Roy v. Neibauer

No. 80-434
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
1981

ROB ROY, individually and as
guardian ad litem of HEATHER ROY,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

WALTER NEIBAUER,
Defendant and Respondent.

1 from: District Court of the Eighth Judicial District,
In and for the County of Cascade.
Honorable Joel G. Roth, Judge presiding.
Counsel of Record:
For Appellant:
Regnier and Lewis, Great Falls, Montana
For Respondent:
,
Jardine, Stephenson, Blewett and Weaver,
Great Falls, Montana
Thomas Boland, Great Falls, Montana

Submitted on briefs: December 30, 1980

oecided R 9-
B 1cJ81
Filed: ;, * :ggj

Clerk
Mr. Justice John Conway Harrison delivered the Opinion of
the Court.
This is an appeal from a summary judgment order entered
by the District Court of the Eighth Judicial District.
Plaintiff-appellant, individually and as guardian ad litem
of his daughter Heather, sued defendant-respondent Walter
Neibauer and defendant John Carlson for injuries received by
Heather in August 1978. After extensive discovery, respon-
dent Neibauer filed a motion for summary judgment. The
District Court ruled in favor of that motion. Appellant
filed a notice of appeal to this Court in September 1979.
Roy v. Neibauer (1980), - Mont. , 610 P.2d 1185, 37
St.Rep. 897. We dismissed the appeal without prejudice
because it was taken prematurely. Subsequently, appellant
dismissed all complaints against defendant John Carlson and
again appealed the order of the District Court.
Walter Neibauer purchased a duplex on August 19, 1978.
Two separate tenant families resided in the duplex pursuant
to a preexisting lease, the Rob Roy family and the John
Carlson family. The Carlsons owned a small cocker spaniel
dog, and their lease expressly allowed them to maintain the
dog on the premises.
On August 27, 1978, or eight days after Neibauer
acquired the duplex, the Carlson dog bit Heather Roy in the
front yard of the duplex on the Carlsons' lawn area. Rob

ROY, as guardian ad litem for his minor daughter, filed a
complaint against both the dog's owner and the owner of the
duplex.
Two issues are raised on this appeal:
1. What duty, if any, did Neibauer, as owner and
landlord of a duplex, owe to ROY, a tenant, for injuries
r e c e i v e d on t h e d u p l e x ' s f r o n t lawn from a dog owned and
h a r b o r e d by a n o t h e r t e n a n t , C a r l s o n , when Neibauer purchased

t h e duplex s u b j e c t t o t h e Carlson l e a s e allowing Carlson t o

have t h e dog, and when t h e dog i n j u r e d t h e Roy c h i l d b e f o r e

Neibauer c o u l d have l e g a l l y t a k e n any s t e p s t o remove t h e

dog from t h e p r e m i s e s o r t o o t h e r w i s e c o n t r o l t h e dog?

2. When a r e d e p o s i t i o n expenses properly taxed a s

c o s t s i n f a v o r of t h e p r e v a i l i n g p a r t y i n summary judgment

cases?

The D i s t r i c t C o u r t found t h a t s i n c e Montana l a w and t h e

C a r l s o n l e a s e r e q u i r e d Neibauer t o g i v e C a r l s o n a t l e a s t

f o u r t e e n d a y s t n o t i c e t o remove t h e dog, and s i n c e t h e dog

i n j u r e d t h e c h i l d only nine days a f t e r Neibauer's purchase,

r e s p o n d e n t , a s a m a t t e r of l a w , had no d u t y t o p r o t e c t Roy

from t h e dog s i n c e h e had no l e g a l remedy t o remove o r

c o n t r o l t h e dog.

I t i s a n e l e m e n t a r y p r i n c i p l e of l a w t h a t b e f o r e a

c l a i m f o r r e l i e f c a n be made a g a i n s t a d e f e n d a n t f o r n e g l i -

gence, t h e e x i s t e n c e of a d u t y by t h e d e f e n d a n t t o t h e

p l a i n t i f f must b e shown, a l o n g w i t h t h e b r e a c h of t h a t d u t y

and a r e s u l t i n g i n j u r y . Kakos v. Byram ( 1 9 3 0 ) , 88 Mont.

309, 292 P. 909; J a c k s o n v . William Dingwall Company (19651,

1 4 5 Mont. 127, 399 P.2d 236.

The e x i s t e n c e of a d u t y i s a m a t t e r of l a w t o b e d e t e r -

mined by t h e c o u r t and n o t t h e j u r y . Kakos, s u p r a . Here,

t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t d e c i d e d a s a m a t t e r of l a w t h a t t h e r e
e x i s t e d no d u t y from r e s p o n d e n t t o a p p e l l a n t s i n c e respon-

d e n t had no c o n t r o l o v e r t h e dog o r t h e r i g h t t o d i s p o s e of

t h e dog p r i o r t o t h e c h i l d ' s i n j u r y . W e agree. Since t h e r e

was no d u t y , t h e r e c o u l d be no n e g l i g e n c e , and a p p e l l a n t ' s
c l a i m a g a i n s t r e s p o n d e n t f a i l e d , r e g a r d l e s s of whether

r e s p o n d e n t had knowledge of any d a n g e r o u s p r o p e n s i t i e s o f

t h e dog.

Respondent Neibauer purchased t h e d u p l e x s u b j e c t t o a

preexisting lease. The l e a s e s p e c i f i c a l l y a l l o w e d C a r l s o n

t o own and h a r b o r a dog. The l e a s e f u r t h e r p r o v i d e d , i n a

p a r a g r a p h d e s i g n a t e d a s " N o t i c e of Change," t h a t r e s p o n d e n t

had t o p r o v i d e C a r l s o n w i t h t h i r t y d a y s ' n o t i c e i f respon-

d e n t i n t e n d e d t o change t h e t e r m s of t h e l e a s e . Respondent

c o u l d o n l y t e r m i n a t e t h e lease by p r o v i d i n g C a r l s o n t h i r t y

days' notice i n writing.

P u r s u a n t t o t h e l e a s e , C a r l s o n a g r e e d h e would n o t

m a i n t a i n o r p e r m i t t o be m a i n t a i n e d a n u i s a n c e on t h e

p r e m i s e s , s u c h a s a dog w i t h dangerous p r o p e n s i t i e s . I f it

was d e t e r m i n e d t h a t C a r l s o n ' s dog w a s a n u i s a n c e on t h e

p r o p e r t y , r e s p o n d e n t ' s o n l y remedy was t o p r o c e e d under t h e
d e f a u l t c l a u s e of t h e l e a s e which r e q u i r e d r e s p o n d e n t t o

g i v e C a r l s o n f i f t e e n d a y s ' n o t i c e of t h e d e f a u l t . More

i m p o r t a n t l y , b e f o r e r e s p o n d e n t c o u l d t e r m i n a t e h i s lease

w i t h C a r l s o n , h e was bound by s e c t i o n 70-24-422, MCA, which

states:

"Noncompliance of t e n a n t g e n e r a l l y -- l a n d l o r d ' s
r i g h t of t e r m i n a t i o n -- damaqes -- i n j u n c t i o n .
(1) ~ x z p a s p r o v i d e d i n t h i s c h a p t e r , i f
t
t h e r e i s a noncompliance by t h e t e n a n t w i t h t h e
r e n t a l agreement o r a noncompliance w i t h 70-24-
321 a f f e c t i n g h e a l t h and s a f e t y , t h e l a n d l o r d
may d e l i v e r a w r i t t e n n o t i c e t o t h e t e n a n t pur-
s u a n t t o 70-24-108 s p e c i f y i n g t h e a c t s and omis-
s i o n s c o n s t i t u t i n g t h e b r e a c h and t h a t t h e
r e n t a l agreement w i l l t e r m i n a t e upon a d a t e n o t
less t h a n 1 4 d a y s a f t e r r e c e i p t of t h e n o t i c e .
I f t h e b r e a c h i s n o t remedied w i t h i n t h a t t i m e ,
t h e r e n t a l agreement t e r m i n a t e s a s p r o v i d e d i n
the notice . . ."
Respondent d i d n o t p u r c h a s e t h e p r e m i s e s s u b j e c t t o

C a r l s o n ' s l e a s e and t h e e x i s t e n c e of t h e dog u n t i l August
19, 1978, eight days before the child was bitten. He had no
opportunity to remove the dog from the premises nor did he
have any control whatsoever over the manner in which Carlson
handled the dog. On these facts and the statute, the Dis-
trict Court correctly found that respondent had no duty to
appellant to prevent Carlson's dog from injuring Heather
Roy; therefore, judgment was properly entered against
appellant as a matter of law.

Appellant next raises the issue of when deposition
expenses are properly taxed as costs in favor of the pre-
vailing party.
Respondent's memorandum of costs and disbursements
included deposition expenses in the amount of $328. The
depositions in question included a deposition of Rob Roy at
a cost of $122, of Marney Roy at a cost of $98, of John
Carlson at a cost of $70, and of Marcia Carlson at a cost of
$38.75. Appellant claims that these depositions were merely
discovery devices used by respondent's attorney for investi-
gation and preparation and cannot now be properly taxed
against appellant. We disagree.
The District Court expressly relied on these "several
depositions" in determining that summary judgment should be
entered against appellant. The District Court made refer-
ence to the depositions in its memorandum decision. These

depositions were necessary for the disposing of this liti-
gation by way of summary judgment and are proper elements of
respondent's costs. Johnson v. Furgeson (1971), 158 Mont.
170, 489 P.2d 1032.
Affirmed.
We concur:

P d dMl
Chief ~ u s t i c e

Justices
4 .MA

This cause was submitted prior to January 5, 1981.