—In an action for specific performance and to recover damages for fraud and misrepresentation, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Milano, J.), entered May 13, 1992, which granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.
Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.
This case involves a proposed sale of a business located at
The Supreme Court properly granted summary judgment to the defendant. The Statute of Frauds (General Obligations Law § 5-703 [2]) provides that a lease for more than one year is void unless the lease or some memorandum thereof is in writing subscribed by the party to be charged or a lawful agent with written authorization. To satisfy the Statute of Frauds, a memorandum evidencing a contract must state the entire agreement with such certainty that the substance thereof will appear from the writing alone (see, Tamir v Greenberg, 119 AD2d 665). The agreement must designate the parties, identify and describe the subject matter, and state all of the essential terms of a complete agreement (see, Aceste v Wiebusch, 74 AD2d 810). The April 29, 1988, memorandum does not contain all the essential terms of a commercial lease, such as a commencement date, a definite term, the monthly rent for the full term, or the identity of the parties. It is unclear whether the plaintiff and the defendant intended to enter into a new lease or whether the owner of the business intended to assign her lease to the plaintiff. Further, where there is an understanding that a more formal contract is to follow a memorandum, and essential terms have been omitted or left for future negotiations, the memorandum is insufficient to satisfy the Statute of Frauds (see, Tamir v Greenberg, supra; Sheehan v Culotta, 99 AD2d 544).
While there is no requirement that a contract for the sale of a business be in writing, the parties elected to execute a written memorandum. There is no evidence of an agreement