FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
December 15, 2008
PUBLISH Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
TENTH CIRCUIT
BRIAN E. ROHRBOUGH; SUSAN A.
PETRONE, individually and as
personal representatives of the estate
of Daniel Rohrbough, deceased;
DAWN L. ANNA, individually and as
personal representative of the estate of
Lauren D. Townsend, deceased,
Plaintiffs - Appellants,
v. No. 07-1186 and 07-1202
WAYNE N. HARRIS; KATHERINE
ANN HARRIS; THOMAS E.
KLEBOLD; SUSAN KLEBOLD,
Defendants - Appellees.
______________________
STATES OF ARKANSAS,
COLORADO, FLORIDA,
MARYLAND, MISSISSIPPI, NEW
HAMPSHIRE, NEW MEXICO,
NORTH DAKOTA, VIRGINIA,
WEST VIRGINIA, WYOMING, AND
SOUTH CAROLINA,
Amici Curiae.
______________________________
MARK A. TAYLOR,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
SLOVAY PHARMACEUTICALS,
INC.,
Defendant.
_____________________
WAYNE N. HARRIS; KATHERINE
ANN HARRIS,
Intervenors - Appellees.
_____________________
STATES OF ARKANSAS,
COLORADO, FLORIDA,
MARYLAND, MISSISSIPPI, NEW
HAMPSHIRE, NEW MEXICO,
NORTH DAKOTA, WEST
VIRGINIA, WYOMING, SOUTH
CAROLINA,
Amici Curiae.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
(D.C. NO. 1:00-CV-808-LTB-PAC)
Barry K. Arrington, Arrington & Associates, P.a., Arvada, Colorado, and
A. Bruce Jones (Anthony J. Navarro, with him on the briefs), of Holland & Hart,
LLP, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiffs - Appellants, Bryan E. Rohrbough, et al.
and Mark A. Taylor.
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C. Michael Montgomery (Erica O. Payne, with him on the briefs), of
Montgomery, Kolodny, Amatuzio & Dusbabek, LLP, Denver, Colorado, for
Defendants - Appellees Wayne N. Harris, et al. and Intervenors - Appellees
Wayne N. Harris, et al.
Elizabeth H. McCann, Deputy Attorney General (John W. Suthers, Attorney
General of Colorado, Daniel D. Domenico, Solicitor General of Colorado,
William Allen and Megan Rundlet, Assistant Attorneys General, with her on the
briefs), Denver, Colorado, for Amici Curiae.
Before KELLY, LUCERO, and HARTZ, Circuit Judges.
HARTZ, Circuit Judge.
In these consolidated appeals we address the fate of several depositions
taken in two civil cases in the United States District Court for the District of
Colorado. Both cases arose out of the 1999 shootings at Columbine High School.
We are asked to determine whether the district court erred in (1) finding that the
depositions constitute records subject to the requirements of the Federal Records
Act and (2) declining to lift the protective orders covering the depositions to
allow an expert in youth violence to review them. We affirm the district court on
both issues.
I. BACKGROUND
These appeals follow the settlement of two civil cases brought in the wake
of the Columbine school shootings. In the first case, Rohrbough v. Harris,
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parents of two of the murdered students (the Rohrbough plaintiffs) 1 sued the
parents of the two shooters, Eric Harris and Dylan Klebold. In the second case,
Taylor v. Solvay Pharmaceuticals, Mark Allen Taylor—a student who was
seriously injured in the shootings—sued the drug company that had manufactured
a drug allegedly taken by Harris before the shootings. Most of the discovery
materials for both Rohrbough and Taylor were kept in a locked room at the
federal courthouse (called the Evidence Room) under the supervision of a special
master.
A series of protective orders in each case restricted access to and disclosure
of discovery materials. Under the orders, evidence was to be produced by
depositing it with the special master. If a deposition required the use of any of
the protected documents, it was to be taken in the Evidence Room with the special
master present. All the depositions at issue in this case were taken in this
manner.
Both cases settled at an early stage. Before they settled, the depositions of
Mr. and Mrs. Harris were taken in Taylor, and depositions of the Harrises and
Mr. and Mrs. Klebold were taken in Rohrbough. Because Rohrbough settled
shortly after the depositions of the Harrises and Klebolds were taken in that case,
those depositions were never signed. In neither case were the depositions ever
used in conjunction with any motion or filed with the district court. After the
1
There were also other plaintiffs but they are not parties to this appeal.
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settlements the magistrate judge entered an order covering both cases—the
Evidence Room Order—to govern disposal of the discovery materials. The order
stated that many of the materials in the Evidence Room, including the deposition
transcripts and court-reporter notes, would be “disposed of” by the court. Taylor
App. at 64, 68. Both the Rohrbough plaintiffs and Taylor objected to the order.
The district court consolidated the two cases for consideration of the objections.
The objections opposed destruction of the Evidence Room materials
because, among other reasons, they are of historical importance and other litigants
might seek access to them. The Harrises, who were granted permission to
intervene in Taylor, submitted a response in support of the Evidence Room Order,
a position later joined by the Klebolds. The Colorado Attorney General filed a
motion to intervene in the cases to object to destruction of the materials; the
district court denied this motion but allowed the attorney general to proceed as an
amicus curiae. The National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) also
participated as an amicus, asserting that the Federal Records Act (FRA) likely
prohibited the destruction of some of the materials covered by the Evidence Room
Order.
At its hearing on the matter the district court proposed to transfer the
materials in the Evidence Room to NARA, subject to a 25-year sealing order, and
requested that the interested parties submit their views on the proposal. In their
responses the parties and amici adopted the following positions: Neither the
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Harrises nor the Klebolds believed the materials to be covered by the FRA; but
the Harrises did not oppose the transfer to NARA so long as the confidentiality
provisions of the protective order remained in effect, whereas the Klebolds
preferred that the materials be destroyed. The Rohrbough plaintiffs opposed the
transfer to NARA and sought a return to the “status quo” before the Evidence
Room Order. The Colorado Attorney General requested that an expert in youth
violence, Dr. Delbert S. Elliott, be permitted to review the depositions. The
attorney general attached an affidavit from Dr. Elliott describing the study to be
conducted and stating that the depositions could be helpful in assessing the
impact of family life on the perpetrators’ social, psychological, and moral
development. Taylor supported the attorney general’s request. Taylor did not
oppose transferring the records to NARA, but he did object to placing a seal on
them for 25 years.
After reading the depositions the district court determined that they were
materials subject to the FRA and that they should be transferred to NARA for
storage. The court also ordered that the depositions be kept under seal for 20
years. In reaching this conclusion, the court weighed the concerns counseling
against disclosure of the depositions—including the risk that release of details
about the shootings could trigger copycat incidents, the privacy interests of the
parties and of nonparties mentioned in the depositions, and the reliance of the
parties on the protective orders—against the public interest in using the materials
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in the hope of preventing similar tragedies in the future. The court concluded that
the balance of interests favored confidentiality and accordingly declined to allow
Dr. Elliott access to the records. Taylor and the Rohrbough plaintiffs both appeal
the order. Taylor challenges only the denial of Dr. Elloitt’s access to the records,
and the Rohrbough plaintiffs challenge only the determination that the depositions
are subject to the FRA.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Federal Records Act
The Rohrbough plaintiffs consider the depositions that they took to be their
property and wish to retain custody of them. Because the depositions were never
signed, the special master’s protocol for depositions did not allow counsel to
make copies of the depositions, so the transcripts and the court-reporter notes and
backup files held in the Evidence Room are the only ones in existence. The
Rohrbough plaintiffs argue that the district court erred in ruling that the
depositions are “records” under the FRA and that the district court therefore had
no authority to transfer them to NARA. The Harrises and Klebolds take no
position on whether the depositions are “records” under the FRA but do not
oppose their transfer to NARA under seal. The district court’s application of the
FRA to the depositions is a mixed question of law and fact, but there are no
disputed historical facts, so our review is de novo. See Scanlon White, Inc. v.
Comm’r, 472 F.3d 1173, 1175 (10th Cir. 2006).
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The FRA 2 governs the management, retention, and disposal of federal
records. See 44 U.S.C. chs. 21, 25, 29, 31, 33. NARA has primary authority
over the management of federal records under the FRA and is authorized to
promulgate regulations regarding records management. See, e.g., id. § 2904(a)
(“The Archivist [of the United States, see id. § 2901(15), who administers NARA,
see id. § 2102] shall provide guidance and assistance to Federal agencies with
respect to . . . ensuring proper records disposition”); id. § 2904(c) (the Archivist,
together with the Administrator of General Services, shall “have the
responsibility—(1) to promulgate standards, procedures, and guidelines with
respect to records management . . . .”); id. § 2905(a) (“The Archivist shall
establish standards for the selective retention of records of continuing value . . .
.”); id. § 3302 (“The Archivist shall promulgate regulations . . . establishing . . .
(1) procedures for the compiling and submitting to him of lists and schedules of
records proposed for disposal [and] (2) procedures for the disposal of records
authorized for disposal . . . .”); Am. Friends Serv. Comm. v. Webster, 720 F.2d 29,
62 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (“Congress clearly intended to transfer final approval
authority over the disposal of records to [NARA]”); see also 44 U.S.C. §§ 2908,
2909; 3303a(d) (additional authority to promulgate regulations). Materials
2
As the D.C. Circuit noted in Armstrong v. Bush, 924 F.2d 282, 284 n.1
(D.C. Cir. 1991), “The FRA is actually a series of statutes, which originated with
the Federal Records Act of 1950, ch. 849, 64 Stat. 583, and the 1943 Disposal of
Records Act, ch. 192, 57 Stat. 380.” We will refer to the original acts and the
amendments collectively as the FRA, as does NARA.
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covered by the FRA must be maintained and (if appropriate) disposed of
according to a schedule created by the originating agency and approved by
NARA. See id. §§ 3303, 3314.
The FRA provides the following definition of the term records:
As used in [chapter 33], “records” includes all books, papers, maps,
photographs, machine readable materials, or other documentary
materials, regardless of physical form or characteristics, made or
received by an agency of the United States Government under
Federal law or in connection with the transaction of public business
and preserved or appropriate for preservation by that agency or its
legitimate successor as evidence of the organization, functions,
policies, decisions, procedures, operations, or other activities of the
Government or because of the informational value of data in them.
44 U.S.C. § 3301. (This definition also applies in chapters 21, 25, 29 and 31. See
id. § 2901(1)). The FRA defines “federal agency”—a term we take to be
synonymous with the term “agency of the United States Government” in
§ 3301—as “any executive agency or any establishment in the legislative or
judicial branch of the Government (except the Supreme Court, the Senate, the
House of Representatives, and the Architect of the Capitol and any activities
under the direction of the Architect of the Capitol).” Id. § 2901(14). District
courts are therefore “agencies” under the FRA.
To simplify, the depositions in this case qualify as records if they were (1)
made or received by the court, and (2) preserved by the court or appropriate for
preservation because they are evidence of government performance or because
they contain other information of value. The Rohrbough plaintiffs do not dispute
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that the second requirement is met. As for the first requirement, the depositions
were clearly not “made” by the court. That leaves the question whether the
depositions were “received” by the court within the meaning of the statute.
There are no court decisions on this point, but NARA has promulgated a
regulation defining what it means for material to be “received”:
Received means the acceptance or collection of documentary
materials by agency personnel in the course of their official duties
regardless of their origin (for example, other units of their agency,
private citizens, public officials, other agencies, contractors,
Government grantees) and regardless of how transmitted (in person
or by messenger, mail, electronic means, or by any other method).
36 C.F.R. § 1222.12(b)(4) (emphasis added). The Rohrbough plaintiffs do not
challenge the NARA regulation’s interpretation of the FRA. Rather, they contend
that no “agency personnel” ever accepted or collected the deposition transcripts.
The term “agency personnel” is undefined in the regulations. Undoubtedly,
employees of the clerk’s office would be “agency personnel” of a district court.
Thus, documents filed with the clerk’s office would be documents “[r]eceived . . .
by agency personnel.” Depositions, however, are not automatically filed with the
court. Rule 5(d)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that
depositions “must not be filed until they are used in the proceeding or the court
orders filing.” As the district court stated, the depositions at issue in this appeal
were never “admitted as evidence nor cited, under seal or otherwise, in any
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proceeding or pleading in either case.” Taylor App. at 289. Consequently, they
were never filed with the clerk of court, who thus never “received” them.
Likewise, we think it clear that district court “agency personnel” includes
the judges of the court. If a judge makes a decision based on materials presented
to him or her, even if the materials are not formally filed, they could be said to be
“accepted” by agency personnel. In this case, however, it is undisputed that the
judge never considered any of the depositions in rendering any decision before
the dispute regarding disposal of the depositions.
Nevertheless, the depositions were required to be deposited with the special
master, and he maintained custody over them (he was the only person with a key
to the Evidence Room, and his presence was required for any inspection of
materials produced under the protective order). The question then is whether the
special master should be considered court personnel. We hold that he should. A
special master occupies a special place in court proceedings, as indicated by
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 53, which governs in some detail the appointment
and authority of special masters. The special master is more than an advisor or
facilitator for the court. In the cases below, for example, he was granted all the
powers provided by Rule 53. In particular, empowered to “address pretrial . . .
matters that cannot be effectively and timely addressed by an available district
judge or magistrate judge of the district,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 53(a)(1)(C), he was
directed to rule on all discovery disputes in both cases. He was present when the
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depositions were taken, and he made contemporaneous rulings on objections. His
presence at depositions made it unnecessary for the parties to raise objections
concerning the depositions with the magistrate judge or the district court, which
would normally require submitting partial transcripts, rendering them “received”
by the court. Indeed, in resolving disputes between the parties, he performed
judicial functions. See Antoine v. Byers & Anderson, Inc., 508 U.S. 429, 435–36
(1993) (a quintessential characteristic of judging is the “performance of the
function of resolving disputes between parties, or of authoritatively adjudicating
private rights.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). In short, the special master
was so intimately an arm of the court that he should be considered “agency
personnel” for the purposes of the FRA. Because the depositions were deposited
with him, they were “received” by the district court and are therefore records
covered by the FRA.
The dissent raises several arguments not presented by the Rohrbough
plaintiffs on appeal. The arguments are interesting ones but they do not persuade
us to reverse.
First, the dissent faults us for relying on the definition of records in 44
U.S.C. § 3301 even though the record-preservation duty imposed on federal
agencies by 44 U.S.C. § 3101 does not encompass everything defined as a record
in § 3301. In particular, it points out that § 3101 requires agencies to “make and
preserve” records “containing adequate and proper documentation of the
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organization, functions, policies, decisions, procedures, and essential transactions
of the agency and designed to furnish the information necessary to protect the
legal and financial rights of the Government and of persons directly affected by
the agency’s activities.” Absent from § 3101 is any mention of those
documentary materials that are records under § 3301 only “because of the
informational value of data in them.” In other words, there is no record-
preservation duty under § 3101 with respect to those documentary materials that
are defined as records only because of their informational value.
This argument might be compelling if § 3101 were intended to establish the
sole record-preservation duties of federal agencies. But that is not the intent of
the section. Its clear purpose is to ensure that agencies make adequate records
documenting its operations. It also mandates, quite naturally, that the agencies
then retain those records (else making them would be of little consequence). It
does not say, however, that if an agency makes other records or receives records
that do not document agency operations, then the agency is free to dispose of
them as it will. Nor can we read § 3101 to imply such a limit on an agency’s
preservation responsibilities. That implication would contradict the express
language of 44 U.S.C. § 3314, which states that “[t]he procedures described by
[chapter 33, which does not include § 3101] are exclusive, and records of the
United States Government may not be alienated or destroyed except under
[chapter 33].” When chapter 33, entitled “Disposal of Records,” imposes duties
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with respect to records, it undoubtedly refers to all records defined by § 3301 of
that chapter, not just the subset described in § 3101.
Moreover, we would be inclined to say that the depositions in this case
come within the category of records described by § 3101. If the special master
had been merely a custodian or guardian of the depositions, we might agree that
they do not. But all the depositions were taken in his presence and he ruled on
objections as they arose. If the depositions had been taken before a judge, there
would be little doubt that they would document the “decisions, procedures, and
essential transactions of the [court].” § 3101. When this role is delegated to
special masters, who, as the dissent agrees, are “agency personnel,” the same
conclusion would seem to follow.
The dissent’s second issue is that our opinion “interprets the FRA as
throwing a wrench into discovery practice.” Op. (Lucero, J. dissenting) at 15. It
argues: “Today’s decision potentially exposes any discovery deposited with a
special master to public inspection. I cannot read a vague, broadly-worded statute
directed toward public agencies as having such a profound effect.” Id. at 15–16.
But as the dissent apparently concedes, id. at 19–20, filed depositions are
“records” subject to the records disposition schedule for the judiciary, see Guide
to Judiciary Policies and Procedures, Vol. 13, ch. 17: Records Disposition
Program and Records Disposition Schedules (2003) (“Judiciary Records
Schedule”). And before 1980, which was well after the FRA took its present
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form, all depositions had to be filed. See, e.g., Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(f) (1970)
(“[The officer before whom the deposition was taken] shall then securely seal the
deposition in an envelope indorsed with the title of the action . . . and shall
promptly file it with the court . . . .”); Fed.R. Civ. P. 30 advisory committee’s
note to 1980 amendment of Rule 30(f)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 5 advisory committee’s
note to 1980 amendment of Rule 5(d). Given that every deposition in a federal
suit was a record subject to the FRA before 1980, it should not be cause for great
concern about the impact on discovery if some depositions still are. We also note
that even for depositions taken after 1980, even when they are governed by a
protective order, they certainly become records under the FRA when they are used
at a trial or in a filed pleading; so no party can be totally confident that a
deposition will not ultimately become such a record.
Finally, the dissent suggests that NARA and the Judicial Conference of the
United States have indicated that depositions not filed or used by a judge are not
governed by the FRA. We disagree. NARA’s district-court brief did say that a
deposition quoted or cited in a motion would be a record under the FRA; but it
made clear that this was only one potential ground for its being a record. NARA
expressed no opinion on whether special masters can be court personnel or on the
consequences that might follow from that categorization. And it is hardly clear
that the Judicial Conference retention schedule does not encompass the
depositions in this case. That schedule includes “records resulting from the
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docketing and processing of a case in a court that pertains to that particular case.”
Judiciary Records Schedule § 15(a). This phrase could be interpreted to include
an unfiled deposition that is otherwise a record. In any event, it would not be at
all surprising if some unusual circumstances, such as those in this case, had been
overlooked when the schedule was prepared. The regulations promulgated by
NARA contemplate that records will be scheduled in stages. See 36 C.F.R.
§ 1228.22 (“Ultimately, all records of an agency must be scheduled, but they need
not all be scheduled at the same time. An agency may schedule the records of
one function, program or organizational element at a time.”). If a category of
records is overlooked in an agency’s schedule, that category need not be
deformed to fit into an established category. The regulations recognize the
possibility that a record that is appropriate for preservation may not be addressed
in existing agency manuals. See id. § 1222-12(b)(6) (“Appropriate for
preservation means documentary materials made or received which in the
judgment of the agency should be filed, stored, or otherwise systematically
maintained by an agency because of the evidence of agency activities or
information they contain, even though the materials may not be covered by its
current filing or maintenance procedures.”(emphasis added)). In such a
circumstance, determination of whether a document is a “record” under the FRA
must be based on the language of the governing statute and regulations, without
assistance from the agency’s schedules.
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B. Modification of Protective Order
Although the district court ordered that physical custody of the depositions
be transferred to NARA, it continued to restrict access to them under its prior
protective orders for 20 years. NARA informed the district court that its practice
is to allow the originating agency to determine access to the records while the
agency retains legal (but not physical) custody of the records, which the court
stated that it would do for 20 years. Taylor appeals the court’s decision not to
modify the protective orders that applied to the depositions. He contends that the
court erred in finding that the interests favoring continued confidentiality
outweighed the public’s interest in the requested access to the depositions.
The modification of a protective order, like its original entry, is left to the
sound discretion of the district court. See United Nuclear Corp. v. Cranford Ins.
Co., 905 F.2d 1424, 1427 (10th Cir. 1990). Under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 26(c), for “good cause” a court may issue a protective order regarding
discovery “to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment,
oppression, or undue burden or expense.” Such an order may forbid the
disclosure of discovery, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(1)(A), and require that
depositions be sealed and opened only upon court order, see id. Rule 26(c)(1)(F).
The “good cause” standard of Rule 26(c) is “highly flexible, having been
designed to accommodate all relevant interests as they arise.” United States v.
Microsoft Corp., 165 F.3d 952, 959 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
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We are unable to review the district court’s exercise of discretion, however,
because the appellants have not provided us with the deposition transcripts that
the court reviewed and relied on. Without these materials, we cannot properly
evaluate certain factors, such as the presence of information that might encourage
copycat incidents, whether the divulgence of the contents of the depositions
would subject the Harrises and Klebolds to embarrassment or oppression, the
extent to which the deposition testimony might have been given in reliance on the
protective orders, or even the potential research interest of the testimony. “A
party who seeks to reverse the decision of a district court must provide an
adequate record for this court to determine that error was committed.” Travelers
Indem. Co. v. Accurate Autobody, Inc., 340 F.3d 1118, 1119 (10th Cir. 2003); see
also 10th Cir. R. 10.3(A)–(B) (“Counsel must designate a record on appeal that is
sufficient for considering and deciding the appellate issues,” and “[t]he court need
not remedy any failure by counsel to designate an adequate record.”). We
recognize that the record on appeal consists of “(1) the original papers and
exhibits filed in the district court; (2) the transcript of proceedings, if any; and (3)
a certified copy of the docket entries prepared by the district clerk,” Fed. R. App.
P. 10, and that the depositions were never filed below. Nevertheless, knowing
that the district court had considered the contents of the depositions in deciding
whether to modify the protective order, Taylor should have moved the district
court to include the sealed depositions in the court record, so that we could
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properly review the court’s decision. 3 Id. at 10(e); see also United States v.
Andiarena, 823 F.2d 673, 677 (1st Cir. 1987) (granting motion to supplement
record to include evidence considered by jury); see generally Gregory A.
Castanias & Robert H. Klonoff, Federal Appellate Practice and Procedure in a
Nutshell §§ 3.4 (Extra-Record Facts), 9.1 (Composition and Supplementation of
the Record on Appeal) (2008). Without those materials, we are obliged to affirm.
III. CONCLUSION
The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
3
We note that Taylor, who is not a party to the Rohrbough case, has not
moved to intervene in that case. The appropriate method for a third party to
challenge a protective order is to intervene in the case. See United Nuclear
Corp., 905 F.2d at 1427. But in light of the inadequacy of the record, we need
not decide whether this procedural flaw would be fatal to Taylor’s appeal.
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07-1186 and 07-1202, Rohrbough v. Harris and Taylor v. Slovay Pharmaceuticals,
Inc.
LUCERO, J., dissenting.
I agree with my respected colleagues that special masters are “agency
personnel” under the Federal Records Act (“FRA” or “Act”). But I disagree that
unfiled depositions taken in private litigation fall within the ambit of the FRA.
Neither Congress, the National Archives and Records Administration (“NARA”),
nor the Administrative Office of the United States Courts understand the FRA to
direct federal courts to transfer any discovery documents deposited with a special
master to the National Archives. The majority’s decision is contrary to the clear
meaning of the FRA and, under the facts of this case, contrary to the expectations
of parties litigating under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Thus, I must
respectfully dissent.
The FRA directs federal agencies to preserve records that document their
“organization, functions, policies, decisions, procedures, and essential
transactions.” 44 U.S.C. § 3101. By doing so, agencies “document[] . . . the
policies and transactions of the Federal Government.” § 2902(1). Simply stated,
the depositions of Wayne and Katherine Harris and Susan and Thomas Klebold do
not document the organization, functions, policies, decisions, procedures, or
essential transactions of the federal courts. In defining “record” without proper
concern for the context provided by §§ 2902 and 3101, the majority’s
interpretation of the statute is jarringly inconsistent with both the text and
purpose of the FRA. 1
In addition, the majority’s interpretation thwarts the expectations of parties
in discovery proceedings under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Parties
depose witnesses to obtain information and compile evidence in aid of litigation.
They do not do so to create, nor did the parties here actually create, a historical
record of the federal judiciary. When the depositions at issue were placed in the
evidence room, that act alone did not create a federal record under the FRA. This
expectation is common to private litigants and was confirmed by the protective
orders entered by the court. Moreover, we should not assume that Congress
intended to upset the reasonable expectations of litigants in the absence of a clear
statement to the contrary.
I
A
As the FRA’s text and structure specify, the role of agencies under the Act
is to manage their own records, not to archive private documents, regardless of
their historical value. Under the Act, agencies must ensure that they “make and
1
The majority states that my dissent raises “several issues not presented by
the Rohrbough plaintiffs on appeal.” Maj. Op. at 12. To the contrary, the
plaintiffs directly argue that the proper construction of the statute is “to ensure
that adequate documentation of the agency’s transactions is preserved,” citing §§
3101 and 2902. Aplts. Opening Br. at 7.
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preserve” only those records that contain information regarding the government’s
“organization, functions, policies, decisions, procedures, and essential
transactions,” § 3101; see also Federal Records Act of 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-754,
§ 506(a), 64 Stat. 578, 586 (1950), none of which is implicated by the depositions
in the case at bar. The majority lights upon the phrase “informational value,”
Maj. Op. at 9, which appears in the definition of “records” found at 44 U.S.C.
§ 3301 but is conspicuously absent from § 3101. By doing so, the majority
expands the role of agencies to include the preservation of materials that do not
document the government’s organization, functions, policies, decisions,
procedures, or essential transactions. This mistake contravenes the objective of
the FRA: to “establish[] . . . standards and procedures to assure efficient and
effective records management,” § 2902, so that records of “the policies and
transactions of the Federal Government” are accurate and complete, easily used,
and judiciously created and preserved, see § 2902(1)–(6).
By relying solely on the definition of “records” in § 3301, the majority
effectively excises important guidance regarding agencies’ preservation duties.
Section 3101 explicitly specifies which records are subject to these duties.
Nonetheless, the majority reads the broader definition of “records” in § 3301 as
controlling over the more specific preservation rule articulated in § 3101. This is
contrary to accepted principles of statutory interpretation. See Gozlon-Peretz v.
United States, 498 U.S. 395, 407 (1991) (“A specific provision controls over one
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of more general application.” (citation omitted)); Franklin v. United States, 992
F.2d 1492, 1502 (10th Cir. 1993) (“[A] specific statute . . . should not be deemed
controlled or nullified by a general statute . . . absent a definite contrary
intention.”).
Following these principles, § 3101—not § 3301—serves as my analytical
starting point. Section 3101 provides:
The head of each Federal agency shall make and preserve records
containing adequate and proper documentation of the organization,
functions, policies, decisions, procedures, and essential transactions
of the agency and designed to furnish the information necessary to
protect the legal and financial rights of the Government and of
persons directly affected by the agency’s activities.
§ 3101. I fail to see in this language a direction to the district courts to transfer
discovery in private litigation to the National Archives. The depositions at issue
do not document the categories described. In essence, the district court and the
majority read out all but the first eleven words of § 3101. But it is the remainder
of § 3101 that establishes an agency’s role under the FRA and answers the
question before us.
The majority exclusively relies on the definition in § 3301, which provides,
in relevant part:
“[R]ecords” includes all . . . documentary materials . . . made or
received by an agency of the United States Government under
Federal law or in connection with the transaction of public business
and preserved or appropriate for preservation by that agency or its
legitimate successor as evidence of the organization, functions,
-4-
policies, decisions, procedures, operations, or other activities of the
Government or because of the informational value of data in them.
§ 3301 (emphasis added). By taking a cut and paste approach, my colleagues
conclude that the depositions at issue need not be “evidence of the organization,
functions, policies, decisions, procedures, operations, or other activities of the
Government,” id., because of their conclusion that a document may also qualify
as a record if it contains data with “informational value.” Maj. Op. at 9 (“[T]he
depositions in this case qualify as records if they were (1) made or received by
the court, and (2) preserved by the court or appropriate for preservation because
they are evidence of government performance or because they contain other
information of value.” (emphasis added)). The district court similarly interpreted
this clause to expand the role of an agency to include the preservation of records
which merely have “informational value,” despite the express guidance in § 3101
that each agency “shall make and preserve” only those which “contain[] adequate
and proper documentation of the organization, functions, policies, decisions,
procedures, and essential transactions of the agency,” § 3101. See Apr. 2, 2007
Order, Rohrbough v. Harris, No. 00-cv-00808-LTB-PAC, 2007 WL 987848, at *4
(D. Colo. Apr. 2, 2007) (“I conclude that the materials relating to the depositions
. . . fall within the definition of records under the FRA. These materials were
received and stored by the Court, and they are of significant historical value.”
(emphasis added)).
-5-
I cannot agree with this interpretation. In § 3101, Congress explicitly
addressed what records agencies should “make and preserve” and excluded the
informational value clause present in § 3301. 2 The broad definition of “records”
analyzed by the majority appears in the chapter entitled “Disposal of Records.”
44 U.S.C. ch. 33. This context illuminates the meaning of the term
“informational value”: it allows for the preservation of materials that would
otherwise be disposed of because they no longer document “the organization,
functions, policies, decisions, procedures, operations or other activities of the
Government.” § 3101. This permits the preservation of records that are valuable
because they document an agency’s history. Section 3303(2) confirms this. It
directs each agency head to submit to the Archivist lists of records that may be
disposed of, as they are “not needed by [the agency] in the transaction of its
current business and . . . do not appear to have sufficient administrative, legal,
research, or other value to warrant their further preservation.” § 3303(2)
(emphasis added). This provision plainly corresponds to the “informational
value” provision in § 3301, and allows for an exception to the disposal of such
2
The original Federal Records Act of 1950 confirms that the contrast
between the duties of agencies in § 3101 and the definition of “records” in § 3301
was intentional. Congress included the definition of the word “records,”
containing the “informational value” clause, in the 1950 Act. Federal Records
Act of 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-754, § 511(a), 64 Stat. 578, 589 (1950). In the same
bill, Congress expressly spelled out the duties of agencies under the FRA but
excluded the “informational value” clause. § 506 (now codified as 44 U.S.C.
§ 3101). Today’s statute continues to reflect this distinction.
-6-
records if they warrant further preservation once they cease to describe current
agency activities.
Viewing the statutory scheme as a whole, an agency must originally
preserve records only because they document its organization, functions, policies,
decisions, procedures, and essential transactions—not merely because they have
“informational value.” 3 Accordingly, this term is excluded from § 3101. By
importing “informational value” into this context, the majority creates an artificial
conflict between § 3101 and § 3301 and then allows the more general
provision—§ 3301—to control.
The majority agrees that my interpretation “might be compelling if § 3101
were intended to establish the sole record-preservation duties of federal
agencies.” Maj. Op. at 13. Precisely because § 3101 is the sole section
establishing agencies’ preservation duties, I read the statute to compel this
conclusion. Section 3101 does not, as the majority implies, govern only records
created by the agency. The majority claims that the “clear purpose” of § 3101 is
to “ensure that agencies make adequate records,” Maj. Op. at 13, and the section
“mandates” that agencies “then retain those records,” id. (emphasis added). Such
3
The majority asserts that it is “not dispute[d] that the [historical value]
requirement is met.” Maj. Op. at 10. This may be so, but as noted supra n.1, the
issue of whether records which have historical value, yet do not document
government activity, fall within the FRA in the first place is squarely before us.
See Aplts. Opening Br. at 7.
-7-
a reading does not interpret the text but rewrites it. The actual text, “[t]he head of
each Federal agency shall make and preserve records,” § 3101 (emphasis added),
does not limit its preservation “mandate” to only those records an agency
“makes.” The plain text of § 3101 requires an agency to preserve records
containing “documentation of [its] organization, functions, policies, decisions,
procedures, and essential transactions” whether it made or received them. If there
were any ambiguity in this text, my reading is confirmed by the title of the
section: “Records management by agency heads; general duties.” § 3101
(emphasis added); see Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 483
(2001) (“[T]he interpretive role of the title” is to “shed light on some ambiguous
word or phrase in the statute itself.” (quotation and alteration omitted)). Section
3101 establishes the complete and sole record creation and record preservation
duties of federal agencies.
The majority further claims that 44 U.S.C. § 3314 establishes a
preservation duty outside of § 3101 because it provides that “the procedures
prescribed by [Chapter 33] are exclusive, and records of the United States
Government may not be alienated or destroyed except under this chapter.” But
the majority’s belief that § 3314 establishes a duty to preserve in addition to the
duties established in § 3101 presupposes its own conclusion. Section 3314 only
controls the disposal of the depositions if they are federal records. If they are not
federal records, § 3314 does not apply to them. Thus, only by assuming that
-8-
these unsigned, unfiled depositions are federal records can the majority possibly
rely on § 3314. Because I do not assume this conclusion, § 3314 does not
establish a preservation duty. Those duties are established solely by § 3101.
B
The genesis of the FRA was President Truman’s Executive Order No. 9784.
See S. Rep. No. 81-2140, at 3547 (1950). Its purpose was “to provide that
Government records may be utilized to maximum advantage and disposed of
expeditiously when no longer needed and in the interest of more efficient internal
management of the Government.” Exec. Order No. 9784, 11 Fed. Reg. 10909
(Sept. 27, 1946). The majority’s interpretation of the FRA not only ignores this
focus on efficient disposal, reflected in § 3301, it contradicts it; under the
majority’s approach, agencies must retain more, not less, of the paper that crosses
their desks.
In 1976, Congress found that:
Because of the new utilization by the government since 1950 of
advanced technologies . . . the records production process has been
speeded up . . . . [T]he amount of paper flowing into the government
each year fills four and a half million cubic feet of space and . . . the
costs to the taxpayer of handling and managing such a mountain of
paper exceed $8 billion a year.
S. Rep. 94-1326, at 2–3 (1976). Congress decided it was necessary to add
Chapter 29, codifying the objectives of the FRA at 44 U.S.C. § 2902, to “provide
a clear expression of Congressional intent to the heads of Federal departments and
-9-
agencies on the necessity to place more emphasis on records management
programs aimed at providing essential, accurate recorded information in the
needed format and time frame to enable agencies to perform their functions
effectively and efficiently.” S. Rep. 94-1326, at 3.
Certainly, Congress was not oblivious to the possibility that records might
have historical value, but it created a separate body, the National Historical
Publications Commission (now the National Historical Publications and Records
Commission), the appointed members of which are all historians, to preserve
those with such value. Federal Records Act of 1950 § 503(a) (now codified as 44
U.S.C. § 2501(a)(2)). Notably, the Commission’s mandate is far broader than the
duties of federal agencies that fall within the ambit of the FRA. The Commission
is directed to “cooperate” with “State . . . and local agencies and
nongovernmental institutions, societies, and individuals” and may “edit[] and
publish[] papers of outstanding citizens of the United States, and other documents
as may be important for an understanding and appreciation of the history of the
United States.” § 2504(b).
Seen in context, the number of documents “made or received” by agency
personnel is orders of magnitude greater than it was in 1976. Following the
direction of Congress, I understand the FRA to restrict which records an agency
preserves to only those that “contain[] adequate and proper documentation of the
organization, functions, policies, decisions, procedures, and essential transactions
-10-
of the agency.” § 3101. The majority, on the other hand, has decided to expand
its scope.
C
The operative question is whether the unfiled, unsigned depositions of
Wayne and Katherine Harris and Susan and Thomas Klebold document “the
organization, functions, policies, decisions, procedures, and essential transactions
of the agency.” The majority errs in failing to answer that question before
addressing whether the depositions were “made or received” by the special
master, which appears to be the focus of their analysis. Maj. Op. at 10–12.
1. “Organization”
The organization of the federal judiciary was not at issue in the appellants’
lawsuit. In the context of the federal judiciary, organizational records might
document the structure of the lower courts, clerks’ offices, and judicial staff. 4
This lawsuit does implicate the structure and management of the courts.
Although the depositions themselves are not before us, it is hard to imagine how
the testimony of the parents of the Columbine shooters could document the
manner in which the federal courts are organized.
4
This list, along with the others in this section, contains only illustrative
examples of what falls within each category enumerated in § 3101 as applied to
the federal courts, and is not intended to be exhaustive.
-11-
2. “Functions”
The primary function of the federal judiciary is to decide cases and
controversies. See U.S. Const. art. III, § 2. To achieve that primary function, the
judiciary also has subsidiary functions such as resolving motions. Records
describing the contours of these responsibilities or assigning them to court
personnel would document the functions of the judiciary. For example, the
protective order in this case is such a record because it appoints and describes the
functions of the special master. Depositions of the private parties litigating this
case, which were never filed nor were their contents considered by the court, do
not document a judicial function.
3. “Policies”
A “policy” is “a definite course or method of action selected . . . to guide
and usually determine present and future decisions.” Webster’s Third New
International Dictionary (Unabridged) 1754 (1993). The Administrative Office of
the United States Courts documents the policies of federal courts in its Guide to
Judiciary Policies and Procedures. Further policies are documented in each
court’s local rules. To consider the Harris and Klebold depositions to constitute
records that “guide and . . . determine present and future decisions” of the federal
courts strains credulity.
-12-
4. “Decisions”
The decisions of a federal court, unlike its organization, functions, or
policies, may well turn on evidence produced in discovery. Motions for summary
judgment, for example, rely on supporting exhibits such as depositions, even if
the exhibits are not admitted at trial. Depositions used to resolve such motions
could be said to document the decision of a court. Here, however, the contents of
the Harris and Klebold depositions were never examined by the court and did not
serve as the basis for any judicial decision. They were held in the evidence room
simply as a consequence of the protective order, which required that
“[d]epositions requiring the use of non-public protected documents shall be
conducted at the Courthouse in the presence of the Special Master” (quotation
omitted). Indeed, it would have been improper for the court to base a decision on
their contents, as they were unsigned and never filed with the court. See Fed. R.
Civ. P. 5(d)(1), 26(g). Consequently, the Harris and Klebold depositions do not
document the decisions of any federal court.
5. “Procedures”
The procedures of the federal courts are closely related to their policies and
are often similarly documented. Along with the Guide to Judiciary Policies and
Procedures, courts’ procedures are also documented in their rules, such as the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, the
Supreme Court rules, circuit rules, and other local rules. In a case challenging
-13-
such procedural rules, depositions that a court substantively considers and relies
on may arguably document its procedures. Because the Harris and Klebold
depositions are not related to a challenge to any judicial procedure and the court
never considered their contents, they do not document the procedures of the
federal courts.
6. “Essential Transactions”
Finally, I turn to whether the depositions document the “essential
transactions” of the judiciary. Essential transactions in a judicial context include
receiving pleadings and documents filed with or presented as evidence to the
Court (the “case file”), holding hearings and trials, entering orders, and issuing
opinions. Accordingly, the majority is correct that documents filed with the
clerk’s office are federal records. Maj. Op. at 10–11. In contrast, unsigned
depositions cannot be filed. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(d)(1), 26(g); Maj. Op. at 11.
Therefore, the Harris and Klebold depositions could not possibly document an
essential transaction of the court because they were neither filed with the clerk’s
office, used at a hearing or trial, nor were their contents relied upon by a judge. 5
5
The majority states that it “would be inclined to say that the depositions in
this case come within the category of records described by § 3101” because “the
depositions were taken in [the special master’s] presence and he ruled on
objections as they arose.” Maj. Op. at 14. As discussed, supra §§ I.C.4 and I.C.6,
the special master’s presence alone does not make these depositions federal
records. Whether the special master “ruled on objections as they arose” is a
question of fact the district court did not address, and which does not appear in
the briefing. The only point at which any party before this court argued that the
(continued...)
-14-
Because the depositions of Wayne and Katherine Harris and Susan and
Thomas Klebold do not fall within any of the above categories, they do not fall
within the ambit of the FRA. § 3101. It is unnecessary to reach whether they
were “made or received” by the court. 6
II
A
Beyond misinterpreting the statute, the majority’s conclusion interprets the
FRA as throwing a wrench into discovery practice. The Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure explicitly and precisely address how discovery materials are collected
and used. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26–36. 7 Today’s decision potentially exposes any
5
(...continued)
special master ruled on objections came at oral argument, when counsel for the
Harrises responded in the affirmative to the question of whether the special
master “made rulings.” My interpretation relies on the text and structure of the
statute, which was plainly misapplied by the district court. Unlike the majority, I
will not make this non-record-supported factual finding on appeal.
6
Because materials including in a filing with the court document an
“essential transaction,” if the appellants had filed the deposition transcripts as a
part of the record on appeal, their appeal would have been self-defeating.
7
Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 (mandatory discovery obligations, scope and timing of
discovery, supplementary disclosures, mandatory discovery conference, and
signature requirement), 27 (perpetuated testimony), 28 (who must witness a
deposition), 29 (stipulations in discovery practice), 30 (timing of oral depositions,
written notice requirements, providing for production of documents via subpoena
duces tecum, format of questioning, objection process during depositions,
duration of depositions, certification requirements, and sanctions), 31 (procedure
for taking written deposition), 32 (use of depositions in hearing or trial), 33
(interrogatories), 34 (production of documents or other electronic or tangible
(continued...)
-15-
discovery deposited with a special master to public inspection. I cannot read a
vague, broadly-worded statute directed toward public agencies as having such a
profound effect. See Canup v. Chipman-Union, Inc., 123 F.3d 1440, 1443 (11th
Cir. 1997) (“We would expect Congress to speak more clearly if it intended such
a radical change in the application and understanding of its . . . statutes.”); In re
Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., Ltd., 793 F.2d 1380, 1382 (5th Cir. 1986)
(“We think it unlikely that Congress would have adopted such a rule—entailing,
as it does, major changes in the way in which a reorganization proceeding is
conducted—without clear, unequivocal statements to that effect in the bankruptcy
statute or, at the least, in its legislative history.”); Flynn v. U.S. ex rel. Eggers,
786 F.2d 586, 591 (3d Cir. 1986) (“[W]e are mindful of the Supreme Court’s
admonition that, absent a clear Congressional statement, we should not infer that
Congress intended to alter equity practices.”). 8
7
(...continued)
items), 35 (physical and mental examinations), 36 (scope and effect of requests
for admission).
8
The majority asserts:
[B]efore 1980, which was well after the FRA took its present form,
all depositions had to be filed. See, e.g., Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(f) (1970)
(“[The officer before whom the deposition was taken] shall then
securely seal the deposition in an envelope indorsed with the title of
the action . . . and shall promptly file it with the court . . . .”) . . . .
Given that every deposition in a federal suit was a record subject to
the FRA before 1980, it should not be cause for great concern about
the impact on discovery if some depositions still are.
(continued...)
-16-
By holding that any document that passes through the hands of a special
master may be transferred to the National Archives, the majority adds a new and
unexpected variable into the calculus of litigation discovery. Until today, parties
could confidently follow the Supreme Court’s command that
“deposition-discovery rules are to be accorded a broad and liberal treatment,”
Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 507 (1947), safe in the knowledge that
objectionable questions and answers would not be admitted at trial, see Fed. R.
Civ. P. 30(c), and, if necessary, would be sealed for “good cause shown,” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 26(c). In other words, taking or sitting for a deposition was confined to a
particular lawsuit. No longer is this the case.
B
In addition to the broad expectations that the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure create, the district court below adhered to those rules and created
specific expectations regarding the disclosure of discovery by entering several
8
(...continued)
Maj. Op. at 14-15 (additional citations omitted). The majority fails to recognize
that before the filing required by the 1970 version of Rule 30(f), depositions had
to be “fully transcribed,” “submitted to the witness for examination,” and “then
be signed by the witness [or the officer before whom the deposition was taken, in
certain circumstances].” Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(e) (1970); see also Fed. R. Civ. P.
30(e) (1979) (same); Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(e) (1950) (same). The deposition
transcripts at issue in this case were never signed, and the record is disputed as to
how many depositions, if any, were even transcribed. It is apparent that the
Federal Rules have always prohibited filing unsigned depositions, such as those at
issue in this case.
-17-
protective orders. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c). The earliest protective order, issued
on January 8, 2002, stated, “Promptly after the termination of this action . . ., all
Protected Documents, Confidential Information, and copies of deposition
transcripts designated as confidential . . . shall be returned to counsel for the party
producing those confidential materials.” The final, consolidated protective order
of April 25, 2003, in effect when Wayne and Katherine Harris and Susan and
Thomas Klebold were deposed, and when the case was settled in August, provides
that “[a]t the conclusion of this litigation, all documents and materials deposited
in the Evidence Room pursuant to this Consolidated Protective Order shall be
returned to the producing party, entity, or person or the appropriate custodian of
any such documents and materials.” All parties to the litigation properly shared
an understanding—confirmed by the court—that all confidential discovery would
be returned to the producing parties.
The Attorney General of Colorado upset the apple cart with its September
23, 2003, motion to intervene. Although intervention was denied, the Attorney
General was permitted to participate as amicus, primarily to address his concern
that an expert in youth violence should be allowed access to the records.
Regardless of the legitimacy of this interest, it was never embraced by the parties
to this appeal nor is there any other reason they would have anticipated it when
the depositions were taken.
-18-
C
Because of the expectations created by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
and the court’s protective orders pursuant to the Rules, it is extremely unlikely
that the parties ever considered that their depositions might be redirected to the
National Archives. Moreover, although the National Archives contain depositions,
see The National Archives, Archival Research Catalog,
http://www.archives.gov/research/arc/ (search for “deposition”) (last visited Oct.
10, 2008), these are from congressional hearings, executive investigations, cases
where the United States or an officer thereof was a party, or cases raising issues of
historical importance. E.g., National Archives, Archival Research Catalog,
http://arcweb.archives.gov/ (search “Reagan and Poindexter”) (last visited Oct. 10,
2008) (deposition of Ronald Reagan in U.S. v. Poindexter); National Archives,
Archival Research Catalog, http://arcweb.archives.gov/ (search “Stowe and
Thomas”) (last visited Oct. 10, 2008) (deposition of Harriet Beecher Stowe in
Stowe v. Thomas, 1 Pitts. 82, 23 F. Cas. 201 (1853)). Although the last category
includes depositions taken in private litigation, the Archives contain only
depositions that were actually part of the case file. 9
9
See, e.g., National Archives, Archival Research Catalog,
http://arcweb.archives.gov/ (search “Stowe and Thomas”) (last visited Oct. 10,
2008) (noting that “[t]he case file from which these documents originate is also
referenced as Stowe versus Thomas, Case #9 October Session 1853” (emphasis
added)).
-19-
The Administrative Office’s schedules do not contemplate archiving unfiled
depositions, confirming that it shares the parties’ expectations regarding the scope
of the FRA. See Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts, The Guide to Judiciary
Policies and Procedures, vol. 1, ch. 12, pt. A, §§ 14-15, Record Management
Policies (2002), available at
http://jnet.ao.dcn/Guide/Volume_1/Chapter_12/Part_A.html (scheduling the
disposal of “Case Records” and “Case-Associated Records”). Records Disposition
Schedule 2 describes “Case Records” as “[a]ll records resulting from the docketing
and processing of a case in a court that pertain to that particular case.” Id. § 15(A)
(emphasis added). Similarly, NARA, in its briefing to the district court, explained
that “[t]here is no way for [it] to know whether any materials in the Evidence
Room were quoted or cited in any motions or other papers . . . . As a result, it
remains unclear at this time whether any of those materials were ‘used’ in the
cases and thus should be considered ‘records’ subject to the FRA.” As the
majority acknowledges, these depositions were never “used” by the court, Maj.
Op. at 11, and thus NARA’s reasoning confirms that they are not records subject
to the FRA.
In all litigation, parties should be on notice of the extent to which discovery
may become public. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure anticipate and
expressly address these concerns, creating justified expectations. See Fed. R. Civ.
P. 26(c), 30(c). The majority assumes that Congress steamrolled over these
-20-
detailed and specific rules with a statute covering all federal agencies that never
once mentions litigation. Absent a clear statement of Congressional intent to
dramatically alter civil discovery practice, I cannot agree with my colleagues that
the depositions in this case are records subject to transfer to the National Archives.
III
Because my reading of the FRA directs the district court to preserve only
those records that document the federal courts’ organization, functions, policies,
decisions, procedures, and essential transactions, I cannot agree with the majority
that the Act covers the unfiled, unsigned depositions of Wayne and Katherine
Harris and Susan and Thomas Klebold. I respectfully dissent.
-21-
Rohrbough v. Harris
Court: Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
Date filed: 2008-12-15
Citations: 549 F.3d 1313
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