On April 13, 1908, the premises described in the complaint were sold under the foreclosure of a first mortgage and purchased by the defendant for $4,010. Plaintiff’s husband was present at the sale as her representative. She had at one time been the owner of the property, although the record title at the time of the foreclosure was in Robert S. Hudspeth, trustee. There were two junior mort
The judgment must be sustained (a) because the promise, not being reduced to writing, was void under the Statute of Frauds; the statute was sufficiently pleaded ; (b) the time specified in the parol agreement, as it was found to exist by the trial court, had expired three months before an offer of compliance upon plaintiff’s part was made; (c) if a written agreement had been made for the period claimed by the plaintiff, and in the form of the oral agreement testified to by her witnesses, it would have been unenforcible for the reason that it was a unilateral agreement. While defendant promised to sell, plaintiff did not agree to buy. In such case an action for specific performance will not lie. (Levin v. Dietz, 194 N. Y. 376; Wadick v. Mace, 191 id. 1.)
The judgment appealed from should be affirmed, with costs.
Woodward, Jenks, Burr, Thomas and Carr, JJ., concurred.
• Judgment affirmed, with costs.