(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2005 1
Syllabus
NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Syllabus
RICE, WARDEN, ET AL. v. COLLINS
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE NINTH CIRCUIT
No. 04–52. Argued December 5, 2005—Decided January 18, 2006
After the prosecutor struck a young, African-American woman, Juror
16, from the panel at respondent Collins’ state-court drug trial,
Collins objected that the strike was made on account of Juror 16’s
race. As race-neutral explanations for the strike, the prosecutor said
that Juror 16 had rolled her eyes in response to a question from the
court; that she was young and might be too tolerant of a drug crime;
and that she was single and lacked ties to the community. In reject-
ing Collins’ challenge, the trial court declared that it did not observe
the complained-of demeanor by Juror 16, but noted that she was
youthful, as was a white male juror also dismissed by peremptory
challenge, and stated it would give the prosecutor “the benefit of the
doubt.” The prosecutor had also referred to Juror 16’s gender in ex-
plaining the strike, but the trial court disallowed any reliance on that
ground. The California Court of Appeal upheld the conviction and
the trial court’s ruling on the peremptory challenge, finding that the
prosecutor permissibly excluded Juror 16 based on her youth. Even if
youth was not a legitimate reason to exercise a peremptory challenge,
said the court, Juror 16’s demeanor supported the strike; nothing in
the record suggested the trial court failed to conduct a searching in-
quiry of the prosecutor’s reasons for striking her. The California Su-
preme Court denied review. The Federal District Court dismissed
Collins’ habeas petition with prejudice, but the Ninth Circuit re-
versed and remanded, concluding that, under the Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), the State Court of Ap-
peal’s affirmance was based on an unreasonable factual determina-
tion in light of the evidence presented at trial.
Held: The Ninth Circuit’s attempt to use a set of debatable inferences to
set aside the state court’s conclusion does not satisfy AEDPA’s re-
2 RICE v. COLLINS
Syllabus
quirements for granting habeas relief. Pp. 3–8.
(a) Under Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U. S. 79, 98, a defendant’s chal-
lenge to a peremptory strike allegedly based on race requires, inter
alia, that the trial court determine whether the defendant has car-
ried his burden of proving purposeful discrimination. This involves
evaluating “the persuasiveness of the [prosecutor’s proffered] justifi-
cation” for the strike, but “the ultimate burden of persuasion regard-
ing racial motivation rests with, and never shifts from, the opponent
of the strike.” Purkett v. Elem, 514 U. S. 765, 768. Because, under
AEDPA, a federal habeas court must find the state-court conclusion
“an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence
presented in the State court proceeding,” 28 U. S. C. §2254(d)(2), a
federal court can only grant Collins’ petition if it was unreasonable to
credit the prosecutor’s race-neutral explanations for the Batson chal-
lenge. Pp. 3–4.
(b) Though the Ninth Circuit recited the proper standard of review,
it improperly substituted its evaluation of the record for that of the
state trial court, which, under §2254(d)(2), did not make an unrea-
sonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented.
Noting that the trial court had not witnessed Juror 16’s purported
eye rolling, the Ninth Circuit concluded that no reasonable factfinder
could have accepted the prosecutor’s rendition of the alleged incident
because the prosecutor had completely undermined her own credibil-
ity based on three considerations: her erroneous statement that an-
other prospective African-American juror, Juror 19, was “young”
when, in fact, she was a grandmother; the prosecutor’s improper at-
tempt to use gender as a basis for exclusion; and the Court of Ap-
peals’ skepticism toward the prosecutor’s explanation that she struck
Juror 16 in part because of her youth and lack of ties to the commu-
nity. As to the first reason, because the prosecutor’s reference to Ju-
ror 19’s youth occurred during a discussion of three prospective ju-
rors, two of whom were, indeed, young, it is quite plausible that the
prosecutor simply misspoke. It is a tenuous inference to say that an
accidental reference with respect to one juror undermines the prose-
cutor’s credibility with respect to another. Second, the Ninth Circuit
assigned the prosecutor’s reference to Juror 16’s gender more weight
than it can bear, given that the prosecutor provided a number of
other permissible and plausible race-neutral reasons for excluding
her. Collins provides no argument why this matter demonstrates
that a reasonable factfinder must conclude the prosecutor lied about
the eye rolling and struck Juror 16 based on her race. Finally, even if
the prosecutor’s concerns about Juror 16’s youth and lack of commu-
nity ties were overly cautious, her wariness could be seen as race
neutral, for she used a peremptory strike on a white male juror, Ju-
Cite as: 546 U. S. ____ (2006) 3
Syllabus
ror 6, with the same characteristics. Viewing the foregoing concerns
together, the most generous reading would suggest only that the trial
court had reason to question the prosecutor’s credibility regarding
Juror 16’s alleged improper demeanor. That does not, however, com-
pel the conclusion that the trial court had no permissible alternative
but to reject the prosecutor’s race-neutral justifications and conclude
Collins had shown a Batson violation. Reasonable minds reviewing
the record might disagree about the prosecutor’s credibility, but on
habeas review that does not suffice to supersede the trial court’s
credibility determination. Pp. 4–8.
365 F. 3d 667, reversed and remanded.
KENNEDY, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. BREYER,
J., filed a concurring opinion, in which SOUTER, J., joined.
Cite as: 546 U. S. ____ (2006) 1
Opinion of the Court
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to
notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-
ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order
that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_________________
No. 04–52
_________________
BERTRAM RICE, WARDEN, ET AL., PETITIONERS v.
STEVEN MARTELL COLLINS
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
[January 18, 2006]
JUSTICE KENNEDY delivered the opinion of the Court
Concerned that, in this habeas corpus case, a federal
court set aside reasonable state-court determinations of
fact in favor of its own debatable interpretation of the
record, we granted certiorari. Our review confirms that
the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit erred, misap-
plying settled rules that limit its role and authority.
I
After a 4-day trial in the Superior Court of California for
the County of Los Angeles, a jury convicted Steven Martell
Collins on one count of possessing cocaine with intent to
distribute. The conviction was all the more serious be-
cause it subjected him to California’s three strikes rule for
sentencing. The question at issue in this federal habeas
corpus action, however, is the California courts’ rejection
of Collins’ argument that the prosecutor struck a young,
African-American woman, Juror 16, from the panel on
account of her race. A second African-American juror was
also the subject of a peremptory strike, and although
Collins challenged that strike in the trial court, on appeal
he objected only to the excusal of Juror 16.
2 RICE v. COLLINS
Opinion of the Court
Even prior to this Court’s decision in Batson v. Ken-
tucky, 476 U. S. 79 (1986), California courts barred per-
emptory challenges to jurors based on race. People v.
Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d 258, 583 P. 2d 748 (1978). Although
our recent decision in Johnson v. California, 545 U. S. ___
(2005), disapproved of the manner in which Wheeler and
Batson were implemented in some California cases, the
state courts in this case used the correct analytical frame-
work in considering and ruling upon the objection to the
prosecutorial strike.
As race-neutral explanations for striking Juror 16, the
prosecutor said that Juror 16 had rolled her eyes in re-
sponse to a question from the court; that Juror 16 was
young and might be too tolerant of a drug crime; and that
Juror 16 was single and lacked ties to the community. A
further, more troubling part of the prosecutor’s unorgan-
ized explanation was her reference to Juror 16’s gender.
The trial court, correctly, disallowed any reliance on that
ground. The trial court, furthermore, which had the bene-
fit of observing the prosecutor firsthand over the course of
the proceedings, rejected Collins’ challenge.
“With regard to 016, the court, frankly, did not ob-
serve the demeanor of Ms. 016 that was complained of
by the District Attorney; however, Ms. 016 was a
youthful person, as was [a white male juror the prose-
cutor also dismissed by peremptory challenge]. And
one or more prospective jurors also. The Court is pre-
pared to give the District Attorney the benefit of the
doubt as to Ms. 016.” 2 App. 14–15.
The California Court of Appeal upheld the conviction
and the trial court’s ruling on the peremptory challenge.
People v. Collins, No. B106939 (Dec. 12, 1997), App. to Pet.
for Cert. 112–117. In its view, youth was a legitimate
reason to exercise a peremptory challenge; and, even if it
were not, Juror 16’s demeanor also supported the strike.
Cite as: 546 U. S. ____ (2006) 3
Opinion of the Court
Id., at 116. According to its review of the record, nothing
suggested the trial court failed to conduct a searching
inquiry of the prosecutor’s reasons for striking Juror 16.
Id., at 116–117. The appeals court thus upheld the trial
court’s ultimate conclusion to credit the prosecutor. Ibid.
Without comment, the Supreme Court of California denied
Collins’ petition for review. Id., at 96.
Collins sought collateral relief on this claim in federal
court. The United States District Court for the Central
District of California dismissed with prejudice Collins’
petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Id., at 91. A divided
panel of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit re-
versed and remanded with instructions to grant the peti-
tion. 348 F. 3d 1082 (2003), amended and superseded by
365 F. 3d 667 (2004). Noting that the Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) governed
Collins’ petition, the panel majority concluded that it was
an unreasonable factual determination to credit the prose-
cutor’s race-neutral reasons for striking Juror 16. Id., at
679. Judge Hall dissented, id., at 687–691; and later, over
the dissent of five judges, the Court of Appeals declined to
rehear the case en banc, id., at 670–673. Though it recited
the proper standard of review, the panel majority improp-
erly substituted its evaluation of the record for that of the
state trial court. We granted the petition for certiorari,
545 U. S. ___ (2005), and now reverse.
II
A defendant’s Batson challenge to a peremptory strike
requires a three-step inquiry. First, the trial court must
determine whether the defendant has made a prima facie
showing that the prosecutor exercised a peremptory chal-
lenge on the basis of race. 476 U. S., at 96–97. Second, if
the showing is made, the burden shifts to the prosecutor to
present a race-neutral explanation for striking the juror in
question. Id., at 97–98. Although the prosecutor must
4 RICE v. COLLINS
Opinion of the Court
present a comprehensible reason, “[t]he second step of this
process does not demand an explanation that is persua-
sive, or even plausible”; so long as the reason is not inher-
ently discriminatory, it suffices. Purkett v. Elem, 514 U. S.
765, 767–768 (1995) (per curiam). Third, the court must
then determine whether the defendant has carried his
burden of proving purposeful discrimination. Batson,
supra, at 98; Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U. S. ___, ___ (2005)
(slip op., at 18). This final step involves evaluating “the
persuasiveness of the justification” proffered by the prose-
cutor, but “the ultimate burden of persuasion regarding
racial motivation rests with, and never shifts from, the
opponent of the strike.” Purkett, supra, at 768.
On direct appeal in federal court, the credibility findings
a trial court makes in a Batson inquiry are reviewed for
clear error. Hernandez v. New York, 500 U. S. 352, 364–
366 (1991) (plurality opinion) (holding that evaluation of a
prosecutor’s credibility “lies ‘peculiarly within a trial
judge’s province’ ”). Under AEDPA, however, a federal
habeas court must find the state-court conclusion “an
unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the
evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28
U. S. C. §2254(d)(2). Thus, a federal habeas court can only
grant Collins’ petition if it was unreasonable to credit the
prosecutor’s race-neutral explanations for the Batson
challenge. State-court factual findings, moreover, are
presumed correct; the petitioner has the burden of rebut-
ting the presumption by “clear and convincing evidence.”
§2254(e)(1). See Miller-El, supra, at ___ (slip op., at 6).
Although the Ninth Circuit assumed §2254(e)(1)’s pre-
sumption applied in this case, 365 F. 3d, at 677, the par-
ties disagree about whether and when it does. We need
not address that question. Even assuming, arguendo, that
only §2254(d)(2) applied in this proceeding, the state-court
decision was not an unreasonable determination of the
facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court.
Cite as: 546 U. S. ____ (2006) 5
Opinion of the Court
Because the California Court of Appeal accepted the
trial court’s credibility finding, the panel majority inquired
whether the appellate court made an unreasonable factual
determination. See id., at 682. The panel majority’s
analysis and conclusions, however, depended entirely on
its view of the trial court’s credibility holding. The panel
majority found no error in the trial court’s proceedings or
rulings in the first two steps of the Batson inquiry. 365
F. 3d, at 677–678. It disagreed, however, with the trial
court’s conclusions on the third step, holding that it was
unreasonable to accept the prosecutor’s explanation that
Juror 16 was excused on account of her youth and her
demeanor. Id., at 678–687. We conclude the Ninth Cir-
cuit erred, for the trial court’s credibility determination
was not unreasonable.
Noting that the trial court had not witnessed Juror 16’s
purported eye rolling, the panel majority concluded that
no reasonable factfinder could have accepted the prosecu-
tor’s rendition of the alleged incident because the prosecu-
tor’s conduct completely undermined her credibility. Id.,
at 683. Having before it only the trial court record, the
Court of Appeals majority drew this conclusion based on
three considerations: first, the prosecutor’s erroneous
statement concerning another prospective African-
American juror’s age; second, the prosecutor’s improper
attempt to use gender as a basis for exclusion; and third,
the majority’s skepticism toward the prosecutor’s explana-
tion that she struck Juror 16 in part because of her youth
and lack of ties to the community. Id., at 683–684.
The first reason the panel majority noted for rejecting
the trial court’s credibility finding pertained not to Juror
16, the subject of Collins’ claim on appeal, but to another
prospective African-American juror, Juror 19. The prose-
cutor referred to Juror 19 as “young” even though she was
a grandmother. This reference to youth took place during
a discussion about three prospective jurors, Jurors 6, 16,
6 RICE v. COLLINS
Opinion of the Court
and 19. Jurors 6 and 16 were both young. As Judge Hall
observed, it is quite plausible that the prosecutor simply
misspoke with respect to a juror’s numerical designation,
an error defense counsel may also have committed. Id., at
688; 2 App. 9. It is a tenuous inference to say that an
accidental reference with respect to one juror, Juror 19,
undermines the prosecutor’s credibility with respect to
Juror 16. Seizing on what can plausibly be viewed as an
innocent transposition makes little headway toward the
conclusion that the prosecutor’s explanation was clearly
not credible.
Second, the panel majority concluded that the trial court
should have questioned the prosecutor’s credibility be-
cause of her “attempt to use gender as a race-neutral basis
for excluding Jurors 016 and 019.” 365 F. 3d, at 684.
Respondent’s trial occurred in August 1996, over two years
after our decision in J. E. B. v. Alabama ex rel. T. B., 511
U. S. 127 (1994), made clear that discrimination in jury
selection on the basis of gender violates the Equal Protec-
tion Clause. Although the record contains a somewhat
confusing colloquy on this point, it can be read as indicat-
ing that one of the prosecutor’s aims in striking Juror 16
was achieving gender balance on the jury. Concerned
about the constitutionality of such a strike, the trial court
made clear that it would not accept gender as a race-
neutral explanation. The panel majority assigned the
gender justification more weight than it can bear. The
prosecutor provided a number of other permissible and
plausible race-neutral reasons, and Collins provides no
argument why this portion of the colloquy demonstrates
that a reasonable factfinder must conclude the prosecutor
lied about the eye rolling and struck Juror 16 based on her
race.
Finally, the panel majority believed to be unsupportable
the prosecutor’s stated concern that Juror 16 might, as a
young and single citizen with no ties to the community, be
Cite as: 546 U. S. ____ (2006) 7
Opinion of the Court
too tolerant of the crime with which respondent was
charged. 365 F. 3d, at 680–682, 684. This was so, the
majority concluded, because during voir dire Juror 16
replied affirmatively when asked if she believed the crime
with which respondent was charged should be illegal and
disclaimed any other reason she could not be impartial.
Id., at 680. That the prosecutor claimed to hold such
concerns despite Juror 16’s voir dire averments does not
establish that she offered a pretext. It is not unreasonable
to believe the prosecutor remained worried that a young
person with few ties to the community might be less will-
ing than an older, more permanent resident to impose a
lengthy sentence for possessing a small amount of a con-
trolled substance. Accord, id., at 690 (Hall, J., dissenting).
Even if the prosecutor was overly cautious in this regard,
her wariness of the young and the rootless could be seen
as race neutral, for she used a peremptory strike on a
white male juror, Juror 6, with the same characteristics.
2 App. 5, 14.
Viewing the panel majority’s concerns together, the
most generous reading would suggest only that the trial
court had reason to question the prosecutor’s credibility
regarding Juror 16’s alleged improper demeanor. That
does not, however, compel the conclusion that the trial
court had no permissible alternative but to reject the
prosecutor’s race-neutral justifications and conclude
Collins had shown a Batson violation. Reasonable minds
reviewing the record might disagree about the prosecutor’s
credibility, but on habeas review that does not suffice to
supersede the trial court’s credibility determination.
The panel majority did not stop at the conclusion that
the trial court rendered an unreasonable factual determi-
nation in light of the evidence presented. It further con-
cluded that the state courts had unreasonably applied
clearly established federal law as determined by this
Court. 365 F. 3d, at 679; 28 U. S. C. §2254(d)(1). The
8 RICE v. COLLINS
Opinion of the Court
question whether a state court errs in determining the
facts is a different question from whether it errs in apply-
ing the law. In this case there is no demonstration that
either the trial court or the California Court of Appeal
acted contrary to clearly established federal law in recog-
nizing and applying Batson’s burden-framework. See
2 App. 14–15; App. to Pet. for Cert. 114–116. The only
question, as we have noted, is whether the trial court’s
factual determination at Batson’s third step was unrea-
sonable. For the reasons discussed above, we conclude it
was not.
III
The panel majority’s attempt to use a set of debatable
inferences to set aside the conclusion reached by the state
court does not satisfy AEDPA’s requirements for granting
a writ of habeas corpus. The judgment of the Court of
Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Cite as: 546 U. S. ____ (2006) 1
BREYER, J., concurring
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_________________
No. 04–52
_________________
BERTRAM RICE, WARDEN, ET AL., PETITIONERS v.
STEVEN MARTELL COLLINS
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
[January 18, 2006]
JUSTICE BREYER, with whom JUSTICE SOUTER joins,
concurring.
Twenty years ago Justice Thurgood Marshall warned
that the test of Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U. S. 79 (1986),
would fail to ferret out unconstitutional discrimination in
the selection of jurors. Id., at 102–103 (concurring opin-
ion) (“The decision today will not end the racial discrimi-
nation that peremptories inject into the jury-selection
process”). In my view, history has proved Justice Mar-
shall right. See Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U. S. ___, ___
(2005) (slip op., at 1) (BREYER, J., concurring). And today’s
case, like Miller-El, helps to illustrate Batson’s fundamen-
tal failings.
For one thing, the prosecutor’s inability in this case to
provide a clear explanation of why she exercised her per-
emptory challenges may well reflect the more general fact
that the exercise of a peremptory challenge can rest upon
instinct not reason. Insofar as Batson asks prosecutors to
explain the unexplainable, how can it succeed? Miller-El,
545 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 2–3) (BREYER, J., concurring).
For another thing, the trial judge’s uncertainty about
the legal validity of the exercise of peremptory challenges
in this case may reflect the more general fact that, some-
times, no one, not even the lawyer herself, can be certain
whether a decision to exercise a peremptory challenge
2 RICE v. COLLINS
BREYER, J., concurring
rests upon an impermissible racial, religious, gender-
based, or ethnic stereotype. Ibid. See also Batson, supra,
at 106 (Marshall, J., concurring) (noting unconscious
internalization of racial stereotypes). How can trial judges
second-guess an instinctive judgment the underlying basis
for which may be a form of stereotyping invisible even to
the prosecutor? Miller-El, supra, at ___ (slip op., at 2)
(BREYER, J., concurring).
Finally, the case before us makes clear that ordinary
mechanisms of judicial review cannot assure Batson’s
effectiveness. The reasons are structural. The trial judge
is best placed to consider the factors that underlie credibil-
ity: demeanor, context, and atmosphere. And the trial
judge is best placed to determine whether, in a borderline
case, a prosecutor’s hesitation or contradiction reflect (a)
deception, or (b) the difficulty of providing a rational rea-
son for an instinctive decision. Appellate judges cannot on
the basis of a cold record easily second-guess a trial judge’s
decision about likely motivation. These circumstances
mean that appellate courts will, and must, grant the trial
courts considerable leeway in applying Batson. See Her-
nandez v. New York, 500 U. S. 352 (1991). As the present
case illustrates, considerations of federalism require fed-
eral habeas courts to show yet further deference to state-
court judgments. See 28 U. S. C. §2254(d)(2) (state-court
factual determination must stand unless “unreasonable”).
The upshot is an unresolvable tension between, on the
one hand, what Blackstone called an inherently “ ‘arbi-
trary and capricious’ ” peremptory challenge system,
Miller-El, supra, at ___ (slip op., at 7) (BREYER, J., concur-
ring) (quoting 4 W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the
Laws of England 346 (1769)), and, on the other hand, the
Constitution’s nondiscrimination command. Given this
constitutional tension, we may have to choose. Miller-El,
supra, at ___ (slip op., at 8) (BREYER, J., concurring);
Swain v. Alabama, 380 U. S. 202, 244 (1965) (Goldberg, J.,
Cite as: 546 U. S. ____ (2006) 3
BREYER, J., concurring
dissenting) (“Were it necessary to make an absolute choice
between the right of a defendant to have a jury chosen in
conformity with the requirements of the Fourteenth
Amendment and the right to challenge peremptorily, the
Constitution compels a choice of the former”); Batson, su-
pra, at 107 (Marshall, J., concurring) (same).
I have argued that legal life without peremptories is no
longer unthinkable. Miller-El, supra, at ___ (slip op., at 6–
7) (concurring opinion) (citing, inter alia, the experience of
England). I continue to believe that we should reconsider
Batson’s test and the peremptory challenge system as a
whole. Nonetheless, because the Court correctly applies
the present legal framework, I concur in its opinion.