Richards v. City of Topeka

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
PUBLISH
MAR 24 1999
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
TENTH CIRCUIT

MICHELLE L. RICHARDS,
Firefighter, City of Topeka Fire
Department,

Plaintiff - Appellant, No. 97-3339
v.

CITY OF TOPEKA,

Defendant - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Kansas
(D.C. No. 95-4037-DES)

Alan G. Warner, Topeka, Kansas, for the Plaintiff - Appellant.

Ann L. Hoover, Topeka, Kansas, for the Defendant - Appellee.

Before KELLY, McKAY and LUCERO, Circuit Judges.

LUCERO, Circuit Judge.

Michele Richards, an apparatus operator for the City of Topeka Fire

Department, filed suit in district court against the City under the Americans with

Disability Act (“ADA”) and the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (“PDA”) claiming
that the City’s policies and collective bargaining agreement with her union

discriminated against her by regarding her pregnancy as a disability. The trial

court granted the City’s summary judgment motion on the ADA claim; the PDA

claim proceeded to trial, and the jury returned a verdict for the City. Richards

now appeals. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and affirm.

In October 1993, appellant informed her employer, for whom she had

worked for more than seven years, that she was pregnant. The Fire Department

promptly removed Richards from her regular duties for the duration of her

pregnancy, in accordance with the collective bargaining agreement between the

City and the firefighters’ union, and reassigned her to “light” duty. Richards’s

regular duties had included driving a fire truck, operating water pumps, and

dragging hoses to the appropriate location for use by the Fire Department; if

called to respond to a major fire, she would have to perform all duties of a

firefighter. While on reassignment, she received her normal salary and benefits,

and continued to accumulate the seniority attached to the bargaining unit position

from which she had been reassigned.

During her reassignment but before the end of her pregnancy, Richards

requested a return to full duty. In support of this request, she presented to her

superiors a medical release from her obstetrician stating that she was capable of

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performing her former responsibilities until the twenty-eighth week of her

pregnancy. 1 Citing its internal policies and contractual agreement with the

firefighters’ union, however, the Fire Department refused to allow her to return to

full duty. In response, Richards filed suit in federal district court, alleging that

the City’s refusal constituted illegal discrimination under Title VII of the Civil

Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2a of (“Title VII”), the PDA, 42 U.S.C. §

2000e(k), and the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12101.

Before trial, the court granted the City’s summary judgment motion on

Richards’s ADA claim, and denied Richards’s motion for summary judgment on

her PDA claim, finding that material facts were in dispute. See Richards v. City

of Topeka, 934 F. Supp. 378, 382 (D. Kan. 1996). At the end of the ensuing trial,

the jury found in favor of the City on the PDA claim. Richards asks us to review

the district court’s disposition of the pre-trial motions, as well as its exclusion of

evidence at trial and its denial of four proposed jury instructions.

“We review the grant or denial of a motion for summary judgment de novo,

applying the same legal standard used by the district court pursuant to

Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c).” Seymore v. Shawver & Sons, Inc., 111 F.3d 794, 797 (10th

1
At the time of her reassignment, Richards had been pregnant for ten
weeks.

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Cir. 1997) (citation omitted). Summary judgment is appropriate “if the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the

affidavits, if any, show there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that

the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c).

A. ADA Claim

The district court granted the City’s summary judgment motion on

Richards’s ADA claim because it concluded that her pregnancy did not qualify as

a disability under the ADA. See Richards, 934 F. Supp. at 382 (citing Gudenkauf

v. Stauffer Communications, Inc., 922 F. Supp. 465, 473 (D. Kan. 1996)).

Richards concedes that “her pregnancy did not impair or substantially limit a

major life activity, nor did it impair her ability to work,” Appellant’s Br. at 13,

and we therefore presume that Richards’s pregnancy, from which she suffered no

medical complications, does not constitute a disability under 42 U.S.C.

§ 12102(2)(A). 2

2
Although the parties’ positions do not require us to decide the issue today,
we do note that numerous district courts have concluded that a normal pregnancy
without complications is not a disability under 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A). See,
e.g. , Gabriel v. City of Chicago , 9 F. Supp.2d 974, 980-81 (N.D. Ill. 1998);
Gudenkauf , 922 F. Supp. at 473; Jessie v. Carter Health Care Ctr. , 926 F. Supp.
613, 616 (E.D. Ky. 1996). Furthermore, regulations promulgated by the EEOC
explicitly state that “conditions, such as pregnancy, that are not the result of a
physiological disorder are . . . not ‘impairments.’” 29 C.F.R. § 1630 app. §
1630.2(h). See also Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc. , 130 F.3d 893, 899 (10th
Cir. 1997), cert. granted on other grounds (citing regulation).

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Richards argues, however, that she is disabled within the meaning of

§ 12102(2)(C), which provides that an individual “regarded [by an employer] as

having . . . an impairment” defined under § 12102(2)(A) can proceed under the

ADA notwithstanding the fact that she would not otherwise be considered

statutorily disabled. Richards advances two factual bases for her § 12102(2)(C)

argument. First, she claims her reassignment established that the City regarded

her pregnancy as an impairment. Second, she notes that the provision of the

1993-95 City of Topeka Firefighters Union contract stipulates that pregnancy and

other pregnancy related illnesses “shall be considered as temporary medical

disabilities and shall be treated as such,” see Appellant’s App. at 228

demonstrating that the City regarded her as disabled.

Richards’s argument is premised on a faulty reading of the ADA and the

regulations promulgated under it. In order for Richards to satisfy the statutory

definition of “regarded as” having an impairment, she must prove she

(1) Has a physical or mental impairment that does not substantially limit
major life activities but is treated by a covered entity as constituting such
limitation;
(2) Has a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits major life
activities only as a result of the attitudes of others toward such impairment;
or
(3) Has none of the impairments defined in paragraphs (h)(1) or (2) of this
section but is treated by a covered entity as having a substantially limiting
impairment.

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29 C.F.R. § 1630.2( l). Richards argues that the City illegally discriminated

against her under § 1630.2( l)(3) by treating her as having a “substantially

limiting impairment,” although her pregnancy does not constitute a physical

impairment under paragraphs (h)(1) and (2). Her interpretation of § 1630.2( l)(3)

reads an exception into the ADA’s definition of disability that would swallow the

statute itself, enabling prospective plaintiffs to claim discrimination against

disabilities that are excluded from coverage by the Act. Moreover, the EEOC’s

interpretive guidelines for the term “substantial limitation in a major life activity”

clearly bars appellant’s argument. “An individual satisfies the third part of the

‘regarded as’ definition of ‘disability’ if the employer or other covered entity

erroneously believes the individual has a substantially limiting impairment that

the individual actually does not have.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630 app. § 1630.2( l).

Because Richards concedes her pregnancy is not a substantially limiting

impairment under the ADA, her claim does not remotely fall within this

definition.

Nor does the use of the term “temporary disability” to describe pregnancy

in the collective bargaining agreement between appellant’s union and appellee,

and the reassignment of someone with such a contractually defined disability,

constitute illegal discrimination under the ADA. The attachment of the word

“disability” in a union contract to a condition that is not a disability for purposes

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of the ADA does not magically transform the condition into one that is

cognizable under the ADA. Of course, a collective bargaining agreement that

would allow discrimination against people with disabilities in contravention of

the ADA would be unenforceable. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(2) (defining labor

organizations as a “covered entity” under the ADA); 45 C.F.R. § 84.11(c)

(providing, under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and made applicable to the

ADA via 42 U.S.C. § 12201(a), that an employer’s obligation to comply with the

Act “is not affected by any inconsistent term of any collective bargaining

agreement to which it is a party”). But it does not follow that the terms of the

collective bargaining agreement concerning pregnancy create rights under the

ADA simply because they include the term “disability.”

We therefore affirm the district court’s award of summary judgment to the

City on appellant’s ADA claim.

B. PDA Claim

Richards argues that the district court erred in denying her summary

judgment motion on her PDA claim. The court denied the motion because it

found disputed factual issues in the City’s assertion of two affirmative defenses:

the “bona fide occupational qualification” (BFOQ) exception to Title VII and the

PDA, and estoppel against Richards because she assisted in the union

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negotiations that resulted in the collective bargaining agreement the City

followed in reassigning her. See Richards , 934 F. Supp. at 382.

Summary judgment issues based on factual disputes end at trial, and are

not subject to appellate review. The proper method for redress of a district

court’s denial of summary judgment based on factual issues is the filing of

motions for judgment as a matter of law during and after trial. See Wolfgang v.

Mid-America Motorsports, Inc. , 111 F.3d 1515, 1521 (10th Cir. 1997) (citing

Whalen v. Unit Rig, Inc. , 974 F.2d 1248, 1250-51 (10th Cir. 1993)). Appellant

does not dispute appellee’s claim that she failed to file any motions for judgment

as a matter of law during or after trial; instead, she asserts that the City could not

utilize a BFOQ defense as a matter of law. Because the denial of summary

judgment on a purely legal question is appealable after final judgment, see

Wilson v. Union Pacific R.R. Co. , 65 F.3d 1226, 1229 (10th Cir. 1995), she

argues, we may consider her appeal.

Under the PDA, the City can raise a BFOQ as an affirmative defense. See

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1) (allowing, under Title VII, an employer to

discriminate where a BFOQ “is reasonably necessary to the normal operation of

[a defendant’s] particular business or enterprise”); International Union UAW v.

Johnson Controls , 499 U.S. 187, 204 (1991) (concluding that a BFOQ defense is

available under the PDA when “pregnancy actually interferes with the employee’s

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ability to perform the job”). Richards’s argument that the City is barred from this

defense because less discriminatory means were available to handle pregnant

firefighters requires conclusions about facts that were in dispute. At best,

appellant’s summary judgment motion raised a mixed questions of law and fact,

rather than a pure question of law. We therefore do not review Richards’s appeal

of the district court’s denial of her motion for summary judgment. 3

III

We review de novo whether the instructions read to a jury, taken as a

whole, “correctly stated the governing law and provided the jury with an ample

understanding of the issues and applicable standards,” and we consider a district

court’s decision on whether to give a particular instruction for abuse of

discretion. Allen v. Minnstar , 97 F.3d 1365, 1368 (10th Cir. 1996) (citations

omitted).

Reviewing the instructions, we conclude that the trial court properly

instructed the jury on the definitions, legal standards, and affirmative defenses of

the relevant law. The judge cited and quoted extensively from Title VII and the

3
Because we base our refusal to review the district court’s denial of
appellant’s summary judgment motion on the disputed material facts concerning
the City’s BFOQ defense, we need not address the question of whether estoppel
is available as a matter of law where a plaintiff may have assisted in the
bargaining over a contract whose provisions the plaintiff challenges under Title
VII and the PDA.

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PDA, clearly listing the statutory elements that plaintiff was required to prove to

prevail on her discrimination claim, and accurately paraphrasing the statutory

definition of BFOQ. Appellant’s first proposed instruction discussed a disputed

issue of fact, the second merely placed in a somewhat different context the same

statutory language that the judge ultimately used to instruct the jury, and the third

and fourth concerned the BFOQ defense, on which the trial court provided

adequate instructions. The court’s refusal to include appellant’s proposed

instructions was not an abuse of its discretion.

As to the court’s instructions on two of the City’s affirmative defenses, the

jury’s response to the first question on its verdict form—whether the City had

intentionally discriminated against Richards—ended its deliberations, because the

form instructed the jury that if its first answer was “NO,” its inquiry was over. 4

Therefore, there is no evidence that the jury considered either defense in reaching

its verdict. Even if the trial court erred in instructing the jury on the estoppel and

business necessity defenses, the error is harmless because “the erroneous

instruction could not have changed the result of the case.” Lusby v. T.G. & Y.

Stores, Inc. , 796 F.2d 1307, 1310 (10th Cir. 1986); see also Hopkins v. Seagate ,

4
Appellant waived her right to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence for
the jury’s verdict by failing to file a motion for judgment as a matter of law under
Fed. R. Civ. P. 50. See FDIC v. United Pac. Ins. Co. , 20 F.3d 1070, 1076 (10th
Cir. 1994).

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30 F.3d 104, 106-07 (10th Cir. 1994) (finding any error in instruction for remedy

to be harmless where jury returned a verdict against plaintiff on the substantive

claim).

The appellant attempted to offer into evidence language from a subsequent

collective bargaining agreement between her union and the City, and to call as a

witness a union attorney who participated in the grievance proceedings between

Richards and the City. The appellant thereby hoped to show that pregnancy is no

longer grounds for immediate light duty assignment for female firefighters, as it

was in the 1995-1997 contract, and that pregnancy therefore could not constitute

a BFOQ. We review the district court’s decision excluding evidence and a

witness for abuse of discretion. See Cartier v. Jackson , 59 F.3d 1046, 1048 (10th

Cir. 1995).

Before trial, the district court granted the City’s motion in limine

prohibiting Richards from introducing the 1995-1997 contract. Because the

provisions in the later contract concerning the reassignment of pregnant

firefighters were the result of settlement negotiations between the City and

female firefighters arising out of the grievance process initiated by appellant, the

trial court considered them inadmissible. Fed. R. Evid. 408 provides:

Evidence of (1) furnishing or offering or promising to furnish, or (2)
accepting or offering or promising to accept, a valuable consideration in

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compromising or attempting to compromise a claim which was disputed as
to either validity or amount, is not admissible to prove liability for or
invalidity of the claim or its amount.

As her attorneys’ August 5, 1994, letter to the City’s representative demonstrates,

Richards considered the change in the contractual provision to be “valuable

consideration” during the settlement negotiations. This gave the district court

ample grounds for its ruling, and we do not consider it an abuse of discretion to

exclude this evidence.

For the reasons stated above, we AFFIRM the judgments of the district

court.

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