Ruiz-Casillas v. Camacho-Morales

United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit

No. 04-1793

NEREIDA RUIZ-CASILLAS,

Plaintiff, Appellant,

v.

LUIS A. CAMACHO-MORALES, in his official capacity as Federal
Programs Director of the Municipality of Humacao; JANE DOE;
conjugal partnership CAMACHO-DOE; MARCELO TRUJILLO-PANISSE,
in his official capacity as Mayor of the Municipality of
Humacao; JANE DOE; conjugal partnership TRUJILLO-DOE,

Defendants, Appellees.

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO

[Hon. José Antonio Fusté, U.S. District Judge]

Before

Boudin, Chief Judge,
Torruella and Lynch, Circuit Judges.

Marie Elsie López-Adames, on brief, for appellant.
Jorge Martínez-Luciano, with whom Gina Ismalia Gutiérrez-
Galang, Law Offices of Pedro Ortiz-Álvarez, and Michael C. McCall,
Civil Rights Legal Task Force, on brief, for appellees.
-

June 30, 2005
 TORRUELLA, Circuit Judge. Plaintiff-appellant Nereida

Ruiz-Casillas appeals the summary judgment entered in favor of

defendants-appellees Mayor and Federal Programs Director of the

Municipality of Humacao for claims of political discrimination

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Specifically, Ruiz contests the district

court's finding that she occupied a policymaking trust position,

thereby foreclosing her First and Fourteenth Amendment claims given

the party affiliation requirement. Appellant also argues that,

despite her dismissed causes of action, the district court erred in

failing to address defendants' qualified immunity defense. After

careful review, we affirm.

I. Background

Ruiz, an employee of the Municipality of Humacao, Puerto

Rico and a member of the Popular Democratic Party (PDP), has served

as Administrative Director of the Federal Programs Division of

Humacao since 1985. Although her appointment as Administrative

Director was initially transitory, the position was made permanent

by virtue of a 1991 ordinance.1

In January 2001, defendant-appellee Marcelo Trujillo-

Panisse became the Mayor of Humacao and, as such, took

responsibility for establishing the municipality's public policy,

1
The "Programmatic" Director position was held by Zaida Pérez
from 1985 until 1996, when Pérez departed. This position remained
vacant until 2001, making Ruiz the de facto Director in the interim
period.

-2-
organization, and personnel regulation. Trujillo appointed

defendant-appellee Luis Camacho-Morales as Director of the

Municipality's Federal Programs Division that same year. Like

Ruiz, both Trujillo and Camacho are members of the PDP.

Ruiz alleges that after defendants' assumption of power,

they harassed and discriminated against her by, inter alia,

stripping her of the job's functions and duties, denying her access

to a phone line, telling other employees not to speak with her, and

acting aggressively towards her. These actions were allegedly

spurred by Ruiz's political beliefs, specifically, her support for

the previous mayor and administration, who were affiliated with the

rival New Progressive Party (NPP).

On November 6, 2002, Ruiz filed a complaint in the

federal district court for the District of Puerto Rico, which she

amended on February 10, 2003 to add First and Fourteenth Amendment

claims under § 1983. Defendants moved for summary judgment on

September 11, 2003, arguing, inter alia, that the claim was barred

by the statute of limitations defense, that Ruiz had failed to

establish a prima facie case, and that they had qualified immunity.

On April 27, 2004, the district court granted defendants'

summary judgment motion and dismissed Ruiz's claims. Ruiz-Casillas

v. Camacho-Morales, No. 02-2640 (D.P.R. Apr. 27, 2004). The court

reviewed the record properly before it to find that the nature of

Ruiz's tasks and her position's close involvement with high-level

-3-
policymakers indicated that she was a policymaking trust employee,

for whom party affiliation was an appropriate employment

requirement. Id. at 13-23. The court also found that Ruiz's

Fourteenth Amendment claim faltered because as a trust employee,

she had no cognizable property interest in her trust employment for

a due process claim, id. at 23-24, and her equal protection claim

merely restated her failed First Amendment claim, id. at 24-25.

Having dismissed all causes of action, the court declined to

address the qualified immunity defense. Id. This appeal follows.

II. Analysis

A. First Amendment

Ruiz first argues that the district court erred in

finding that she had occupied a "political" position, and thus

lacked a colorable First Amendment claim for political

discrimination on the basis of party affiliation. We are not

convinced.

Summary judgment entries are reviewed de novo, viewing

all facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and

granting all reasonable inferences in that party's favor. See,

e.g., Torres v. E.I. Dupont De Nemours & Co., 219 F.3d 13, 18 (1st

Cir. 2000). Such judgments are upheld "if the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,

together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine

issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled

-4-
to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Summary

judgments will also be upheld "if the nonmoving party rests merely

upon conclusory allegations, improbable inferences, and unsupported

speculation," Medina-Muñoz v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 896 F.2d

5, 8 (1st Cir. 1990). Finally, our inquiry as to whether a

government position is "political," though fact intensive, presents

a question of law requiring a de novo assessment of all relevant

evidence. Ortiz-Piñero v. Rivera-Arroyo, 84 F.3d 7, 12 (1st Cir.

1996).

In political discrimination cases, plaintiffs must first

establish that party affiliation was a substantial or motivating

factor behind the adverse employment action. See Mt. Healthy City

Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977).

Defendants then carry the burden to establish either a

nondiscriminatory reason for the challenged action, see id. at 287,

or that plaintiff held a "political position," for which party

affiliation constitutes "an appropriate requirement for the

effective performance of the public office involved," Branti v.

Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 518 (1980). See Ortiz-Piñero, 84 F.3d at 12.

Unlike non-policymaking career positions, "political positions" are

terminable without cause when political affiliation is an

appropriate requirement for the position. See, e.g., Elrod v.

Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 362-63 (1976); Galloza v. Foy, 389 F.3d 26,

28-29 (1st Cir. 2004). This rule ensures that "representative

-5-
government [will] not be undercut by tactics obstructing the

implementation of policies of the new administration, policies

presumably sanctioned by the electorate." Elrod, 427 U.S. at 367.

In determining whether a position is "political," we

engage in a two-step inquiry: (1) whether the governmental unit

decides "issues where there is room for political disagreement on

goals or their implementation," and (2) whether the position's

responsibilities "resemble[] [those of] a policymaker, a privy to

confidential information, a communicator, or some other office

holder whose function is such that party affiliation is an equally

appropriate requirement." Jiménez Fuentes v. Torres Gaztambide,

807 F.2d 236, 241-42 (1st Cir. 1986) (en banc); see also Galloza,

389 F.3d at 29-30; Duriex-Gauthier v. López-Nieves, 274 F.3d 4, 9

(1st Cir. 2001).

In determining the second prong, we examine the

position's "inherent attributes," for which the job description is

the most useful starting point. Galloza, 389 F.3d at 31. Job

descriptions that are broad or open ended -- given the employee's

latitude to exercise discretionary judgment -- generally indicate

a policymaking position, while job descriptions that are narrowly

circumscribed inhibit freedom of action and generally indicate a

non-policymaking position. Id. The job title, however, is not

necessarily dispositive in the inquiry, Duriex-Gauthier, 274 F.3d

at 8. Instead, we examine other indicia including "relative pay,

-6-
technical competence, power to control others, authority to speak

in the name of policymakers, public perception, influence on

programs, contact with elected officials, . . . responsiveness to

partisan politics and political leaders . . . [and]

responsibilities that are not well defined or are of broad scope."

Jiménez Fuentes, 807 F.2d at 242 (internal quotation marks

omitted).

Before delving into our inquiry, we note that appellant

has submitted voluminous documents to this court that were never

introduced, or were never properly introduced,2 before the district

court. Our inquiry, therefore, is limited to the record properly

before the court. See Fed. R. App. P. 10(a).

The resolution of the instant case revolves around the

second prong described above, as "the OFP [Office of Federal

Programs] unmistakably is a municipal department or agency whose

overall functions involve decision making on issues where there is

room for political disagreement on goals or their implementation."

Ortiz-Piñero, 84 F.3d at 12-13 (internal quotation marks omitted).

Our examination of the second prong -- for which the job

description3 is the most useful starting point -- indicates that

2
The district court declined to consider one document submitted
by defendants which failed to comply with the requirements of 48
U.S.C. § 864 (2000 & Supp. 2003).
3
Although neither party submitted a proper job description before
the district court (defendants submitted an untranslated copy of
Ruiz's job description which was not considered), defendants

-7-
appellant's responsibilities resemble those of a policymaker. Her

duties are broad and open-ended: "[a]ny matter for the mayor

referred to [her] regarding the [federal] programs." Docket

Document No. 52. Moreover, Ruiz remained in continuous contact

with the Mayor and the Director regarding the progress of projects,

attended meetings, seminars, Housing and Development (HUD)

orientation, and accomplished various tasks which demonstrate

"technical competence, power to control others, authority to speak

in the name of policymakers, . . . influence on programs, [and]

contact with elected officials."4 Jiménez Fuentes, 807 F.2d at

242. Furthermore, Ruiz's "relative pay," another factor we

consider, see id., is only $100 less than the monthly salary of

Director Camacho, whose position is indisputably a "political"

trust position. We also note that when Camacho left the director

office on October 9, 2001, Ruiz assumed the de facto position of

director, assuming duties including the supervision of employees.5

submitted certified translations of Ruiz's deposition discussing
her job description, which forms the basis of our inquiry. This
deposition testimony merely recites the duties in Ruiz's official,
written job description (Form OP-16).
4
After Camacho assumed the Director position, Ruiz admits to,
inter alia, participating in the preparation of a HUD monitoring
report, reviewing professional services contracts, attending
meetings with auditors to discuss audit reports, sending a memo to
Camacho regarding the dress code, reviewing contracts regarding the
building facilities, and drafting communication directing employees
to take ethics seminars. Ruiz Casillas, No. 02-2640 at 19-20.
5
It also appears that Ruiz occupied the de facto director
position from 1996 until 2001, when the Director position was

-8-
Given Ruiz's broad-based responsibilities,6 as well as her close-

working relationships with policymakers, we find that she occupied

a "political" trust position, for which party affiliation is a

requirement, see Jiménez Fuentes, 807 F.2d at 240.

Appellant nonetheless attempts to salvage her claim by

arguing that the Administrative Director position was labeled as a

"career" position by a 1991 municipal ordinance. While such

designation might be entitled to some deference by this court,

"[w]e have consistently held that the job description is the best,

and sometimes dispositive, source for determining the inherent

functions of the position." Duriex-Gauthier, 274 F.3d at 8. This

is the case here, where an examination of Ruiz's job description

strongly indicates that she occupied a policymaking trust

position.7

Appellant also alleges that the district court erred in

relying on her deposition testimony relating to tasks she performed

as Director and Administrative Director. The deposition testimony

analyzed by the district court, however, merely recites the duties

unoccupied.
6
Although the record indicates that Ruiz also performed more
specific tasks, such as answering mail and phone calls, we find
that her overall job description accords more closely to a
policymaking position.
7
Furthermore, the "Programmatic" Director position, like the
Administrative Director position, is likewise labeled as "career,"
further indicating the gap between position labels and actual job
functions.

-9-
in appellant's official, written job description (Form OP-16). We

therefore find no error in the district court's reliance on the

deposition testimony.

Since appellant's Administrative Director position

resembles that of a policymaking trust employee -- for which party

affiliation is an appropriate requirement -- her First Amendment

claim necessarily founders. Thus, we affirm the district court's

entry of summary judgment on her First Amendment claim.

B. Fourteenth Amendment

Appellant further argues that even if she had performed

certain policymaking duties, this did not extinguish her "career"

position and the due process "property rights" attached thereunder.

This argument also fails.

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment

protects government employees who possess property interests in

continued public employment. See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v.

Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 541 (1985); Galloza, 389 F.3d at 33. To

determine whether public employees possess such a property right,

we examine the local law and the terms and conditions of the

employment arrangement. See id.; Ortiz-Piñero, 84 F.3d at 17.

Under Puerto Rico law, public employees are categorized into either

career or trust/confidential positions. 3 P.R. Laws Ann. § 1349.

Trust or confidential employees "intervene or collaborate

substantially in the formation of the public policy, [and] . . .

-10-
advise directly or render direct services to the head of the agency

. . . ." Id. § 1350. Unlike career employees, who are removable

only for cause, trust employees are of "free selection and

removal." Id. Thus, "trust [employees] do[] not have a

constitutionally protected property interest in that position."

Galloza, 389 F.3d at 34.

In any event, whether or not appellant's downgrading of

duties would constitute adverse action for purposes of the First

Amendment, Ruiz was not fired, and "[u]nder Puerto Rico law, public

employees have a property interest in their continued employment,

not in the functions they perform." Rosado de Vélez v. Zayas, 328

F. Supp. 2d 202, 212 (D.P.R. 2004) (citing Consejo de Educación de

la U.P.R. v. Roselló, 137 D.P.R. 83, 110 (1994)). The equal

protection claim also founders, as it is a mere restatement of

appellant's failed First Amendment claim. See, e.g., Néstor Colón

Medina & Sucesores, Inc. v. Custodio, 964 F.2d 32, 45 (1st Cir.

1992) (finding "little basis or justification for applying equal

protection analysis" where Equal Protection claim overlapped with

failed First Amendment claim). We therefore affirm on this issue.

C. Qualified Immunity

The failure of appellant's constitutional claims obviates

our need to address the qualified immunity defense: we have found

no constitutional violation. See Suboh v. Dist. Attorney's Office,

298 F.3d 81, 90 (1st Cir. 2002) (citing Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S.

-11-
730 (2002); Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001); Siegert v.

Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 232 (1991)) ("The threshold inquiry [in

determining whether an official is entitled to qualified immunity]

is whether the plaintiff's allegations, if true, establish a

constitutional violation."). The district court's judgment is

affirmed.

Affirmed.

-12-