COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Coleman, Willis and Bumgardner
Argued at Richmond, Virginia
MAYNARD RUCKMAN, JR., S/K/A
MAYNARD F. RUCKMAN, JR.
OPINION BY
v. Record No. 2499-97-2 JUDGE SAM W. COLEMAN III
OCTOBER 20, 1998
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF AMELIA COUNTY
Thomas V. Warren, Judge
Robert E. Hawthorne, Jr. (Hawthorne &
Hawthorne, P.C., on brief), for appellant.
Jeffrey S. Shapiro, Assistant Attorney
General (Mark L. Earley, Attorney General, on
brief), for appellee.
Maynard F. Ruckman, Jr. was convicted in a bench trial for
obstruction of justice in violation of Code § 18.2-460(A). On
appeal, Ruckman contends the evidence is insufficient to prove
that he knowingly obstructed a law enforcement officer in the
performance of his duties. We agree and reverse the conviction.
Code § 18.2-460(A) provides, in pertinent part, that "[i]f
any person without just cause knowingly obstructs . . . any law
enforcement officer in the performance of his duties or refuses
without just cause to cease such obstruction when requested to do
so by such . . . law enforcement officer, he shall be guilty of a
Class 2 misdemeanor."
"To constitute an obstruction of an officer
in the performance of his duty, it is not
necessary that there be an actual or
technical assault upon the officer, but there
must be acts clearly indicating an intention
on the part of the accused to prevent the
officer from performing his duty, as to
'obstruct' ordinarily implies opposition or
resistance by direct action. . . . It means
to obstruct the officer himself not merely to
oppose or impede the process with which the
officer is armed." . . . [T]here is a broad
distinction between avoidance and resistance
or opposition.
Jones v. Commonwealth, 141 Va. 471, 478-79, 126 S.E. 74, 77
(1925) (citation omitted). As the Supreme Court has held, and as
the plain language of the statute states, obstruction of justice
does not occur when a person fails to cooperate fully with an
officer or when the person's conduct merely renders the officer's
task more difficult but does not impede or prevent the officer
from performing that task. For example, an accused's hiding or
seeking "to escape [an] officer by merely running away [is] not
such an obstruction as the law contemplates." Jones, 141 Va. at
478, 126 S.E. at 76.
Viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, see
Derr v. Commonwealth, 242 Va. 413, 424, 410 S.E.2d 662, 668
(1991), the evidence established that on October 20, 1996,
Virginia State Police Trooper J.R. White responded to the scene
of an automobile accident involving a truck in which Ruckman and
another man, James Marlin, were riding. When interviewed by
Trooper White, Ruckman stated that he "felt he was too
intoxicated to drive . . . and that the other gentleman was
driving." In a second interview in April 1997, Ruckman again
told the officer that he was not driving the truck. But, in a
third interview in June 1997, Ruckman told Trooper White that he
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could not remember who was driving the truck but that he was too
intoxicated to have been driving.
Trooper White charged Ruckman with obstructing a law
enforcement officer in the performance of his duty based upon the
fact that White claimed he could not complete an accident report
to the Division of Motor Vehicles without further information as
to who was operating the truck. Based on Trooper White's
evidence concerning the variation in Ruckman's accounts, the
trial court found that Ruckman "knowingly impeded [Trooper White]
in the performance of his duty" to investigate the traffic
accident and convicted Ruckman of obstruction of a law
enforcement officer in violation of Code § 18.2-460(A).
The evidence is insufficient to support the conviction
because it failed to prove that Ruckman "obstruct[ed]" White's
investigation of the accident. No proof was offered that Ruckman
opposed or resisted Trooper White's investigation of the accident
or White's attempt to file his report with the Division of Motor
Vehicles. Trooper White was fully able to investigate the single
vehicle accident. On at least three occasions, he questioned
witnesses and gathered facts about the accident. The fact that
during the third interview Ruckman stated that he could no longer
remember who was driving the truck did not oppose or impede the
trooper from performing the investigation. Ruckman did not
oppose or impede Trooper White's efforts to locate or interview
witnesses. Rather, in the course of his investigation, the
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trooper received what he may have considered conflicting
statements from Ruckman as to whether Ruckman could remember who
was driving the truck. Cf. Hudson v. State, 218 S.E.2d 905,
907-08 (Ga. Ct. App. 1975) (defendant attempted to mislead police
officers by falsely stating that suspect was in another city and
was not present in defendant's home). Although Ruckman's
apparently conflicting statements may have frustrated Trooper
White's investigation, the statements did not oppose, impede, or
resist White's efforts to conduct an investigation. Therefore,
Ruckman did not "obstruct" Trooper White in the performance of
his duties as contemplated by Code § 18.2-460(A).
Accordingly, we reverse the conviction and dismiss the
charge.
Reversed and dismissed.
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