No. 81-448
I N THE SUPREME COURT O THE STATE O M N A A
F F OTN
1982
STANLEY J. ROBERTS and DONNA J .
ROBERTS,
P l a i n t i f f s and A p p e l l a n t s ,
MARY JANE BORIN,
Defendant and Respondent.
Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court o f t h e F o u r t h J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t ,
I n and f o r t h e County o f M i s s o u l a , The Honorable
J a c k L. Green, Judge p r e s i d i n g .
Counsel o f Record:
For A p p e l l a n t :
J e f f r e y H. Langton, Hamk?ton, Montana
For Respondent :
M o r a l e s , V o l i n k a t y & H a r r , M i s s o u l a , Montana
S u b m i t t e d on B r i e f s : J a n u a r y 1 4 , 1982
Decided: May 1 3 , 1982
Mr. J u s t i c e Gene B. Daly d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e C o u r t .
Appellants, S t a n l e y and Donna R o b e r t s , brought this
s u i t i n t h e D i s t r i c t Court of t h e Fourth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t ,
i n and f o r t h e County o f M i s s o u l a , t o o b t a i n r e l i e f from t h e
forfeiture of their real estate contract with rsspondent,
Mary J a n e M o r i n , or, in the alternative, t o o b t a i n damages
f o r b r e a c h of that contract. After a nonjury trial, the
District Court entered judgment in favor of Morin and
awarded her the property and attorney fees in the amount
requested. The c o u r t t h e r e a f t e r e n t e r e d an amended judgment
jiving the Robertses a credit for expenses incurred in
making improvements to the property while they were in
possession. The R o b e r t s e s a p p e a l from t h e amended j u d g m e n t .
M o r i n ' s p r e d e c e s s o r , Morin Lumber Company, o r i g i n a l l y
sold the subject property i n 1974 t o a Mr. Woolhiser by a
c o n t r a c t f o r deed. The s a l e s p r i c e was $ 9 , 5 0 Q . A downpay-
rnent o f $8(ZI0 was made, l e a v i n g a balance of $8,9(ZI0 p a y a b l e
at 8% i n t e r e s t in monthly installments of $72.78 until
S e p t e m b e r 2 0 , 1 9 8 2 , a t which t i m e t h e f u l l b a l a n c e , includ-
i n g i n t e r e s t , was t o become d u e .
The c o n t r a c t p r o v i d e d , in part, t h a t i n t h e event of
b u y e r ' s b r e a c h and c o n t i n u a n c e o f t h e b r e a c h f o r s i x t y d a y s
Lollowing w r i t t e n n o t i c e of breach m a i l e d , " t o t h e buyer a t
1318 Defoe Street, Missoula, Montana, return receipt
r e q u e s t e d , o r such o t h e r a d d r e s s a s t h e buyer s h a l l p r o v i d e
t o t h e s e l l e r from t i m e t o t i m e , " the s e l l e r could, at his
option, declare a f o r f e i t u r e and retake possession of the
p r o p e r t y o r pursue a l l o t h e r remedies a v a i l a b l e a t law.
The c o n t r a c t a l s o p r o v i d e d t h a t t h e p r e v a i l i n g p a r t y
in any litigation would be entitled to attorney f e e s and
costs of suit and that no assignment would be permitted
without the s e l l e r ' s w r i t t e n consent.
Not l o n g a f t e r W o o l h i s e r entered into the contract,
he assigned his interest to Albert and Emma R o b e r t s , the
p a r e n t s of S t a n l e y R o b e r t s , The a s s i g n m e n t was c o n s e n t e d t o
by Morin Lumber Company. Later, i n December 1 9 7 6 , A l b e r t
and Emma R o b e r t s a s s i g n e d t h e c o n t r a c t t o t h e i r s o n S t a n l e y
and his w i f e Donna. At t h e t i m e of t h i s assignment, the
principle balance due to Morin was $8,299.36. Mor i n ' s
predecessor consented t o t h i s assiynment. While a p p e l l a n t s
owned the property, they resided there and made various
improvements, which the court determined to be valued at
$4,981.
On October 12, 1977, appellants entered into a
contract for the s a l e of t h e p r o p e r t y t o Warren and K a t h y
Iverson. The contract provided that the Iversons would
assume the Robertses' obligations to Morin and that upon
completion of the Iversons' obligations to the Robertses,
the Robertses would assign their interest in the Morin
contract to the Iversons. Pursuant to this agreement an
a s s i g n m e n t of c o n t r a c t was drawn up t o be p l a c e d i n escrow
and a c o n s e n t t o a s s i g n m e n t was drawn and s i g n e d by Morin
and p l a c e d i n escrow with t h e assignment. Morin was a w a r e
a t t h i s t i m e t h a t t h e R o b e r t s e s were s e l l i n g t o t h e I v e r s o n s
on a s e p a r a t e c o n t r a c t ,
Unknown t o t h e R o b e r t s e s t h e t i t l e company m i s t a k e n l y
filed the a s s i g n m e n t of record before delivering t h e con-
tract and related papers to escrow. Further, the escrow
agent of the parties treated the contract as presently
a s s i g n e d and s e t up s e p a r a t e e s c r o w f i l e s f o r t h e R o b e r t s -
I v e r s o n c o r l t r a c t and t h e Iversori-Morin contract. The r e s u l t
was that t h e I v e r s o n s made payments through escrow t o the
R o b e r t s e s and p a y m e n t s t h r o u g h e s c r o w t o Morin.
P e r s o n a l and f i n a n c i a l p r o b l e m s b e s e t t h e I v e r s o n s i n
1979, resulting in their separation and falling behind on
t h e e s c r o w payments. The I v e r s o n s m i s s e d a payment t o Morin
e a r l y i n 1 9 7 9 , b u t no a c t i o n was t a k e n on t h e p a r t o f Morin
t o e n f o r c e t h e t i m e of the essence clause i n the contract.
The I v e r s o n s ' l a s t payment t o Morin was on J a n u a r y 1 7 , 1 9 8 0 .
Morin s e n t a n o t i c e o f d e f a u l t t o t h e I v e r s o n s a t 1 3 1 8 Defoe
S t r e e t a f t e r t h e I v e r s o n s m i s s e d t h e i r payment. L a t e r , upon
expiration of the sixty-day default period, Morin sent a
n o t i c e of forfeiture to the Iversons at the Defoe Street
address and took possession. Meanwhile, the Robertses,
though having trouble with the t i m e l i n e s s of the payments
from t h e I v e r s o n s , r e c e i v e d payments u n t i l J u l y 1 9 8 0 .
Morin s e n t no n o t i c e o f d e f a u l t o r f o r f e i t u r e t o t h e
Robertses, nor did the I v e r s o n s inform t h e Robertses t h a t
they had defaulted on the Morin contract until July or
August 1980. On A u g u s t 18, 1980, the Robertses' attorney
requested a statement of the balance due from Morin's
a t t o r n e y and o f f e r e d to cure the default. T h i s o f f e r was
rejected. On S e p t e m b e r 1 0 , 1 9 8 0 , R o b e r t s e s ' attorney sent a
written tender of payment to Morin and to her attorney,
offering to pay the amount in default and related costs
t o g e t h e r w i t h i n t e r e s t from t h e d a t e o f t h e l a s t payment by
Iversons t o the d a t e of tender, a total of $7,552.61 plus
i n t e r e s t , i n e x c h a n g e f o r a d e e d from Morin. T h i s o f f e r was
r e j e c t e d , b u t t h e amount o f t h e o f f e r was n o t d i s p u t e d .
On S e p t e m b e r 1 7 , 1 9 8 0 , t h e R o b e r t s e s commenced s u i t
t o compel lvlorin t o a c c e p t t h e i r t e n d e r and d e l i v e r h e r d e e d ,
o r f o r damages. Throughout t h e proceedings, Hobertses have
o f f e r e d t o pay t h e a b o v e - s t a t e d amount,
The f o l l o w i n g i s s u e s a r e p r e s e n t e d f o r r e v i e w :
1. Were the Robertses e n t i t l e d to notice prior to
Morin d e f a u l t i n g t h e I v e r s o n c o n t r a c t ?
2. Once t h e R o b e r t s e s had n o t i c e o f t h e d e f a u l t and
offered to tender full compensation to Morin, should the
t r i a l c o u r t have d e n i e d a f o r f e i t u r e of t h e c o n t r a c t ?
The first issue presented by appellants is w h e t h e r
t h e y were e n t i t l e d t o n o t i c e p r i o r t o Morin d e f a u l t i n g t h e
Iverson contract. The contract provides that notice of
d e f a u l t be s e n t t o t h e " b u y e r " a t 1 3 1 8 D e f o e . Morin i n t e r -
preted this t o Inean t h a t n o t i c e o f d e f a u l t had t o be s e n t
only to the a d d r e s s of the "buyer" named in the original
contract, r e g a r d l e s s of t h e assignments. The p r o b l e m w i t h
t h i s type of notice is t h a t it f a i l s in t h i s situation to
take i n t o account the Robertses i n t e r e s t i n the property.
A l t h o u g h t h e r e is no s p e c i f i c c a s e o r s t a t u t e d e a l i n g
d i r e c t l y w i t h t h i s s i t u a t i o n , t h e r e is an a n a l o g y i n t h e l a w
t h a t p r o v i d e s a s u f f i c i e n t r a t i o n a l e f o r n o t i c e t o be g i v e n
in this instance. In Chambers v. Cranston (1976), 16
Wash.App. 5 4 3 , 558 P.2d 2 7 1 , i t was h e l d :
"The p u r c h a s e r i n an e x e c u t o r y r e a l e s t a t e
c o n t r a c t h a s a n i n t e r e s t which h e c a n mort-
g age Sigman v . Stevens-Norton, Inc. 70
inJash,2d 9 1 5 , 425 P.2d 8 9 1 ( 1 9 6 7 ) ; N e l s o n v .
B a i l e y , 54 Wash.2d 1 6 1 , 338 P.2d 757, 73
A. L . R , 2d 1400 ( 1 9 5 9 ) .
I f t h e purchaser has
mortgaged h i s i n t e r e s t , t h e mortgagee i s
e n t i t l e d t o n o t i c e of f o r f e i t u r e i f t h e
s e l l e r knows o f t h e m o r t g a g e , and t h e m o r t -
g a g e e h a s t h e r i g h t t o t e n d e r payments t o t h e
s e l l e r necessary t o protect h i s security,
i.e., t o keep t h e c o n t r a c t i n e f f e c t . " 558
P.2d a t 273.
S e e a l s o , MacFadden v . Walker ( 1 9 7 1 ) , 97 C a l . R p t r . 537, 488
P.2d 1353.
The situation presented here and the situation
p r e s e n t e d above a r e n o t s u b s t a n t i a l l y d i s s i m i l a r . Here, t h e
R o b e r t s e s a s s i g n e d t h e d u t y o f p a y i n g on t h e Morin c o n t r a c t
to the Iversons but did not assign their interest to the
Iversons. Further, the Iversons did not "assume" in the
s t r i c t l e g a l sense the contract of the Robertses but merely
agreed, in writing, to pay Morin d i r e c t l y t h e amount that
t h e R o b e r t s e s had been i n i t i a l l y paying according t o t h e i r
c o n t r a c t assignment. The f a c t t h a t t h e a s s i g n m e n t was d u l y
r e c o r d e d by t h e t i t l e company d o e s n o t a f f e c t t h e i n t e n t o f
the parties, and i t h a s no l e g a l e f f e c t on t h e t r a n s a c t i o n
itself. 66 Am.Jur.2d R e c o r d s and R e c o r d i n g Laws, sec. 98.
The i m p o r t a r l t s i m i l a r i t y l i e s i n t h e f a c t t h a t h e r e ,
a s i n Chambers, supra, t h e r e was a r e t a i n e d i n t e r e s t i n t h e
land. In Chambers, the court held that because Citizens
S a v i n g s and Loan A s s o c i a t i o n was t h e m o r t g a g e e i t had ". . .
t h e r i g h t t o n o t i c e o f d e f a u l t and t o an o p p o r t u n i t y t o k e e p
the contract in effect . . ." 558 P.2d a t 274. The R o b e r t s e s
s h o u l d h a v e had t h a t same o p p o r t u n i t y . They were e n t i t l e d
to a n o t i c e of default because they retained an interest,
similar to a mortgagee's interest, in the property, and
Morin was a w a r e o f t h a t i n t e r e s t .
The second issue is whether the trial court should
have denied a forfeiture when the Robertses offered to
tender full compensation to Morin. A discussion of this
issue should be premised with the statement that "equity
abhors forfeitures." Yellowstone County v. Wight (1944) ,
115 Mont. 4 1 1 , 1 4 5 P.2d 516; Sharp v. Holthusen ( 1 9 8 0 ) , -
Mont. ,
- 616 P.2d 374, 37 S t . R e p . 1651. Here, there are
both s t a t u t o r y and e q u i t a b l e r e a s o n s t o d e n y f o r f e i t u r e o f
the contract.
Montana h a s a s p e c i f i c s t a t u t e d e a l i n g with forfei-
ture. S e c t i o n 28-1-104, MCA, provides:
"-l i e f f r o m f o r f e i t u r e .
R e- Whenever by t h e
terms of an o b l i g a t i o n a p a r t y t h e r e t o i n c u r s
a f o r f e i t u r e or a l o s s i n the nature of a
f o r f e i t u r e by r e a s o n o f h i s f a i l u r e t o comply
w i t h i t s p r o v i s i o n s , h e may b e r e l i e v e d
t h e r e f r o m upon m a k i n g f u l l c o m p e n s a t i o n t o
the other party, except i n case of a grossly
negligent, w i l l £u l , o r fraudulent breach of
duty."
This Court h a s i n t e r p r e t e d s e c t i o n 28-1-104, MCA, in
numerous c a s e s . I n Yellowstone County v. Wight, supra, we
" S e c t i o n 8 6 5 8 , R e v i s e d C o d e s [now 28-1-104,
MCA] , was e n a c t e d f o r t h e b e n e f i t o f o b l i g o r s
w h o s e f a i l u r e t o p u n c t u a l l y p e r f o r m would
r e s u l t i n l o s s t o them i n t h e m a t t e r s i n
r e s p e c t t o which t h e y have c o n t r a c t e d . The
i n t e n t i o n of t h e Legislature i n enacting t h e
s t a t u t e was t h a t i t s h o u l d b e o p e r a t i v e a n d
t h a t it s h o u l d be g i v e n f u l l f o r c e and e f f e c t
when t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s i n a n y c a s e g a v e i t
application. The i n t e n t i o n o f t h e l a w u n d e r
t h i s s t a t u t e is t h a t a f o r f e i t u r e should n o t
be n e e d l e s s l y e n f o r c e d . The c o u r t s h a v e
e s t a b l i s h e d t h a t a s t h e p o l i c y o f law i n t h e
absence of s t a t u t e . The r u l e a s i t h a s f o u n d
e x p r e s s i o n i n c o u r t d e c i s i o n s g e n e r a l l y is
t h a t b o t h i n l a w and i n e q u i t y f o r f e i t u r e s
a r e abhorred." 1 4 5 P.2d a t 518.
See a l s o , P a r r o t v. Heller ( 1 9 7 6 ) , 1 7 1 Mont. 212, 5 5 7 P.2d
819, and S h a r p v. Holthusen, supra, for a reaffirmation of
t h e above s t a t u t o r y i n t e r p r e t a t i o n .
The D i s t r i c t Court ruled t h a t t h e R o b e r t s e s had n o t
appealed to the conscience of t h e c o u r t and cited section
28-1-104, IvlCA, and F r a t t v . Daniels-Jones ( 1 9 1 3 ) , 47 Mont.
4 8 7 , 1 3 3 P. 700, a s a u t h o r i t y . The C o u r t i n F r a t t c o n c l u d e d
that to invoke the anti-forfeiture statute a party must
appeal to the conscience of a c o u r t of equity. While t h i s
Inay indeed be true, the philosophy of the law since the
r u l i n g i n F r a t t h a s changed d r a m a t i c a l l y . What a p p e a l s t o
t h e conscience of a court i n e q u i t y i n 1913 is n o t neces-
s a r i l y t h e same a s w h a t a p p e a l s t o t h e c o n s c i e n c e o f a c o u r t
of e q u i t y i n 1982. I n 1913, t h e l e g a l concept t h a t e q u i t y
abhors forfeitures was in its infancy, Presently, the
c0ncep.t is one that is considered axiomatic. Under the
p r e s e n t s t a t e o f t h e law and t h e c u r r e n t interpretation of
s e c t i o n 28-1-104, MCA, F r a t t v. Daniels-Jones, supra, i s no
longer t h e proper authority.
The D i s t r i c t C o u r t a l s o r u l e d t h a t t h e R o b e r t s e s were
grossly negligent and therefore unable t o avail themselves
the use of section 28-1-104, MCA, for failing to remain
a b r e a s t of Iversons' delinquency. T h e r e is n o t h i n g in the
r e c o r d s u p p o r t i n g t h e r u l i n g t h a t t h e R o b e r t s e s were g r o s s l y
negligent in their duty under the terms o f the contract.
The f a c t t h a t t h e R o b e r t s e s were h a v i n g trouble collecting
from t h e Iversons does not necessarily impute to them the
k n o w l e d g e t h a t t h e I v e r s o n s h a d d e f a u l t e d o n t h e i r M o r i n ob-
ligation. Indeed, w i t h o u t n o t i c e from Morin t h a t a d e f a u l t
existed, they could not have been expected to correct the
default, Also, t h e r e c o r d s h o w s t h a t upon l e a r n i n g o f the
default, they immediately contacted their attorney, asked
lvIorin for a payoff figure, and made a written offer to
perform. Morin, through her attorney, rejected t h i s offer.
A s f o r Morin's reasons behind t h e r e j e c t i o n , she t e s t i f i e d :
"Q, Now, t o y o u r k n o w l e d g e , d o e i t h e r you o r
your a t t o r n e y o b j e c t t o t h e amount o f f e r e d ?
O r you j u s t o b j e c t e d t o t a k i n g a n y a m o u n t o f
money? A. I j u s t objected. I j u s t wanted
t h e house.
IlQ. To your knowledge h a s t h e p r o p e r t y
a p p r e c i a t e d i n v a l u e s i n c e i t was s o l d i n
1 9 7 4 ? A, Yes, i t ' s a much b e t t e r p r o p e r t y
now." ( E m p h a s i s s u p p l i e d .)
There are instances where a party who fails to
perform cannot utilize section 28-1-104, MCA, but this is
n o t one of t h o s e i n s t a n c e s , W f i n d t h a t t h e R o b e r t s e s were
e
not grossly negligent in their duty to Morin and clearly
f a l l w i t h i n t h e p a r a m e t e r s o f s e c t i o n 28-1-104, MCA.
The a p p l i c a t i o n o f e q u i t y t o d e n y f o r f e i t u r e h a s b e e n
u s e d by t h i s C o u r t and c o u r t s o f other jurisdictions. In
State ex rel. Howeth v . D. A. D a v i d s o n & Co. ( 1 9 7 3 ) , 163
Mont. 3 5 5 , 517 P,2d 7 2 2 , we s t a t e d :
" E q u i t y w i l l i n t e r c e d e i n c a s e s where f o r f e i -
t u r e of t h e p u r c h a s e r ' s e q u i t a b l e t i t l e is
p r o v i d e d by t h e p u r c h a s e c o n t r a c t i n t h e
e v e n t of h i s d e f a u l t . If the defaulting
p u r c h a s e r c a n make a showing t h a t he i s
e q u i t a b l y e n t i t l e d t o s u c h r e l i e f and t h a t
h i s b r e a c h o f d u t y was n o t g r o s s l y n e g l i g e n t ,
willful or fraudulent, the courts w i l l , in
proper cases, relieve the defaulting
p u r c h a s e r from t h e f o r f e i t u r e . " 517 P.2d a t
730.
The Supreme C o u r t o f Hawaii i n J e n k i n s v. Wise (Haw,
1 9 7 8 ) , 574 P.2d 1337, s t a t e d :
". . . A c c o r d i n g l y , where t h e v e n d e e ' s b r e a c h
h a s n o t been due t o g r o s s n e g l i g e n c e , o r t o
d e l i b e r a t e o r b a d - f a i t h c o n d u c t , on h i s p a r t ,
and t h e v e n d o r c a n r e a s o n a b l y and a d e q u a t e l y
be c o m p e n s a t e d f o r h i s i n j u r y , c o u r t s i n
equity w i l l generally grant relief against
f o r f e i t u r e and d e c r e e s p e c i f i c p e r f o r m a n c e o f
t h e agreement.
574 P.2d a t 1 3 4 1 .
[Citations omitted.] . . ."
Also, in MacFadden v. Walker ( 1 9 7 1 ) , 97 Cal ,Rptr.
537, 4 8 8 P.2d 1353, t h e C a l i f o r n i a Court h e l d :
". . . A s we p o i n t e d o u t i n t h e B a r k i s c a s e ,
allowing t h e d e f a u l t i n g vendee t o c u r e h i s
d e f a u l t and p e r f o r m t h e c o n t r a c t may o f t e n be
the f a i r e s t solution, for the unjust enrich-
ment o f t h e v e n d o r t h a t i s p r e c l u d e d by
r e s t i t u t i o n of t h e e x c e s s of p a r t payments
o v e r t h e damages c a u s e d by t h e b r e a c h may
b e a r l i t t l e o r no r e l a t i o n t o t h e f o r f e i t u r e
imposed on t h e v e n d e e i f h i s r i g h t t o p e r f o r m
t h e c o n t r a c t is t e r m i n a t e d . 'A vendee i n
d e f a u l t who is s e e k i n g t o k e e p t h e c o n t r a c t
a l i v e , however, is i n a b e t t e r p o s i t i o n t o
s e c u r e r e l i e f t h a n one who is s e e k i n g t o
r e c o v e r back t h e e x c e s s o f what h e h a s p a i d
o v e r t h e amount n e c e s s a r y t o g i v e t h e v e n d o r
t h e b e n e f i t of h i s b a r g a i n a f t e r performance
under t h e c o n t r a c t h a s t e r m i n a t e d . In the
l a t t e r s i t u a t i o n i t may be s o d i f f i c u l t t o
compute t h e v e n d o r ' s damages t h a t t h e v e n d e e
w i l l be u n a b l e t o p r o v e t h a t t h e v e n d o r w i l l
be u n j u s t l y e n r i c h e d by a l l o w i n g him t o k e e p
a l l t h e money t h a t h a s been p a i d ...
I II 488
P.2d a t 1 3 5 6 .
Here, e q u i t a b l e p r i n c i p l e s m u s t b e invoked t o a c h i e v e a j u s t
result.
The equitable reasons to deny forfeiture are quite
apparent. In comparing the equities of this case, the
D i s t r i c t Court f a i l e d t o i n c l u d e one v e r y important f a c t o r .
The factor not included in the comparison was that Morin
would receive the property, not at i t s 1974 v a l u e , but at
its g r e a t l y increased 1982 v a l u e . Morin's predecessor in
i n t e r e s t s o l d t h e p r o p e r t y t o t h e o r i g i n a l buyer f o r $9,500
in 1974. By the time the Robertses sold the property in
1977, the value had increased to $23,@0O. If Morin were
allowed to keep -the property, she would not only have
received $2,027.21, or 21 percent of the original sales
price, but s h e would be e n h a n c e d by t h e i n c r e a s e d v a l u e o f
the property.
On t h e o t h e r hand, the R o b e r t s e s would retain only
t h e arnount r e c e i v e d on t h e I v e r s o n s c o n t r a c t , amounting t o
about $7,080. Though the Robertses may have recovered
r o u g h l y 47 p e r c e n t of t h e i r o r i g i n a l e q u i t y , t h e y have been
denied t h e b e n e f i t of t h e increased v a l u e of t h e property.
By a p p l y i n g s e c t i o n 28-1-104, MCA, t o deny a f o r f e i -
t u r e , and by r e q u i r i n g t h e R o b e r t s e s t o make f u l l payment o f
t h e b a l a n c e of t h e o r i g i n a l c o n t r a c t t o Morin, t h e e q u i t l e s
i n t h i s case a r e resolved--that i s , Morln r e c e i v e s t h e bene-
f i t of the original contract, and t h e R o b e r t s e s r e t a i n t h e
l a n d , l e s s t h e l r payment t o Morin. Further, the Robertses
a r e o b l i g a t e d t o Morin f o r any e x p e n s e s i n c u r r e d by Morin
reiatlny t o the Iversons' possession of the property. This
would consist of utility expenses, maintenance expenses,
r e p a i r e x p e n s e s and d e l i n q u e n t t a x e s . It d o e s n o t include,
however, any i m p r o v e m e n t s made by Morin w h i l e this action
was p e n d i n g . S e e , L a r r y C. lverson, Inc. v. Bouma (1981),
- Mont . -, 639 P.2d 47, 38 S t .Rep. 1911.
Morln i s r e s p o n s i b l e f o r a t t o r n e y f e e s and c o s t s .
The judgment of the D i s t r i c t Court is reversed, and
the cause is remanded to the District Court for further
proceedings consistent with t h i s opinion.
W e concur:
a&&,@-
Chief J u s t i c e c-e&s?,