Appellant was charged by indictment in three counts; Count I, kidnapping; Count II, rape; and Count III, commission of a felony, rape while armed. Trial by jury resulted in verdicts of guilty on all three counts. The trial court sentenced the appellant to life imprisonment on the verdict of guilty on Count I, and to thirty years imprisonment on the verdict of guilty to Count III, said sentences to run concurrently.
The facts as shown by the record necessary for the writing of this opinion are that the appellant entered a dwelling house where he accosted the prosecuting witness, a twelve-year old child, while she was asleep in a bed, forced her to leave the house at knife point and raped her. He was arrested by police officers at the scene of the crime while still holding a knife to the prosecuting witness’s back.
However in the case at bar there is no charge of automobile banditry. Thus this case does not fall within the factual framework of the cases cited by the appellant. The mere fact that a particular crime may be charged so as to be an included offense in a particular crime does not mean that in every case where such a crime is charged it is necessarily an included offense in a greater crime which might have been charged but was not charged.
We therefore hold that automobile banditry was not charged in this case; therefore the crimes charged were not included offenses in the crime of automobile banditry. The trial court did not err in sentencing the appellant according to the statutory penalties for the crimes for which he was convicted. The trial court is in all things affirmed.