Rose v. District Court of the Eighth Judicial District

No. 81-90
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
1981

RONALD E. ROSE,
Petitioner and Appellant,
VS.

THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE EIGHTH
JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF
MONTANA, Cascade County, H. William Coder, Judge,
Respondents.

ORIGIPJAL PROCEEDING :
Counsel of Record:
For Appellant:
Lawrence A. Anderson argued, Great Falls, Montana
For Respondents:
Hon. Mike Greely, Attorney General, Helena, Montana
Mark Murphy, argued, Assistant Attorney General, Helena,
Montana
J. Fred Bourdeau, County Attorney, Great Falls, Montana
Barbara Bell argued, Deputy County Attorney, Great Falls,
Montana
Mike Garrity argued, Dept. of Revenue, Helena, Montana
Robert F. James, Great Falls, Montana

Submitted: April 24,1981
Decided: -MAY 281a
?
Filed:
Mr. J u s t i c e Gene B. D a l y d e l i v e r e d t h e O p i n i o n of t h e C o u r t .

This is an application for a writ of certiorari
s e e k i n g a r e v i e w o f t h e p r o c e e d i n g s by which Ronald Rose was

adjudged g u i l t y of contempt of c o u r t .

The record discloses that on o r about January 15,
1 9 8 0 , t h e S t a t e o f Montana, t h e Department of Revenue, t h e

D e p a r t m e n t o f S o c i a l and R e h a b i l i t a t i o n S e r v i c e s , D i a n a L .
Ruff and L i s a M. R u f f f i l e d a p e t i t i o n i n t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t

of the Eighth Judicial District, Cascade County, to
establish paternity and p r o v i d e s u p p o r t f o r a minor child

b o r n on S e p t e m b e r 2 1 , 1 9 7 9 . The p e t i t i o n a l l e g e d t h a t t h e

State, t h e m o t h e r and t h e d a u g h t e r ". . . a r e i n f o r m e d and
b e l i e v e t h a t Respondent [Rose] is t h e f a t h e r of the child
based upon the following: Diana L. Ruff has named the

Respondent, Ronald E. Rose, as the father of the minor
child, Lisa M. Ruff." Attendant to the petition was a
m o t i o n t o r e q u i r e Rose t o s u b m i t t o b l o o d t e s t s p u r s u a n t t o
s e c t i o n 40-6-112, MCA. An ex p a r t e o r d e r was i s s u e d by t h e
D i s t r i c t C o u r t r e q u i r i n g Rose t o show c a u s e why h e s h o u l d

not submit to a blood test. On F e b r u a r y 28, 1 9 8 0 , Rose

f i l e d an a n s w e r .

On March 11, 1 9 8 0 , Rose f i l e d a m o t i o n t o q u a s h t h e
o r d e r t o show c a u s e . The b a s i s f o r R o s e ' s m o t i o n was t h a t

submission to a blood test would violate various
constitutional rights including his right of privacy and
freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures. In

o p p o s i t i o n t h e p e t i t i o n e r s argued t h a t t h e reasonableness of
t h e i n t r u s i o n , coupled with t h e compelling s t a t e i n t e r e s t t o
determine parentage, authorizes the minimal invasion of
p r i v a c y involved i n o b t a i n i n g a blood sample.
 On A u g u s t 21, 1980, the D i s t r i c t Court entered its

order vacating the pretrial hearing originally set for

A u g u s t 20, 1 9 8 0 , and r e s e t i t f o r December 15, 1980. The

D i s t r i c t Court a d d i t i o n a l l y ordered t h a t t h e S t a t e ' s motion

compelling discovery be heard on September 19, 1980.

Subsequently, on O c t o b e r 9 , 1980, t h e D i s t r i c t Court issued

a n e x p a r t e o r d e r f o r b l o o d t e s t s , whereby Rose was o r d e r e d

to appear a t Columbus H o s p i t a l , Great Falls, Montana, on

October 21, 1980, t o submit t o a blood t e s t . After formally

asserting his right to refuse the test, Rose failed to

appear f o r t h e court-ordered blood t e s t .

On November 5 , 1 9 8 0 , t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t o r d e r e d Rose

t o show c a u s e why he s h o u l d n o t be h e l d i n c o n t e m p t o f c o u r t

f o r f a i l i n g t o t a k e t h e blood test. On November 28, 1980,

the District Court found Rose in contempt of court and

issued the following decree:

"1. T h a t R e s p o n d e n t , R o s e , be c o n f i n e d i n
t h e C a s c a d e County J a i l f o r a p e r i o d o f f i v e
days ;

"2. T h a t t h e e x e c u t i o n o f s a i d judgment o f
c o n t e m p t and o r d e r o f c o n f i n e m e n t i n t h e
Cascade County J a i l b e , and h e r e b y i s ,
stayed ;

" 3 . T h a t R e s p o n d e n t , R o s e , may p u r g e h i m s e l f
of s a i d contempt by complying w i t h t h e
Court's Order of October 9, 1980, by
s u b m i t t i n g t o t h e r e q u i r e d blood t e s t w i t h i n
f o u r t e e n d a y s from t h e d a t e h e r e o f ;

"4. That t h e Clerk of t h i s Court is d i r e c t e d
t o p r o v i d e n o t i c e of t h i s O r d e r by m a i l i n g a
t r u e copy t h e r e o f t o t h e R e s p o n d e n t , Rose."

On December 11, 1 9 8 0 , Rose f i l e d a c o m p l a i n t in the

United States District Court alleging civil rights

v i o l a t i o n s under 42 U.S.C. 1983, i n t h a t s e c t i o n 40-6-112,

MCA, violated his constitutional rights. Rose p r a y e d that

the court grant injunctive relief barring the State
District Court from ordering blood tests under section

40-6-112, MCA. On J a n u a r y 6 , 1 9 8 1 , t h e S t a t e f i l e d a m o t i o n
t o dismiss with supporting briefs. The F e d e r a l District

Court has not issued a temporary restraining order or
g r a n t e d any i n j u n c t i v e r e l i e f at this time, and t h e m o t i o n
t o d i s m i s s is p r e s e n t l y under advisement.

On o r a b o u t March 3 , 1 9 8 1 , Rose f i l e d w i t h t h i s C o u r t
an a p p l i c a t i o n f o r w r i t of c e r t i o r a r i o r o t h e r a p p r o p r i a t e
r e l i e f t o determine t h e m a t t e r s s e t f o r t h above.

On J u n e 27, 1 9 8 0 , p r i o r t o b e i n g h e l d i n c o n t e m p t by
the D i s t r i c t Court, p e t i t i o n e r f i l e d a p e t i t i o n f o r a w r i t
of supervisory control with t h i s Court. The p e t i t i o n was

denied on the ground that he had an adequate remedy by

appeal. This ruling contemplated that petitioner would
submit to the blood test and, in the assertion of

constitutional rights, e i t h e r move t o s u p p r e s s t h e r e s u l t s
prior t o an a d j u d i c a t i o n of p a t e r n i t y o r a p p e a l t h e f i n a l
judgment on the merits. This procedure would answer
petitioner's c o n t e n t i o n t h a t submission t o a blood t e s t is
an irretrievable forfeiture of constitutional rights;

however, it does not prevent a possible constitutional

violation i n the f i r s t instance.
Herzog v. R e i n h a r d t ( 1 9 6 5 ) , 2 A r i z . A p p . 1 0 3 , 406 P.2d
738, holds that citizens are protected from a r b i t r a r y

a c t i o n s of the t r i a l court. If fundamental c o n s t i t u t i o n a l
rights are violated i n t h e contempt p r o c e s s , t h e contempt
o r d e r c a n be a t t a c k e d c o l l a t e r a l l y a s v o i d , upon c e r t i o r a r i .
Also, in precluding an appeal from an adjudication of
contempt, section 3-1-523, MCA, provides that the only

method of review is a writ of certiorari. A writ of
certiorari w i l l i s s u e o n l y when a t r i a l c o u r t h a s e x c e e d e d

its jurisdiction. State v. District Court of Second

J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t ( 1 9 0 0 ) , 24 Mont. 4 9 4 , 62 P. 820; M a t t e r o f

Gr a v e l e y Mont .

The statute in question is section 40-6-112, MCA,

which is attacked in isolation from the balance of the

Uniform A c t and p r o v i d e s a s f o l l o w s :

" ( 1 ) The c o u r t may, and upon r e q u e s t o f a
a r t y s h a l l , r e q u i r e t h e c h i l d , mother o r
i l l e q e d f a t h e r t o submit t o blood t e s t s . The
tests s h a l l be p e r f o r m e d by a n e x p e r t
q u a l i f i e d a s an examiner of blood t y p e s ,
a p p o i n t e d by t h e c o u r t .

" ( 2 ) The c o u r t , upon r e a s o n a b l e r e q u e s t b y a
p a r t y , s h a l l o r d e r t h a t independent tests be
performed by o t h e r e x p e r t s q u a l i f i e d a s
examiners of blood t y p e s .

" ( 3 ) In a l l cases the court s h a l l determine
the number and qualifications of the
experts." (Emphasis added.)

I n Marshall v. Barlows, Inc., OSHA ( 1 9 7 8 ) , 436 U.S.

307, 98 S.Ct. 1816, 56 L.Ed.2d 305, the United States

Supreme C o u r t h e l d t h e s e a r c h and s e i z u r e p r o v i s i o n o f the

F o u r t h Amendment applicable to civil as well as criminal

investigations. The Court also held in Schmerber v.

C a l i f o r n i a ( 1 9 6 6 ) , 384 U.S. 757, 86 S . C t . 1 8 2 6 , 1 6 L.Ed.2d

"Cour t - o r d e r e d b l o o d t e s t s a r e u n d o u b t e d l y
'searches' within the meaning of the
constitution. The Fourth Amendment
p r o s c r i p t i o n , h o w e v e r , is d i r e c t e d o n l y t o
t h o s e s e a r c h e s which a r e u n r e a s o n a b l e . An
u n r e a s o n a b l e s e a r c h i s o n e u n j u s t i f i e d by t h e
circumstances o r c a r r i e d o u t i n an improper
m a n n e.r . -" . 3 8 4 U.S. a t 757. (Emphasis
-
supplied ) .
I n S t a t e v . Meacham ( 1 9 8 0 ) , 93 Wash.2d 738, 612 P.2d

795, precisely the same p o i n t s came b e f o r e t h e Washington
court as are presented in the case before us today. In that
case, which involved two separate cases consolidated for
appeal, the putative fathers were ordered to submit to the
withdrawal of a small amount of their blood for testing.
Each objected on constitutional grounds: (1) invasion of the
right of privacy; (2) the unlawful search and seizure; and
(3) interference with their freedom of religion.
With respect to privacy the Washington court said:
"The right to privacy, to be let alone, while
fundamental and personal in nature, is not
absolute. The State may reasonably regulate
this right to safeguard society or where it
otherwise has a compelling interest. Whalen
v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 97 S.Ct. 869, 51
L.Ed.2d 64 (1977).
"Here, the State has a compelling interest in
fixing the parentage of a minor child. The
test specified to be used is highly reliable.
No other evidence that is at all comparable
in effectiveness is available to the State.
The pain inflicted when blood is withdrawn by
an experienced technician is inconsequential.
And, any hazard to health is virtually
nonexistent." 612 P.2d 797.
With respect to the argument that the blood test was
an unreasonable search and seizure, the Washington court
said:
"In addition to the issue of privacy,
appellants challenge the order to submit to
blood withdrawal on grounds that it
constitutes an illegal search and seizure
under the Fourth Amendment. We reject that
contention out of hand.
"'Court-ordered blood tests are undoubtedly
"searches" within the meaning of the
constitution. The Fourth Amendment
proscription, however, is direct* only to
those searches which are unreasonable. A n
unreasonable search is one unjustified by t G
circumstances or carried out i n a n improper
manner. ' Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S.

"For example, in Schmerber, a blood sample
was taken over the objections of a criminal
defendant. An informed, deliberate decision
 was made t o o r d e r t h e t e s t . Because of t h e
S t a t e ' s i n t e r e s t i n d e t e r r i n g driving while
under t h e i n f l u e n c e of a l c o h o l and t h e
r e l a t i v e l y inoffensive nature of a properly
conducted blood t e s t , t h e t a k i n g of t h e
d e f e n d a n t ' s b l o o d i n t h e h o s p i t a l s e t t i n g was
n o t deemed t o be a n u n r e a s o n a b l e s e a r c h . "
Meacham, 612 P.2d a t 798.

However, the blood tests in Meacham were ordered

a f t e r a f u l l adversary hearing before the t r i a l court where

i t was d e t e r m i n e d t h a t a p r i m a f a c i e showing had b e e n made

to justify the order for blood tests. Here, attempts a t

d i s c o v e r y from p e t i t i o n e r h a v e b e e n met w i t h c o n s t i t u t i o n a l

objections a s t o h i s testimony. A d e p o s i t i o n of t h e mother

was taken before the second order which indicated sexual

a c t i v i t y with p e t i t i o n e r .

The Montana statute on blood tests in paternity

proceedings is found i n a s e c t i o n o f t h e Uniform P a r e n t a g e

Act, T i t l e 40, Montana Code A n n o t a t e d . The Act h a s been

a d o p t e d now i n most o f the states. The A c t a r i s e s b e c a u s e

o f t h e e f f o r t s of t h e f e d e r a l government t o r e c o v e r monies

paid for the support of dependent children where the

children are born out of wedlock or, as here, an absent

p a r e n t is n o t s u p p o r t i n g h i s c h i l d .

There is a s t r o n g s o c i e t a l r e a s o n f o r upholding such

a c t s which r i s e f r o m d e c i s i o n s o f t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s Supreme

C o u r t i n t h e 1970s t h a t i l l e g i t i m a t e c h i l d r e n were e n t i t l e d

to the same constitutional benefits and protections as

legitimate children. Out of this concept, only lately

developed, h a s come t h e d o c t r i n e t h a t a m o t h e r , e v e n t h o u g h

n o t wed, o r l i v i n g a p a r t from t h e f a t h e r , n e v e r t h e l e s s h a s a

r i g h t t o h a v e t h e b u r d e n o f s u p p o r t s h a r e d by t h e f a t h e r o f

the child. The C a l i f o r n i a c o u r t i n S a l a s v . C o r t e z , ( 1 9 7 9 ) ,

154 C a l . R p t r . 529, 593 P.2d 226, d e f i n e s t h e S t a t e i n t e r e s t
i n these cases as follows:

"The state's interest in determining
p a r e n t a g e h a s t r a d i t i o n a l l y been l i m i t e d t o
p r e v e n t i n g c h i l d r e n born o u t of wedlock from
becoming p u b l i c c h a r g e s ( s e e a n A c t f o r
S e t t i n g t h e Poor on Work ( 1 5 7 6 ) , 1 8 E l i z . 1,
Ch. 3 , S 2 , q u o t e d i n K r a u s e , s u p r a , a t p p .
105-106). The amendments t o f e d e r a l l a w
which g a v e r i s e t o t h e p r e s e n t c a s e s w e r e
b r o u g h t a b o u t by c o n c e r n s s i m i l a r t o t h o s e
t h a t i n s p i r e d t h e E l i z a b e t h a n Poor Laws--the
i n c r e a s i n g a p p e a r a n c e on t h e w e l f a r e r o l l s o f
c h i l d r e n born o u t of wedlock. ( S e e , Note
( 1 9 7 6 ) , 52 Wash.L.Rev. 1 6 9 , 1 7 0 . ) In recent
y e a r s n e a r l y h a l f of t h e f a m i l i e s r e c e i v i n g
AFDC h a v e had a t l e a s t o n e c h i l d b o r n o u t o f
wedlock. ( I d . a t 1 7 7 . ) Were t h e s t a t e a b l e
t o r e c o v e r from a b s e n t p a r e n t s e v e n a p o r t i o n
o f t h e f u n d s e x p e n d e d t h r o u g h t h e AFDC
p r o g r a m , t h e s a v i n g s would be s u b s t a n t i a l .
(See, Id. a t 172.)

" I t i s c l e a r l y w i t h i n t h e power o f t h e s t a t e
t o provide f o r t h e enforcement of t h e
parental duty t o support one's children. The
s t a t e may f u r t h e r l e g i t i m a t e l y p r o v i d e f o r
t h e e x p e n d i t u r e of p u b l i c f u n d s t o a s s i s t
custodial parents i n enforcing the support
o b l i g a t i o n s of a b s e n t p a r e n t s , whether o r n o t
the custodial parent is receiving public
assistance. Such e f f o r t s a r e a l a u d a b l e
attempt t o prevent custodial parents, the
overwhelming m a j o r i t y o f w h i c h a r e women,
from h a v i n g t o b e a r a l o n e t h e b u r d e n o f a
mutual d e c i s i o n t o engage i n s e x u a l r e l a t i o n s
. . ." 593 P.2d a t 233.

In Salas, the court held that an indigent putative

f a t h e r was e n t i t l e d t o c o u n s e l , s u p p l i e d a t t h e expense of

the state.

Although a number of c a s e s a r e now arising on the

problem of b l o o d t e s t s u n d e r t h e Uniform P a r e n t a g e A c t , no

court has set aside the statute requiring blood tests as

unconstitutional per se. The l e g a l significance of blood

tests is not that the results may possibly include the

a c c u s e d a s t h e f a t h e r , b u t t h a t s u c h r e s u l t s may p o s i t i v e l y

e x c l u d e him a s t h e f a t h e r . Thus, i t h a s been h e l d i n any

number of cases that a father has an absolute right to
demand a b l o o d t e s t o f t h e m o t h e r and c h i l d , e v e n t o g e t a

continuance if the child has not yet been born for the

reason that such test may positively exclude him as the

father. See People v. S t o e c k l (Mich. 1 9 5 6 ) , 78 N.W.2d 640.

Thus, the rights of the parties are reciprocal, and a

constitutional elimination of the statute would severely

l i m i t t h e r i g h t s of t h e p u t a t i v e f a t h e r .

To u n d e r s t a n d t h e p r o c e d u r e i n t h e Uniform P a r e n t a g e

Act, particularly with relation to blood tests, it is

necessary to realize the advances t h a t have b e e n made in

c o n n e c t i o n with blood t e s t s . For t h i s p u r p o s e , a r e a d i n g o f

Current S t a t u s of P a t e r n i t y Testinq, by Dr. Chang L i n g Lee,

9 F a m i l y Law Q u a r t e r l y 615 (1975), is instructive. The

a r t i c l e explains t h e v a r i o u s means o f testing for genetic

markers.

Under s e c t i o n 40-6-114(4), MCA, it is p r o v i d e d t h a t

if the scientific evidence resulting from a blood test

conclusively shows the defendant could not have been the

father, t h e a c t i o n s h a l l be d i s m i s s e d . I f , however, there

is a s t a t i s t i c a l chance t h a t he is t h e f a t h e r , the blood

tests, weighed in accordance with the evidence, are

admissible r e l a t i v e t o the paternity. S e c t i o n 40-6-113(3),

MCA .
I n t h e p r e s e n t c a s e i t is a p p a r e n t t h a t t h e s t a t u t o r y

p r o c e d u r e h a s n o t been followed. What s h o u l d o c c u r under

t h e Uniform P a r e n t a g e Act i s t h a t a f t e r t h e a c t i o n h a s b e e n

brought t o d e c l a r e t h e p a t e r n i t y of t h e c h i l d , an i n f o r m a l

hearing by way of pretrial proceedings should occur.

Section 40-6-111, MCA. A t the pretrial hearing, if any

p a r t y t o t h e a c t i o n r e f u s e s t o t e s t i f y under o a t h , t h e c o u r t
may order him to testify. If he refuses to testify, the
court has the power to grant him immunity from all criminal
liability on account of the testimony he is required to
produce (except for perjury). Section 40-6-111(2), MCA.
It is at the pretrial proceeding that the court may
order the blood tests. Section 40-6-112, MCA. At that
point, therefore, it is assured from the statutory scheme
that a prima facie case (the equivalent of probable cause in
a criminal proceeding) is established for the ordering of
the blood test. It is at the pretrial proceedings that the
evidence relating to paternity, including the blood tests,
are considered. Section 40-6-114, MCA. Thereafter, there
are pretrial recommendations to be made as set forth in
section 40-6-114(1), MCA. At that point, the court
considers whether or not the case should go on. The statute
says :
"On the basis of the information produced at
the pretrial hearing, the judge or referee
conducting the hearing shall evaluate the
probability of determining the existence or
nonexistence of the father and child
relationship in a trial and whether a
judicial declaration of the relationship
would be in the best interest of the child.
On the basis of the evaluation, an
appropriate recommendation for settlement
shall be made to the parties, which may
include any of the following: [options
omitted]." Section 40-6-114, MCA.
As our discussion has revealed, the mere conclusory
allegations by the movant in the petition are insufficient
to satisfy the "reasonableness" requirement of the Fourth
Amendment of the United States Constitution and Art. 11,
Section 11, 1972 Montana Constitution. Reasonableness can
only be established by an affirmative showing by the movant
that there exists a prima facie case against the putative
father. After t h i s , a b l o o d t e s t may be t a k e n . Therefore,

t h e Uniform P a r e n t a g e A c t , as it r e l a t e s t o t h i s s u b j e c t ,

m u s t be c o n s t r u e d a s a w h o l e , and we w i l l not consider an

attack upon an isolated section, i.e., section 40-6-112,

MCA, t o determine its c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y .

However, w e do c o n c l u d e t h a t t h e f a i l u r e t o f o l l o w

the s t a t u t o r y procedures t o e s t a b l i s h reasonableness p r i o r

t o t h e o r d e r i n g of t h e "search" r e n d e r s t h e ordered s e a r c h a

violation of the accused's F o u r t h Amendment rights to be

s e c u r e from " u n r e a s o n a b l e " s e a r c h and a l s o v i o l a t e s A r t . 11,

S e c t i o n 11, 1972 Montana C o n s t i t u t i o n .

The w r i t , a s p r a y e d f o r , s h a l l i s s u e :

1. The c o n t e m p t o r d e r of November 2 8 , 1 9 8 0 , by t h e

D i s t r i c t C o u r t i s h e r e b y v a c a t e d and s e t a s i d e .

2. The c a s e i s r e t u r n e d t o t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t w i t h

instructions to follow the procedure set forth in the

Uniform P a r e n t a g e A c t a s d i s c u s s e d h e r e i n . A s provided in

section 40-6-111, MCA, this will require an informal

p r e t r i a l proceeding before t h e c o u r t . I n t h e event a prima

f a c i e case i s made showing t h e d e f e n d a n t t o be a p o s s i b l e

father, then an o r d e r p r o p e r l y may be made requiring the

defendant to submit to the blood test. In the event

defendant refuses to testify, the court may grant him

immunity from a l l c r i m i n a l l i a b i l i t y and t h e r e a f t e r r e q u i r e

t h a t he t a k e t h e b l o o d t e s t .

3. A copy of t h i s o p i n i o n , when s e r v e d by t h e C l e r k

of t h i s C o u r t , s h a l l p e rf o r m t h e o f f i c e of a formal w r i t .

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Justice
W e concur:

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Chief J u s t i c e

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~ o n d r a b l eJames B. W h e e l i s .
i c t Judge, s i t t i n g i n
of Mr. J u s t i c e J o h n C .