Ruiz-Sulsona v. University of Puerto Rico

United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit

No. 02-1608

WILSON RUIZ-SULSONA,

Plaintiff, Appellant,

v.

UNIVERSITY OF PUERTO RICO, ET AL.,

Defendants, Appellees.

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO

[Hon. Jay A. García-Gregory, U.S. District Judge]

Before

Torruella, Circuit Judge,

Coffin, Senior Circuit Judge,

and Selya, Circuit Judge.

Israel Roldán-González, for appellant.
Raquel M. Dulzaides, with whom Carlos George, Sonia B. Alfaro-
de la Vega, and Jiménez Graffam & Lausell, were on brief, for
appellees.

July 3, 2003
 TORRUELLA, Circuit Judge. Plaintiff-Appellant, Wilson

Ruiz-Sulsona ("Ruiz"), appeals from the dismissal of his political

discrimination suit against the University of Puerto Rico and

several members of its faculty. The district court found that his

claims were time barred and lacked sufficient evidence. After

careful review, we affirm with additional clarification.

I. Background

The University of Puerto Rico, Aguadilla Campus

("University"), hired Ruiz to serve as a professor on a part-time

basis beginning in August, 1995. After Ruiz had worked at the

University for almost two years, the University did not renew his

service contract for the 1997-1998 school year. In May and June

1997, Ruiz applied for a probationary professor position at the

University. The University did not hire Ruiz to fill any position.

Ruiz then filed suit against five faculty members of the

Department of Business Administration who served on the

Department's Personnel Committee (the "Department") and the

University, claiming that Defendants1 did not renew his teaching

contract because he is a member of Puerto Rico's New Progressive

Party (NPP). In addition to asserting claims under the laws and

constitution of Puerto Rico, Ruiz filed a § 1983 action, alleging

1
Defendants include the University of Puerto Rico, Diana Ruiz
Gómez, Pedro N. González, Luis Crespo-Bello, Fernando Neris-Flores,
and Miguel González Valentín. Crespo-Bello was the Director of the
Department until he retired in 1996; he was succeeded by Diana Ruiz
Gómez ("Defendants").

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violations of his rights under the First, Fifth, and Fourteenth

Amendments. The district court dismissed the case, adopting the

magistrate judge's report and recommendation, which found that

summary judgment should be granted in favor of Defendants because

Ruiz's claims were barred by the applicable statute of limitations

and because Ruiz lacked trial-worthy evidence. Ruiz appeals.

II. Standard of Review

We review summary judgment decisions de novo, construing

the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.

Kauch v. Dep't for Children, Youth & Their Families, 321 F.3d 1, 3-

4 (1st Cir. 2003). Summary judgment is appropriate where there is

no "genuine issue as to any material fact." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56.

III. Discussion

A. Section 1983 Claims

The district court found that Ruiz's § 1983 claims were

time barred. In cases brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, we

apply the forum state's statute of limitations period for personal

injury actions, which in Puerto Rico is one year. Rivera-Muriente

v. Agosto-Alicea, 959 F.2d 349, 353 (1st Cir. 1992). We then apply

federal law to determine when the limitations period begins to

accrue. Id. In most instances, the date of accrual occurs "when

the plaintiff knows, or has reason to know, of the injury on which

the action is based." Id. In wrongful discharge suits, such as

the case before us, "the statute of limitations begins to run when

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the plaintiff learns of the decision to terminate his employment."

Id. To qualify as the accrual date, it is only necessary that "the

employee reliably knew he had lost his job, not the date when the

employer dotted a particular 'i' or crossed a particular 't.'" Id.

As he admitted in his deposition, Ruiz learned that the

University would not renew his contract in May of 1997. However,

Ruiz did not file his complaint until June of 1998, a date falling

outside the one-year statute of limitations period. Ruiz contends,

however, that the accrual period properly begins in August, 1997

because, although he knew in May, 1997 that his earlier contract

would not be renewed, he had a reasonable expectancy of being re-

hired or of being appointed to a new position until he met with

Dean Segarra de Jaramillo in August, 1997. It was at the August,

1997 meeting that Dean Segarra de Jaramillo made it clear to Ruiz

that the University would not hire him for any teaching position.

We reject Ruiz's position. As the Supreme Court

explained, "[d]iscrete acts such as termination, failure to

promote, denial of transfer, or refusal to hire are easy to

identify. Each incident of discrimination and each retaliatory

adverse employment decision constitutes a separate actionable

'unlawful employment practice.'" AMTRAK v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101,

114 (2002). "[D]iscrete discriminatory acts are not actionable if

time barred, even when they are related to acts alleged in timely

filed charges." Campbell v. BankBoston, N.A., 327 F.3d 1, 26 (1st

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Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). The Supreme Court has distinguished

between claims involving discrete incidents of discrimination and

retaliation from hostile work environment claims. Morgan, 536 U.S.

at 110-116. "[H]ostile work environment claims do not turn on

single acts but on an aggregation of hostile acts extending over a

period of time." Marrero v. Goya of P.R., Inc., 304 F.3d 7, 18

(1st Cir. 2002). Consequently, the statute of limitations "will

not exclude acts that are part of the same unlawful employment

practice if at least one act falls within the time period."

Dressler v. Daniel, 315 F.3d 75, 79 (1st Cir. 2003). In contrast,

acts such as those alleged by Ruiz -- failure to renew his contract

and failure to hire him for a new position -- constitute discrete

acts, for which claims must be filed within the time period.

Rivera v. P.R. Aqueduct and Sewers Auth., No. 02-1349, 2003 U.S.

App. LEXIS 11459, *11 (1st Cir. 2003).

The non-renewal of Ruiz's teaching contract in May, 1997

constituted a discrete incident of alleged discrimination, and Ruiz

had an obligation to file within the appropriate time period.

While in an appropriate case we have the ability to toll the time

period by applying an equitable doctrine, Morgan, 536 U.S. at 122,

we decline to do so because applying the statute of limitations

creates no injustice to Ruiz. Ruiz claims that he knew all along

that he was being discriminated against for his political beliefs.

When he realized that his temporary contract would not be renewed,

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he had an obligation to file his claim. For us to decide otherwise

would allow a plaintiff to extend the statute of limitations merely

by applying for additional positions, even though the employer has

clearly terminated his employment.

The University's refusal to hire Ruiz for a new position

that Ruiz applied for in June, 1997 would qualify as a discrete act

of alleged discrimination falling inside the filing period.

However, Ruiz has not brought a claim for denial of a new position.

Ruiz's complaint focuses on how Defendants' actions resulted in the

non-renewal of his work contract. The first mention of his May and

June, 1997 applications for new positions is found in Plaintiff's

Motion in Opposition to Summary Judgment. Because there are no

circumstances present that warrant departure from the general rule

that arguments "not seasonably advanced below" are lost, we find

that Ruiz has waived an independent claim for denial of additional

positions. Clauson v. Smith, 823 F.2d 660, 666 (1st Cir. 1987)

(explaining that the prudential basis for not considering new

theories on appeal lies in fairness; plaintiff should not be able

to idle and then produce arguments that the defendant had no cause

to rebut and the district judge had no cause to examine).

Consequently, we find that the district court properly dismissed

Ruiz's § 1983 claims as untimely.2

2
Because we affirm based on Ruiz's failure to file within the
statute of limitations, we need not reach Ruiz's sufficiency of the
evidence claim.

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 B. Pendent State Claims

We find that the district court was well within its

discretion in refusing supplemental jurisdiction over the state law

claims. As a general rule, where the district court dismisses the

federal claims before trial, the court should dismiss the state law

claims without prejudice. Rodríguez v. Doral Mortgage Corp., 57

F.3d 1168, 1177 (1st Cir. 1995).

IV. Conclusion

For the reasons explained above, we affirm the judgment

of the district court.

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