Rolland v. Romney

          United States Court of Appeals
                       For the First Circuit


No. 02-1697

          LORETTA ROLLAND; TERRY NEWTON; BRUCE AMES;
      FREDERICK COOPER; MARGARET PINETTE; LESLIE FRANCIS;
           TIMOTHY RAYMOND; THE ARC OF MASSACHUSETTS;
              STAVROS CENTER FOR INDEPENDENT LIVING,

                       Plaintiffs, Appellees,

                                 v.

        MITT ROMNEY; FREDERICK LASKEY; WILLIAM O'LEARY;
      BRUCE M. BULLEN; GERALD MORRISSEY; ELMER C. BARTELS;
                    HOWARD KOH; TERESA O'HARE,

                       Defendants, Appellants.


          APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
                FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

         [Hon. Kenneth P. Neiman, U.S. Magistrate Judge]


                               Before

                         Selya, Circuit Judge,
              Coffin and Bownes, Senior Circuit Judges.



     Peter T. Wechsler, Assistant Attorney General, with whom
Thomas F. Reilly, Attorney General, was on brief for appellants.
     Steven J. Schwartz with whom Cathy E. Costanzo, Center for
Public Representation, Matthew Engel, Disability Law Center,
Richard d'A Belin, Kristi Hatrick, Foley, Hoag & Eliot LLP, Frank
Laski, and Mental Health Legal Advisors were on brief for
appellees.
     Buckmaster De Wolf, Howrey Simon Arnold & White, LLP, and
Ethan B. Andelman on brief for The Arc of the United States,
National Association of Protection and Advocacy Systems, Judge
David L. Bazelon Center for Mental Health Law, National Health Law
Program, and National Senior Citizens Law Center, amici curiae.



                        January 28, 2003
     COFFIN, Senior Circuit Judge. Appellants, the governor of the

Commonwealth of Massachusetts and various officials (collectively

referred to as the "Commonwealth"), appeal the decision of the

district court, acting through a magistrate judge, see 28 U.S.C. §

636(c), requiring them to provide certain services to appellees, a

group of adults with mental retardation or other developmental

disabilities     who    reside   in    nursing   homes     in   Massachusetts.1

Concluding     that    the   court's   interpretation      of   the   applicable

federal law was not in error, we affirm.

                                 I. Background

     Residents,       then-plaintiffs,       filed   a   section   1983   action

against the Commonwealth in federal district court in 1998 on

behalf of a putative class of approximately 1600 similarly disabled

residents of Massachusetts nursing homes, alleging violations of a

variety of federal statutes, including 42 U.S.C. § 1396r, a part of

the Nursing Home Reform Amendments ("NHRA")2 to the Medicaid law.

The residents sought various forms of relief, but of particular

relevance to this case requested an injunction requiring the

Commonwealth to provide them with "specialized services," a term



     1
      Two organizational plaintiffs joined appellees below and in
this appeal. In addition, multiple organizations (the Arc of the
United States, the National Association of Protection and Advocacy
Systems, the Judge David L. Bazelon Center for Mental Health Law,
the National Health Law Project, and the National Senior Citizens
Law Center) have provided helpful briefing as amici.
     2
         For convenience, we refer to the NHRA in the singular.

                                       -3-
given    particular   meaning   in    the   NHRA   and   its    implementing

regulations.3    The parties allowed a magistrate judge to conduct

proceedings.

     Following the judge's denial of the Commonwealth's motion to

dismiss, Rolland v. Cellucci, 52 F. Supp.2d 231 (D. Mass. 1999),

and subsequent mediation by the parties, a settlement agreement

("Agreement") was finalized in November 1999 and operated as a stay

of the litigation.     After a fairness hearing, the court endorsed

the Agreement and entered it as an order in January 2000.             Rolland

v. Cellucci, 191 F.R.D. 3 (D. Mass. 2000).          In the Agreement, the

Commonwealth committed to provide specialized services as defined

by federal regulation to all Massachusetts nursing home residents

with mental retardation who had been identified as needing them

through the preadmission screening and annual resident review

process ("PASARR screening") required by the NHRA.

        Enforcement was addressed in the following way.             A proviso

stated that the Agreement could not be enforced through breach of

contract or contempt actions.        If the residents were dissatisfied

with the Commonwealth's performance, the Agreement authorized them

to   enter    mediation,   and,      that   failing,     seek   a    judicial


     3
      We note at the outset that the original statutory term,
"active treatment," was replaced by the language "specialized
services" in 1990 and that the parties disagree about the import of
this change. Several of the congressional reports cited herein,
preceding the change, used the term “active treatment.”         The
interrelation of the terms is discussed in detail in Section V
infra.

                                     -4-
determination      that   the      Commonwealth     was    in     substantial

noncompliance with the Agreement. The residents would only then be

entitled to seek relief based upon the "then existing facts and

law."

     In September 2000, the residents filed a "Motion for Further

Relief Concerning Specialized Services," asking the court to find

the Commonwealth in noncompliance with the specialized services

portion of the Agreement, contending that a significant number of

class members were not receiving all necessary specialized services

and some class members were not receiving any.                    Following a

hearing, the judge entered a finding in March 2001 that the

Commonwealth was in substantial noncompliance with its specialized

services obligations and lifted the stay. Rolland v. Cellucci, 138

F. Supp.2d 110 (D. Mass. 2001).

     The residents then moved again for further relief, asking the

court to order the Commonwealth to provide specialized services,

which they alleged were required by both federal law and the

Agreement.    Following a four-day evidentiary hearing in November

2001, the court, in a well reasoned and thoughtful decision of May

2002, held that the Commonwealth was in violation of federal law as

well as     the   Agreement   by   its   failure   to   provide   specialized

services to residents who required them.

        The court ordered the Commonwealth to take five particular

remedial actions.      Specifically at issue here, the district court


                                     -5-
required the Commonwealth to provide specialized services and

implement a policy of "active treatment," another term of art

defined by federal regulation, for all class members needing

specialized services.       Although the Commonwealth does not dispute

the court's noncompliance findings, it contests the legitimacy of

the order that it provide specialized services and implement a

policy of active treatment. The Commonwealth has not sought a stay

and has apparently attempted compliance.

        The     Commonwealth      contends   that     the    district       court

misconstrued both federal law and the Agreement.              The language of

the   Agreement,    disallowing      contempt   or     breach      of   contract

proceedings, requires the residents to seek relief based on the

"then existing facts and law."        The Commonwealth argues that even

a finding of noncompliance by the court merely allows the residents

"to reopen the litigation."          The residents rejoin that such an

interpretation provides them with no more than what they began with

and was not what the parties intended.             Rather than grapple with

the question of whether the district court's order was in keeping

with the enforcement provisions of the Agreement, we have assessed

the   court's    reliance    on    federal   law     and    have    found    that

supportable.

                 II. The NHRA's History and Framework

      The history of the NHRA is instructive.               During the 1970s,

numerous class action lawsuits were filed against states claiming


                                     -6-
insufficient care and treatment of mentally retarded individuals in

state-run   intermediate       care    facilities    for    mentally   retarded

individuals    ("ICF/MRs").           Gen.    Accounting    Office,    Medicaid:

Addressing the Needs of Mentally Retarded Nursing Home Residents 11

(1987) [hereinafter GAO Medicaid Report].             Because of the suits,

thirty states, including Massachusetts, became parties to consent

decrees in which they agreed to improve the quality of care.                 Id.

At that time, a common method to reduce overcrowding in the ICF/MRs

was to move mentally retarded individuals to Medicaid-certified

nursing homes.       H.R. Rep. No. 100-391, pt. 1, at 459 (1987),

reprinted in 1987 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2313, 2313-279.

     Residents moved to nursing homes, however, were often deprived

of necessary services. The General Accounting Office found that by

1985, approximately 140,000 mentally retarded individuals resided

in nursing homes nationwide.           GAO Medicaid Report at 11.        Because

nursing homes were often not equipped to provide the services or

treatment     they   needed,    however,      mentally     retarded    residents

frequently went without them.           Id.

     In 1987, Congress passed the NHRA, part of the Omnibus Budget

Reconciliation Act, as a response to this apparently widespread

problem.    The report from the House of Representatives began:

     Substantial numbers of mentally retarded and mentally ill
     residents are inappropriately placed, at Medicaid
     expense, in [skilled nursing facilities] or ICFs. These
     residents often do not receive the active treatment or
     services that they need. A recent [Government Accounting
     Office] review of mentally retarded residents in [these

                                        -7-
       facilities] in Connecticut, Massachusetts, and Rhode
       Island concluded that the active treatment needs of these
       individuals were generally not being identified or met.

H.R.    Rep.     No.    100-391,     pt.    1,   at   459,    reprinted      in    1987

U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2313-279.

       The NHRA attempted to ensure that those placed in nursing

homes actually needed nursing care and that once residing in a

nursing    home,       individuals    would      receive     the    other   kinds       of

treatment they needed.             Towards that end, the NHRA established

requirements for nursing homes in their care of mentally retarded

residents, 42 U.S.C. § 1396r(b); instituted specific enumerated

rights for residents, id. § 1396r(c); and required states to screen

and    provide    services    to     mentally      retarded    residents,         id.    §

1396r(e).

       Specifically,       states    must     perform      PASARR    screenings         of

potential nursing home admittees to determine two things: first,

whether the individual requires nursing facility levels of care,

addressing physical and mental conditions; second, whether the

individual requires specialized services, addressing needs for

training, therapies, and other means of accomplishing improvement

of functioning.          Id. § 1396r(e)(7)(A)(i) & (B)(ii).                 A nursing

facility may admit a person only if the PASARR screening determines

that nursing care is required.                   Id. § 1396r(b)(3)(F).            After

admittance, states must review an individual's needs for nursing




                                           -8-
facility   care   and    specialized   services   whenever   there   is   a

significant change in the individual's condition.        Id.

     For mentally retarded individuals who were already living in

nursing homes at the time of the NHRA's enactment, the statute

required states to institute the same two-faceted PASARR screening

process.   Id. § 1396r(e)(7)(B)(ii).       When then-current residents

were found not to require nursing facility levels of care, the

statute required states to place them elsewhere, with the exception

that those residents who had lived in a nursing care facility for

at least thirty months had the option to remain in residence.         Id.

§ 1396r(e)(7)(C).       For all residents found not to require nursing

facility care, states were explicitly required to provide all

needed specialized services, regardless of whether the residents

remained housed in nursing facilities.       Id.4


     4
      The statute differentiated among three groups of then-current
nursing facility residents based on their PASARR screening results:
     (C) Response to preadmission screening and resident
     review
     As of April 1, 1990, the State must meet the following
     requirements:
     (i) Long-term residents not requiring nursing facility
     services, but requiring specialized services
                In the case of a resident who is
           determined, under subparagraph (B), not to
           require the level of services provided by a
           nursing facility, but to require specialized
           services   for   mental  illness   or   mental
           retardation, and who has continuously resided
           in a nursing facility for at least 30 months
           before the date of the determination, the
           State   must,   in   consultation   with   the
           resident's family or legal representative and
           care-givers--

                                    -9-
     (I) inform the resident of the institutional
     and noninstitutional alternatives covered
     under the State plan for the resident,
     (II) offer the resident the choice of
     remaining in the facility or of receiving
     covered services in an alternative appropriate
     institutional or noninstitutional setting,
     (III) clarify the effect on eligibility for
     services under the State plan if the resident
     chooses to leave the facility (including its
     effect on readmission to the facility), and
     (IV) regardless of the resident's choice,
     provide for (or arrange for the provision of)
     such specialized services for the mental
     illness or mental retardation.
. . . .
(ii) Other residents not requiring nursing facility
services, but requiring specialized services
     In the case of a resident who is determined, under
subparagraph (B), not to require the level of services
provided by a nursing facility, but to require
specialized services for mental illness or mental
retardation, and who has not continuously resided in a
nursing facility for at least 30 months before the date
of the determination, the State must, in consultation
with the resident's family or legal representative and
care-givers--
     (I) arrange for the safe and orderly discharge
     of the resident from the facility, consistent
     with the requirements of subsection (c)(2) of
     this section,
     (II) prepare and orient the resident for such
     discharge, and
     (III) provide for (or arrange for the
     provision of) such specialized services for
     the mental illness or mental retardation.
(iii) Residents not requiring nursing facility services
and not requiring specialized services
     In the case of a resident who is determined, under
subparagraph (B), not to require the level of services
provided by a nursing facility and not to require
specialized services for mental illness or mental
retardation, the State must--
     (I) arrange for the safe and orderly discharge
     of the resident from the facility, consistent
     with the requirements of subsection (c)(2) of

                         -10-
      Despite its detailed mandates, the statute does not explicitly

answer the question of whether states must provide specialized

services to "dual need residents," those who need both nursing

facility care and specialized services, as contrasted with those

who do not need nursing facility care but do need specialized

services.      The Secretary of the United States Department of Health

and Human Services ("HHS") has found this obligation to provide

specialized services for dual need residents to be implicit in the

statute and has explicitly imposed it on states through regulation.

See 42 C.F.R. § 483.120(b).

      The Commonwealth presents several arguments in support of its

position that it is not obligated to provide specialized services

to dual need residents.         First, it infers from the statutory

silence on this issue that it has no such obligation and contends

that the regulation that does so obligate it is unenforceable

because it is contrary to the statute's intent.                 Second, the

Commonwealth argues that even if the NHRA does impliedly require it

to   provide    specialized   services    to   dual   need   residents,   the

residents do not have a private right of action to enforce the

Commonwealth's obligation.       Third, the Commonwealth takes issue



          this section, and
          (II) prepare and orient the resident for such
          discharge.
42 U.S.C. § 1396r(e)(7)(C).

                                   -11-
with the court's order that it implement a policy of active

treatment for all mentally retarded residents who need specialized

services.

            III. Whether the NHRA Requires States to Provide
              Specialized Services to Dual Need Residents

      The Commonwealth argues that the NHRA requires it to provide

specialized services only to those individuals who are found not to

require     nursing    home    care     but    to    need   specialized     services,

regardless of whether such individuals continue to reside in

nursing care facilities.           The Commonwealth construes the statutory

silence on its obligation to residents with dual needs as support

for   its    position.        It     further    contends     that   the   regulation

explicitly creating the obligation to provide specialized services

for dual need residents is ultra vires and therefore unenforceable.

      As always, the plain meaning of the statutory language, as

derived from the whole of the statute, including its overall policy

and purpose, controls.          See Summit Inv. & Dev. Corp. v. Leroux, 69

F.3d 608,     610     (1st    Cir.    1995).        Further,    "the   congressional

intendment     conveyed       by      unclear       statutory    language    may   be

discernible from its legislative history."                  Id. (citing O'Neill v.

Nestle Libbys P.R., Inc., 729 F.2d 35, 36 (1st Cir. 1984)).

      In this case, also available are interpretations of the

statutory provisions at issue from HHS, the agency responsible for

their implementation.          Where an agency has been endowed with the



                                         -12-
power to administer a congressionally created program, as here,

regulations should be given substantial deference:

     If Congress has explicitly left a gap for the agency to
     fill, there is an express delegation of authority to the
     agency to elucidate a specific provision of the statute
     by regulation. Such legislative regulations are given
     controlling weight unless they are arbitrary, capricious,
     or manifestly contrary to the statute.

Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837,

843-44 (1984); see also United States v. Meade Corp., 533 U.S. 218,

227 (2001)("Delegation of such authority may be shown in a variety

of ways, as by an agency's power to engage in adjudication or

notice-and-comment rulemaking, or by some other indication of a

comparable congressional intent.").          As this court has held, "[a]n

inquiring court – even a court empowered to conduct de novo review

– must examine the Secretary's interpretation of the statute, as

expressed    in    the   regulation,     through   a    deferential    glass."

Strickland v. Comm'r, Maine Dep't of Human Servs., 48 F.3d 12, 16

(1st Cir. 1995).

     Applying these precepts to the question of whether Congress

intended to require states to provide specialized services to dual

need residents, we look first at the NHRA's plain language.                 The

NHRA is silent on this precise question, but we gather clues of

congressional      intent   from   several   separate    provisions    in   the

statute,    ever   mindful   of    its   overriding    purpose,   to   protect

individuals from being warehoused in nursing facilities and denied



                                     -13-
necessary services.      See H.R. Rep. No. 100-391, pt. 1, at 459,

reprinted in 1987 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2313-279.5

     First, although the NHRA does not specify states’ obligations

to provide specialized services to dual need residents, it does

explicitly    require   states   to    provide     specialized   services   to

residents who do need them but who do not require nursing facility

care.    It is clear that the statute's intent in this regard was not

to elevate those individuals with only the need for specialized

services above those with dual needs, but rather to bring them up

to par with the dual needs group.            Indeed, this explicit language

appears designed to ensure that those most likely to be left out –

those not in a facility – received specialized services if needed.

As   such,    the   basic    stance          of   the   Commonwealth   seems

counterintuitive. Under its analysis, for example, it would supply

specialized services to those with needs insufficient to require




     5
      The GAO investigative report, cited by the House                      of
Representatives, explained:
     Mentally    retarded     residents    in     Connecticut,
     Massachusetts, and Rhode Island nursing homes generally
     have not had their active treatment needs identified and
     met. These conditions existed because nursing homes were
     not part of the service delivery network for the
     retarded, nursing homes did not prepare written plans of
     care to assess the active treatment needs of their
     retarded residents and develop programs to meet those
     needs, and state inspectors were not determining whether
     retarded residents were receiving needed active treatment
     services.
GAO Medicaid Report at 3.

                                      -14-
nursing home care but deny such services to those substantially

worse off.6

     Second, an internal signal of great importance is derived from

the screening requirements for both then-current and potential

residents, necessitating determinations of whether nursing facility

care is required and whether specialized services are required. If

Congress had intended that states manage reviews in a two-tiered

fashion,    conducting   the    specialized    services    portion   of   the

screening only for those found not to need nursing facility care,

it easily could have written the statute in such a manner.              As the

residents point out, the Commonwealth's construction of the statute

would render the second prong of the PASARR screening requirements

for specialized services a meaningless exercise for individuals

found to need nursing facility care in the first prong because the

Commonwealth would not be required to provide them.

     Given that Congress instead structured the requirement as

involving     both   steps     for   every   individual,    it   must     have

contemplated that states would utilize the information from both

portions of the PASARR screening.        This conclusion is bolstered by

the fact that Congress committed to funding seventy-five percent of



     6
      The fact that residents with thirty months or more of
occupancy in nursing facilities who wished to remain, but did not
require nursing care, are guaranteed specialized services, poses
the picture even more dramatically – that of a physically robust
resident receiving habilitative specialized services while his
ailing housemate is ignored.

                                     -15-
the costs of screening, 42 U.S.C. § 1396b(a)(2)(C), and assuredly

would not have assumed three-quarters of the expenses unless the

reviews were to render useful results.              A Senate Budget Committee

report issued two years after the NHRA’s enactment confirms that

Congress   viewed   the    law    as    holding     states     responsible   for

specialized services (then termed "active treatment") for all who

needed them:

     If a resident is found to be mentally ill or mentally
     retarded and requires nursing facility care, the
     individual may reside in a facility, but the State is
     required to provide active treatment if the individual is
     found to need it.
     . . . .
          The law implies, but does not explicitly indicate,
     that it is the obligation of a State to furnish “active
     treatment” to an individual who needs it.

135 Cong. Rec. S13057, S13238 (daily ed. Oct. 12, 1989).

     A third statutory clue to Congress's intent can be discerned

in the requirement that states create an appeals process for

individuals    adversely   impacted      by   the    outcome    of   any   PASARR

screening determination.         See 42 U.S.C. § 1396r(e)(7)(F).           It is

clear that Congress perceived the screening as vesting individuals

with rights to the services deemed necessary:

     Individuals could be adversely affected not only by a
     determination that he or she does not need nursing
     facility services, but also by determinations that he or
     she does not need active treatment. . . . The Committee
     expects that these appeal procedures will offer mentally
     ill and mentally retarded individuals at least the due
     process protections of a Medicaid fair hearing under
     current law, including notice of the right to appeal,
     right to representation by counsel, and right to a fair
     hearing and impartial decision-making process.

                                       -16-
H.R.       Rep.    No.   100-391,   pt.   1,    at   462-63,      reprinted   in     1987

U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2313-282 to 2313-283.                      This language strongly

suggests that Congress intended the determination of need for

specialized services to result in the provision or denial of those

services for every individual screened.

       Reviewing finally the interpretation of the statute by the

federal agency responsible for its implementation, HHS, we find

that Congress gave the Secretary very broad duties under the NHRA:

            It is the duty and responsibility of the Secretary
       to assure that requirements which govern the provision of
       care in nursing facilities under State plans approved
       under this subchapter, and the enforcement of such
       requirements, are adequate to protect the health, safety,
       welfare, and rights of residents and to promote the
       effective and efficient use of public moneys.

42   U.S.C.        §   1396r(f)(1).   Specifically,        Congress       required    the

Secretary to oversee the PASARR screening process by developing

"minimum          criteria   for    States     to    use   in    making    [screening]

determinations . . . and in permitting individuals adversely

affected to appeal such determinations."                    Id. § 1396r(f)(8)(A).

Further, the NHRA required the Secretary to specifically monitor

state compliance with certain requirements.                     Id. § 1396r(f)(8)(B).

       The Secretary has promulgated a rule explicitly requiring

states to provide specialized services to dual need residents.

See 42 C.F.R. § 483.116(b).7              During the comment period, states


       7
        The regulation states:
       If the State mental health or mental retardation
       authority determines that a resident or applicant for

                                          -17-
objected to this requirement, noting that the statute explicitly

required   them   to   provide   specialized   services   only   to   those

residents who did not need nursing facility services but who did

need specialized services. The Secretary responded:

     In our view, the law does require that the States provide
     specialized services to persons in [nursing facilities
     "NFs")] who have been determined through their PASARR
     programs to require both NF services and specialized
     services. While the statute contains no explicit
     reference to provision of specialized services to those
     residents with dual needs, we are, in placing this
     requirement on States, relying on the central theme of
     all the [NHRA] provisions which is that all of a
     resident's needs must be identified and served. Congress
     could not possibly have intended that the specialized
     services needs of those residents who also need NF
     services, and are therefore approved for NF residence,
     should be ignored or go unmet. Since the description of
     specialized services at section 1919(e)(7)(G) clearly
     indicates that specialized services is beyond the scope
     of NF services, the NF cannot be required to provide it.
     Both the statute and the legislative history indicate
     that the provision of specialized services is solely a
     State responsibility . . . . The logical corollary is
     that the State must provide specialized services to
     residents with dual needs.

57 Fed. Reg. 56,450, 56,477 (Nov. 30, 1992) (emphasis added).


     admission requires both a [nursing facility ("NF")] level
     of services and specialized services for the mental
     illness or mental retardation–
          . . . .
          (2) The State must provide or arrange for the
          provision of the specialized services needed
          by the individual while he or she resides in
          the NF.
See also 42 C.F.R. § 483.120(b) ("The State must provide or arrange
for the provision of specialized services . . . to all NF residents
with [mental illness or mental retardation] whose needs are such
that continuous supervision, treatment and training by qualified
mental health or mental retardation personnel is necessary."
(emphasis added)).

                                   -18-
     The Commonwealth contends that the regulation is unenforceable

because it exceeds the bounds of the statute and "runs directly

counter to one of the primary purposes of the Act, namely, the

conservation of federal and state funds."   Because the regulations

are contrary to congressional intent, they are without force, the

Commonwealth concludes.

     Although we agree with the Commonwealth's assertion that if

the regulation were contrary to congressional intent, it would be

unenforceable, we do not find the contested regulation to be so.

It almost should go without saying that Congress was concerned with

fiscal conservatism, but clearly the statute's primary purpose is

to ensure that the needs of all mentally retarded nursing facility

residents are identified and served.   See H.R. Rep. No. 100-391,

pt. 1, at 459, reprinted in 1987 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2313-279.     The

regulation manifests coherence with this goal, and as such, is not

contrary to the statute, arbitrary, or capricious. It follows that

it is endowed with controlling authority. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at

843-44.

     In conclusion, the statutory language and legislative history,

as well as agency interpretations, all lead us to adjudge that the

Commonwealth is required to provide dual need residents with

specialized services if screening deems them necessary.




                               -19-
           IV.   Whether the Right to Specialized Services
                       is Privately Enforceable

     The Commonwealth next argues that the NHRA does not create a

private right of action for the residents.          Thus, even if the

residents are entitled to specialized services under the statute,

the Commonwealth contends, the statute does not endow them with the

right to enforce that entitlement through an action brought under

42 U.S.C. § 1983.

     Section 1983 allows individuals to bring claims in federal

court based on alleged "deprivations of any rights, privileges, or

immunities secured by the Constitution and laws."       A section 1983

claim would not be permitted where the statute did not create

enforceable rights, privileges, or immunities or where "Congress

has foreclosed such enforcement of the statute in the enactment

itself."   Wright v. City of Roanoke Redev. & Hous. Auth., 479 U.S.

418, 423 (1987).

     The Commonwealth particularly contends that the statute does

not create an enforceable right.        The determination of whether a

federal statute creates a private right for the residents turns on

Congress's intent.    See Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 286

(2001); Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. Nat'l Sea Clammers

Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1, 13 (1981).8     We consider de novo whether the

     8
      In Sandoval, the Court explained that "[t]he judicial task is
to interpret the statute Congress has passed to determine whether
it displays an intent to create not just a private right but also
a private remedy."      Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 286.       The Court

                                 -20-
statute reflects this intent.   See Bryson v. Shumway, 308 F.3d 79,

84 (1st Cir. 2002).

     Traditionally, the three indicators of congressional intent to

create an enforceable right have been:

     First, Congress must have intended that the provision in
     question benefit the plaintiff. . . . Second, the
     plaintiff must demonstrate that the right assertedly
     protected by the statute is not so "vague and amorphous"
     that its enforcement would strain judicial competence. .
     . . Third, the statute must unambiguously impose a
     binding obligation on the States. In other words, the
     provision giving rise to the asserted right must be
     couched in mandatory rather than precatory terms.

Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 340-41 (1997) (citing Wilder

v. Virginia Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498, 510-11 (1990); Wright, 479

U.S. at 430-32).   Further, as the Supreme Court remarked in Cannon

v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979), "the right- or duty-

creating language of the statute has generally been the most




subsequently clarified that:
     Plaintiffs suing under § 1983 do not have the burden of
     showing an intent to create a private remedy because §
     1983 generally supplies a remedy for the vindication of
     rights secured by federal statutes. . . . Once a
     plaintiff demonstrates that a statute confers an
     individual right, the right is presumptively enforceable
     by § 1983. But the initial inquiry – determining whether
     a statute confers any right at all – is no different from
     the initial inquiry in an implied right of action case,
     the express purpose of which is to determine whether or
     not a statute "confer[s] rights on a particular class of
     persons."
Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 322 (2002) (quoting California
v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287, 294 (1981)) (footnotes omitted).

                                -21-
accurate indicator of the propriety of implication of a cause of

action."    Id. at 690 n.13.9

     Importantly, a regulation "may invoke a private right of

action that Congress through statutory text created, but it may not

create a right that Congress has not."         Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 291.

Nevertheless, regulations that "merely interpret a statute may

provide evidence of what private rights Congress intended to

create."    Love v. Delta Air Lines, 310 F.3d 1347, 1354 (11th Cir.

2002) (citing Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 284); see also Wright, 479 U.S.

at 427 (utilizing agency interpretation to assist in determining

whether statute created right of action).          And the agency view on

this issue is entitled to some deference.         See Wright, 479 U.S. at

427 (citing Jean v. Nelson, 472 U.S. 846, 865 (1985); Chevron, 467

U.S. at 844).

     Preliminarily, we confirm that "rights-creating" language is

prevalent    in   the    NHRA.     "Rights-creating     language"   can   be

characterized     as    language   that   "explicitly   confer[s]   a   right


     9
      Some courts have concluded that Sandoval represents the
culmination of a trend to recede from the multi-factor analysis
begun in Cort v. Ash, 442 U.S. 66 (1975), in favor of an exclusive
focus on congressional intent. See, e.g, Love v. Delta Air Lines,
310 F.3d 1347, 1351-52 (11th Cir. 2002). The Commonwealth has not,
however, suggested this and argues along the lines of the Blessing
three-factor test.       Therefore, our analysis follows the
Commonwealth's arguments, while keeping at the forefront the
penultimate question of whether Congress intended to create a
private right of action in favor of the residents. See Bryson, 308
F.3d at 88 ("Ultimately, of course, this is an issue of
congressional intent, and the three tests are just a guide.").

                                     -22-
directly on   a   class   of   persons    that   include   the   plaintiff."

Cannon, 441 U.S. at 690 n.13.       Rights-creating language has also

been found in provisions that identify "'the class for whose

especial benefit the statute was enacted.'"                Id. at 688 n.9

(quoting Texas & Pacific Ry. Co. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33, 39

(1916)). Statutory language that protects the general public, such

as that customarily found in criminal statutes, or that is simply

a ban on discriminatory conduct by recipients of federal funds, is

far less likely to imply a private remedy than rights-creating

language.   See id. at 690-94.

     The NHRA speaks largely in terms of the persons intended to be

benefitted, nursing home residents, a significant factor in Cannon.

The statute contains a laundry list of rights to be afforded

residents and commands certain state and nursing home activities in

order to ensure that residents receive necessary services.10              In



     10
      The statute endows residents with rights, among others, to
choose their personal attending physicians, to be fully informed
about and participate in care and treatment, to be free from
physical or mental abuse, to voice grievances, and to enjoy privacy
and confidentiality.    42 U.S.C. § 1396r(c)(1)(A).    It requires
nursing homes, among other things, to care for residents in a
manner promoting quality of life, provide services and activities
to maintain the highest practicable physical, mental and
psychosocial well-being of residents, and conduct comprehensive
assessments   of   residents'   functional  abilities.      Id.   §
1396r(b)(1),(2) & (3). States, in addition to being required to
conduct the PASARR screenings, must review training and competency
programs for nurse aides, provide appeal procedures for residents
contesting discharges or transfers, and develop written notices of
the rights of nursing facility residents. Id. § 1396r(e)(1),(3) &
(6).

                                   -23-
short, after clearly identifying those it seeks to protect, the

statute goes on to endow them with particular rights, utilizing

"rights-creating" language.

     We turn now to the Blessing factors.              The Commonwealth does

not contest that the provision in question intends to benefit

persons such as the residents, but does contend that the right

asserted by the residents is vague and amorphous and that the

statute does not unambiguously impose a binding obligation on

states.

     A. Whether the Right is Vague and Amorphous

     The Commonwealth argues that the term "specialized services"

is too vague and amorphous to translate into a right amenable to

judicial enforcement.       It stresses that the NHRA does not define

the term, but instead delegates the task of definition to the

Secretary,    and   contends   that    the   regulatory      definition      only

obscures the meaning of the term.

     The statute's delegation of authority to define "specialized

services" for mentally retarded nursing home residents provides the

Secretary with unlimited discretion to craft a definition, the only

limitation being that it must exclude “services within the scope of

services which      the   facility    must   provide    or   arrange   for    its

residents.”    42 U.S.C. § 1396r(e)(7)(G)(iii).              The Secretary's

promulgated definition, specific to mental retardation, is as



                                     -24-
follows:      "For mental retardation, specialized services means the

services specified by the State which, combined with services

provided by the NF or other service providers, results in treatment

which meets the requirements of 483.440(a)(1)."                          42 C.F.R. §

483.120(a)(2).       Section 483.440(a)(1) of the regulations, in turn,

sets   a     standard   of   "active      treatment"         for   the   provision     of

specialized services:

       Each client must receive a continuous active treatment
       program,    which   includes    aggressive,    consistent
       implementation of a program of specialized and generic
       training, treatment, health services and related services
       described in this subpart, that is directed toward –
       (i) The acquisition of the behaviors necessary for the
       client to function with as much self determination and
       independence as possible; and
       (ii) The prevention or deceleration of regression or loss
       of current optimal functional status.

42 C.F.R. § 483.440(a)(1).

       The    Commonwealth     relies      on    the    concurrence       in    Gonzaga

University      v.   Doe,    536   U.S.    273   (2002),       declaring       that   the

statutory      right    of   the    plaintiff     to    be     protected       from   the

unconsented-to release of his educational records was too vague.

The concurring justices believed that key language, such as the

term   "education       records,"    was    broad      and    nonspecific,      leaving

schools with great uncertainty about what information they could

reveal from their records.           Id. at 326 (Breyer, J., concurring).

       The language at issue here, however, is more akin to examples

found by the Supreme Court not to be vague and amorphous.                             For

                                          -25-
example,    in    Wright,     low-income    tenants      challenged      a    housing

authority's right to charge for utilities above a statutorily

mandated    "reasonable"        rent    ceiling.       The    defendant       housing

authority asserted that a tenant's right not to be charged more

than a "reasonable" amount for utilities was vague and amorphous.

In holding that the tenants' rights were enforceable, the Court

noted that the regulations set out particular guidelines for

housing authorities to follow when setting reasonable utility

charges and required that tenants have notice and opportunity to

comment.    Wright, 479 U.S. at 431-32.

       More recently, in Livadas v. Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107 (1994),

petitioner,      a   former     employee,   asserted     that    her    rights      "to

complete    the      collective-bargaining       process      and    agree     to    an

arbitration clause" under the National Labor Relations Act had been

abridged.     Id. at 134.       The rights claimed by the petitioner were

not explicit in the statute.             Nevertheless, the Court held that

even   though     they   were    "not    provided   in   so   many     words,"      the

petitioner’s rights were sufficiently manifest in the statute's

structure to avoid being vague and amorphous.                 Id.

       In Martin v. Voinovich, 840 F. Supp. 1175 (S.D. Ohio 1993), a

district    court     grappled    with    the   contention      that    the    PASARR

screening requirements, inextricably tied to the provision of

services at issue here, were vague and amorphous.                      Id. at 1200.

The court held that they were not:

                                         -26-
      The implementing PASARR regulations contain numerous
      requirements and give detailed guidance and definitions
      about how, when and by whom the required PASARR
      determinations are to be made. . . . [T]he basic
      requirement derived from the statutory provisions, that
      the State must make PASARR determinations, is supported
      not only by fairly specific statutory language, but also
      a comprehensive regulatory scheme explaining exactly how
      the determinations are to be undertaken.

Id.

      In the instant case, the NHRA expressly delegates authority to

define "specialized services" and the Secretary has complied.               The

agency's definition, consistent with rights affirmed in prior case

law, provides contextual guidance, and it is sufficient to allow

residents     to   understand    their   rights   to   services,   states    to

understand their obligations, and courts to review states' conduct

in fulfilling those obligations.            In complex areas such as this,

more cannot reasonably be expected.

      B. Whether the NHRA Unambiguously Binds the States

      The Commonwealth asserts that the final Blessing factor is not

present because the NHRA does not unambiguously bind states.                It

relies   in    particular   on    the    fact   that   the   statute,   while

conditioning funding on compliance with other sections, does not

explicitly tie funding to the provision of specialized services.

      Reviewing the language of the NHRA, however, we conclude that




                                     -27-
it does unambiguously bind states.11 The statutory requirements for

states and nursing facilities are clearly mandatory rather than

advisory. The word "must" is repeated frequently. See Bryson, 308

F.3d at 89 (concluding that the words "must" and "shall" denoted

statutory requirements rather than mere guidelines).              For example,

with    regard   to     the   prescreening     for   new   residents,   nursing

facilities "must not admit" any new resident who has not been

screened by the state, 42 U.S.C. § 1396r(b)(3)(F); they "must

provide" specified services, id. § 1396r(b)(4)(A); and they "must"

inform residents of their legal rights, id. § 1396r(c)(1)(B).

States are instructed that they "must have in effect a preadmission

screening program," id. § 1396r(e)(7)(A)(i); they "must review and

determine"    whether      current   nursing    facility    residents   require

nursing facility levels of care and specialized services, id. §

1396r(e)(7)(B)(i); and they "must" utilize the results of that

screening in order to house and serve residents in specific ways,

id. § 1396r(e)(7)(C).         Not only are the directives mandatory, but

deadlines are often prescribed.           See, e.g., id. § 1396r(b)(3)(F) &

(e)(7)(A)-(C).         This is not a situation akin to that in Sandoval,

where the sole source of the right at issue was found in the

regulations      and    the   statute   did    not   utilize   rights-creating


       11
      Lower courts addressing the question of whether the NHRA
unambiguously binds the states have concluded that it does. See
Ottis v. Shalala, 862 F. Supp. 182, 186-87 (W.D. Mich. 1994);
Martin, 840 F. Supp. at 1200. The Commonwealth has not supplied
cites for any cases holding otherwise, nor are we aware of any.

                                        -28-
language, limited the agency's ability to effectuate individual

rights, and focused on the implementing agency rather than the

individuals being protected.           See Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 288-89.

     With regard to funding, the Commonwealth points out that

federal Medicaid funding is not specifically conditioned upon the

provision of specialized services. For support, it cites Pennhurst

State School & Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1 (1981), wherein

the Supreme Court relied in part on the absence of a direct funding

condition      in    holding    that    the     statute   did     not     intend   to

unambiguously bind the states.                 Id. at 17.       The NHRA is far

different from the federal statute reviewed by the Supreme Court in

Pennhurst, in which Congress "'legislate[d] by innuendo, making

declarations of policy and indicating a preference while requiring

measures that, though falling short of legislating its goal, serve

as a nudge in the preferred directions.'" Id.                    at 19 (citations

omitted).       As the Commonwealth acknowledges, however, such a

condition is only "one means of manifesting a Congressional intent

to impose a requirement on the states."             In the case before us, we

find other and sufficient indicia of intent.

     Moreover, we discern at least an attenuated link between

funding   and       the   provision    of   specialized       services.      Section

1396r(e)(7)(D) of the NHRA requires that funding to a state be

denied    if   the    state    fails   to     conduct   the    PASARR     screenings

prescribed by subsections 1396r(b)(3)(F) and (e)(7)(B).                        Thus,

                                        -29-
although the funding incentive is not directly tied to states'

provision    of    specialized     services,    funding   is   conditioned   on

completion of the screening leading to the provision of services.

42 U.S.C. § 1396r(e)(7)(D)(i).           The suggestion that a sanction

could result from a state failing to provide specialized services

is at least implicit.        In any event, the language of the statute

depicts an unmistakable desire to mandate state behavior.

     Because we find that the right at issue is not vague and

amorphous and that the NHRA unambiguously binds the states, we hold

that the residents are endowed with a private right of action,

which they may enforce via section 1983.

   V. Whether the Court Erred in Requiring the Commonwealth to
             Implement a Policy of Active Treatment

     We move now to the final question: whether the district court

erred in requiring the Commonwealth to implement a policy of

"active     treatment"     for    mentally     retarded   residents    needing

specialized services.            The Commonwealth protests the district

court's     "conflation"     of    the   terms    "active      treatment"    and

"specialized services," asserting that an active treatment standard

is beyond its obligation, besides being unattainable.

     To be sure, the distinction between specialized services and

active treatment lacks easy definition for those outside the

discipline.       Congress itself has utilized both terms at different

times and the current regulations use "active treatment" to define

                                      -30-
"specialized    services"       with    regard    to     those    with    mental

retardation.   The Commonwealth explains that "active treatment" is

a global concept embodied by "a model of service delivery that

underlies all of the activities of a person," traditionally applied

in ICF/MRs, while "specialized services" are "a specific set of

interventions aimed at promoting skill acquisition and preventing

regression,    as     provided    through      various       service     models."

Additionally, the amici explain that the active treatment standard

of care has been developed through years of implementation in

ICF/MRs, but, until the NHRA, had not been utilized in the care of

individuals    with    mental    illness.        As    the    Secretary     later

acknowledged, those concerned with applying the concept to persons

with mental illness were unclear as to the term's meaning and scope

in that context.      See 57 Fed. Reg. 56,450, 56,472 (Nov. 30, 1992).

     When the NHRA was enacted, it mandated that states provide

"active treatment" to individuals with mental illness as well as

those with mental retardation.          Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act

of 1997, P.L. No. 100-203, § 4211, 101 Stat. 1330 (1987).                Congress

instructed the Secretary to define "active treatment," and gave no

direction other than excluding, for nursing facility residents,

services that fell within the responsibility of the facilities, as

opposed to the responsibility of the states.             Id.

     Three    years    later,    Congress     passed    several    "minor    and

technical" amendments to the NHRA.            The amendments replaced the

                                       -31-
term "active treatment" with "specialized services," Omnibus Budget

Reconciliation Act of 1990, P.L. No. 101-508, § 4801(b)(8), 104

Stat. 1388 (1990), and again gave the Secretary broad discretion to

create a definition, as long as it excluded services provided by

the nursing facilities, 42 U.S.C. § 1396r(e)(7)(G)(iii).

      The House of Representatives report confirms that the change

was intended to clarify that "active treatment" did not necessarily

have the same application for all groups covered by the NHRA as it

did in      its   traditional      application       in   the   context    of   mental

retardation in ICF/MRs.             H.R. Rep. No. 101-881, at 118 (1990),

reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2017, 2130 (“In response to some

confusion that has arisen over the development of [the term 'active

treatment'], the Committee bill clarifies, that for the purposes of

meeting the [NHRA] requirements, the term 'active treatment' does

not necessarily have the same meaning as it does for the purposes

of   meeting      the    Medicaid    requirements         for   intermediate         care

facilities for the mentally retarded.” (emphasis added)).                             The

Senate   report     reiterated       that   "specialized        services    [should]

include active treatment where appropriate."                       136 Cong. Rec.

S15629, S15661 (daily ed. Oct. 18, 1990).

      The    Commonwealth        disregards    the    discretion    given       to    the

Secretary      as   well    as    the   critical      importance     of    the       word

"necessarily."          The Secretary, in recognition of the distinction

being made, created two definitions of specialized services.                          For

                                        -32-
those with mental illness, "specialized services" are defined as

services "specified by the State which, combined with services

provided by the NF, results in the continuous and aggressive

implementation of an individualized plan of care" developed by an

interdisciplinary      team,        prescribing     specific     therapies     and

activities, and directed toward diagnosing and reducing behavioral

symptoms and improving functioning.              42 C.F.R. § 483.120(a)(1).

     For individuals with mental retardation, such as the appellees

here, however, the Secretary crafted a definition of specialized

services   that     incorporated        the      active    treatment    standard

traditionally      applied     in     ICF/MRs.       The    Secretary    defined

specialized   services       for    these   individuals     as   "the   services

specified by the State which, combined with services provided by

the NF or other service providers, results in treatment which meets

the [active treatment] requirements of § 483.440(a)(1)."                     Id. §

483.120(a)(2).12     Again, Chevron directs that such regulations,


     12
      The Secretary also remarked in comment:
     Essentially we are simply substituting one term for
     another. We believe this is the intent of Congress as
     well as of those groups which sought the legislative
     change from Congress.
     . . . .
          Originally, the term active treatment referred to a
     mode of treatment rather than a set of treatments. By
     exchanging the term "specialized services" for "active
     treatment," we are substituting terms and not concepts.
     We wish to preserve the original intent of emphasizing
     the mode and intensity of treatment rather than the
     separate and distinct nature of these specialized
     services.
57 Fed. Reg. 56,450, 56,472 (Nov. 30, 1992).

                                       -33-
flowing    from    an    express   delegation   of    authority,   be     given

controlling weight unless arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly

contrary to the statute, none of which apply here.

     Thus, the regulations require states to provide specialized

services in such a manner as to constitute active treatment to

mentally retarded individuals when combined with the services

provided by others.       Contrary to the Commonwealth's protestations,

however, they do not impose on states, when serving mentally

retarded nursing home residents, the considerable onus of complying

with every obligation placed on them in their broader role in

ICF/MRs.

     The district court ordered the Commonwealth to "implement a

clear policy of 'active treatment' to be provided to all class

members who need specialized services." The magistrate judge spent

considerable time in his opinion evaluating the Commonwealth's

argument that the standard was unworkable, concluding that the use

of the active treatment standard by the Commonwealth's contracted

agent evidenced that the standard could in fact be utilized.                The

court     also    made   the   compelling   factual    findings    that     the

Departments of Mental Retardation, Medical Assistance, and Public

Health had created a joint training program mirroring active

treatment criteria and that the independent expert chosen by the

parties, as well as at least one of the Commonwealth's experts,

utilized the active treatment standard in their evaluations. Given

                                     -34-
the history of the statutory changes, the regulatory language, and

the district court's factual findings, we cannot say that the court

erred    in    holding      the    Commonwealth       responsible     for   providing

specialized services in a way that results in active treatment when

combined with services provided by nursing facilities and others.

      Although the district court did not impose on the Commonwealth

any     particular        method    of   compliance,       it   may    benefit     the

Commonwealth to continue its efforts to improve the coordination of

services between itself and nursing homes.                Other remedial actions

ordered by the court and not challenged by the Commonwealth on

appeal,       such   as    requiring     the   Commonwealth     to     establish    an

individual service plan and coordinator for each member of the

putative class, will also likely assist the Commonwealth in meeting

its obligations.

                                    VI. Conclusion

      We can understand the Commonwealth's posture in this case,

especially given its exigent budgetary circumstances.                          In the

complex field of care for mentally retarded individuals and the

related regulation of nursing homes and states, however, Congress

has made it clear that the Secretary is to fill in gaps and provide

definition.          The    products     of    that    delegation     of    authority,

responding to widespread documented problems, provide an effective

manner for care of mentally retarded nursing home residents and are

entitled to deference. Finally, the history of cooperation between

                                         -35-
the Commonwealth and the residents gives us confidence that the

Commonwealth will be able to meet its obligations and accomplish

the tasks ordered by the district court.

Affirmed.




                              -36-