In The
Court of Appeals
Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo
No. 07-12-00125-CR
RICHARD AHMED ZAMBRANA, APPELLANT
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE
On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 2
Potter County, Texas
Trial Court No. 132,487-2, Honorable Pamela Cook Sirmon, Presiding
February 24, 2014
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before QUINN, C.J., and CAMPBELL and HANCOCK, JJ.
Appellant Richard Ahmed Zambrana appeals from his jury conviction of an
assault against his wife causing bodily injury, 1 and the resulting punishment of 180 days
confinement in the Potter County Jail, probated for eighteen months, and $500 fine plus
court costs. Through two issues, appellant contends the trial court erred. We will affirm
the judgment.
1
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.01 (West 2012).
Background
Appellant was charged by information alleging that in April 2011, he intentionally,
knowingly or recklessly caused bodily injury to his wife Tina Alexander-Zambrana.2 The
couple married in March 2010. They separated in February 2011 but continued to “work
on their marriage.” Alexander filed for divorce in August 2011.
In April 2011, the couple went together to a cookout in Groom, Texas. Both
parties consumed alcohol at that gathering. During the evening, appellant became
angry with Alexander and later, while they drove back home, appellant again became
angry with her. Appellant accused Alexander of flirting with another man.
Alexander’s testimony at trial described further events of the evening, during
which appellant bought and consumed additional beer, continued to accuse her of
flirting with the other man at the cookout, and became angry when she would not agree
to stay with him that night. Eventually, she testified, they argued and she told appellant
she would not attend their marriage counseling session the next morning. Appellant
then became angry and assaulted her in various ways. By her testimony, he threw her
across the floor and into furniture, kicked her hips and thighs, grabbed her hair, shoved
her into a wall, choked her, and slapped her face.
Alexander testified that after she saw that appellant was asleep, she crawled into
the living room and slept on the couch. She told the jury her head hurt “so bad,” her
back hurt, her legs hurt and “kept trembling,” and her throat was sore. The next
2
Hereafter, we refer to the victim of appellant’s assault as Tina Alexander, which
is the name by which she identified herself at trial.
2
morning, appellant apologized. The two drove separate cars to their marriage
counseling appointment.
Alexander testified she did not report the assault to the police because she did
not want her marriage to end, nor did she want appellant to lose his job as a firefighter.
A co-worker of Alexander’s testified she observed “kind of blue and purplish”
bruises on Alexander’s arms at about the same time as the assault occurred.
Alexander’s sister also testified she saw dark bruises on her arm on April 10, 2011.
Appellant did not testify during the guilt-innocence phase of trial.
Following presentation of the evidence, the jury found appellant guilty of the
offense as charged in the information and sentence was assessed as noted. This
appeal followed.
Analysis
Defect in Court’s Judgment
Appellant’s first issue focuses on the manner in which the trial court’s written
judgment describes the offense of which he was convicted. His contention is the same
as that he presented in his appeal of another conviction for assault on his wife, which
appeal is this Court’s Cause No. 07-12-00124-CR.3
3
The two cases were tried two weeks apart. See Zambrana v. State, No. 07-12-
00124-CR, ___ Tex. App. LEXIS ____ (Tex. App.—Amarillo February 24, 2014) (mem.
op., not designated for publication).
3
The form of the information, jury charge, verdict form, and judgment in this case
are very similar to the forms of those documents appearing in Cause No. 07-12-00124-
CR. Like the judgment in Cause No. 07-12-00124-CR, the judgment in this case
contains the language “Offense Convicted of: Assault, Domestic Violence,” and “Degree
of Offense: Class A misdemeanor.” Like the other judgment, the judgment in this case
also refers in several other places to the convicted offense as “Assault (Domestic
Violence), a Class ‘A’ Misdemeanor.” It recites the verdict of the jury as finding appellant
“guilty of the offense of Assault, Domestic Violence, as charged in the Information.” It
adjudges appellant “guilty of the offense of Assault (Domestic violence), a Class ‘A’
Misdemeanor, as found by the Jury.” It also contains a family violence finding.4
And, like in Cause No. 07-12-00124-CR, appellant argues here that the wording
of the judgment reflected his conviction only of a Class C misdemeanor offense
because it omitted any express reference to bodily injury. He again refers to the
judgment’s omission of an express reference to bodily injury as a “fatal variance,” and
again asserts it requires his acquittal of the Class A misdemeanor offense.
Like in Cause No. 07-12-00124-CR, appellant relies on our opinion in Tanner v.
State, 335 S.W.3d 784 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2011, no pet.) to support his position. For
the same reason we have described in our opinion in Cause No. 07-12-00124-CR, we
find Tanner does not aid appellant in this case. And, we find no variance on this record
because, as was also true in Cause No. 07-12-00124-CR, there is no discrepancy
between the information and the proof at trial. As we discuss later in this opinion, the
4
See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 42.013 (West 2013) (requiring affirmative
finding of family violence).
4
victim’s testimony was sufficient to permit the jury to find appellant caused her bodily
injury. See Gollihar v. State, 46 S.W.3d 243, 246 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001) (defining
variance as occurring when there is a discrepancy between the allegation in the
charging instrument and the proof at trial. In a variance situation, the State has proven
the defendant guilty of a crime, but has proven its commission in a manner that varies
from the allegations in the charging instrument”).
Lastly, we note appellant cites no authority supporting his argument that because
the judgment omits express reference to bodily injury, it must refer to assault as a Class
C misdemeanor offense. See Johnson v. State, 409 S.W.3d 738, 743 (Tex. App.—
Houston [1st Dist.] 2013, no pet.) (modifying judgment but noting defendant cited no
authority for complaint regarding manner in which offense was described in judgment).
We resolve appellant’s first issue against him.
Sufficiency of the Evidence
By appellant’s second issue, he contends the evidence supporting his conviction
is insufficient.
In assessing the sufficiency of the evidence, we view all of the evidence in the
light most favorable to the verdict to determine whether any rational trier of fact could
have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v.
Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1979); Brooks v.
State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 912 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). “[O]nly that evidence which is
sufficient in character, weight, and amount to justify a factfinder in concluding that every
element of the offense has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt is adequate to
5
support a conviction.” Brooks, 232 S.W.3d at 917 (Cochran, J., concurring). Our review
of the evidentiary sufficiency leads ultimately to the question whether the jury’s finding
of guilt was a rational finding. Id. at 906-07.
The Jackson v. Virginia standard gives full play to the responsibility of the trier of
fact to resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable
inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319. When
performing an evidentiary sufficiency review, we may not re-evaluate the weight and
credibility of the evidence or substitute our judgment for that of the factfinder. Williams v.
State, 235 S.W.3d 742, 750 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). Instead, we must presume that the
factfinder resolved any conflicting inferences in favor of the verdict and defer to that
resolution. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 326; Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 16-17 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2007). We measure the sufficiency of the evidence against the instructions of a
hypothetically correct jury charge. Malik v. State, 953 S.W.2d 234, 240 (Tex. Crim. App.
1997).
Penal Code section 22.01(a) provides that a person commits an offense by
intentionally, knowingly or recklessly causing bodily injury to another, including the
person’s spouse. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.01(a)(1) (West 2012). The information
alleged that:
…on or about the 8th day of April, 2011, RICHARD AHMED ZAMBRANA did then
and there intentionally, knowingly or recklessly cause bodily injury to TINA
ALEXANDER by pulling her hair, slapping her face, grabbing her wrist, grabbing
her arm, choking her, pressing on her neck, throwing her against a wall, or
throwing her against furniture; and at the time of this offense, TINA ALEXANDER
was a member of the defendant’s family or a member of the defendant’s
household or a person with whom the defendant had or had had a dating
6
relationship, as defined by the Texas Family Code sections 71.0021(b), or
71.003, or 71.005.
Appellant specifically argues the evidence was insufficient to show his actions
caused Alexander bodily injury. For this purpose, “bodily injury” means “physical pain,
illness, or any impairment of physical condition.” TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 1.07(a)(8)
(West 2012). Direct evidence that a victim suffered pain is sufficient to show bodily
injury. Laster v. State, 275 S.W.3d 512, 524 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009).
The prosecutor asked Alexander whether, after the assault, she was “feeling
pain.” As we have noted, Alexander testified her head hurt “so bad,” her back hurt, her
legs hurt and “kept trembling,” and her throat was sore. From the context of her
statement, the jury rationally could have inferred that the pain she referred to in several
parts of her body was caused by the physical assaults from her husband which she had
just described for the jury. See Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 16 (an inference is a conclusion
reached by considering other facts and deducing a logical consequence from them).
Appellant also points to other reasons why, in his view, Alexander’s testimony
could not support a rational finding of guilt. He argues her account of the assault was
rendered untrustworthy by (1) evidence she was intoxicated at the time of the events;
(2) her untruthful testimony concerning the amount she had to drink; 5 (3) her frequent
responses to questions during testimony indicating she could not remember particular
events or why she took particular actions; (4) her inability to explain adequately why she
did not leave appellant’s home after the attack but slept there; (5) her failure to make a
5
Another person who attended the cookout testified Alexander drank more vodka
than Alexander testified to drinking.
7
report to police or complaint to family members about the assault; (6) the lack of
pictures or documentation of claimed injuries; and (7) evidence of her behavior the next
morning, including her attendance at marriage counseling with appellant. Appellant also
points out Alexander had a financial motive to pursue the prosecution because of the
parties’ pending divorce.
All the factors to which appellant points are reasons why jurors might have
disbelieved Alexander’s testimony, but none of them provide reasons the jurors were
required to disbelieve it. It is the role of the jury to judge the credibility of evidence and
the weight to be given particular items of evidence, to resolve conflicts in the testimony,
and to draw reasonable inferences from that evidence. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319;
Isassi v. State, 330 S.W.3d 633, 638 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010); see also TEX. CODE CRIM.
PROC. ANN. art. 38.04 (West 2012). In carrying out its factfinding functions, the jury was
free to believe Alexander and to give weight to the testimony regarding bruises on her
arms. Viewing all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, we hold that
a rational trier of fact could have determined beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant
intentionally, knowingly or recklessly caused bodily injury to Alexander, a member of his
family or household, by “pulling her hair, slapping her face, grabbing her wrist, grabbing
her arm, choking her, pressing on her neck, throwing her against a wall or throwing her
against furniture.” Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319, Isassi, 330 S.W.3d at 638.
We overrule appellant’s second issue, and affirm the judgment of the trial court.
James T. Campbell
Justice
Do not publish.
8
Richard Ahmed Zambrana v. State
Combined Opinion