S-M-J

Interim Decision #3303

In re S-M-J-, Applicant

Decided January 31, 1997

U.S. Department of Justice
Executive Office for Immigration Review
Board of Immigration Appeals

(1) General background information about a country, where available, must be included in the
record as a foundation for an applicant’s claim of asylum and withholding of deportation.

(2) Where the record contains general country condition information and an applicant’s claim
relies primarily on personal experiences not reasonably subject to verification, corroborat-
ing documentary evidence of the asylum applicant’s particular experience is not required;
but where it is reasonable to expect such corroborating evidence for certain alleged facts
pertaining to the specifics of an applicant’s claim, such evidence should be provided or an
explanation should be given as to why such information was not presented. Matter of Dass,
20 I&N Dec. 120 (BIA 1989); Matter of Mogharrabi, 19 I&N Dec. 439 (BIA 1987),
clarified.

(3) The Immigration and Naturalization Service should play an active role in introducing evi-
dence regarding current country conditions.

(4) Although the burden of proof is not on the Immigration Judge, if background evidence is
central to an alien’s claim and the Immigration Judge relies on the country conditions in
adjudicating the alien’s case, the source of the Immigration Judge’s knowledge of the partic-
ular country must be made part of the record.

FOR APPLICANT: Jeannette Freeman, Esquire, Atlanta, Georgia

FOR THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE: Grace A. Sease, Assistant
District Counsel

BEFORE: Board En Banc: SCHMIDT, Chairman; DUNNE, Vice Chairman; VACCA,
HEILMAN, HOLMES, HURWITZ, VILLAGELIU, FILPPU, COLE, MATHON, and
GUENDELSBERGER, Board Members. Concurring Opinion: ROSENBERG, Board
Member.

HEILMAN, Board Member:

The applicant, a citizen of Liberia, has timely appealed from the Immigra-
tion Judge’s decision dated June 7, 1995, denying asylum and withholding of
exclusion and deportation. The sole issue on appeal is whether the applicant
is eligible for those forms of relief. The record will be remanded.

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I. FACTS
According to the applicant’s affidavit attached to her Request for Asylum
in the United States (Form I-589), in 1989, when the Liberian Government
was overthrown, the applicant was living in Zaire. She had been living there
since 1987 with her uncle, who had been appointed the Liberian ambassador
to Zaire. She remained in Zaire until 1991, when she was evacuated to the
United States through the assistance of the American Embassy in Zaire, and
she was granted parole until March 29, 1992.
The applicant indicated that in 1990, while living in Zaire, she saw on tele-
vision on the Cable News Network that the area where she used to live in
Liberia, including her father’s house, had been burned down. She indicated
that her father’s house had been singled out and burned. She said that her
father was the governor of the Vai tribe in Liberia and stated, “I’m scared if I
go back to Liberia I might be affected too.” She indicated that although the
Vai tribe, of which she is a member, has not had any trouble with the Liberian
Government, she feared that members of other tribes might seek to harm her
because of her father’s position. The applicant has not spoken to either of her
parents since 1989 and does not know their whereabouts. The applicant also
testified that “Prince Anderson” is her brother-in-law and that she fears
repercussions as a result of her relationship to him.
Before we turn to the review of the applicant’s case, we set out the analysis
which we apply in determining whether an asylum applicant has met his or
her burden of proof.

II. EVIDENTIARY REQUIREMENTS
Although we recognize that the burden of proof in asylum and withhold-
ing of deportation cases is on the applicant, we do have certain obligations
under international law to extend refuge to those who qualify for such relief.
See United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28,
1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 150. Congress incorporated the international obligation
into domestic United States law when it enacted the withholding of deporta-
tion provision of the Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102,
prohibiting the refoulement of refugees. Going beyond the nonrefoulement
provision, Congress also established asylum as a discretionary form of relief
for those who could meet a lesser standard of proof. See section 208 of the
Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (1994). Because this
Board, the Immigration Judges, and the Immigration and Naturalization Ser-
vice are all bound to uphold this law, we all bear the responsibility of ensur-
ing that refugee protection is provided where such protection is warranted by
the circumstances of an asylum applicant’s claim. Further, in light of the
bifurcated process experienced by many asylum applicants, whereby appli-
cants begin with a nonadversarial approach at a Service Asylum Office and

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move to a more “adversarial” proceeding before an Immigration Judge, a
cooperative approach in Immigration Court is particularly appropriate.

A. The Role of the Alien
1. Evidence of General Country Conditions
The burden of proof is on an applicant to establish her asylum claim.
8 C.F.R. § 208.13(a) (1996). We held in Matter of Dass, 20 I&N Dec. 120
(BIA 1989), that an alien’s own testimony may in some cases be the only evi-
dence available, and it can suffice where the testimony is believable, consis-
tent, and sufficiently detailed to provide a plausible and coherent account of
the basis of the alien’s alleged fear. See also Matter of Mogharrabi, 19 I&N
Dec. 439, 446 (BIA 1987). Similarly, the regulations indicate that “[t]he tes-
timony of the applicant, if credible in light of general conditions in the appli-
cant’s country of nationality or last habitual residence, may be sufficient to
sustain the burden of proof without corroboration.” 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(a).
Implicit in these statements is an assumption that the adjudicator will have
some background information against which to measure an applicant’s
claim. In order to determine if an alien’s claim is “credible in light of general
conditions in the applicant’s country,” 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(a), or “plausible,”
Matter of Dass, supra, at 124, 125, an adjudicator must understand the gen-
eral country conditions. Therefore, general background information about a
country, where available, must be included in the record as a foundation for
the applicant’s claim. This point bears emphasis because many applicants,
such as the applicant here, seek to rely solely on their testimony without
either offering any background information or explaining its absence.
Because the burden of proof is on the alien, an applicant should provide
supporting evidence, both of general country conditions and of the specific
facts sought to be relied on by the applicant, where such evidence is avail-
able. Matter of Dass, supra, at 124. If such evidence is unavailable, the appli-
cant must explain its unavailability, and the Immigration Judge must ensure
that the applicant’s explanation is included in the record. Moreover, general
country condition information may be necessary to support an applicant’s
testimony where the alien’s claim is based on allegations which may be inde-
pendently verified. “[W]hen the basis of an asylum claim becomes less
focused on specific events involving the respondent personally and instead is
more directed to broad allegations regarding general conditions in the
respondent’s country of origin, corroborative background evidence that
establishes a plausible context for the persecution claim (or an explanation
for the absence of such evidence) may well be essential.” Matter of Dass,
supra, at 125. As we indicated in Dass, this position is consistent with the
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Handbook
on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status under the 1951
Convention and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees para.

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42, at 12 (Geneva, 1992) (“Handbook”), which notes that an “applicant’s
statements cannot, however, be considered in the abstract, and must be
viewed in the context of the relevant background situation." The Handbook
summarizes the role of the asylum applicant, stating that he or she should do
the following:
(i) Tell the truth and assist the examiner to the full in establishing the facts of his case.
(ii) Make an effort to support his statements by any available evidence and give a satisfac-
tory explanation for any lack of evidence. If necessary he must make an effort to procure
necessary evidence.
(iii) Supply all pertinent information concerning himself and his past experience in as much
detail as is necessary to enable the examiner to establish the relevant facts. He should be
asked to give a coherent explanation of all the reasons invoked in support of his application
for refugee status and he should answer any questions put to him.
Id. para. 205(a)(i)-(iii), at 48-49.
The Handbook recognizes that:
[a]fter the applicant has made a genuine effort to substantiate his story there may still be a
lack of evidence for some of his statements . . . . [I]t is hardly possible for a refugee to
“prove” every part of his case . . . . It is therefore frequently necessary to give the applicant
the benefit of the doubt.
Id. para. 203, at 48. The Handbook recommends, however, that the benefit of
the doubt only be given “when all available evidence has been obtained and
checked and when the examiner is satisfied as to the applicant’s general cred-
ibility. The applicant’s statements must be coherent and plausible, and must
not run counter to generally known facts.” Id. para. 204, at 48.
2. Evidence to Support the Alien’s Particular Claim
Where the record contains general country condition information, and an
applicant’s claim relies primarily on personal experiences not reasonably
subject to verification, corroborating documentary evidence of the asylum
applicant’s particular experience is not required. Unreasonable demands are
not placed on an asylum applicant to present evidence to corroborate particu-
lar experiences (e.g., corroboration from the persecutor). However, where it
is reasonable to expect corroborating evidence for certain alleged facts per-
taining to the specifics of an applicant’s claim, such evidence should be pro-
vided. That is, an asylum applicant should provide documentary support for
material facts which are central to his or her claim and easily subject to verifi-
cation, such as evidence of his or her place of birth, media accounts of large
demonstrations, evidence of a publicly held office, or documentation of med-
ical treatment. If the applicant does not provide such information, an expla-
nation should be given as to why such information was not presented. For
example, if an applicant claims persecution based on her activities as
vice-president of a union for 2 years, she should provide some corroborating
evidence indicating that she held the office of vice-president or an explana-
tion of why she did not provide such corroborating evidence. The absence of

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such corroborating evidence can lead to a finding that an applicant has failed
to meet her burden of proof.
We point this out to clarify Matter of Mogharrabi, supra, in which we first
stated that an “alien’s own testimony . . . can suffice where the testimony is
believable, consistent, and sufficiently detailed to provide a plausible and
coherent account of the basis for his fear." Id. at 445. We further stated in
Matter of Mogharrabi:
Where the country at issue in an asylum case has a history of persecuting people in circum-
stances similar to the asylum applicant’s, careful consideration should be given to that fact
in assessing the applicant’s claims. A well-founded fear, in other words, can be based on
what has happened to others who are similarly situated. The situation of each person, how-
ever, must be assessed on its own merits.1
Id. at 446.
Consequently, we also expect general corroborating evidence, from a reli-
able source, of persecution of persons in circumstances similar to an appli-
cant where such information is reasonably available. In the example of the
union vice-president, for example, we would expect general information that
union members in her country faced persecution. However, specific docu-
mentary corroboration of an applicant’s particular experiences is not
required unless the supporting documentation is of the type that would nor-
mally be created or available in the particular country and is accessible to the
alien, such as through friends, relatives, or co-workers.
Although the burden of proof in establishing a claim is on the applicant,
the Service and the Immigration Judge both have a role in introducing evi-
dence into the record.

B. The Role of the Service
The Service, of course, should also play a significant role at the asylum
hearing. The trial attorney may call witnesses and should present evidence to
support any argument it makes regarding the applicant’s eligibility for
asylum or withholding of deportation. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 236.3(c)(4),
242.17(c)(4)(iv) (1996). Such evidence should be used to examine an appli-
cant regarding his or her claim. The more background information the Ser-
vice has about the applicant’s country, the more thorough and intelligent the
examination will be.
If the Service opposes a grant of asylum, independent evidence to support
its opposition often is critical. Such an approach would not only be effective
at the hearing; it would also enable the Board to better evaluate an asylum

1 We note that this standard contemplates the introduction of evidence regarding similarly

situated persons to support an individual claim of persecution. This situation is distinct from the
use of evidence of the persecution of similarly situated persons to establish a well-founded fear
of persecution where there is no claim of individualized persecution, i.e., in a pattern or practice
claim. See 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(2)(i).

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applicant’s claim from the record developed at the hearing. For example, if
we find on appeal that an asylum applicant has met her burden of proof and is
otherwise eligible for asylum and the Service had failed to provide any evi-
dence to counter her claim, we would find no basis for denying the asylum
application.
Moreover, as we noted above, the Service has an obligation to uphold
international refugee law, including the United States’ obligation to extend
refuge where such refuge is warranted. That is, immigration enforcement
obligations do not consist only of initiating and conducting prompt proceed-
ings that lead to removals at any cost. Rather, as has been said, the govern-
ment wins when justice is done. In that regard, the handbook for trial
attorneys states that “[t]he respondent should be aided in obtaining any pro-
cedural rights or benefits required by the statute, regulation and controlling
court decision, of the requirements of fairness.” Handbook for Trial Attor-
neys § 1.3 (1964). See generally Freeport-McMoRan Oil & Gas Co. v.
FERC, 962 F.2d 45, 48 (D.C. Cir. 1992)(finding astonishing that counsel for
a federal administrative agency denied that the A.B.A. Code of Professional
Responsibility holds government lawyers to a higher standard and has obli-
gations that “might sometimes trump the desire to pound an opponent into
submission”); Reid v. INS, 949 F.2d 287 (9th Cir. 1991)(noting that govern-
ment counsel has an interest only in the law being observed, not in victory or
defeat).
As a general matter, therefore, we expect the Service to introduce into evi-
dence current country reports, advisory opinions, or other information
readily available from the Resource Information Center.

C. The Role of the Immigration Judge
Thus far, we have emphasized the need for the parties to introduce sup-
porting documents into the record. We note, however, that even after the par-
ties have had an opportunity to introduce supporting documents into the
record, the Immigration Judge may be left with an inadequate record.
Although the burden of proof is not on the Immigration Judge, if background
information is central to an alien’s claim, and the Immigration Judge relies on
the country conditions in adjudicating the alien’s case, the source of the
Immigration Judge’s knowledge of the particular country must be made part
of the record. The Act states that in deportation and exclusion proceedings,
an Immigration Judge “shall administer oaths, present and receive evidence,
interrogate, examine, and cross-examine the alien or witnesses.” Section
242(b) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(1994) (emphasis added); see also sec-
tion 236 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1226 (1994). Thus, the statute specifically rec-
ognizes that the presentation of evidence is a proper function of an
Immigration Judge.

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The regulations also require that an Immigration Judge seek evidence in
cases where the Immigration Judge receives an application for asylum that
has not been referred by an asylum officer. The Immigration Court “shall for-
ward a copy to the Department of State pursuant to § 208.11.” 8 C.F.R.
§§ 236.3(b), 242.17(c)(3). “At its option, the Department of State may pro-
vide detailed country conditions information addressing the specific condi-
tions relevant to eligibility for refugee status . . . .” 8 C.F.R. § 208.11(a)
(1996).
Moreover, in order to fully explain the reasons for the decision, the Immi-
gration Judge should consider background evidence. A decision rendered by
the Immigration Judge in deportation proceedings “shall also contain a dis-
cussion of the evidence pertinent to any application made by the respondent
[for asylum or withholding of deportation] and the reasons for granting or
denying the request.” 8 C.F.R. § 242.18(a) (1996). An adverse decision in an
asylum case “will state why asylum or withholding of deportation was
denied.” 8 C.F.R. §§ 236.3(d), 242.17(c)(5). Further, “[a]ny such informa-
tion relied upon by an immigration judge in deciding a claim for asylum or
withholding of deportation shall be made part of the record . . . .” 8 C.F.R.
§ 208.11(a). We recognize that over time, Immigration Judges will accumu-
late significant knowledge from their experience involving the conditions in
numerous countries. However, any evidence relied upon by the Immigration
Judge must be included in the record so that the Board can meaningfully
review any challenge to the Immigration Judge’s decision on appeal.2
Background evidence often is particularly important to an Immigration
Judge’s credibility determination. As previously noted, an adjudicator must
have general background information about a country in order to determine if
an asylum applicant’s testimony is “credible in light of general conditions in
the applicant’s country,” 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(a), or “plausible,” Matter of
Dass, supra, at 124, 125. In other words, in the ordinary case, credibility
determinations must not be made in a vacuum.
Thus, in considering a persecution claim, an adjudicator must consider the
testimony against the background information. Cases have arisen, however,
where an Immigration Judge first considers testimony as a discrete portion of
the record and, at that point, makes a “credibility” determination. After that is
done, the Immigration Judge considers the background information and sep-
arately weighs that evidence. In such circumstances, it has not been unusual
for an Immigration Judge to determine that testimony is “credible” in the
same decision with a subsequent discussion of the background information
2 The Board, of course, has the authority to take administrative notice under certain
circumstances. See, e.g., Kaczmarczyk v. INS, 933 F.2d 588, 593-94 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 502
U.S. 981 (1991); de la Llana-Castellon v. INS, 16 F.3d 1093, 1096 (10th Cir. 1994).
Nevertheless, the Board is not required to independently take administrative notice of relevant
country conditions, particularly where the alien does not provide any such evidence. Fisher v.
INS, 79 F.3d 955 (9th Cir. 1996); Liu v. Waters, 55 F.3d 421, 427 (9th Cir. 1995).

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containing findings that are in conflict with the testimony. Adverse credibil-
ity determinations are appropriately based on inconsistent statements, con-
tradictory evidence, and inherently improbable testimony; and where these
circumstances exist in view of the background evidence on country condi-
tions, it is appropriate for an Immigration Judge to make an adverse credibil-
ity determination on such a basis. See generally Artiga-Turcios v. INS, 829
F.2d 720, 723 (9th Cir. 1987); Damaize-Job v. INS, 787 F.2d 1332, 1338 (9th
Cir. 1986) (regarding discrediting factors); Matter of B-, 21 I&N Dec. 66
(BIA 1995). Testimony is not a discrete, self-contained unit of evidence
examined and weighed without context; it is part of the body of evidence
which is intertwined and considered in its totality. Although we recognize
that an Immigration Judge can make an adverse credibility determination
independent of country condition information, e.g., based on inconsistent
statements, we find that general country condition information is essential for
an Immigration Judge’s evaluation of an applicant’s credibility. Immigration
Judges, therefore, should place general country condition information into
evidence.
We note, however, that there may be instances in which an Immigration
Judge finds an applicant to be credible, but finds that she has failed to meet
her burden of proof. For example, it may be that an applicant’s testimony is
plausible in light of general country condition information, but that it is
overly general. In such a case, we would find that the applicant had failed to
meet the required burden of proof, but an adverse credibility determination
would not be appropriate.
Although not binding on Immigration Judges, various guidelines for asy-
lum adjudicators recommend the introduction of evidence by the adjudicator.
For example, the Handbook states: “[W]hile the burden of proof in principle
rests on the applicant, the duty to ascertain and evaluate all the relevant facts
is shared between the applicant and the examiner.” Handbook, supra, para.
196, at 47. The role of the asylum adjudicator is to “[e]nsure that the applicant
presents his case as fully as possible and with all available evidence.” Id.
para. 205(b)(i), at 49.
Similarly, the Basic Law Manual, prepared by the Asylum Division and
Office of the General Counsel of the Service for its asylum officers, recog-
nizes the need for an asylum adjudicator to acquire information on the gen-
eral country conditions. U.S. Dept. of Justice, INS, The Basic Law Manual,
U.S. Law and INS Refugee/Asylum Adjudications (1994). It states that “[t]he
asylum officer should be fully familiar with the reports and country profiles
developed by the INS Resource Information Center, with the Department of
State’s Country Reports of Human Rights Practices for the country being
considered and with reports from Amnesty International and other reputable
organizations, including academic institutions.” Id. at 100.
Therefore, in adjudicating an application for asylum, the Immigration
Judge ordinarily should state for the record how the testimony or other

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evidence presented comports with the background information relating to the
specific claim. If no such information is in the record, we expect the Immi-
gration Judge to explain how the testimony has been assessed and how its
plausibility or implausibility has been established without such information.3

III. APPLICATION OF EVIDENTIARY REQUIREMENTS TO
APPLICANT’S CASE
A. The Applicant Failed to Provide Sufficient Supporting Evidence
We find that the applicant has not provided sufficient evidence to meet her
burden of proof. See 8 C.F.R. § 208.13. We note preliminarily that the appli-
cant has not provided any general information about country conditions in
Liberia, nor has she explained whether such evidence is unavailable. Conse-
quently, there is no background information against which to judge her
claim. For example, the record does not contain information about the Vai
tribe, such as who might seek to harm members of the tribe. There is not even
independent evidence to indicate that the tribe exists. The applicant also did
not provide information as to who “Prince Anderson” is, what role he played
in Liberia, or why anyone affiliated with him might be targeted. In fact, the
applicant has not identified any faction or tribe who might have an inclination
to persecute those affiliated with Prince Anderson or the Vai tribe. See Mat-
ter of Mogharrabi, supra. Further, the applicant has not provided any expla-
nation for the lack of information on these issues. We note that the applicant
attached an affidavit to her Form I-589 in which she provides background
information about Liberia, such as where it is located, how it was founded,
and how political tensions in the country developed. However, general infor-
mation about the history or political climate in a country should, where avail-
able, be provided through corroborative background evidence such as
country reports provided by a credible source or an expert witness. See Mat-
ter of Dass, supra, at 125. The applicant is not an expert witness.
Regarding the aspects of the applicant’s testimony that involve her own
personal experience, we find that the applicant has failed to satisfy her bur-
den of submitting evidence that is sufficiently detailed to provide a coherent
account of the basis of her fear. See Matter of Dass, supra, at 124; Matter of
Mogharrabi, supra. The applicant’s testimony was general and did not pro-
vide additional details about, for example, her experience as a Vai tribe mem-
ber. Further, she has not indicated how her alleged persecutor could become
aware of her tribal affiliation, her father’s political position, or her relation-
ship to Prince Anderson. Moreover, the information in the applicant’s

3 As we noted above, the burden of proof is on an applicant to establish her asylum claim. We

do not intend our analysis regarding the roles of the Service and the Immigration Judge to shift
this burden. If the Service and the Immigration Judge do not carry out their roles, the applicant
does not prevail by default.

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affidavit does not provide additional detail about specific events in which she
was involved. An asylum applicant’s own testimony, whether in the form of
in-court testimony or an affidavit, should focus on the particular circum-
stances of her case. Consequently, the applicant has failed to satisfy her bur-
den of presenting testimony that is believable, consistent, and sufficiently
detailed to provide a plausible and coherent account of the basis for her fear.
See Matter of Dass, supra; Matter of Mogharrabi, supra.
Although we find that the applicant has not met her burden of proof, we do
not find that she is incredible. The evidentiary standard set out above and in
Matter of Dass, supra, requires that the applicant provide background evi-
dence so that her claim can be evaluated in the broader context of the condi-
tions in her country. Even if an alien is found to be credible, if there is no
context within which to evaluate her claim, she has failed to meet her burden
of proof because she has not provided sufficient evidence of the foundation
for her claim. A failure of proof is not a proper ground per se for an adverse
credibility determination. The latter finding is more appropriately based
upon inconsistent statements, contradictory evidence, and inherently
improbable testimony. See Artiga-Turcios v. INS, supra; Damaize-Job v.
INS, supra; Matter of B-, supra.
The applicant correctly points out on appeal that an alien applying for asy-
lum based on a well-founded fear of persecution shall not be required to pro-
vide evidence that she would be singled out individually for persecution if
she establishes that there is a pattern or practice in her country of persecution
of persons similarly situated to the applicant on account of one of the enumer-
ated grounds of a group in which the applicant claims membership. 8 C.F.R.
§ 208.13(b)(2)(i).
The applicant claims that she is identified with Charles Taylor through her
father’s former position as governor of Vai and through her brother-in-law’s
position as a supporter of Taylor. The applicant has not provided evidence to
meet the regulatory requirements for a pattern or practice claim, however.
First, the applicant has not provided evidence to indicate that there is a pat-
tern or practice of persecution of Taylor supporters in Liberia. See 8 C.F.R.
§ 208.13(b)(2)(i)(A). Secondly, the applicant has not established that she is
similarly situated to persons being persecuted in Liberia. See 8 C.F.R.
§ 208.13(b)(2)(i)(B). For example, assuming arguendo that there is a pattern
or practice of persecution of Taylor supporters in Liberia, the applicant has
not established how her father is linked to Taylor, or what Prince Anderson’s
role in support of Taylor has been. It is not clear whether either of her rela-
tives is identifiable as a Taylor supporter, and, as discussed above, it is not
clear whether the applicant’s association with her father and brother-in-law is
identifiable.

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B. The Service and the Immigration Judge Failed
to Provide Background Evidence About Liberia
Preliminarily, we note that the Service trial attorney questioned the appli-
cant regarding her testimony, but did not introduce any evidence to contradict
the applicant’s claim or to suggest it is implausible.
Similarly, the Immigration Judge in the instant proceeding did not present
or receive objective evidence against which the applicant’s claim could be
measured. We note that although the Immigration Judge indicated that he had
“considered the State Department advisory [opinion],” the only report from
the Department of State’s Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian
Affairs in the record relates to Zaire, not Liberia. In fact, the February 3,
1995, request from the Immigration Court to the Bureau of Human Rights
and Humanitarian Affairs reflected the applicant’s nationality as “Zaire.”
Although the applicant indicated that she had lived in Zaire, she never indi-
cated that she has any legal status there, and she is a citizen of Liberia. Fur-
ther, the Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs submission does
not indicate that it reviewed the applicant’s application from the standpoint
of her being a native and citizen of Liberia. The additional material attached
to its response suggests that such was not the case. It may be that the Immi-
gration Judge considered a report from the State Department regarding the
country conditions in Liberia, but no such report was specifically identified
or made a part of the record.
The Immigration Judge concluded that the applicant “fears going back to
her country because there is a very active civil war raging there.” He further
noted that “there’s no showing that she would be anymore at risk than any
other citizen in Liberia.” The Immigration Judge appears to have evaluated
the applicant’s claim in light of his knowledge of country conditions in Libe-
ria, but the record does not provide us with the basis for that knowledge. Con-
sequently, in considering the applicant’s appeal, it is difficult for us to
evaluate the propriety of the Immigration Judge’s conclusions.

IV. CONCLUSION
Under ordinary circumstances, we would be inclined to dismiss the appli-
cant’s appeal based on her failure to meet her burden of proof. However, the
regulations provide that applications for asylum must be forwarded to the
Department of State for review and possible comment. See 8 C.F.R.
§§ 208.11, 236.3(b), 242.17(c)(3). In addition, the regulations require that
country conditions information “relied upon by an immigration judge . . .
shall be made part of the record and the parties shall be provided an opportu-
nity to review and respond to such information prior to the issuance of a deci-
sion.” 8 C.F.R. § 208.11(a). In this case, where the request to the Department
of State referenced the wrong country of nationality, where its response only
included information relevant to Zaire, where the Immigration Judge relied

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on information not included in the record, and where the only country report
in the record is for the wrong country, we will remand the record for further
proceedings at which these deficiencies can be corrected and the application
for asylum further considered. The parties should be provided the opportu-
nity to present any further evidence regarding the applications for asylum and
withholding of deportation, or to explain its absence.
Accordingly, the following order will be entered.
ORDER: The record is remanded to the Immigration Judge for
further proceedings consistent with the foregoing opinion.
CONCURRING OPINION: Lory D. Rosenberg, Board Member
I respectfully concur.
Our decision today is intended to clarify and provide notice to the appli-
cant and guidance to the Immigration and Naturalization Service and the
Immigration Judge of our expectations concerning the parties’ responsibility
for the production of evidence and the creation of a record in asylum hear-
ings. In particular, we address both the need for documentation of general
country conditions which must be included in the record “as a foundation for
the applicant’s claim,” Matter of S-M-J-, 21 I&N Dec. 722, 724 (BIA 1997),
or where relied on by the Immigration Judge, and a requirement that certain
supporting evidence specific to the applicant’s claim should be provided
when it is available.
Perhaps what is most important about this decision is what we are not
holding. Nowhere do we propose that an asylum seeker is presumed to be
fabricating her claim or otherwise to lack credibility. Figeroa v. INS, 886
F.2d 76 (4th Cir. 1989) (emphasizing that the fact an applicant is an alien
does not mean the Board is entitled to presume he is a liar). In addition, we do
not presume that certain forms of supporting evidence of material facts “eas-
ily subject to verification,” Matter of S-M-J-, supra, at 725, are readily avail-
able in the case of every applicant or necessarily required for the alien to
satisfy her burden of proof. In other words, there is no presumption that an
asylum applicant’s testimony is to be treated as other than truthful, and there
is no presumption that the “absence of such corroborating evidence” alone
supports a finding that “an applicant has failed to meet her burden of proof.
Id. at 726.
While I concur in the instant decision, I write separately to elaborate on
these matters, which I consider vital to the application of this decision in
practice.

I. ASYLUM CONSIDERATIONS
With the advantage of computer technology, television news, and film,
which have made our study of history and current events more accessible, we
can easily envision the situation of one forced to flee her country. We can see

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the poverty, the political repression, the exploitation, the corruption, the reli-
gious intolerance, or the ethnic divisions which gave rise to the conflict that
escalated to the point where the applicant or a family member was persecuted
or is likely to be persecuted. Perhaps she has been forced to sever all ties with
family, tribe, friends, and co-workers, leaving her country and those she
knew and loved behind. She now may be in a situation and environment
totally foreign to her, only to find that the conditions which motivated her
flight have deteriorated even further, and that she has lost contact with or
become separated from associates or family members.
It is also possible to have a different vision: to see this same person as an
opportunist, who would perpetrate a fraud. In that case we see a person who,
through technology and other sources, has heard about asylum in the United
States and who is using our laws simply to gain access to a life in our country,
at our expense. She knows that we can never fully verify her testimony or
ascertain the validity of her supporting documentation. No one likes to be
fooled or played for a fool. Moreover, as the administrative body charged
with ultimately determining these claims, we are responsible to see that the
asylum system is not abused, but is extended fairly to qualifying asylum
seekers. Given the potential for deceit, and our legitimate desire to protect the
integrity of the process, how do we determine whether this person really war-
rants our protection?
The unique circumstances of the refugee or asylum seeker among other
potential noncitizens applying for a legitimate status in the United States
under our immigration laws is not a matter of controversy. Various provi-
sions of congressional enactments, including the language of the Illegal
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Division C
of Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (“IIRIRA”), recognize and give
deference to the circumstances of refugees and asylum seekers. See, e.g., sec-
tion 242B(e) of the Immigration and Naturalization Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1252b(e)
(1994), currently in force, where Congress exempts asylum seekers from
statutory bars to relief imposed on other aliens who failed to appear at a prop-
erly scheduled deportation hearing or to depart following a grant of permis-
sion to leave voluntarily; see also sections 304(a)(3), 306(a)(2) of the
IIRIRA, (to be codified at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1230(b)(7),(c)(6)(C)(ii),
1252(a)(2)(B)(ii)); 61 Fed. Reg. 18,900, 18,905 (1996) (to be codified at
8 C.F.R. § 3.2(c)(3)(ii)).
At the Board level, as the author of today’s opinion recognized some years
ago,
the purpose of the asylum provision would be better served by abandoning the fixation with
the manner in which the asylum applicant arrived . . . . The asylum provisions are humani-
tarian in their essence and indeed recognize that the forces which impel persons to seek
refuge may be so overwhelming that the “normal” immigration laws cannot be applied in
their usual manner.

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Matter of Pula, 19 I&N Dec. 467, 476 (BIA 1987) (Heilman, concurring)
(citing the United Nations Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of
Refugees, the “international agreement which the asylum provisions imple-
ment”). While the concurring Board Member there referred to substantive
considerations concerning an alien’s manner of entry, his statement is no less
applicable to the procedural standards which we impose on the asylum appli-
cant with regard to his or her burden of proof.

II. BURDEN OF PROOF
With these considerations in mind, I turn to the imposition of the burden of
proof in the immigration laws as applied in their “usual manner.” Matter of
Pula, supra, at 476. The approach we have taken is to place the burden of
proof on the applicant to prove, by evidence which in some cases may consist
only of her credible testimony, past persecution or a reasonable fear of perse-
cution. INS v. Cardoza Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (1987). In fact, as we explain
in our opinion, placing the burden on the applicant for protection in this way
is consistent with international law. However, in so placing the burden, it is
important to note our recognition of the essential role played by the “benefit
of the doubt.” See Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Ref-
ugees, Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Sta-
tus under the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status
of Refugees paras. 203, 204, at 48 (Geneva, 1992) (“Handbook”).
In concurring in this opinion, I do not understand it to increase the appli-
cant’s burden. I understand our decision to clarify both Matter of
Mogharrabi, 19 I&N Dec. 439 (BIA 1987), and Matter of Dass, 20 I&N Dec.
120 (BIA 1989), earlier decisions in which we addressed the asylum appli-
cant’s burden of proof, to better allocate the burden and to specify our expec-
tation that an applicant either provide, or offer an explanation for the absence
of, supporting documentation related to “material facts which are central to
his or her claim and easily subject to verification.” Matter of S-M-J-, supra,
at 725.
We recognize that evidentiary considerations in asylum cases must be
judged by standards which take into account the situation of the asylum
seeker. For example, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
recognized that “omitting a corroboration requirement may invite those
whose lives of freedom are not threatened to manufacture evidence . . . . But
the imposition of such a requirement would result in the deportation of many
people whose lives genuinely are in jeopardy.” Bolanos-Hernandez v. INS,
767 F.2d 1277, 1285 (9th Cir. 1984) (emphasis added)(stating that persecu-
tors are not likely to provide their victims with evidence of their motives); see
also Matter of S-M-J-, supra, at 725.
The concept of the responsibility for establishing a record being shared by
both the parties and the Immigration Judge is especially appropriate in the

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context of asylum adjudications, where we are carrying out international
obligations, as codified by Congress, to provide refuge to those facing actual
or feared persecution. Our imposition on the parties and the Immigration
Judge alike of the responsibility to provide evidence of general conditions
where available or relied upon, while a practical change, is not particularly
controversial as a matter of law. It is consistent with the regulations generally
and with the specified role contemplated for the adjudicator of an asylum
application. See, e.g., 8 C.F.R. § 208.1(a) (1996) (stating this part shall apply
to all applicants for asylum whether before an asylum officer or an Immigra-
tion Judge); 8 C.F.R. § 208.12 (1996)(stating that the adjudicator may rely on
information from a variety of sources ranging from the Department of State
to credible international organizations or academic institutions).
An allocation of the asylum applicant’s burden, which looks to the sub-
mission of supporting evidence as a reasonable adjudicatory aid intended to
facilitate a reasoned and fair decision, is consistent, both with the current reg-
ulations and with those currently proposed by the Attorney General to imple-
ment the provisions of the IIRIRA. See 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(a) (1996), which
holds that testimony which is credible in light of general conditions may sus-
tain an applicant’s burden; see also Matter of S-M-J-, supra, at 3. By contrast,
however, imposition of a higher burden absolutely requiring such evidence
would conflict, not only with established case law, but also with regulations
promulgated by the Attorney General which we do not have the authority to
supersede. Matter of Ponce De Leon, 21 I&N Dec. 154 (BIA 1996).
As we have stated only recently, credibility concerning individual fears or
events particular to the individual applicant is not diminished or called into
question by the absence of corroboration; unrefuted and credible testimony
alone is perfectly adequate to satisfy the applicant’s burden of proof of a
threat. Matter of H-, 21 I&N Dec. 337, 340 (BIA 1996). The courts have
affirmed our acknowledgment that an applicant’s burden can be met once
general background information places the applicant’s consistent and coher-
ent testimony in context. See Sotelo-Aquije v. Slattery, 17 F.3d 33, 36 n.2 (2d
Cir. 1994) (finding the suggestion of an extra requirement of corroboration
excessive where the Board found credible testimony which was supported by
general documentary evidence), rev’d on other grounds, 62 F.3d 54 (2d Cir.
1995); see also Sotel-Aquije v. Slattery, 62 F.3d 54, 56-57 (2d Cir. 1995). In
addition, any inferences drawn concerning the implausibility of factual
allegations must themselves be supported by substantial evidence.
Aguilera-Cota v. INS, 914 F.2d 1375, 1381 (9th Cir. 1990).
Thus, our opinion should not be read to impose upon the individual asy-
lum applicant the necessity of providing more than her credible testimony to
satisfy her burden, if that is all that is available. To the contrary, what I under-
stand the Board to restate is our understanding that testimony which is
“believable, consistent and sufficiently detailed” alone will suffice to satisfy
the alien’s burden under certain circumstances. Matter of Mogharrabi,

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supra, at 445; see also Cardoza-Fonseca v. INS, 767 F.2d 1448, 1453 (9th
Cir. 1985) (noting that establishment of objective facts through testimony
alone does not make them any less objective), aff’d, 480 U.S. 421 (1987).
What we are clarifying is that, as a general rule, where corroborating evi-
dence is available, particularly evidence which is documentary in nature or
otherwise objective, it should be provided, as it is useful in substantiating the
applicant’s claim.

A. The Practical Disabilities of the Applicant
Observance of our international obligations, which one might presume
would involve primarily humanitarian considerations, unfortunately has
come to include a significant policing function. At the same time, we cannot
allow this factor to overcome our awareness that real victims of persecution
very often have little available to them in the way of supporting evidence, tes-
timonial or documentary, to support their claims. See Plateros-Cortez v. INS,
804 F.2d 1127 (9th Cir. 1986); Bolanos-Hernandez v. INS, supra; Margano
v. Pilliod, 299 F.2d 217 (7th Cir. 1962) (holding an applicant requesting
political asylum is entitled to considerable latitude in presenting evidence),
cert. denied, 370 U.S. 924 (1962); see also Matter of Pula, supra (Heilman,
concurring); Matter of Joseph, 13 I&N Dec. 70, 74 (BIA 1968) (stating that
the applicant must have a “reasonable opportunity to present his proofs for
the stakes are high”); Matter of Silhasle, 11 I&N Dec. 533 (BIA 1960)
(acknowledging that the applicant’s testimony must be accorded the most
careful and objective evaluation). Moreover, our decision states clearly that
we do not place unreasonable demands on the asylum applicant to corrobo-
rate personal experiences not reasonably subject to verification. Matter of
S-M-J-, supra, at 725.
In addition, we should realize that a good portion of the peoples of the
world remain semi-literate and may adhere to different cultural norms, which
may affect how an asylum applicant recounts events, seeks or obtains corrob-
oration, or explains the inability to provide supporting documentation. Con-
fronted with an adversary process, many individuals may have difficulty
presenting corroborating evidence that satisfies the standards we employ
without expert and effective legal representation. See Castro-O’Ryan v. INS,
847 F.2d 1307 (9th Cir. 1988). In addition, an accurate, verbatim interpreta-
tion of testimony presented at the hearing is essential; and not only is the skill
level of an interpreter a significant factor, but the political and psychological
dynamics which flow from the introduction of a third party into the asylum
hearing may be relevant in assessing the record.
Even more critical, we must understand that many asylum seekers are con-
fined in Service detention. Do the rules of the institution allow such an indi-
vidual to make an overseas telephone call without money, on credit? Can she
even place such a call at all? May such an individual contact her family by

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letter and manage to receive a response before her hearing actually takes
place? Even if the applicant is able to communicate with her family, how can
they provide her with the information or corroboration which she needs with-
out endangering themselves?
And even if the applicant has the freedom and finances to obtain such cor-
roborating evidence, can she seek and receive it within the time we set for her
hearing? I recall a time, when I was a lawyer in pro bono practice, when long
after I submitted his application, my client finally received information on
tissue-thin paper, tucked into a false front of an international air letter which
his co-worker had unsealed and re-glued to protect it from being intercepted
by the authorities of his country. We must be careful to consider when imped-
iments attendant to the asylum applicant’s situation have prevented the
orderly or even the timely presentation of evidence that would corroborate
the material facts which may be central to a specific claim. In the vast major-
ity of cases, where internally credible testimony is provided, both the practi-
cal disabilities experienced by many asylum applicants, and the Handbook‘s
recognition that no refugee is likely to be able to prove every aspect of her
claim, favor our extending the benefit of the doubt in determining whether
the applicant has met her burden.

B. The Service’s Access to Evidence
In Matter of Vivas, 16 I&N Dec. 68 (BIA 1977), we held that while the
Service has the burden of proof in a deportation case to establish
deportability by evidence which is clear, unequivocal, and convincing, a
respondent may be required to go forward with evidence when the Service
has made a prima facie case and the respondent has better control or knowl-
edge of the evidence. In that case, the Board stated specifically that the rule
enunciated, shifting the burden of going forward with evidence to the party
not bearing the burden of proof, is not new to either criminal or civil proceed-
ings. See, e.g., United States v. Fleishman, 339 U.S. 349 (1950); see also
Campbell v. United States, 365 U.S. 85 (1961); Government of Virgin Islands
v. Lake, 362 F.2d 770 (3d Cir. 1966); Rhay v. Browder, 342 F.2d 345 (9th Cir.
1965).
We recognized that this principle should apply, in particular, when a party
is under a “serious practical handicap.” Matter of Vivas, supra, at 70. It is dif-
ficult to imagine a more comparable situation than the asylum context, where
it is the applicant’s burden to establish a well-founded fear of persecution.
See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, supra. Therefore, I view the Service’s respon-
sibility in these proceedings to require not only the production of evidence
pertaining to general country conditions, but to require that the Service pro-
vide any other evidence, either within its possession or readily accessible,
which supports the contentions made by the applicant. Matter of S-M-J-,
supra, at 730 n.3.

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As I read the law, what this means in the context of our opinion today, is
that when a respondent has provided straightforward and uncontradicted tes-
timony which establishes a prima facie claim of persecution warranting a
grant of asylum, as well as a reasonable contention that she cannot provide
corroborating documentation, the burden should shift to the Service. At this
point, as the majority explains, the Service should present any evidence it
has, supporting or contradicting the applicant’s asylum claim. If the Service
does not refute the claim made by the applicant, then it would appear that,
even in the absence of specific documentation corroborating claims related to
identity, membership or official status, or medical attention, the applicant has
satisfied his or her burden of proof. Id. at 726-727.

III. CREDIBILITY CONSIDERATIONS
Thus, we confront the centrality of testimonial credibility in asylum deter-
minations. Should we believe the foreigner? How do we assist the legitimate
asylum seeker and weed out those cases in which claims or representations
made in support of claims are fraudulent? What criteria are appropriate in
assessing this aspect, which so often goes to the outcome of an asylum claim?
We have stated that credible testimony, alone, may satisfy the applicant’s
burden, but that the absence of corroborating evidence related to material
facts central to the applicant’s claim “can lead to a finding that an applicant
has failed to meet her burden of proof.” Matter of S-M-J-, supra, at 726. Two
aspects of this evaluation are especially critical. One is how we determine the
credibility of the applicant’s testimony generally. The other is how we judge
the “reasonableness” of our expectation that corroborating evidence is avail-
able, and how we determine the “reasonableness” of an asylum applicant’s
explanation for failing or being unable to provide such evidence.
In my view, we should avoid any predisposition against believing the
applicant who may be unable to obtain supporting documentation at all, or
who manages to submit documents which corroborate only part of her con-
tentions. I stress that while the burden of proof is borne by the asylum appli-
cant, our law does not include a presumption that an applicant is
unbelievable. If as adjudicators we intentionally or subjectively approache an
asylum applicant and presume an individual to be a liar rather than a truth
teller, we violate not only our duty to be impartial, but we abrogate the statute
and regulations which govern our adjudications.

A. Applications Involving Common Claims or
Unfamiliar Contentions
Although an asylum application calls for an individual adjudication, our
knowledge or lack of knowledge of external factors may affect the adjudica-
tion. In this we must allow the benefit of the doubt, as opposed to cynicism, to
prevail. It is more reasonable to conclude, for example, that a similarity in the

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content of claims substantiates the reality of the claimed persecution than to
conclude that an applicant’s story is fabricated. Bolanos-Hernandez v. INS,
supra. Similarly, the unique character of a claim which raises unfamiliar con-
tentions is not a sufficient basis to disbelieve otherwise internally consistent
testimony.
History has demonstrated that some of the most offensive, inhumane, and
intolerable forms of discrimination, abuse, and torture were those which the
international community either failed to acknowledge or could not bring
itself to admit until long after such abuses resulted in persecution which deci-
mated populations. For example, there are some, even today, who continue to
insist that the Holocaust, in which millions of Jews, gypsies, homosexuals,
and communists were interned and murdered by the Nazis, simply never
occurred.
The possibility that an individual adjudicator may not be familiar with the
particular organization to which the applicant claims to belong, or with the
particular history in the country of persecution affecting religious, ethnic,
tribal, political or other prejudice or strife, or with the relevance of geography
or other circumstances which underlie the situation narrated by the applicant,
is no measure by which to judge credibility. When the applicant has made a
genuine effort to substantiate her story, and there is no reason to question the
applicant’s credibility, the applicant should be given the “benefit of the
doubt.” Handbook paras. 203, 204, at 48.

B. Internal Consistency of Application and Testimony
Comparison of an application in English (from a non-English-speaking
and often semi-literate applicant) with testimony presented in court with the
assistance of an interpreter is, in my view, an ineffective and often unfair
measure of credibility. See Osorio v. INS, 99 F.3d 928 (9th Cir. 1996).
Instead, the application should be considered as a component part of the
applicant’s evidence, viewed on the record as a whole. Matter of Fefe, 20
I&N Dec. 116 (BIA 1989) (emphasizing that testimony which may add to or
elaborate on the information provided in the application is appropriate and
reasonable).
While prior statements typically are acceptable means for challenging
present testimony, in the asylum context these applications are often pre-
pared by well-meaning friends, family, or religious or community advocates,
who may fail to probe for details, misunderstand or even embellish informa-
tion given, and never read the content of the application back verbatim to the
applicant. Equally as common is the question and answer approach generally
undertaken by notaries, unauthorized practitioners, and some attorneys who
approach the asylum application process as a source of high-volume income.
Clearly, application of the law “as usual” is not appropriate. Matter of Pula,
supra, at 476.

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 Interim Decision #3303

Furthermore, the often traumatic circumstances giving rise to asylum
applications commonly result in information coming out seriatim rather than
the entire claim being presented in one piece. In particular, studies of gender
based claims have revealed that “[w]omen applicants may have difficulty
speaking about past experiences that are personally degrading, humiliating or
culturally unacceptable” and that “because of the very delicate and personal
issues arising from sexual abuse, some women claimants may understand-
ably have inhibitions about disclosing past experiences to male interviewers”
or through male interpreters. Coven, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Considerations
for Asylum Officers Adjudicating Asylum Claims from Women 5 (1995); see
also Matter of Kasinga, 21 I&N Dec. 357 (BIA 1996).
The point of an inquiry or review is never to isolate or seize upon technical
inconsistencies between the written application and oral testimony in order to
justify a denial of asylum. In keeping with our recognition that our govern-
ment has a duty to uphold international law, Matter of S-M-J-, supra, at 723,
727, it is rather to seek to elicit detail that establishes a reasonable likelihood
of persecution and satisfies the applicant’s burden.

C. Evaluation of Supporting Documentation
What constitutes corroboration establishing a plausible story or what is no
more than merely self-serving evidence may be more in the eye of the
beholder than in the ability of an asylum applicant to document her claim.
The cynical adjudicator who believes that any document can be, and proba-
bly is, fabricated will not only reject those documents determined by an offi-
cial forensic laboratory to be conclusively fraudulent. Any handmade piece
of “official,” but homemade stationary or other paper of lesser quality than
the business letterhead to which we in the United States are accustomed, can
be subject to doubt. The adjudicator who may erroneously perceive his or her
job as being to repel the majority of asylum seekers, notwithstanding the con-
trolling statute, regulations, and case law, can readily conclude that, if they
cannot be rejected as fabricated, letters or other documentation from family,
doctors, religious leaders, or organizational leaders should be dismissed as
self-serving. Damaize-Job v. INS, 787 F.2d 1332 (9th Cir 1986); see also
Kahassi v. INS, 16 F.3d 323, 326 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that credibility
could be evaluated favorably when the applicant’s testimony was based on
what she learned as a child since there is a distinct difference between provid-
ing such a description and reciting a fabricated story). Thus, the mere require-
ment of documentation is no guarantee that an adjudicator will be satisfied
that a claim is both real and legitimate.
It is critical to understand the anomaly created by the concept of
“self-serving documentation.” The fact that such evidence may advance an
applicant’s cause does not mean it is not admissible or entitled to due weight.
See Dawood-Haio v. INS, 800 F.2d 90, 96 (6th Cir. 1986). It was error for an

741
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Immigration Judge to find a witness unbelievable merely because his testi-
mony helped his cause. Jang Man Cho v. INS, 669 F.2d 936, 940 n.6 (4th Cir.
1982); see also Matter of Mazar, 10 I&N Dec. 79, 81 (BIA 1962). Further-
more, it would be nonsensical to so hold, as such an approach would achieve
only the “anomalous and unfair result” of accepting as true that part of an
alien’s testimony that undermines his case, while rejecting that which sup-
ports it. Henry G. Watkins, Credibility Findings in Deportation Proceed-
ings: ”Bear[ing] Witness Unto The Truth," 2 Geo. Immigr. L.J. 231, 259
(1988) (citing Navia-Duran v. INS, 568 F.2d 803, 807 (1st Cir. 1977) (stating
that an adjudicator’s reliance on a portion of the testimony that undermines a
claim may indicate acceptance of the veracity of all of the testimony)).

D. Reasonable Explanation for Unavailable Documentation
In our decision today we have set forth two “reasonableness” determina-
tions that need to be made in assessing the adequacy of the asylum appli-
cant’s evidence. One is whether it is reasonable to expect that the applicant’s
personal experiences are easily subject to verification. The other is whether
in such a case, the explanation given by an asylum applicant for failing to
provide such documentation is a reasonable one. In making these “reason-
ableness” determinations we should be guided by the standard we employ in
related credibility assessments. However, if we are reluctant to base our deci-
sion on the merits solely on otherwise consistent and credible testimony of an
applicant for asylum, will we accept her equally straightforward (but uncor-
roborated) explanation of the unavailability of supporting documentation?
The federal courts have not been shy in recognizing the often
unsupportable subjective and conjectural conclusions periodically drawn by
adjudicators. Certainly, we have not demonstrated consistently an ability to
reasonably judge individual events occurring outside our own society. For
example, a finding that it was “astonishing” that after being chased and shot
at by guerrillas, and then beaten by the same guerrillas, an applicant was
released rather than killed, does not set forth a specific cogent reason to dis-
believe the applicant. Mosa v. Rogers, 89 F.3d 601, 605 (9th Cir. 1996);
Lopez-Reyes v. INS, 79 F.3d 908 (9th Cir. 1996) (finding a Guatemalan who
was released by his torturers not incredible because he was not killed);
Turcios v. INS, 821 F.2d 1396, 1399 (9th Cir. 1987); see also Nasseri v. INS,
34 F.3d 723, 725 (9th Cir. 1994), overruled on other grounds, Fisher v. INS,
79 F.3d 955 (9th Cir. 1996); Perez-Alvarez v. INS, 857 F.2d 23, 24 (1st Cir.
1988) (adopting concurring opinion of Board Member which stated that in
considering claims of persecution it is “highly advisable to avoid assump-
tions about how other societies operate”); Matter of D-V-, 21 I&N Dec. 77
(BIA 1993) (finding that despite the Immigration Judge’s conclusion that
further harm was ”pure speculation," a Haitian woman subjected to gang rape
was known to agents of persecution and could be harmed again).

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These considerations are no less relevant in determining the reasonable-
ness of obtaining verification of a claimant’s personal experiences, or the
unavailability of supporting evidence of those claims, than they are to assess-
ing the fundamental credibility of an applicant’s testimony concerning perse-
cution. Adjudicators are regularly faced with difficult determinations of fact
and of law as applied to those facts. Indeed, this may in part underlie our clar-
ifying today the applicant’s responsibility to provide objective documenta-
tion, or to submit a reasonable explanation for being unable to provide it. We
should take the utmost care not to import the understandable desire to achieve
certainty or remove doubt in our decisions into the further adjudication we
establish here today. Our evaluation under this decision of what constitutes a
“reasonable explanation,” again, must rely upon our openness to that expla-
nation untarnished by any adverse presumption.

IV. CONCLUSION
Given our holding today, the fact that an applicant may be in a position to
offer more supporting evidence that may make his or her claim more persua-
sive is not to say that in some cases simple testimony may not be perfectly
adequate to satisfy the burden of proof. Ultimately, establishing eligibility
for asylum cannot turn on the satisfaction of a rigid and technical evidentiary
formula. Our responsibility is to extend protection to those who demonstrate
by even a significant degree less than a preponderance of the evidence a pos-
sibility of persecution on a ground recognized in the Act. Cardoza-Fonseca
v. INS, supra. Under the law of the Supreme Court, the federal courts, and
this Board, the absence of corroborating evidence alone should not be
dispositive. What is dispositive is whether the applicant has set forth the sub-
jective and objective elements of a fear of persecution on a protected ground
that is plausible in light of existing country conditions.

743