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Sandlin v. State

Court: Indiana Supreme Court
Date filed: 2005-03-17
Citations: 823 N.E.2d 1197
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4 Citing Cases

Attorney for Appellant                  Attorneys for Appellee
Leanna Weissmann                        Steve Carter
Lawrenceburg, Indiana                        Attorney General of Indiana

                                        Christopher C.T. Stephen
                                        Deputy Attorney General
________________________________________________________________________

                                   In the
                            Indiana Supreme Court
                      _________________________________

                            No. 78S01-0503-CR-111

Joshua Sandlin
                                       Appellant (Defendant below),

                                     v.

State of Indiana

                                       Appellee (Plaintiff below).
                      _________________________________

   Appeal from the Switzerland Superior Court Court, No. 78D01-9801-CF-004
                     The Honorable John Mitchell, Judge
                      _________________________________

 On Petition To Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals, No. 78A01-0402-
                                   CR-061
                      _________________________________

                               March 17, 2005

Sullivan, Justice.

      Defendant Joshua Sandlin pled guilty to robbery.  In March, 1999,  the
trial court sentenced him to ten years in prison, four years of  which  were
suspended during which  Defendant  was  placed  on  probation.   Defendant’s
probation began in February, 2001.  While on probation, Defendant  committed
five counts of burglary and theft for which he was convicted.


      The State  asked  the  original  trial  court  to  revoke  Defendant’s
probation on grounds of the  burglary  and  theft  convictions.   The  trial
court ordered Defendant to serve the  entire  four  years  of  the  original
sentence that had previously been suspended.


      Defendant appealed the trial court’s decision revoking his  probation,
arguing that the trial court should have ordered him  to  serve  a  sentence
less than the  entire  four  years  of  the  sentence  originally  suspended
because of his youth and alleged lack of extensive  criminal  history.   The
Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court, holding that  the
trial court acted within its discretion.  “While Sandlin is  young,  he  has
amassed a number of criminal convictions  in  a  relatively  short  span  of
time, including robbery, reckless driving, and multiple counts of theft  and
burglary, in spite  of  the  fact  that  he  has  been  incarcerated  for  a
significant part of his adult life.”   Sandlin  v.  State,  812  N.E.2d  254
(Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (mem.).


      In arguing that the trial court should have ordered him to serve  less
than the entire four years of his suspended sentence, Defendant  took  issue
with the holdings of the Court of Appeals in two cases that  had  held  that
where a trial court revokes a defendant’s probation, it has no  jurisdiction
to order the defendant to serve anything less than the entire amount of  the
sentence originally suspended.  Stephens v. State,  801  N.E.2d  1288  (Ind.
Ct. App. 2004), rev’d, 818 N.E.2d 936; Pugh v. State, 804 N.E.2d  202  (Ind.
Ct. App. 2004), rev’d, 819 N.E.2d 375.  Subsequent to the Court  of  Appeals
decision in this case, we held to the contrary.  We concluded that  a  trial
court has the authority to  order  executed  time  following  revocation  of
probation that is less than the length of the sentence  originally  imposed.
Stephens, 818 N.E.2d at 942.


      Although Defendant  never  explicitly  says  so,  we  infer  from  his
argument that he contends that the trial court in this  case  believed  that
it was required to impose the  entire  amount  of  the  sentence  originally
suspended.  If that had been the case,  it  might  well  be  appropriate  to
remand this case to the trial court for  reconsideration  in  light  of  our
holding in Stephens.


      We have reviewed the transcript of the  probation  revocation  hearing
and find nothing in it indicating that  the  trial  court  believed  it  was
required to impose the entire amount of the sentence  originally  suspended.
Absent a fairly explicit statement to  the  contrary,  we  presume  a  trial
court is aware of its authority to order executed time following  revocation
of probation that is  less  than  the  length  of  the  sentence  originally
imposed.


      We grant transfer and summarily affirm the decision of  the  Court  of
Appeals.  Ind. Appellate Rule 58(A)(2).


Shepard, C.J., and Dickson, Boehm, and Rucker, JJ., concur.