t i f f was n o t
on t h e main l i n e o f t h e r a i l r o a d and b e c a u s e t h e f a c i l i t i e s
w e r e l e a s e d t o t h e Ksanka Lumber Company, p l a i n t i f f was n o t
entitled to protection under t h e Act. Second, assuming
a p p l i c a t i o n of t h e Act t o t h i s c a s e , the railroad alleged
t h a t it was e n t i t l e d t o a s s e r t t h e d e f e n s e s o f a s s u m p t i o n o f
r i s k and c o n t r i b u t o r y n e g l i g e n c e , and p l e a d e d b o t h d e f e n s e s
a s affirmative defenses.
We first set forth the facts of the accident before
a g a i n v e n t u r i n g i n t o t h e p r o c e d u r a l e n t a n g l e m e n t a t t h e end
o f t r i a l which l e d t o t h i s a p p e a l .
Plaintiff, a t t h e time o f his injuries, was a 4 5 - y e a r
old employee of Ksanka Lumber Company, who worked at a
woodchip-loading facility a t Fortine, Montana, on land
l e a s e d by Ksanka Lumber Company from t h e d e f e n d a n t r a i l r o a d .
(We note, parenthetically, and w i l l h a v e more t o s a y o f t h i s
later, that Ksanka Lumber Company is a wholly-owned
s u b s i d i a r y o f Plum C r e e k Lumber Company, and t h a t Plum C r e e k
Lumber Company is i n t u r n , a wholly-owned subsidiary of t h e
defendant railroad.) On O c t o b e r 3 , 1974, a t approximately
8:00 a.m., r a i l r o a d e m p l o y e e s p l a c e d a s t r i n g o f f i v e empty
cars against a sixth car already placed on a side track
a d j a c e n t t o Ksanka's woodchip-loading facility. None o f t h e
b r a k e s on t h e f i v e c a r s were s e t .
When p l a i n t i f f came t o work a t 4:00 p.m., t h e f i r s t of
t h e s i x c a r s had a l r e a d y b e e n s p o t t e d a t t h e l o a d i n g c h u t e .
T h i s c a r was a p p r o x i m a t e l y 1 5 0 f e e t f r o m t h e r e m a i n i n g empty
railroad cars. Plaintiff finished f i l l i n g the partially-
l o a d e d c a r w i t h c h i p s a b o u t 8 : 3 0 p.m. and r o d e i t down t h e
incline to a spot where it would be rerouted by the
railroad. He t h e n w a l k e d up t h e i n c l i n e t o t h e r e m a i n i n g
string of empty c a r s . He testified that he climbed the
ladder on t h e s e c o n d car i n t h e s t r i n g and t i g h t e n e d and
secured its brakes before uncoupling t h e lead car. Upon
u n c o u p l i n g t h e l e a d c a r , h e r o d e i t down t o t h e l o a d i n g a r e a
t o l o a d it w i t h w o o d c h i p s .
To f a c i l i t a t e e v e n l o a d i n g o f w o o d c h i p s , a n e l e c t r i c c a r
puller is provided f o r t h e loading o p e r a t i o n . This puller
moves a c a r up and down t h e t r a c k t o a l l o w w o o d c h i p s l e a v i n g
t h e chute t o f i l l t h e c a r evenly. After stopping the lead
car at the chip loader, the plaintiff attached the car
puller c a b l e t o t h e end o f the car. While doing so, he
straddled the car puller c a b l e and t u r n e d h i s back t o t h e
string of cars which were further down the track. The
s t r i n g o f empty c a r s s u d d e n l y began r o l l i n g and s t r u c k t h e
c a b l e o v e r which he was s t r a d d l e d . The c o l l i s i o n p r o p e l l e d
p l a i n t i f f i n t o t h e a i r and h i s l e g was b a d l y b r o k e n .
Plaintiff's l e g remained i n a c a s t f o r two and a h a l f
years and d u r i n g t h i s time, s u r g e r y was p e r f o r m e d several
times. He r e t u r n e d t o work i n A p r i l 1 9 7 7 , b u t i m m e d i a t e l y
e x p e r i e n c e d a d d i t i o n a l p r o b l e m s w i t h t h e f o o t on h i s i n j u r e d
leg. H i s p h y s i c a l . p r o b l e m s p r e v e n t e d him f r o m c o n t i n u i n g t o
work a t h i s old job and from p e r f o r m i n g any d u t i e s which
r e q u i r e d movement o f h i s l e g o r foot. Plaintiff sued t h e
r a i l r o a d i n December 1 9 7 5 .
The p r o c e d u r a l p r o b l e m s i n r e l a t i o n to the substantive
b a s i s f o r r e c o v e r y , had t h e i r b e g i n n i n g i n t h e p l e a d i n g s and
c a r r i e d over i n t o t h e p r e t r i a l o r d e r . In h i s complaint, a s
a s e p a r a t e a l l e g a t i o n of negligence, p l a i n t i f f a l l e g e d t h a t
d e f e n d a n t owed him t h e d u t y of providing him w i t h a s a f e
p l a c e t o work. H e a l s o enumerated s e v e r a l s p e c i f i c a t i o n s of
negligence whereby the railroad had caused his injuries.
The c o m p l a i n t c o n t a i n e d no a l l e g a t i o n t h a t p l a i n t i f f was a
business invitee of the defendant railroad. Without
specifying how the S a f e t y Appliance Act applied to him,
plaintiff also alleged that the railroad had v i o l a t e d the
A c t and was t h u s r e s p o n s i b l e f o r h i s i n j u r i e s .
W e c a n n o t t e l l from t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t f i l e w h e t h e r t h e
t r i a l court held a p r e t r i a l conference, although t h e r e is a
pretrial order s i g n e d by t h e t r i a l court and a p p r o v e d by
counsel for both sides. The imprecise pleadings were
c a r r i e d over i n t o t h e p r e t r i a l o r d e r . The o r d e r , signed so
a s t o s u p p l e m e n t t h e p l e a d i n g s ( s e e R u l e 1 6 , M.R.Civ.P.) set
f o r t h t h e i s s u e s of f a c t and l a w a s f o l l o w s :
1. Was t h e d e f e n d a n t n e g l i g e n t i n which n e g l i g e n c e was
t h e proximate cause of p l a i n t i f f ' s i n j u r y ?
2. Was t h e p l a i n t i f f c o n t r i b u t o r i l y n e g l i g e n t ?
3. Did p l a i n t i f f assume t h e r i s k o f i n j u r y ?
4. Did d e f e n d a n t v i o l a t e t h e S a f e t y A p p l i a n c e A c t ?
5. The e x t e n t and amount of plaintiff's injury and
damage.
Neither the District Court file nor the trial
transcript, r e v e a l s any s i g n i f i c a n t r u l i n g s o r d i s c u s s i o n s
on q u e s t i o n s of law. Rather, i t a p p e a r s t h a t no rulings
w e r e made until the end o f t h e t r i a l when the court and
c o u n s e l were s e t t l i n g j u r y i n s t r u c t i o n s .
Plaintiff offered several instructions relating t o his
n e g l i g e n c e t h e o r y of l i a b i l i t y . Several contained language
t h a t t h e p l a i n t i f f was a b u s i n e s s i n v i t e e o f t h e d e f e n d a n t
r a i l r o a d and t h a t a s s u c h t h e r a i l r o a d owed p l a i n t i f f a d u t y
t o p r o v i d e him w i t h a s a f e p l a c e t o work. The r a i l r o a d ' s
p o s i t i o n on t h e b u s i n e s s i n v i t e e s t a t u s o f p l a i n t i f f is not
entirely clear, but there i s no doubt that the railroad
a s s e r t e d t h a t i t d i d n o t owe a d u t y t o p r o v i d e him w i t h a
safe place t o work. The railroad argues that such d u t y
a p p l i e s o n l y t o a n employer-who must p r o v i d e i t s employees
with a safe place t o work--and that plaintiff was n o t a n
employee of the railroad. All of plaintiff's offered
instructions were laced with language stating that the
r a i l r o a d owed h i m a d u t y t o p r o v i d e a s a f e p l a c e t o work.
We cannot determine t h e p r e c i s e rulings of the trial
c o u r t on t h e q u e s t i o n s of law p r e s e n t e d by these offered
instructions. For example, the record does not d i s c l o s e
whether t h e t r i a l c o u r t r u l e d o n l y t h a t t h e r a i l r o a d d i d n o t
owe p l a i n t i f f a d u t y t o p r o v i d e him w i t h a s a f e p l a c e t o
work, or whether it also ruled that plaintiff was not a
business invitee. Neither p l a i n t i f f ' s counsel nor d e f e n s e
c o u n s e l made any e f f o r t t o o b t a i n a d e f i n i t i v e r u l i n g . The
consequence is t h a t t h e t r i a l c o u r t r e f u s e d almost a l l of
the plaintiff's offered i n s t r u c t i o n s on h i s negligence
theory of liability. Because he was effectively left
w i t h o u t any i n s t r u c t i o n s s u p p o r t i n g h i s n e g l i g e n c e t h e o r y o f
liability, plaintiff's counsel t o l d t h e t r i a l c o u r t t h a t it
might a s w e l l d i r e c t a v e r d i c t i n favor of the railroad.
The defendant railroad also renewed its motion for a
directed verdict. The t r i a l c o u r t , a c c o r d i n g l y , d i r e c t e d a
v e r d i c t a g a i n s t p l a i n t i f f on t h e n e g l i g e n c e t h e o r y .
S i m i l a r p r o b l e m s c r o p p e d up w i t h r e l a t i o n t o p l a i n t i f f ' s
theory of recovery under the S a f e t y Appliance A c t . The
record is e q u a l l y clouded. The p a r t i e s d i d n o t r e q u e s t t h e
t r i a l c o u r t t o e n t e r any p r e l i m i n a r y r u l i n g s a s t o w h e t h e r
t h e A c t a p p l i e d i n t h i s c a s e , and i f a p p l i c a b l e , t h e n a t u r e
and extent of its application. Thus, t h e problems f i r s t
a r o s e d u r i n g s e t t l e m e n t of j u r y i n s t r u c t i o n s r e l a t i n g t o t h e
Act. Plaintiff offered several instructions relating t o h i s
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of t h e Act a s a p p l i e d t o t h i s c a s e , and t h e
t r i a l c o u r t r e f u s e d m o s t o f them. Unfortunately, the record
does not tell us the particulars of why the trial court
c o n s i d e r e d t h e i n s t r u c t i o n s t o be i n e r r o r o r i n a p p l i c a b l e .
Plaintiff offered an i n s t r u c t i o n defining causation
u n d e r t h e A c t , b u t which u s e d t h e l a n g u a g e c o n t a i n e d i n t h e
Federal Employers' Liability Act ( 5 51 thru 60; in
particular, see 5 51.) Another paragraph of the same
instruction stated that contributory n e g l i g e n c e was n o t a
defense to an action under the Safety Appliance Act.
Although t h e t r i a l c o u r t refused t h i s i n s t r u c t i o n , we cannot
determine whether he ruled that both paragraphs were in
error, or whether the causation language or contributory
n e g l i g e n c e s t a t e m e n t was i n e r r o r . The p l a i n t i f f made no
e f f o r t t o obtain a c l a r i f y i n g ruling t o determine p r e c i s e l y
what was wrong w i t h h i s o f f e r e d i n s t r u c t i o n . The r e c o r d i s
further confused by the fact that the defendant railroad
offered an instruction under the Act containing language
t h a t c o n t r i b u t o r y n e g l i g e n c e was a d e f e n s e , and p l a i n t i f f ' s
counsel did not object. I t makes l i t t l e s e n s e f o r p l a i n t i f f
t o o f f e r an i n s t r u c t i o n s t a t i n g t h a t c o n t r i b u t o r y n e g l i g e n c e
is not a defense and then to fail to object to the
defendant's offered instruction stating that contributory
n e g l i g e n c e is a d e f e n s e , t o an a c t i o n u n d e r t h e A c t . (We
n o t e h e r e t h a t t h e r a i l r o a d a s s e r t s t h a t it d i d n o t o f f e r an
instruction containing assumption or risk as a defense
because i t was satisfied that the evidence rendered this
defense inapplicable.)
Because the trial court refused most of plaintiff's
offered instructions defining and applying the Safety
Appliance A c t , p l a i n t i f f a s s e r t e d t h a t he could n o t argue a
v i o l a t i o n of the A c t t o the jury, and t h e r e f o r e r e q u e s t e d
t h a t t h e t r i a l c o u r t a l s o e n t e r a d i r e c t e d v e r d i c t on t h i s
t h e o r y of l i a b i l i t y . D e f e n s e c o u n s e l a g r e e d , and a d i r e c t e d
v e r d i c t was a c c o r d i n g l y e n t e r e d .
Plaintiff's counsel later moved for a new trial and
alleged on several grounds, that the trial court had
improperly construed and applied the law. We cannot
determine i f b r i e f s were s u p p l i e d t h e c o u r t i n s u p p o r t of
t h i s motion. I n any e v e n t , i t a p p e a r s t h a t t h e m o t i o n was
o r a l l y argued, and t h a t w i t h i n a few d a y s t h e t r i a l c o u r t
d i r e c t e d t h e c l e r k t o e n t e r a minute e n t r y s t a t i n g t h a t t h e
m o t i o n f o r a new t r i a l was d e n i e d . R e a s o n s f o r d e n i a l were
not stated. P l a i n t i f f ' s appeal followed.
Plaintiff states the issues as follows: (1) Was
Reynolds a business invitee on p r e m i s e s o f Burlington
Northern? (2) Did B u r l i n g t o n N o r t h e r n owe R e y n o l d s a d u t y
o f p r o v i d i n g h i m w i t h a s a f e p l a c e t o work? (3) Does t h e
Federal S a f e t y Appliance A c t apply to Reynolds? (4) Is
c o n t r i b u t o r y n e g l i g e n c e a d e f e n s e under t h e Act? (5) Did
t h e Court e r r i n d i r e c t i n g its v e r d i c t a g a i n s t Reynolds?
The r a i l r o a d , on t h e o t h e r h a n d , s t a t e s the issues i n
t h e following language: ( 1) Was t h e p l a i n t i f f improperly
p r e c l u d e d from s u b m i t t i n g t h e i s s u e o f " p r e m i s e s l i a b i l i t y "
t o the jury? (2) Was t h e p l a i n t i f f improperly precluded
from s u b m i t t i n g t h e i s s u e of S a f e t y A p p l i a n c e A c t l i a b i l i t y
t o the jury? (3) Did t h e C o u r t commit r e v e r s i b l e e r r o r by
directing a verdict against the plaintiff?
I t i s c l e a r t h a t t h e p a r t i e s c a n n o t a g r e e on t h e i s s u e s
and that the trial record does not demonstrate a
well-prepared and w e l l - p r e s e n t e d c a s e by c o u n s e l f o r e i t h e r
side. Although we cannot say that this c a s e would not
u l t i m a t e l y h a v e b e e n a p p e a l e d had it gone t o t h e j u r y , we
have no doubt that it would be here in a different
p r o c e d u r a l c o n t e x t i f c o u n s e l f o r b o t h s i d e s had p a i d c l o s e r
attention to the l a w and t o d r a f t i n g t h e i r proposed jury
instructions. W note a l s o t h a t t h e t r i a l court should not
e
b e f a u l t e d by t h e p l a i n t i f f f o r d i r e c t i n g a v e r d i c t when i t
was t h e p l a i n t i f f who r e q u e s t e d t h e t r i a l c o u r t t o d o s o .
On t h e o t h e r h a n d , had t h e t r i a l c o u r t b e e n more c a r e f u l i n
i t s r u l i n g s w i t h r e l a t i o n t o t h e p r o p o s e d i n s t r u c t i o n s , and
had t h e p a r t i e s i n s i s t e d on c a r e f u l r u l i n g s , we would b e i n
a b e t t e r position t o handle the substantive i s s u e s without
f i r s t s o r t i n g o u t t h e p r o c e d u r a l p r o b l e m s which l e d t o t h e
results a t the t r i a l court level.
Because of the nature of the rulings affecting
p l a i n t i f f ' s offered instructions a s t o h i s negligence theory
o f l i a b i l i t y , w e c a n n o t t e l l why t h e t r i a l c o u r t e f f e c t i v e l y
t o o k t h e n e g l i g e n c e t h e o r y away f r o m t h e j u r y . Nor c a n w e
determine the trial court's rulings in relation to the
application and scope of the Safety Appliance Act.
N o n e t h e l e s s , w e d e t e r m i n e t h a t w e must d e c i d e w h e t h e r , under
t h e f a c t s of t h i s c a s e , t h e d e f e n d a n t r a i l r o a d had t h e d u t y
t o p r o v i d e p l a i n t i f f w i t h a s a f e p l a c e t o work. Although it
appears that the railroad concedes the right of the
plaintiff to sue under t h e S a f e t y Appliance A c t , w e must
a l s o determine whether t h e r a i l r o a d h a s a v a i l a b l e t o it t h e
d e f e n s e s o f a s s u m p t i o n o f r i s k and c o n t r i b u t o r y n e g l i g e n c e .
W discuss f i r s t
e t h e a p p l i c a t i o n and s c o p e o f the Safety
Appliance A c t .
APPLICATION OF THE FEDERAL SAFETY APPLIANCE ACT: Procedural
Backqround
In that portion of the pretrial order setting forth
plaintiff's contentions, plaintiff simply alleged that
" d e f e n d a n t v i o l a t e d t h e S a f e t y A p p l i a n c e A c t ( 4 5 U.S.C. S 1-
16) in providing a car with a defective handbrake."
D e f e n d a n t , on t h e o t h e r h a n d , had s e v e r a l c o n t e n t i o n s i n t h e
p r e t r i a l order pertaining t o its defense of t h e case. It
a l l e g e d f i r s t t h a t t h e c a r s w e r e n o t i n u s e on d e f e n d a n t ' s
l i n e a t t h e t i m e of t h e a c c i d e n t . Second, it a l l e g e d t h a t
plaintiff's injuries were not caused by a defective
handbrake or, by a failure of a handbrake to perform
p r o p e r l y and e f f i c i e n t l y on t h e o c c a s i o n i n q u e s t i o n when
u s e d i n a n o r m a l , o r d i n a r y and p r o p e r o p e r a t i o n . T h i r d , it
argued that plaintiff's injuries were caused by his
negligence in failing to properly set a handbrake o r by
improperly s e t t i n g the handbrakes on the remaining cars.
Fourth, it a l l e g e d t h a t p l a i n t i f f had assumed t h e r i s k o f
h i s i n j u r i e s ( a l t h o u g h t h i s c o n t e n t i o n was w i t h d r a w n a t t h e
t i m e jury i n s t r u c t i o n s were s e t t l e d . ) Fifth, the railroad
asserted that there is no evidence that any of the
h a n d b r a k e s on any of t h e c a r s w e r e d e f e c t i v e .
Initially, we note that the defendant did not assert
d u r i n g s e t t l e m e n t of j u r y instructions, nor does it a s s e r t
h e r e , t h a t t h e S a f e t y Appliance Act is i n a p p l i c a b l e because
t h e r a i l r o a d c a r s were n o t i n u s e o n d e f e n d a n t ' s l i n e a t t h e
time plaintiff sustained his injuries. We assume,
therefore, that defendant has abandoned this contention.
Furthermore, i n J e n k i n s v. Chicago & Southeastern I l l i n o i s
Railroad ( 1 9 7 2 ) , 5 Ill.App.3d 954, 284 N.E.2d 392, a case
remarkably s i m i l a r t o t h e f a c t s h e r e , t h e Court ruled t h a t
the cars, although on a siding, that was leased to the
plaintiff's employer, were i n o p e r a t i o n on d e f e n d a n t ' s
railroad line. W hold a l s o ,
e t h a t defendant cannot d e f e a t
a p p l i c a t i o n of t h e A c t b e c a u s e t h e c a r s w e r e on a s i d i n g ,
even though the c a r l o a d i n g o p e r a t i o n s on the s i d i n g were
h a n d l e d by Ksanka Lumber Company.
THE FEDERAL SAFETY APPLIANCE ACT: Substantive Application
Plaintiff's offered instructions applying the Safety
Appliance Act, s t a t e d t h a t proof of a v i o l a t i o n of t h e Act,
together with a c a u s a l r e l a t i o n s h i p between t h e v i o l a t i o n
and the injuries sustained, is sufficient to impose
l i a b i l i t y on t h e r a i l r o a d . They f u r t h e r p r o v i d e d t h a t t h e
defenses of c o n t r i b u t o r y n e g l i g e n c e and a s s u m p t i o n o f r i s k
were not available to the railroad. The definition of
causation was that which is p r o v i d e d for in the Federal
E m p l o y e r s ' L i a b i l i t y Act--and we s h a l l h a v e more t o s a y o f
this later. The r a i l r o a d a l s o o f f e r e d s e v e r a l i n s t r u c t i o n s
defining the Act, but provided t h a t contributory negligence
i s a d e f e n s e even i f a v i o l a t i o n o f t h e A c t i s p r o v e d . (As
we p r e v i o u s l y s t a t e d , t h e r a i l r o a d e l i m i n a t e d i t s a s s u m p t i o n
of risk defense from its offered instructions because it
believed that as a matter of evidence, the defense was
inapplicable ) .
The t r i a l c o u r t r e f u s e d p l a i n t i f f ' s o f f e r e d i n s t r u c t i o n s
and approved the defendant's instructions. Contributory
n e g l i g e n c e was t h u s a d e f e n s e u n d e r t h e A c t . Only two o t h e r
i n s t r u c t i o n s had d i r e c t a p p l i c a t i o n t o t h e A c t . The f i r s t
(and a proper instruction) defined inefficient brake and
defective brake; and the second ( w h i c h a l s o was proper)
d e f i n e d t h e t e r m s i n e f f i c i e n t and i n e f f e c t i v e , but further
s t a t e d t h a t t h e t e r m s w e r e n o t synonymous.
The trial court approved several more of defendant's
o f f e r e d i n s t r u c t i o n s t h a t apply t o p l a i n t i f f ' s t h e o r i e s of
recovery; but t h e i n s t r u c t i o n s do n o t s p e c i f y t h a t t h e y a r e
intended to apply either to the negligence theory of
recovery, o r t o t h e S a f e t y Appliance A c t t h e o r y of recovery,
or to both. The danger, of course, is that the jury,
without being properly instructed, could improperly apply
the instructions without the necessary designation.
One o f the instructions defined reasonable care, which
could apply only to plaintiff's common l a w n e g l i g e n c e
action. A second d e f i n e d t h e t e r m n e g l i g e n c e , which a g a i n
c o u l d o n l y be a p p l i e d t o p l a i n t i f f ' s n e g l i g e n c e t h e o r y . A
t h i r d i n s t r u c t i o n d e f i n e d t h e term c o n t r i b u t o r y n e g l i g e n c e ,
b u t d i d n o t a t t e m p t t o s t a t e whether it a p p l i e d t o e i t h e r o r
both of plaintiff's theories of recovery. A fourth
instruction also defined contributory negligence, and is
s i m i l a r l y d e f e c t i v e f o r a f a i l u r e t o d e s i g n a t e which t h e o r y
it applied to. A fifth instruction defined the term
proximate cause, and a l t h o u g h p r o p e r l y a p p l i c a b l e t o b o t h
t h e o r i e s of recovery, f a i l e d t o c o n t a i n language t e l l i n g t h e
jury t h a t t h e d e f i n i t i o n did apply t o both theories. We are
thus l e f t with a s e r i e s of i n s t r u c t i o n s t h a t a r e woefully
i n a d e q u a t e , e v e n a s s u m i n g t h a t t h e t r i a l c o u r t had p r o p e r l y
r u l e d on t h e a p p l i c a t i o n and s c o p e o f t h e S a f e t y A p p l i a n c e
Act. If t h e c a s e had g o n e t o t h e j u r y , and t h e p l a i n t i f f
r e c e i v e d a n a d v e r s e j u r y v e r d i c t , w e would b e c o m p e l l e d t o
reverse for the reason that the jury was improperly
instructed.
We next proceed to a discussion of the substantive
p r o v i s i o n s of t h e F e d e r a l S a f e t y Appliance Act a s t h e y apply
t o t h i s case.
W h a v e no d o u b t t h a t t h e p l a i n t i f f
e i s a member o f t h e
c l a s s which c a n i n v o k e t h e p r o v i s i o n s o f t h e F e d e r a l S a f e t y
A p p l i a n c e A c t , 45 U.S.C. 55 1 t h r u 46. S e c t i o n 11 p r o v i d e s
in part:
" I t s h a l l b e u n l a w f u l f o r a n y common c a r r i e r
. .. t o h a u l , o r p e r m i t t o be hauled o r used
on i t s l i n e , a n y c a r
...
. . . . . ."
e f f i c i e n t hand b r a k e s
n o t equipped with
Section 13 of t h e Act p r o v i d e s f o r c r i m i n a l p e n a l t i e s f o r
any v i o l a t i o n .
Although the Act itself does not create a cause of
a c t i o n i n favor of anyone, it h a s b e e n g i v e n e f f e c t t h r o u g h
c i v i l s u i t s under t h e F e d e r a l Employers' Liability A c t (45
U.S.C. 5s 5 1 t h r u 6 0 ) i n t h e c a s e o f r a i l r o a d e m p l o y e e s , and
by s u i t s i n s t a t e c o u r t s i n v o k i n g s t a t e l a w f o r n o n r a i l r o a d
employees. I n Coray v. Southern Pac. Co. ( 1 9 4 9 ) , 335 U.S.
520, 522-523, 69 S . C t . 275, 276, 93 L.Ed.2d 208, 210, the
U n i t e d S t a t e s Supreme C o u r t l o n g a g o s t a t e d :
". . . t h i s Act, f a i r l y i n t e r p r e t e d , must be
h e l d t o p r o t e c t a l l who need p r o t e c t i o n f r o m
dangerous r e s u l t s due t o maintenance o r
operation of congressionally prohibited
defective appliances."
I n Boyer v. Atchison, Topeka and S a n t a Fe R a i l w a y Co.
( 1 9 6 7 ) , 38 111.2d 31, 230 N.E.2d 1 7 3 , t h e I l l i n o i s Supreme
Court held t h a t a r a i l r o a d passenger could invoke t h e
p r o t e c t i o n o f t h e A c t , and f u r t h e r m o r e , t h a t t h e d e f e n s e o f
a s s u m p t i o n of r i s k was n o t a v a i l a b l e t o t h e r a i l r o a d . In
Jenkins, supra, following the lead set forth in Boyer,
the I l l i n o i s Appellate Court declared that a nonrailroad
employee w o r k i n g on t h e r a i l r o a d ' s s i d i n g , c o u l d i n v o k e t h e
p r o t e c t i o n o f t h e A c t , and f u r t h e r m o r e , t h a t t h e d e f e n s e o f
c o n t r i b u t o r y n e g l i g e n c e was n o t a v a i l a b l e t o t h e r a i l r o a d .
It is t h u s c l e a r t o us t h a t t h e p l a i n t i f f here can invoke
t h e p r o t e c t i o n o f t h e A c t ; and i t i s e q u a l l y c l e a r t h a t t h e
r a i l r o a d cannot a s s e r t t h e d e f e n s e s of assumption of risk
and c o n t r i b u t o r y n e g l i g e n c e .
Because it is a federal A c t , federal court decisions
necessarily define the substantive provisions. The U.S.
Supreme C o u r t h a s d e c l a r e d that t h e Act imposes absolute
liability that is not i n any way d e p e n d e n t on t h e l a w o f
negligence. I n O'Donnell v. E l g i n J. & E. Ry. Co. (1949),
338 U.S. 384, 390, 70 S.Ct. 200, 204, 94 L.Ed. 187, the
Court s t a t e d :
". . . t h i s Court e a r l y swept a l l i s s u e s of
n e g l i g e n c e o u t of c a s e s under t h e S a f e t y
Appliance A c t . For r e a s o n s s e t f o r t h a t
l e n g t h i n our books, t h e Court h e l d t h a t a
f a i l u r e of equipment t o perform a s 0 r e q u i r e d
by t h e S a f e t y A p p l i a n c e A c t i s i n i t s e l f a n
a c t i o n a b l e wrong, i n no way d e p e n d e n t upon
n e g l i g e n c e and f o r t h e p r o x i m a t e r e s u l t s o f
which t h e r e i s l i a b i l i t y - - a liability that
c a n n o t be e s c a p e d by p r o o f o f c a r e o r
diligence. (Citing cases.)"
For reasons t h a t a r e not e n t i r e l y c l e a r , however, the
U.S. Supreme Court has also declared that whether the
r a i l r o a d can a s s e r t c o n t r i b u t o r y negligence o r assumption of
r i s k a s d e f e n s e s i n a c a s e i n v o l v i n g a n o n r a i l r o a d employee,
depends entirely on state law rather than federal law.
The most recent case adhering to this interpretation is
C r a n e v. Cedar R a p i d s & Iowa R a i l w a y Co. ( 1 9 6 9 ) , 395 U.S.
164, 89 S . C t . 1 7 0 6 , 23 L.Ed.2d 176. I n Crane, t h e Court
u p h e l d a n Iowa Supreme C o u r t d e c i s i o n h o l d i n g t h a t o n e who
b r i n g s s u i t u n d e r t h e S a f e t y A p p l i a n c e A c t must p r o v e ( u n d e r
Iowa l a w ) t h a t he was f r e e from c o n t r i b u t o r y n e g l i g e n c e . In
d e c l a r i n g , however, t h a t a nonemployee c o u l d n o t i n v o k e t h e
same p r o t e c t i o n s u n d e r t h e F e d e r a l E m p l o y e r s ' L i a b i l i t y A c t
to which a railroad employee is entitled, the majority
stated:
"We r e c o g n i z e t h e i n j u s t i c e o f d e n y i n g
r e c o v e r y t o a nonemployee which would n o t be
d e n i e d t o a n employee p e r f o r m i n g t h e same t a s k
i n t h e same manner a s d i d p e t i t i o n e r . But it
i s f o r C o n g r e s s t o amend t h e s t a t u t e t o
p r e v e n t such i n j u s t i c e . It is not permitted
t h e Court t o r e w r i t e t h e s t a t u t e . " 395 U.S.
a t 167.
J u s t i c e Black, joined by C h i e f J u s t i c e Warren and J u s t i c e
Douglas, dissented, arguing that a nonemployee under the
S a f e t y Appliance Act should have the same p r o t e c t i o n s as
those given a railroad employee who i n v o k e s t h e A c t as a
b a s i s of p r e d i c a t i n g c i v i l l i a b i l i t y .
Because the Safety Appliance Act creates absolute
l i a b i l i t y n o t d e p e n d e n t upon t h e l a w o f n e g l i g e n c e , w e m u s t
decide this i s s u e on the basis of whether we p e r m i t the
d e f e n s e s of assumption of r i s k and c o n t r i b u t o r y n e g l i g e n c e
where suit is brought under a state statute that imposes
absolute l i a b i l i t y . I n P o l l a r d v. Todd ( 1 9 6 6 ) , 1 4 8 Mont.
171, 418 P.2d 869, a case brought under the Montana
Scaffolding Act, we ruled that liability is established
where it is proved that a s t a t u t e has been v i o l a t e d and
t h e r e is a p r o x i m a t e c a u s e c o n n e c t i o n between t h e v i o l a t i o n
and t h e r e s u l t i n g i n j u r i e s . W ruled,
e furthermore, t h a t i n
such a case, the defenses of assumption of risk and
contributory negligence are not available t o o n e who h a s
responsibility under the Scaffolding Act. We would be
inconsistent in interpreting absolute l i a b i l i t y statutes i f
w e were t o p e r m i t the railroad to invoke t h e d e f e n s e s of
assumption of risk and contributory negligence under the
S a f e t y Appliance Act b u t t o d i s a l l o w t h e d e f e n s e s under t h e
Montana S c a f f o l d i n g A c t . I n e i t h e r c a s e , t h e p r i n c i p l e is
t h e same, and t h e p r i n c i p l e s h o u l d b e c o n s i s t e n t l y a p p l i e d .
We are not alone in holding that the defenses of
assumption of risk and contributory negligence are not
available to the railroad where sued by a plaintiff who
invokes the provisions of the S a f e t y Appliance Act. In
B o y e r , s u p r a , t h e I l l i n o i s Supreme C o u r t d e t e r m i n e d t h a t t h e
actionable wrong under the Act is the failure of the
equipment t o perform a s required under t h e Act, and that
o n c e t h e v i o l a t i o n is p r o v e d , t h e p l a i n t i f f need o n l y p r o v e
the causal relationship between the violation and the
injuries sustained. In ruling that the defense of
a s s u m p t i o n o f r i s k was n o t a v a i l a b l e u n d e r I l l i n o i s l a w , t h e
court stated:
"Under s u c h a p o l i c y w h i c h i m p o s e s a n a b s o l u t e
d u t y t o p r o v i d e f o r p u b l i c s a f e t y i t would b e
incongruous to allow the doctrine of
a s s u m p t i o n o f r i s k t o be employed by t h e
defendant t o avoid t h e r e s p o n s i b i l i t y t o one
f o r whose b e n e f i t t h e s t a t u t e was e n a c t e d . "
230 N.E.2d a t 1 7 8 .
Not t o be d e n i e d , two y e a r s l a t e r , a d e f e n d a n t r a i l r o a d
asserted t h e defense of contributory negligence i n a s u i t
brought by a nonrailroad employee p u r s u a n t to the Safety
Appliance Act. The I l l i n o i s A p p e l l a t e C o u r t , f o l l o w i n g t h e
lead i n Boyer, held t h a t c o n t r i b u t o r y negligence is n o t a
defense t o a s u i t brought pursuant t o t h e Act. Jenkins,
supra. The C o u r t s t a t e d :
"Because t h e a c t i o n i s one t o e n f o r c e an
a b s o l u t e l i a b i l i t y , t h e a p p l i c a b l e s t a t e law
is t h a t which d e a l s w i t h t h o s e t y p e s of
actions. I t is elementary t h a t contributory
negligence, a concept of the law of
negligence, is not an applicable defense
a g a i n s t one s e e k i n g t o e n f o r c e a n a b s o l u t e
liability." 284 N.E.2d a t 400.
The c o u r t in Jenkins also laid t o r e s t any a s s u m p t i o n
t h a t t h e d e f e n s e s would b e a v a i l a b l e t o t h e r a i l r o a d w h e r e
s u e d by a n o n r a i l r o a d e m p l o y e e :
" I m p l i c i t i n t h e d e f e n d a n t ' s argument is t h e
contention t h a t the f a c t t h a t p l a i n t i f f is a
nonemployee o f t h e d e f e n d a n t r a i l r o a d c h a n g e s
his status with respect t o the available
defenses. Defendant has not suggested,
however, t h a t p l a i n t i f f is n o t w i t h i n t h e
c l a s s o f t h o s e i n t e n d e d t o b e p r o t e c t e d by t h e
statute. W e c a n s e e no c o g e n t r e a s o n s t o
apply the remedy the s t a t u t e provides
i n c o n s i s t e n t l y w i t h r e s p e c t t o employees
v e r s u s nonemployees. P l a i n t i f f is w i t h i n t h e
p r o t e c t e d c l a s s and t h e r e f o r e h e s h o u l d b e
a f f o r d e d a l l t h e i n c i d e n t s o f t h e remedy,
including the unavailability of contributory
negligence a s a defense." 284 N.E.2d a t 400-
401.
Nor c a n we s e e a n y c o g e n t r e a s o n s why t h e d e f e n s e s o f
assumption of risk and contributory negligence should be
i n a p p l i c a b l e i n a s u i t b r o u g h t by a r a i l r o a d e m p l o y e e b u t
a p p l i c a b l e i n a s u i t b r o u g h t by a n o n r a i l r o a d e m p l o y e e . The
Safety Appliance Act does not require us to reach this
unjust result. Crane, supra. F u r t h e r m o r e , o u r own c a s e o f
P o l l a r d , s u p r a , c l e a r l y sets f o r t h our p o s i t i o n w i t h r e s p e c t
to a s t a t u t e imposing absolute liability--the d e f e n s e s of
assumption of risk and contributory negligence are not
available.
T h e r e i s , however, one a r e a where a r a i l r o a d employee is
e n t i t l e d t o a more l i b e r a l s t a n d a r d i m p o s i n g l i a b i l i t y t h a n
i s a n o n r a i l r o a d employee--and t h a t is w i t h r e s p e c t t o t h e
q u e s t i o n of causation. In t h i s case, the plaintiff offered
a n i n s t r u c t i o n w h i c h d e f i n e d c a u s a t i o n by t h e s t a n d a r d s o f
t h e F e d e r a l Employers' Liability Act. That portion of t h e
instruction stated:
". . . Under t h e Federal S a f e t y Appliance Act,
i f a r a i l r o a d , such a s t h e Defendant i n t h i s
a c t i o n , v i o l a t e s a n y s u c h a c t , and i f t h e
v i o l a t i o n c o n t r i b u t e s i n a n y way o r manner t o
t h e i n j u r y of a person such a s t h e P l a i n t i f f
i n t h i s c a s e , such r a i l r o a d s h a l l be l i a b l e i n
damages t o t h a t p e r s o n f o r h i s i n j u r i e s . "
(Emphasis added. )
This instruction defined causation according to the
d e f i n i t i o n contained i n t h e F e d e r a l Employers' L i a b i l i t y Act
( 4 5 U.S.C. S 5 1 ) and c o u r t d e c i s i o n s f u r t h e r s o l i d i f y i n g t h e
statutory definition. See G a l l i c k v. B a l t i m o r e and Ohio
R a i l r o a d Co. ( 1 9 6 3 ) , 372 U.S. 1 0 8 , 83 S . C t . 659, 9 L.Ed.2d
618; R o g e r s v. Missouri P a c i f i c Railroad Co. ( 1 9 5 7 ) , 352
U.S. 500, 77 S . C t . 443, 1 L.Ed.2d 493. The U.S. Supreme
C o u r t h e l d i n C r a n e , t h a t o n e who i s n o t a r a i l r o a d e m p l o y e e
cannot invoke the benefits of the Federal Employers'
Liability A c t in a s u i t against a railroad. (Crane, supra,
395 U.S. at 166.) Because there is no definition of
c a u s a t i o n i n t h e S a f e t y Appliance Act, w e conclude t h a t t h e
i s s u e o f p r o x i m a t e c a u s e m u s t be d e c i d e d on t h e b a s i s o f t h e
d e f i n i t i o n which p r e v a i l s u n d e r s t a t e law. S e e , McNair v .
Berger (1932), 92 Mont. 441, 1 5 P.2d 834; Montana Jury
Instruction Guide, No. 15.00, and cases cited in the
commentary t o t h i s i n s t r u c t i o n . W e have n o t fashioned a
special d e f i n i t i o n t o a p p l y t o s t a t u t e s imposing a b s o l u t e
liability. Pollard, supra.
SAFE PLACE TO WORK
W e next d i s c u s s t h e i s s u e of whether t h e r a i l r o a d owed
plaintiff t h e d u t y t o p r o v i d e him w i t h a s a f e p l a c e t o work
e v e n t h o u g h he was a n o n r a i l r o a d e m p l o y e e . The l e g a l b a s i s
upon which the plaintiff would i m p o s e t h i s d u t y upon t h e
railroad was never clearly set forth at the trial court
l e v e l , n o r i s it c l e a r l y s e t f o r t h i n t h i s a p p e a l .
P l a i n t i f f alleged i n h i s complaint, and t h e a l l e g a t i o n
is c a r r i e d over i n t o t h e p r e t r i a l o r d e r - - t h a t the railroad
b r e a c h e d i t s d u t y t o p r o v i d e him w i t h a s a f e p l a c e t o work.
I n t h e c o m p l a i n t , t h i s was s i m p l y a n a l l e g a t i o n made w i t h o u t
a n y s p e c i f i c a t i o n o f how o r why t h e r a i l r o a d d i d n o t p r o v i d e
him w i t h a safe place to work. He did, however, have
s e v e r a l s e p a r a t e s p e c i f i c a t i o n s of negligence i n a d d i t i o n t o
t h e s a f e p l a c e t o work a l l e g a t i o n . In the pretrial order,
he has a general allegation that the railroad failed to
provide him w i t h a safe place t o work, and then several
specifications of negligence, all apparently aimed at
specifying how o r why the railroad breached its duty to
p r o v i d e him w i t h a s a f e p l a c e t o work.
Nowhere i n t h e complaint or in the pretrial order is
t h e r e an i n d i c a t i o n t h a t t h e p l a i n t i f f c l a i m e d h i s s t a t u s a s
a businesss-invitee triggered the r a i l r o a d ' s duty t o provide
him with a safe place to work. This allegation first
appeared in plaintiff's offered instructions, at the
conclusion of t h e t r i a l . W e c a n g e t a n a p p r e c i a t i o n o f what
h a p p e n e d o n l y by r e a d i n g t h e t r a n s c r i p t w i t h r e l a t i o n t o t h e
s e t t l e m e n t of j u r y instructions. Plaintiff's instructions
stated f i r s t that the plaintiff was a b u s i n e s s i n v i t e e of
the railroad, and s e c o n d , that a s a business invitee, the
r a i l r o a d owed him a d u t y t o p r o v i d e him w i t h a s a f e p l a c e t o
work. It does not appear that the railroad refuted
p l a i n t i f f ' s c o n t e n t i o n t h a t h e was a b u s i n e s s i n v i t e e - - f o r ,
on t h a t q u e s t i o n a t l e a s t , t h e law is c l e a r . However, t h e
railroad did object to any conclusion that the duty to
provide plaintiff with a safe place to work arose from
p l a i n t i f f ' s s t a t u s a s a business-invitee.
N e i t h e r t h e r a i l r o a d nor t h e p l a i n t i f f d i s a g r e e t h a t a s
to an invitee, the railroad had a duty to exercise
reasonable care to avoid injuring an invitee on the
premises. But p l a i n t i f f w e n t a s t e p f u r t h e r and p e r s i s t e d
in his claim that the railroad had the duty, based on
p l a i n t i f f ' s i n v i t e e s t a t u s , t o p r o v i d e him w i t h a s a f e p l a c e
t o work. He b a s e d h i s a r g u m e n t on t h e F e d e r a l E m p l o y e r s '
L i a b i l i t y Act, which, judicially interpreted, requires
r a i l r o a d e m p l o y e r s t o p r o v i d e a s a f e p l a c e t o work f o r t h e i r
employees. Plaintiff a t no time o f f e r e d a n e x p l a n a t i o n a s
t o how o r why, a s a n o n r a i l r o a d e m p l o y e e , h e was e n t i t l e d t o
the protection of the Employers' Liability Act. The
railroad, on the other hand, c i t e d Crane, supra, for the
p r o p o s i t i o n t h a t a n o n r a i l r o a d employee c a n n o t a v a i l h i m s e l f
o f t h e p r o t e c t i o n p r o v i d e d by t h e E m p l o y e r s ' L i a b i l i t y A c t .
Although the trial court rejected plaintiff's offered
instructions, t h e r e i s no c l e a r r e a s o n why i t d i d s o . Was
i t b e c a u s e t h e t r i a l c o u r t c o n c l u d e d t h a t p l a i n t i f f was n o t
a business invitee, or was it because the trial court
c o n c l u d e d t h a t t h e r a i l r o a d d i d n o t owe p l a i n t i f f the duty
t o p r o v i d e him w i t h a s a f e p l a c e t o w o r k ? O r was i t b o t h ?
Part of the problem here is that the language as to
business-invitee s t a t u s and t h a t a s t o a s a f e p l a c e t o w o r k ,
was c o n t a i n e d i n t h e same i n s t r u c t i o n s . Thus, without a
c l e a r r u l i n g from t h e t r i a l c o u r t a s t o why i t r e j e c t e d t h e
instruction, we are left to guess. The problem is
compounded because p l a i n t i f f 's counsel made no effort to
obtain a clear r u l i n g f r o m t h e t r i a l c o u r t a s t o why t h e
i n s t r u c t i o n s were r e j e c t e d . He s h o u l d h a v e d o n e s o . W are
e
l e f t w i t h t h i s s i t u a t i o n a t t h a t p o i n t where t h e t r i a l c o u r t
refused plaintiff's offered instructions: the plaintiff
offered no substitutes; the defendant offered no
instructions on the question of the legal relationship
e x i s t i n g between p l a i n t i f f and the railroad (the railroad
contended p l a i n t i f f was an invitee); and the trial court
p r o p o s e d none o f i t s own. The r e s u l t i s t h a t t h e r e c o r d i s
barreh o f i n s t r u c t i o n s t h a t would h a v e i n a n y way s e t f o r t h
p l a i n t i f f ' s t h e o r y o f t h e c a s e on t h e n e g l i g e n c e c o u n t had
t h e c a s e been s u b m i t t e d t o t h e j u r y . T h i s i s a n anomolous
s i t u a t i o n , t o say the l e a s t .
A s we have i n d i c a t e d , p l a i n t i f f i n t h i s a p p e a l , now s e t s
forth the issues as to business-invitee status and safe
p l a c e t o work, a s s e p a r a t e i s s u e s . T h a t i s n o t t h e way t h e y
were p r e s e n t e d t o t h e t r i a l c o u r t . Plaintiff in his briefs
to this Court sets forth citation after citation of
e n c y c l o p e d i a l a w t h a t p l a i n t i f f was a b u s i n e s s i n v i t e e - - a n d
with this the railroad agrees--as d o we. There is no
question, and a p p a r e n t l y never was one that plaintiff at
l e a s t had t h e s t a t u s o f a b u s i n e s s - i n v i t e e . W do n o t need
e
t o belabor t h i s point here.
I n h i s b r i e f s , the p l a i n t i f f contends t h a t t h e railroad
owed him a s a f e p l a c e t o w o r k , h i s c o u n s e l p r o v i d e s u s w i t h
a b s o l u t e l y no a u t h o r i t y , nor e v e n good a r g u m e n t , that the
railroad had a duty t o provide him w i t h a safe place to
work. All of his citations miss the issue he raises.
Nonetheless, there a r e important f a c t o r s i n t h i s case, not
b r o u g h t t o o u r a t t e n t i o n by e i t h e r p a r t y , t h a t compel u s t o
h o l d t h a t u n d e r t h e f a c t s o f t h i s c a s e , t h e r a i l r o a d d i d owe
p l a i n t i f f t h e d u t y t o p r o v i d e him w i t h a s a f e p l a c e t o work.
It is an elementary principle that an employer must
p r o v i d e i t s e m p l o y e e s w i t h a s a f e p l a c e t o work. Shannon v .
Howard S. W r i g h t C o n s t . Co. (1979), Mont . , 593
P.2d 438; P o l l a r d , 418 P.2d a t 8 7 2 ; A l l e n v. B e a r C r e e k C o a l
Co. (1911), 43 Mont. 269, 1 1 5 P. 673, 677; Anderson v.
N o r t h e r n Pac. Ry. Co. ( 1 9 0 6 ) , 34 Mont. 181, 85 P.2d 884,
890. See also 56 C.J.S. Master& Servant S 204; 53
Am.Jur.2d Master & S e r v a n t S 195. The r a i l r o a d , o f c o u r s e ,
acknowledges t h i s p r i n c i p l e , b u t a r g u e s t h a t t h i s p r i n c i p l e
c a n n o t a p p l y h e r e f o r t h e s i m p l e r e a s o n t h a t p l a i n t i f f was
n o t i t s employee. A s f a r a s it goes, i t i s a good a r g u m e n t .
But we cannot ignore the real relationship between the
B u r l i n g t o n N o r t h e r n and Ksanka Lumber Company.
At the beginning of trial, counsel for the railroad
f i l e d a m o t i o n i n l i m i n e w i t h t h e t r i a l c o u r t , b a s e d on t h e
following revelations: Ksanka Lumber Company i s a w h o l l y -
owned subsidiary of Plum Creek Lumber Company; and Plum
C r e e k Lumber Company i s i n t u r n , a wholly-owned subsidiary
of Burlington Northern. The r a i l r o a d a s s e r t e d t h a t i t would
be h i g h l y p r e j u d i c i a l f o r t h e j u r y t o l e a r n o f i t s o w n e r s h i p
of Ksanka Lumber Company, through the Plum Creek Lumber
Company. I t a p p e a r s t h a t t h i s m o t i o n was g r a n t e d , for the
j u r y d i d n o t , a t l e a s t d i r e c t l y , have t h i s information. It
may well be true that the information would be highly
prejudicial t o the defendant r a i l r o a d here, but we cannot
ignore t h i s information i n d e t e r m i n i n g t h e d u t i e s owed b y
the railroad to the plaintiff here. The plaintiff was
p e r f o r m i n g work more d i r e c t l y c o n n e c t e d t o t h e o p e r a t i o n s o f
a r a i l r o a d t h a n t o t h e o p e r a t i o n s o f a l u m b e r company.
P l a i n t i f f worked a t a r a i l r o a d s i d i n g , f i l l i n g r a i l r o a d
c a r s w i t h woodchips. H i s work r e q u i r e d him t o n o t o n l y b e
on r a i l r o a d t r a c k s , b u t a l s o t o c l i m b on and o f f railroad
c a r s t o f a c i l i t a t e t h e i r movement t o t h e p l a c e o f l o a d i n g .
He also had to shuttle the railroad cars away from the
l o a d i n g a r e a t o make room f o r t h e n e x t r a i l r o a d c a r t o be
loaded. T h a t t h e r a i l r o a d l e a s e d t h e p r e m i s e s t o Plum C r e e k
Lumber Company, which i n t u r n l e a s e d t h e p r e m i s e s t o Ksanka
Lumber Company--both being the alter ego o f the railroad
company--makes l i t t l e difference. The p l a i n t i f f was w o r k i n g
d i r e c t l y i n the operations of the railroad i n every sense of
t h e word.
We do not question here the right of a railroad
c o r p o r a t i o n t o c r e a t e wholly-owned subsidiary corporations
t o c o n d u c t some o f i t s b u s i n e s s . W e do, however, question
t h e r i g h t o f a r a i l r o a d by s o d o i n g , t o a b s o l v e i t s e l f of
the responsibility to provide a safe place to work for
employees who are technically employed by a subsidiary
c o r p o r a t i o n , b u t whose employment i s d i r e c t l y r e l a t e d t o t h e
o p e r a t i o n s of a r a i l r o a d . We thus hold t h a t the defendant
railroad here, owed t h e p l a i n t i f f t h e d u t y t o p r o v i d e him
w i t h a s a f e p l a c e t o work.
Where o n e c o r p o r a t i o n i s t h e wholly-owned subsidiary of
the parent company, and where t h e employee is engaged in
d u t i e s t h a t a r e a s c l o s e l y connected t o t h e business of t h e
p a r e n t company a s t h e y a r e t o t h e s u b s i d i a r y c o r p o r a t i o n , a s
they are here, justice requires us to hold that both
c o r p o r a t i o n s owed t h e d u t y t o p r o v i d e p l a i n t i f f w i t h a s a f e
place to work. It is safe to assume that plaintiff
c o l l e c t e d W o r k e r s ' C o m p e n s a t i o n b e n e f i t s f r o m Ksanka Lumber
Company, and t h u s t h a t K s a n k a ' s d u t y t o p r o v i d e a s a f e p l a c e
to work was discharged by the Worker's Compensation
benefits. On t h e o t h e r h a n d , t h e r i g h t o f t h e w o r k e r t o s u e
t h e p a r e n t company u n d e r t h e f a c t s h e r e i s n o t d o u b t e d . Had
t h e employee been a b l e t o s u e a s a n employee o f t h e r a i l r o a d
under the Federal Employers' Liability Act, supra, and
invoked the Safety Appliance A c t a s h i s cause of action,
t h e r e i s no d o u b t t h a t h i s c h a n c e s o f r e c o v e r y a g a i n s t t h e
railroad would have been considerably enhanced. For
example, plaintiff would have been entitled to a more
liberal definition of causation than t h a t t o which he is
e n t i t l e d i n t h i s case. Thus, t h e r a i l r o a d is e n t i t l e d t o a
s t r i c t e r d e f i n i t i o n of c a u s a t i o n t o be a p p l i e d i n t h i s c a s e .
The o r d e r o f t h e D i s t r i c t Court d i r e c t i n g a v e r d i c t on
both counts is reversed. This cause i s remanded to the
D i s t r i c t C o u r t f o r a new t r i a l .
W e Concur:
Chief J u s t i c e
/ Justices
v