Attorneys for Appellant
Susan K. Carpenter
Public Defender of Indiana
David P. Freund
Deputy Public Defender
Indianapolis, IN
Attorneys for Appellee
Jeffrey A. Modisett
Attorney General of Indiana
Janice Brown Mallett
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, IN
IN THE
INDIANA SUPREME COURT
MICHAEL O. RINGO,
Appellant (Defendant below),
v.
STATE OF INDIANA,
Appellee (Plaintiff below).
)
) Supreme Court No.
) 28S00-9804-CR-218
)
)
)
)
)
)
APPEAL FROM THE GREENE SUPERIOR COURT
The Honorable David Holt, Judge
Cause No. 28D01-9702-CF-140
ON DIRECT APPEAL
October 18, 2000
SULLIVAN, Justice.
Defendant Michael Ringo was convicted of Murder. He appeals, arguing
that his confession was improperly admitted into evidence. We find that
the trial court properly denied Defendant’s motion to suppress his
confession.
We have jurisdiction over this direct appeal because the longest
single sentence exceeds 50 years. Ind. Const. art. VII, § 4; Ind.
Appellate Rule 4(A)(7).
Background
The facts most favorable to the verdict show the victim, Larry Ringo,
was last seen alive on February 10, 1997. Defendant Michael Ringo, the
victim’s brother, was reported missing on February 25, 1997. On February
27, 1997, Defendant was located in a motel in Lafayette. When contacted by
the police, Defendant refused to leave the motel room resulting in a
standoff. At approximately 3:10 a.m. on February 28, 1997, the State
Police Emergency Response Team removed the door of the motel room and
entered. Defendant was apprehended and escorted out into the parking lot.
Upon being placed in a police vehicle, Defendant was read his Miranda
rights and then transported to the Tippecanoe County Detention Center and
booked.
Detectives David Reed and James Richardson interviewed Defendant.
Both officers testified that Defendant was alert and responsive, had no
problem walking or speaking, was able to understand their questions, and
provided detailed answers. Defendant was again advised of his Miranda
rights and signed a waiver of rights form. Defendant then confessed to
killing the victim.
On September 15, 1997, Defendant filed a motion to suppress his
statement arguing his statement was not proceeded by a knowing and
voluntary waiver of Miranda rights. On December 9, 1997, the trial court
held a hearing on Defendant’s motion to suppress. On January 14, 1998, the
trial court denied Defendant’s motion.
The State charged Defendant with Murder.[1] On February 6, 1998, a
jury found Defendant guilty. The trial court imposed a sentence of 65
years for murder. Defendant appeals.
We will recite additional facts as needed.
Discussion
Defendant’s sole contention on appeal is that the trial court
committed reversible error by denying his motion to suppress his statement
to the police.
Several standards govern our review. First, the State bears “the
burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant voluntarily
and intelligently waived his rights, and that the defendant’s confession
was voluntarily given.” Schmitt v. State, 730 N.E.2d 147, 148 (Ind. 2000)
(citing Berry v. State, 703 N.E.2d 154 (Ind. 1998) (citing in turn Owens v.
State, 427 N.E.2d 880 (Ind. 1981))). Second, where that standard has been
met, “[t]he decision whether to admit a confession is within the discretion
of the trial judge and will not be reversed absent an abuse of that
discretion.” Jones v. State, 655 N.E.2d 49, 56 (Ind. 1995), reh’g denied.
And third, when reviewing a challenge to the trial court’s decision to
admit a confession, we do not reweigh the evidence but instead examine the
record for substantial probative evidence of voluntariness. Carter v.
State, 730 N.E.2d 155, 157 (Ind. 2000).
I
The first question that must be addressed is whether Defendant waived
his Miranda rights. A waiver of one’s Miranda rights occurs when the
defendant, after being advised of those rights and acknowledging that he
understands them, proceeds to make a statement without taking advantage of
those rights. See Speed v. State, 500 N.E.2d 186, 188 (Ind. 1986). The
admissibility of a confession is controlled by determining from the
totality of the circumstances whether the confession was made voluntarily
and was not induced by violence, threats, or other improper influences that
overcame the defendant’s free will. See Wilcoxen v. State, 619 N.E.2d 574,
577 (Ind. 1993). The same test determines whether Miranda rights were
voluntarily waived. See Gregory v. State, 540 N.E.2d 585, 592 (Ind. 1989).
Thus, the voluntariness of a defendant’s waiver of rights is judged by the
totality of the circumstances. See Allen v. State, 686 N.E.2d 760, 770
(Ind. 1997), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1073 (1999). A signed waiver form is
one item of evidence showing the accused was aware of and understood his
rights. Id. When challenged, the State may need to show additional
evidence tending to prove that Defendant’s waiver and decision to speak
were voluntary. Id.
The testimony at the suppression hearing supports the finding that
beyond a reasonable doubt Defendant had been fully advised of his rights
and he voluntarily waived those rights. During the hearing, the State
showed that the appropriate Miranda rights were read on at least two
occasions and in addition Defendant signed a waiver of rights form. During
the taped statement, Detective Reed asked Defendant, “You remember in the
car at the motel I advised you of your rights, do you remember that?”
Defendant answered, “Yes.” (R. at 552.) Next, Detective Richardson read
the waiver of rights form to Defendant and concluded by asking Defendant,
“Do you understand those rights?” Defendant responded, “Yes, Sir.” (R. at
553.) Defendant then signed the waiver of rights form.
Defendant followed this exchange with a very detailed account of what
happened on the day of the murder. After reiterating that he read
Defendant his rights, Detective Richardson then asked Defendant if he
voluntarily gave his statement of his own free will, so that he was not
threatened or coerced in anyway. Defendant responded, “Yes.” (R. at 568.)
Defendant argues that he was confused about his Miranda rights. Yet
during his own testimony, Defendant admitted that he remembered both his
Miranda rights advisement when he was put in the police car and the fact
that he acknowledged understanding those rights. (R. at 714.) And there is
no evidence of violence, threats, promises or improper influence.[2]
II
Defendant also argues that due to his physical and mental state at
the time of his arrest, he was unable to appreciate his Miranda rights and
give a voluntary confession. Once again, the trial court judge disagreed
and denied Defendant’s motion to suppress.
Coercive police activity is a necessary prerequisite to finding a
confession is not voluntary within the meaning of the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment. Light v. State, 547 N.E.2d 1073, 1077 (Ind.
1989) (citing Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 167 (1986)), reh’g
denied. A confession is voluntary if, in light of the totality of the
circumstances, the confession is the product of a rational intellect and
not the result of physical abuse, psychological intimidation, or deceptive
interrogation tactics that have overcome the defendant’s free will. United
States v. Dillon, 150 F.3d 754, 757 (7th Cir. 1998). The critical inquiry
is whether the defendant’s statements were induced by violence, threats,
promises or other improper influence. Page v. State, 689 N.E.2d 707, 710
(Ind. 1997).
Defendant contends that he was intoxicated on the day of his arrest.
He also argues that he was stressed and fatigued by the events leading up
to his arrest. Intoxication and lack of sleep may be factors in
determining voluntariness. Brewer v. State, 646 N.E.2d 1382, 1385 (Ind.
1995) (citing Pettiford v. State, 619 N.E.2d 925 (Ind. 1993) (citing in
turn Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157 (1986))). But as noted in Part I,
there is no evidence of violence, threats, promises, or improper influence
in this case.
Conclusion
We find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying
Defendant’s motion to suppress. The record contains substantial probative
evidence sufficient to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant
was able to appreciate his Miranda rights and give a voluntary confession,
and there is no evidence of improper police influence in obtaining the
confession.
We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
SHEPARD, C.J., and DICKSON, BOEHM, and RUCKER, JJ., concur.
-----------------------
[1] Ind. Code § 35 42-1-1(1) (1993).
[2] In his brief, Defendant characterizes police questioning of him as
“emotional and compassionate,” Appellant’s Br. at 24, and as
“compassionate, artful, and skilled,” id. at 26. We do not take this to be
a claim of improper coercion and do not find it to be.