RUST, the present appellant, filed his bill against La-rue, the appellee, for the purpose of redeeming some slaves and other articles held by Larue as a pledge. The court belovy sustained the claim of pedemptipn, and on an appeal to-this cour.g the same righqfc was sustained; hut the cause was reversed for some errors imthc details
-, H^rd.in-.,a,nsv^(^(k admitlin^i.!t>'he”iV Rractto Laru.e, and-denying that he.eyei’.© pursu^- the cause' through this ¡court, inu<¡4in» '•had pever^attempted to practise, arid aV-ei;S;tt|| .dertakipg was confined to .tl^e court, hel'q^ there he. had wholly conducted ,,t>he^,cause',v,^!S tendted his services to taking de^ition's.,; not within the purview of his-duty-as. c©tu^ li,di-tor -in the cause, - until the whole prewar was completed. lie denies that - be hv.fr ábf-jíd the oause,- and alleges that the only colour ,to*¡s®$h allegation was, that Rust was imprudent- i-riHjt ‘about the suit during its pend'énc$‘ and h.ejwaá that^as the; case rested much Qn parol testifnorfy,, wiquld, hy his idle talk, destroy the suit, as. .aware that, the opposing party .was watphipg; the^t vefsatlon,of Rust, to obtain from hirmsome leobf^sljc aud-ito prevent this, he had threatened- Rusty-if naiuMiit his chattering about -the caas.% -bey'ja^ abandon it; but never did sp, uá he-j " . menace Jp resi-rah'' Rust and for his benefit. drlé*6$|é|¡| that he met with Rust in Frankfort,¡^^rin'g .a rt this court, at the term when the Gcjfus'ehwas that Rust proposed his staying for the ¿purpose-ing the cause,Imd that he refused td do-ft;‘mrhfadii^ Rust that his contract did not compel him to-.cro- so,*, aaP* that his official diíties in coh^r-ess then* Required -li¥s|ap «t-e-ntlon there, so that be could n.of, and. did'not, ptf#.* He-ndmits his absence when the caus-e was fksb t pilftait in the court below; but avers that tbe cause -was fuj%i prepared-, and that he had engaged Charles. A. TOi^SrJ liffe, Esq. a professional gentleman of ■acknowledig'&oh talents, tongue the cause in his stead; but Mr./W'ihkr liffe was prevented from attending that co.urt by sickness; that afterwards, discovering t-hat Rust had-employed other counsel, he immediately took-up.and discharged the note for forty dollars, given as a fee, and offered to pay Rust the remaining ten, which had been paid; but Rust refused to receive it. He exhibits this note in court, and alst> the ten dollars^ to be delivered to'Rust. He avers tJi^j|Rust brought to him the opinion of the appellate c*o$Tt, which.he had caused to be |^¡r '"
, híffie-court1 bélovHirst decreed to Rust two-th,irds of tke-lflaves, and to pay the two-thirds of the mortgage ¡pghey due, and retained the cause, as to the remaining third, to abide the contest now raised between Hardin, Rjijsst and Larue; and finally,-on the hearing of that cdfSfiqversy, decreed in favor of Larue, that he should rfjdspp» the remaining; third in discharge of the contract From this decree Rust has
'** - It is now contended for the appellant, that after-the, ca-.o|>éehad progressed through this court, .and a decree, ■vJt&sfherie directed in the court below, the aftitudelpf-the}pities- could not'be’altered, and that it was in.com¡M^nl-foiyLarue to introduce or set up any claim which. prevent him from restoring the slaves.,
a;bill ofreview will lie to a decree directed ,.thís-coürt; it |s unnecessary now to enquire, as the answer of Larue, filed after the return of .the cause from tps’court, does not seek to review or change the de-CTee^o-'Rfoa-t Larue could not set up an$jpñaim calcula-, feá to defiSit the decree against him in whole or impart, Which he might-have set ufi before tlfkfinal hearing, is readily admitted; but his answer now under consideration is not of this character. It yields to the principles, of-the decree as settled by this court, and is -in affirmance-of them, and claims the one-third- as a purchaser o'fthe benefit of it. Although this answer is styled by the’writer, an amended answer, yet it is not®éntitíed to. that name. It is purely supplemental, and alleges facts which have occurred since the decree, and shows that according to the principles of the decree, by subsequent events, he is entitled to one third, Suppose that Larue had purchased out the whole decree from Rust himself, or had by operation of law become entitled to the slaves, ■ could it be contended that Rust must still go on and obi tain the decree, and take frorn|?|,j,m the estate? We aonceive not; and we perceive nmf'mproprjety, accord-
'‘'dt-'i^fuíbftérHirged'on the'paid ofthe a’p'péllanqytiíiit xs'gntirfhotís and' u nc o'ns c i e nti o u s, ffñd fti'drawe o'pglit hbj¡; te be^éüfolded hy the chance Hot., d|,oJthfeHv'e 'adáWrbr,‘1;K'hf the prospect of success' was verj^doubtful,' •dfíd. so proved i fit he end, and tiidt ií-á|&í rltkbd all’his sdiVic'eMh’ á doübtful cause', whith tBj''fé*maine d so lbfig ih rlj'ritest, a,s to idse ifitich an vipKíefShd ,#é-ea‘flñot ’ '0¡¡$‘{£& tíSe‘diS¡iagénisation"%ás wholly contingent1,'that it is too’ enormous'tó p'reéru.de ‘the aid'bf'a ctfá’ftceííor.
■'% -fe ’fitihily cbhtetrd'ed, that tlikdoatratt-' w’ás'Tna'de IfcftWhjskptirtids sending in lh%*?elatictí of .coaáSjSre^nd ■flight,'‘ádd4htt -obé madd^h rtxdh ákthtiiihd'fe ¿f* ccfeh-di^ñí$,ítóf£^'dt feé süp'p'oríedf l!tita,'írijé’,<'*'s^’ch á#e'vWwfetl with ?f very jealous eye b^y tlreNdWttcél'lor, alfdhhán'j' sikh'li&'vé'bekd é'étfMíM, '^¿♦'feorftf^l'boaí-p¿á¥ed: té’ áfcdqpt' a heaséndílfe cdmjyensáfíofs-'íhT't herir ’s^^tfees. "-Mdfel 'oftbe“!Q'fi/sds,' MJw^frei*}"‘wíiich^xiít; of ‘íji'fe^kátüi'e, Wííí be TO¿tó$ id* h'é eó'ñcdrning cOfttraets ' itmfe afte'r crdkfisél Wa'S^eñgdgeá', ‘^¡a^befdfe the'tetai-tóffi'^d'ktfte sdit.’ - íífeé'qhhM&'tBerí fe, <6stñ *i?hé cotí-at kljie' RM'átd^p.^jírtl %'e. ákll^'ct'tbrthe slwe*¿®é|!fe¡''W1e’,péi^i%e.’i#o!wWtre'ásbtí‘'i¥l^,íhshcs.TM
We, therefore, conceive, as no unfairness is} shown in obtaining this contract, but it was the best the employer could do, according to his own history of the transaction, as others charged hirb a greater certain fee than he was able to give, that the contract ought not to be set aside on this ground.
But we cannot dismiss this contract without considering another objection to it, which has not been expressly made and debated at the bar, and which is of a still more serious nature. It is clear, that the supplemental answer of the appellee, setting up the contract, must be considered as a bill for specific performance; and the circumstance of the writing being assigned to the per-^on who holds the possession of the estate to be divided, cannot place him in a better altitude than the original holder stood, «jp6 ancient and long neglected,,lmt still valid provisions existing in law against champerty and maintenance, must bear against it. Champerty, which is maintenance of the strongest character, is nothing else than an agreement to aid in a suit, and then divide the thing recovered; and there is no doubt, that this contract fully comes up to this definition. It is true, the answer of the complainant, below does not expressly make this point; but every fact suggested or alleged about it, in the pleadings of all the parties, as well as the writing itself, shows that it is an agreement of this character. Can the agreement, then,, be specifically enforced? The doctrine is well established, that equity will not carry into effect an agreement against the policy of the law, any more than one against its morality. It is not necessary that we should discuss the question, whether champerty be Sr.be not an offence against morality, or only a prohibited, act. Be it whichsoever it
The decree, therefore, dividing this property, must be reversed with costs, and the cause remanded, with directions to the court below to decree to the original complainant in that court, the redemption and possession of the remaining third of the slaves, on the same principles as the other two 'thirds have been decreed, leaving the validity of the contract to be hereafter tested in a.court of law, if the parties resort to that mode.