The opinion of the Court was delivered by
Jeremiah Klinger, the plaintiff below, claimed the 10 acres of land in question by virtue of his warrant for 400 acres, bearing date 29th November 1824, interest from April 1799; a survey on the 26th February 1825 of 400 acres 42 perches, on which the deputy-surveyor returned : “ Improvements, small log-house and stable and eight acres of cleared land commenced about three years ago by Doctor John Rose, the son-in-law of Jeremiah Klinger, who requested that his improvements should be included in his father-in-law’s survey.” There was evidence that John Rose, Jun., moved on the place for which this ejectment was brought, in 1819, that he had commenced his improvement the year before, and continued in possession except a short period, and is still in possession. There is no evidence in the paper-book that Jeremiah Klinger ever had an actual settlement and improvement within the bounds of his survey. He perfected his title on the improvement of Rose. An improvement was necessary to support his warrant and survey, as the warrant was taken out in 1824 and called for interest from April 1799. On the 20th April 1829 Klinger obtained a patent.
Rose gave evidence that he had a wife and children on the land before the survey was made. He had therefore an actual resident settlement. He further proved by Lawrence Shamper that the witness got acquainted with Klinger about nine years ago. Klinger said he had a quarrel with Rose, and said Rose wanted a right
On this evidence the Court of Common Pleas instructed the jury that from the allegations of Rose the land in question was rented by the plaintiff to a man by the name of Merwine, as stated by the record of the proceedings before the Board of Property; and this is the first error assigned. In this case the proceedings of the Board of Property were not evidence against Rose. That was a contest between Rose and Bechtel. The law is well settled that facts stated by the Board of Property as proved before them, are not even prima, facie evidence of their truth. The law on this subject, correctly stated, will be found in the opinion of Gibson, J., in Carothers v. Dunning, (3 Serg. & Rawle 373). When a survey has been made which is supposed to be injurious to another claimant, he ought to file his caveat. Drinker v. Holliday, (2 Smith 255). In this case the caveat against Bechtel by Rose was proper; that caveat was filed before the survey made on Klinger’s warrant. There is nothing in that caveat inconsistent with the then title of Rose as it appeared on the trial. If the defendant Rose had read that caveat, the plaintiff might have read the decision of the Board of Property to show how it was disposed of; but even then the recital of facts proved before the board*would not have been evidence to affect Rose, unless those facts were proved in court on the trial.
It is further assigned for error that the court below instructed the jury that if Rose went on the land in question in his own right, intending to take it up as vacant and made his improvement, still he could not withhold the possession from Klinger without tendering to him the expenses of patenting the land; and in refusing to submit the fact to the jury whether Rose was to pay any part of the patenting fees. In this instruction, I think, there was error. The learned Judge forgot that unless there was an improvement the plaintiff’s warrant was void. By connecting his warrant with his son-in-law’s improvement, Klinger got 350 acres of land; and there is some evidence in the cause which ought to have been submitted to the jury that Rose was to get .50 acres clear of all expenses and costs. The jury would have understood this, as the practice of the interior of the State from 1795 down to a late period, was for men who discovered vacant land to place a settler upon it, and each to have a portion of the land so secured. Rose paid taxes for several years for 50 acres. This, although not evidence of title, was some evidence of the extent of his claim. In the case before the court the direction was wrong that the defendant could
Judgment reversed, and a venire de novo awarded.