The opinion of the court was delivered by
The plaintiffs, being creditors of Cyrus Adams, attached the premises in question, recovered judgment and levied their execution thereon.
The defendant, James Adams, being in possession of the premises, they commenced their action against James and Cyrus Adams. James set up a title under a mortgage deed from Cyrus of a prior date, duly executed and acknowledged and on which there is a certificate of Cyrus, who was then town clerk, that it was received for record and recorded. On referring to the records it is found that the mortgage deed was recorded on the back leaf of volume third of said records, on which there had been no deeds recorded for upwards of twelve years previous to the time said mortgage purported to be recorded. On the back leaf of the fourth volume of records another deed from" Cyrus Adams to James Adams, dated June 3d 1826, was copied as recorded, although the last deeds recorded on that book, were in May 1820. In the fifth volume of the town records there was no record of the deed in question, although it was the book where others, received in June and July 1826,- were recorded.
On the first particular, there is but little doubt that recording means the copying of the instrument, to be recorded, into the pub-lie records of the town in a book kept for that purpose, by or under the superin tendance of the officer appointed therefor. This recording may and does take effect from the time the deed or instrument is delivered to the officer, if it is in due time placed upon the records. The delivery of the deed to a town clerk, or his minute on the same that he has received the same for record, are not the recording; but the record, if completed, is considered as taking effect from that time. Hence, if the deed is by the grantee taken from the possession and custody of the clerk after he has received it, and again returned, the record can only be considered as
Furthermore, the deed must be duly recorded. Hence if the deed, as it appears on the record, contains defects which would render it void, if they existed in the original, although there are no such defects in the original, such deed is treated as not recorded. The cases which have been decided on this principle, Huntington vs. Cobleigh, Skinner et al. vs. McDaniel et al. in Vermont Reports, are but following the principle decided in Popham’s Reports, “ that an enrolment remans good, notwithstanding'omissions by the clerk, when the omissions are not that which is of any substance in the deed.” — Sir Francis Englefields case, Populism 21.
If the town clerk in recording a deed, through accident or design, carelessly or falsely records or describes the boundaries in a deed, so that it would appear to convey but a part of the land conveyed in the original deed, the record would be good only, and considered as notice only of a conveyance of so much as appeared on the record to be conveyed. In the case of Beckman vs. Frost 18 Johns. 544, the registry of a mortgage of 3000 as a mortgage of 300 was considered as notice only of an incumbrance * for the sum stated in the record. In such cases, the purchaser jmay be wholly free from fault or negligence. He may deliver his ¡deed to the proper officer and it may be returned to him as record-led, but through accident or design it is not truly recorded. Subsequent purchasers or creditors, having no other means of knowl-I edge of the contents of the deed than by resorting to the records, ' cannot be considered as having notice of any other conveyance than such as appeared on record.
The object of recording, as has already been noticed, is for the purpose of notice to after purchasers and creditors. In considering what is necessary to complete a record, it will not answer [to-say that the record may be so made as entirely to defeat the object for which it was designed. The purchaser may fairly deliver his deed to the town clerk. The clerk may return it to him with a regular certificate that it has been recorded; and if he does nothing more; if he does not record it in fact, there is no actual or' constructive notice to purchasers of the existence of such deed. The clerk is guilty of fraud, and the person who left the deed for record is deceived; still his deed .is not recorded and no title passes thereby, except as against the grantor and his heirs. In such a. case there can be no doubt that the purchaser will lose his
A variety of new cases have been supposed in argument, in which a town clerk might literally perform the duty and yet render his act wholly ineffectual. We cannot say, how ingenious, or corrupt and fraudulent public officers may be in evading the laws; nor are we to suppose that cases may exist more flagrant than the one under consideration. In one of the eases supposed, of the clerk recording a deed and immediately gluing two leaves together, or cutting out the one containing the record, it may not perhaps be material to enquire what would be the effect of such an act. The same thing might be done by any other person. Either of them in such a case would be guilty of forgery and exposed to the penalty of the law therefor. If the deed was actually recorded and the duty enjoined by law done and performed, it is not necessary to declare what would be the effect of such after proceedings; but I can say for myself that, if I believed the town clerk recorded the deed, having at the time the intention to cut it out or efface it as soon as recorded, and did so cut it out or efface it, I ¡should he loth to say that such a deed had ever been recorded. In the case
The result to which we come is, that the mortgage deed has not been recorded; and we do this with less reluctance, as the defendant has a clear and undoubted remedy against the town clerk and against the town, if he has not been in any way a party, or consenting to the fraudulent act of the town clerk. The remedy of the plaintiffs, in the event of a decision the other way, is not so clear. Indeed, if the mortgage of the defendant had been recorded, they had constructive notice, and proceeded with knowledge of the existence of the deed, and probably could have no remedy.
The judgment of the county court is reversed and new trial granted.