Seiferth v. Helicopteros Atuneros, Inc.

United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit

In the FILED
December 11, 2006
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
_______________

m 05-60860
_______________

FREDERICK M. SEIFERTH,
REPRESENTATIVE OF THE HEIRS AT LAW OF JAMES A. SEIFERTH, DECEASED,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

VERSUS

HELICOPTEROS ATUNEROS, INC., AND MARK CAMOS,

Defendants-Appellees.

_________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Mississippi
m 4:03-CV-463
______________________________

Before SMITH, GARZA, and CLEMENT, I.
Circuit Judges. HAI, a California corporation with principal
place of business there, buys, sells, leases, and
JERRY E. SMITH, Circuit Judge: maintains helicopters. It leased a helicopter to
non-party Air 2, L.L.C. (“Air 2”), for one
Frederick Seiferth (“Seiferth”) appeals the year, with Air 2 assuming responsibility for all
dismissal of his suit against Helicopteros Atun- maintenance, inspections, and operational ex-
eros, Inc. (“HAI”), and Mark Camus for want penses. There were no geographic restrictions
of personal jurisdiction. We affirm in part, on the helicopter’s operation, and Air 2 was
vacate in part, and remand. not required to inform HAI of the helicopter’s
whereabouts. The lease expressly authorized Stripling v. Jordan Prod. Co., LLC, 234 F.3d
the use of an “externally attached cargo rack 863, 869 (5th Cir. 2000). The plaintiff bears
to support an aerial lineman” for work on the burden of establishing jurisdiction but is
power line structures. required to present only prima facie evidence.
Luv n’ care, Ltd. v. Insta-Mix, Inc., 438 F.3d
Mark Camus1 designed and patented an ex- 465, 469 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct.
ternal work platform for use with a helicopter. 2968 (2006). We resolve all relevant factual
Although he is a Tennessee domiciliary, all disputes in the plaintiff’s favor. Id.
work on the design was conducted in Florida,
where he was living at the time. He licensed District courts have “broad discretion in all
the design to Air 2, which had hired him as a discovery matters.” Alpine View Co. Ltd. v.
pilot. Air 2 had the platform manufactured, Atlas Copco AB, 205 F.3d 208, 220 (5th Cir.
and it installed the platform on the helicopter 2000) (quoting Wyatt v. Kaplan, 686 F.2d
leased from HAI. Camus transported the heli- 276, 283 (5th Cir. 1982)). On matters regard-
copter and work platform to Mississippi for ing personal jurisdiction, discovery rulings are
use by Air 2 in that state. In April 2000, be- reviewed for abuse of discretion and “will not
fore flying a mission for Air 2 in Mississippi, be disturbed ordinarilyunless there are unusual
he inspected the work platform. circumstances showing a clear abuse.” Id.
(quoting Wyatt, 686 F.2d at 283).
In February 2001, James Seiferth, an Air 2
employee and New York resident, was stand- A federal court sitting in diversity must sat-
ing on the work platform performing an aerial isfy two requirements to exercise personal jur-
inspection of power lines in Mississippi. The isdiction over a nonresident defendant. First,
base of the work platform broke, and he fell, the forum state’s long-arm statute must confer
suffering injuries resulting in his death. personal jurisdiction. Second, the exercise of
jurisdiction must not exceed the boundaries of
Seiferth, as the decedent’s personal repre- the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
sentative, sued HAI and Camus in federal Amendment. Mink v. AAAA Dev. LLC, 190
court, invoking diversity jurisdiction. The F.3d 333, 335 (5th Cir. 1999).
court, after denying Seiferth’s request for lim-
ited jurisdictional discovery as to HAI, granted Mississippi’s long-arm statute confers per-
the defendants’ motion to dismiss for a lack of sonal jurisdiction over “[a]ny nonresident per-
personal jurisdiction. Seiferth appeals the dis- son . . . who shall commit a tort in whole or in
missal and, in the alternative, the denial of dis- part in this state against a resident or nonresi-
covery as to HAI. dent of this state . . . .” MISS. CODE ANN.
§ 13-3-57 (2002). Under Mississippi law, a
II. tort is not complete until an injury is suffered.
We review de novo a district court’s deter- Thompson v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 755 F.2d
mination that it lacks personal jurisdiction. 1162, 1168 (5th Cir. 1985) (quoting Smith v.
Temco, Inc., 252 So. 2d 212, 216 (Miss.
1971)). If the injury occurs in Mississippi, the
1
Camus’s name was misspelled “Camos” in the tort is committed, at least in part, in the state,
initial filings and the district court’s opinion. We and the requirements of the long-arm statute
use the proper spelling in the body of this opinion.

2
are satisfied. Id. The tortfeasor’s presence in the forum state or purposefully availed it-
Mississippi is not required; causing an injury self of the privileges of conducting activi-
that occurs in the state is sufficient. Id. (quot- ties there; (2) whether the plaintiff’s cause
ing Brown v. Flowers Indus., Inc., 688 F.2d of action arises out of or results from the
328, 333 (5th Cir. 1982)). defendant’s forum-related contacts; and
(3) whether the exercise of personal juris-
The Due Process Clause “operates to limit diction is fair and reasonable.
the power of a State to assert in personam
jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant.” Id. at 378 (citing Burger King, 471 U.S. at
Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. 474). If the plaintiff successfully satisfies the
Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 413-14 (1984). The “con- first two prongs, the burden shifts to the de-
stitutional touchstone” of the inquiry to deter- fendant to defeat jurisdiction by showing that
mine if personal jurisdiction can be exercised is its exercise would be unfair or unreasonable.
whether the defendant “purposefully estab- Id. at 382.
lished minimum contacts in the forum State.”
Asahi Metal Ind. Co. v. Super. Ct., 480 U.S. III.
102, 108-09 (1987) (quoting Burger King The Mississippi long-arm statute permits
Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 474 the exercise of personal jurisdiction over both
(1985)). defendants. It is not disputed that the injury,
James Seiferth’s death, occurred in Missis-
Personal jurisdiction can be general or spe- sippi. He fell from a platform that had been
cific. If a defendant’s contacts with the forum transported to the state by Camus and inspect-
state are “continuous and systematic,” a court ed by him there, and the platform was attached
may exercise general jurisdiction over any ac- to HAI’s helicopter, which had been leased
tion brought against that defendant, regardless with an express provision permitting the use of
of whether the action is related to the forum a work platform. Thus, under Mississippi law,
contacts. Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 414-15. at least part of the tort allegedly perpetrated by
If a defendant has relatively few contacts, a HAI and Camus was committed in Mississippi.
court may still exercise specific jurisdiction “in That fact authorizes the exercise of personal
a suit arising out of or related to the defen- jurisdiction under the long-arm statute.
dant’s contacts with the forum.” Id. at 414 &
n.8. It is not disputed that HAI and Camus Although Camus admitted to the district
lack sufficient contacts to justify general jur- court that the “general allegations of the plain-
isdiction; only specific jurisdiction is at issue. tiff’s complaint satisfy the long arm statute,”
he now claims that, because all of his Missis-
We articulated a three-step analysis for the sippi contacts were in the context of his Air 2
specific jurisdiction inquiry in Nuovo Pignone, employment, the court cannot exercise person-
SpA v. STORMAN ASIA M/V, 310 F.3d 374 al jurisdiction. This argument misstates the
(5th Cir. 2002): law.

(1) whether the defendant has minimum Camus relies on Cole v. Alton, 567 F.
contacts with the forum state, i.e., whether Supp. 1081 (N.D. Miss. 1983), an opinion not
it purposely directed its activities toward binding on this court, as authority for his

3
claim. This reliance is misplaced. Cole in- the exercise of personal jurisdiction offends the
volved an automobile accident in which the Due Process Clause.
defendants were Atlas, the company that
leased and operated the truck involved in the A.
accident; the Atlas employee who was driving The exercise of personal jurisdiction over
the truck; the owner of the truck; and several HAI is inconsistent with the limitations of the
executives and shareholders of Atlas. Neither Due Process Clause, because HAI did not es-
Atlas nor the driver, who had acted in the tablish minimum contacts with Mississippi.
scope of his employment, contested jurisdic- The stream-of-commerce theory does not con-
tion, which was challenged only by the re- fer jurisdiction because, even if the theory ex-
maining defendants, none of whom had a sin- tended to leased products, HAI did not expect,
gle direct contact with Mississippi. The court nor should it have expected, that the helicopter
held that jurisdiction “over the corporate entity would be used in Mississippi. We affirm the
cannot, without more, confer jurisdiction over dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction as to
the officers and shareholders individually.” Id. HAI.
at 1083 (citing Webb v. Culberson, Heller &
Norton, Inc., 357 F. Supp. 923, 925 (N.D. 1.
Miss. 1973)). The first step of the Nuovo Pignone analy-
sis asks whether a defendant has minimum
Unlike the Cole defendants, Camus had dir- contacts with the forum state. HAI’s owner-
ect contacts with Mississippi. He transported ship of the helicopter, which was leased and
the helicopter and work platform to the state operated by Air 2, is considered under the
and inspected the platform there less than a stream-of-commerce theory in the following
year before the accident. Under Mississippi section. The district court found that HAI did
law, when a corporate officer “directly partici- not have any other contacts with Mississippi.
pates in or authorizes the commission of a tort, We agree.
even on the behalf of the corporation, he may
be held personally liable.” Mozingo v. Correct HAI did not have a physical presence in
Mfg. Corp., 752 F.2d 168, 173 (5th Cir. 1985) Mississippi. It did not conduct business in the
(citing First Mobile Home Corp. v. Little, 298 state. Its contract with Air 2 was not signed in
So. 2d 676, 679 (Miss. 1974)). Mississippi, nor did the contract call for per-
formance in that state. Despite this dearth of
In short, Camus is alleged to have directly contacts, Seiferth relies on two cases to argue
participated in the commission of a tort in Mis- that the exercise of personal jurisdiction over
sissippi. It is immaterial whether he did so HAI is consistent with the Due Process
within the scope of his Air 2 employment. The Clause: Elkhart Eng’g Corp. v. Dornier
district court correctly held that Seiferth’s Werke, 343 F.2d 861 (5th Cir. 1965), and
“allegations fall within the aegis of the [long- Brown v. Astron Enters., Inc., 989 F. Supp.
arm] statute.” 1399 (N.D. Ala. 1997). This argument is
unavailing.
IV.
Thus, Mississippi’s long-arm statute reach- After selling an airplane to Elkhart, Dornier
es both defendants. We now consider whether requested permission to use the plane in dem-

4
onstrations to potential buyers throughout the for lack of personal jurisdiction.
United States. Elkhart agreed, and a Dornier
pilot flew the plane to Alabama for the sole The court found that the exercise of juris-
purpose of showing it to potential clients; a diction was proper because NAFTA’s rental
Dornier sales manager and mechanic were also was an act “directed at Alabama because the
present. The plane crashed during the dem- pilot stated his intention to come to Alabama
onstration, and Elkhart sued in federal court in in a pre-filed flight plan.” Id. This distinguish-
Alabama. Elkhart, 343 F.2d at 863. This es NAFTA’s situation from HAI’s; unlike the
court held that the district court could properly student pilot, Air 2 did not state an intention to
exercise personal jurisdiction over Dornier. operate the helicopter in Mississippi.
Id. at 868.
Dornier in Elkhart, and the student pilot in
Elkhart is plainly distinguishable from the Brown, declared their intentions to use the air-
present case. Dornier transported the plane to craft in the forum. Air 2 did not, and HAI had
the forum for a sales demonstration. At the no reason to expect that its helicopter would
time of the crash, Dornier possessed the plane; be used in Mississippi. Thus, contrary to Sei-
a Dornier mechanic was inspecting and main- ferth’s assertion, these cases do not support
taining it, and its pilot was flying it. HAI, con- the exercise of personal jurisdiction over HAI.
versely, did not transport the helicopter to
Mississippi; indeed, it did not even know the 2.
helicopter had been transported there. HAI Seiferth alleges that, by placing the heli-
did not possess the helicopter at the time of copter into the stream of commerce, HAI pur-
the crash; it was neither maintaining nor op- posefully directed its activities at Mississippi
erating it. The rationale for the exercise of and thus subjected itself to the jurisdiction of
personal jurisdiction in Elkhart, that the de- Mississippi courts. We disagree.
fendant brought the aircraft to the forum and
was operating it at the time of the accident, The stream-of-commerce theory permits
does not provide a basis for the exercise of the exercise of personal jurisdiction over a
personal jurisdiction over HAI, which never nonresident defendant that “delivers its prod-
entered Mississippi. ucts into the stream of commerce with the ex-
pectation that they will be purchased by con-
Brown, a district court opinion not binding sumers in the forum State.” World-Wide
on this court, similarly does not support the Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286,
exercise of personal jurisdiction over HAI. 298 (1980). The foreseeability required in the
The defendant, North American Flight Train- products liability context is “not the mere like-
ing Academy (“NAFTA”), rented one of its lihood that a product will find its way into the
airplanes for a training flight from Georgia to forum State. Rather, it is that the defendant’s
Alabama. Brown, 989 F. Supp. at 1401-02. conduct and connection with the forum State
The student pilot declared his intention to trav- are such that he should reasonably anticipate
el to Alabama in a pre-filed flight plan, and being haled into court there.” Id. at 297.
during the flight the plane crashed in Alabama. Once a product has reached the end of the
Id. at 1405. After plaintiff sued in federal stream and is purchased, a consumer’s unilat-
court in Alabama, NAFTA moved to dismiss eral decision to take a product to a distant

5
state, without more, is insufficient to confer Seiferth does not show any reason for HAI to
personal jurisdiction over the manufacturer or have expected Air 2 to use the helicopter in
distributor. Id. at 298. Mississippi.4 The transportation of the heli-
copter to Mississippi was a unilateral act of
We have not extended this theory to leased Air 2, which under World Wide Volkswagen is
products, and we need not and do not decide insufficient to confer personal jurisdiction over
whether to make such an extension.2 The ex- HAI.
ercise of personal jurisdiction would not be
proper even if the stream-of-commerce theory B.
applied to leased products, because HAI did Seiferth brings four claims against Camus:
not expect the lessee to take the helicopter to defective design, failure to warn, negligence,
Mississippi.3 See supra Part IV.A.1. The and negligence per se. The first claim arises
lease imposed no geographical limitations, and out of Camus’s design of the work platform
from which Seiferth fell, and the remaining
three from Camus’s contacts with Mississippi.
2
The other circuit to consider this question like-
wise refused to extend the stream-of-commerce We initially consider what appears to be an
theory to leased products. See Bell Helicopter issue of first impression for our court: Is spe-
Textron v. HeliQwest Int’l., Ltd., 385 F.3d 1291 cific personal jurisdiction a claim-specific in-
(10th Cir. 2004). The facts are remarkably similar quiry? We conclude that it is. A plaintiff
to those before us: A company leased a helicopter bringing multiple claims that arise out of dif-
in Canada and took it to Utah, where it crashed. ferent forum contacts of the defendant must
The lessor was sued in Utah, and the Tenth Circuit establish specific jurisdiction for each claim.
held that the exercise of personal jurisdiction of-
fended the Due Process Clause because the lessor
This result flows logically from the distinc-
had no reason to expect the lessee to take the heli-
copter to Utah. The court found that even if the tion between general and specific jurisdiction
lessee had operated a physical facility in Utah and is confirmed by the decisions of our sister
when the lease was signed, that would be insuffi- circuits.5 If a defendant does not have enough
cient to establish personal jurisdiction over the
lessor. Id. at 1297.
4
Seiferth’s allegation that HAI should have
3
See, e.g. Luv n’ care, 438 F.3d at 470-71 known that Air 2 generally operated in the south-
(finding jurisdiction over defendant that expected east region of the United States is insufficient to es-
its products to be purchased in the forum state, as tablish that HAI expected the helicopter to be used
evinced by its filling sixty-five purchase orders for in Mississippi. See Bell Helicopter, 385 F.3d at
items bound for the forum and sending invoices to 1298 (holding that although the lessor could poten-
the retailer confirming the same); Nuovo Pignone, tially have foreseen that the helicopter would be
310 F.3d at 379-80 (finding jurisdiction over de- used in western states with national forests, “[a]
fendant that shipped a reactor to the forum state on general hope that a party will use a product in a
a defective vessel); Bean Dredging Corp. v. general region is too remote an aspiration to qualify
Dredge Tech. Corp., 744 F.2d 1081, 1085 (5th as purposeful availment in a specific state”).
Cir. 1984) (finding jurisdiction over defendant that
5
sold castings to distributor with the expectation Phillips Exeter Acad. v. Howard Phillips
that distributor would retail the castings to a na- Fund, Inc., 196 F.3d 284, 289 (1st Cir. 1999)
tionwide market). (continued...)

6
contacts to justify the exercise of general juris- separately Seiferth’s defective design claim,
diction, the Due Process Clause prohibits the which does not arise out of the same forum
exercise of jurisdiction over any claim that contacts as do his other three claims.
does not arise out of or result from the defen-
dant’s forum contacts. 1.
The Due Process Clause precludes the ex-
Permitting the legitimate exercise of specif- ercise of personal jurisdiction over Camus for
ic jurisdiction over one claim to justify the ex- Seiferth’s claim based on Camus’s alleged de-
ercise of specific jurisdiction over a different fective design of the work platform. By trans-
claim that does not arise out of or relate to the porting the helicopter and work platform to
defendant’s forum contacts would violate the Mississippi and inspecting the platform there,
Due Process Clause. Thus, if a plaintiff’s Camus directed his activity toward the state
claims relate to different forum contacts of the and purposefully availed himself of its laws,
defendant, specific jurisdiction must be estab- which satisfies the first prong of the Nuovo
lished for each claim.6 We therefore consider Pignone analysis.7 The inquiry fails, however,
at the second step, because the defective de-
sign claim does not arise out of or result from
5
(...continued) Camus’s Mississippi contacts.
(“Questions of specific jurisdiction are always tied
to the particular claims asserted.”); Remick v. None of Camus’s Mississippi contacts re-
Manfredy, 238 F.3d 248, 255-56 (3d Cir. 2001) lates to his design of the platform. Camus de-
(holding that the personal jurisdiction inquiry “is signed the rack in Florida, not Mississippi; he
claim specific because a conclusion that the Dis- did not manufacture it in Mississippi. Indeed,
trict Court has personal jurisdiction over one of the
he did not manufacture it at allSSAir 2 had it
defendants as to a particular claim asserted by
manufactured. The stream-of-commerce theo-
Remick does not necessarily mean that it has per-
sonal jurisdiction over that same defendant as to ry does not provide a basis for jurisdiction, be-
Remick’s other claims”); Zumbro, Inc. v. Cal. Nat- cause Camus did not place a product into the
ural Prods., 861 F. Supp. 773, 779 (D. Minn. stream, but merely licensed a design to Air 2.
1994) (“Because specific jurisdiction requires a The dismissal of Seiferth’s defective design
nexus between the defendant’s contacts with the
forum state and the subject matter of Zumbro’s
6
claims in this litigation, it is necessary to address (...continued)
each of Zumbro’s claims individually.” (citing such thing as supplemental specific personal juris-
Morris v. Barkbuster, Inc., 923 F.2d 1277, 1281- diction; if separate claims are pled, specific person-
82 (8th Cir.1991))); Resnick v. Rowe, 283 F. al jurisdiction must independently exist for each
Supp. 2d 1128, 1132 (D. Haw. 2003) (“[A] plain- claim and the existence of personal jurisdiction for
tiff must establish personal jurisdiction over a de- one claim will not provide the basis for another
fendant with respect to each claim.” (citing Data claim.”).
Disc, Inc. v. Sys. Tech. Assocs. Inc., 557 F.2d
7
1280, 1289 n.8 (9th Cir. 1977))). That prong asks “whether the defendant has
minimum contacts with the forum state, i.e., wheth-
6
See 5B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR er it purposely directed its activities toward the
R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: forum state or purposefully availed itself of the
CIVIL 3d § 1351, at 299 n.30 (2004) (“There is no privileges of conducting activities there.” Nuovo
(continued...) Pignone, 310 F.3d at 378.

7
claim for lack of personal jurisdiction was um-related contacts.” Nuovo Pignone, 310
proper. F.3d at 378. Camus transported the work
platform to Mississippi and inspected it there.
2. Viewing all facts favorablytoward jurisdiction,
Camus’s Mississippi contacts are relevant as we must, this is sufficient to find that the
to Seiferth’s claims of failure to warn, negli- claims of failure to warn, negligence, and neg-
gence, and negligence per se. As discussed ligence per se arise out of Camus’s Mississippi
above, these contacts demonstrate activities contacts.
directed toward Mississippi and a purposeful
availment of its laws. Camus again claims that The district court found that “Camos’ April
these contacts cannot be considered in our due 2000 inspection of the work platform is too far
process analysis because they were made in his removed in time to have played any role in Sei-
capacity as an Air 2 employee and thus cannot ferth’s death nearly a year later.” Though this
expose him to personal jurisdiction. We have statement may be true, it does not bear on the
rejected this argument with respect to Missis- jurisdictional question, but rather goes to the
sippi’s long-arm statute in Part III, supra, and merits of Seiferth’s claims. A defendant with
we do the same here. the required minimum contacts “cannot avoid
personal jurisdiction by speculating as to
The Supreme Court addressed this issue in whether another partywas actuallyresponsible
Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984). The for the accident.” Id. at 380. Thus, because
defendants were employees of a newspaper Seiferth’s claims of failure to warn, negligence,
and challenged jurisdiction by asserting, inter and negligence per se arise out of Camus’s
alia, that their only contacts with the forum forum contacts, the second step of the Nuovo
state were in the context of their employment. Pignone analysis is satisfied.
The Court held that the defendants’ “status as
employees does not somehow insulate them The third and final step asks “whether the
from jurisdiction. Each defendant’s contacts exercise of personal jurisdiction is fair and rea-
with the forum State must be assessed individ- sonable.” Id. at 378. The burden of proof
ually.” Id. at 790. The Court found that juris- shifts to the defendant to show that the exer-
diction was proper because the defendants cise of personal jurisdiction is unfair or unrea-
were “primary participants in an alleged sonable based on five factors: “(1) the burden
wrongdoing intentionally directed at a Califor- on the nonresident defendant; (2) the interests
nia resident.” Id. of the forum state; (3) the plaintiff’s interest in
obtaining relief; (4) the interstate judicial sys-
Accordingly, we do not exclude Camus’s tem’s interest in the most efficient resolution
Mississippi contacts from the jurisdictional an- of controversies; and (5) the shared interests
alysis, because they were in the context of his of the several states in furthering fundamental
Air 2 employment. He directed his activities at social policies.” Id. at 382 (citing Felch v.
Mississippi, which satisfies step one of the Nu- Transportes Lar-Mex SA de CV, 92 F.3d 320,
ovo Pignone analysis. 324 (5th Cir. 1996)). Because the district
court determined that Camus did not have suf-
Step two asks whether the cause of action ficient contacts with Mississippi to permit the
“arises out of or results from [Camus’s] for- exercise of personal jurisdiction, it did not

8
reach the third step. In summary, because HAI did not have suf-
ficient contacts with Mississippi, we AFFIRM
We conclude that Camus directed his ac- the dismissal, for want of personal jurisdiction,
tivities at Mississippi and purposefully availed of all claims against HAI. Because Seiferth’s
himself of the privileges of conducting activi- claim against Camus for defective design did
ties there and that Seiferth’s claims of failure not arise out of or relate to a forum contact,
to warn, negligence, and negligence per se we AFFIRM the dismissal of that claim for
arise out of Camus’s Mississippi contacts. We want of personal jurisdiction. Because the re-
thus vacate the dismissal of these claims and maining claims against Camus arise out of his
remand to the district court to determine Mississippi contacts, we VACATE the dis-
whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction missal of those claims and REMAND for the
over Camus by a Mississippi court is fair and district court to determine whether the exer-
reasonable. cise of personal jurisdiction is fair and reason-
able. Finally, we AFFIRM the denial of jur-
V. isdictional discovery as to HAI.
Seiferth appeals the denial of limited juris-
dictional discovery as to HAI. The standard of
review poses a high bar; a district court’s dis-
cretion in discovery matters “will not be dis-
turbed ordinarily unless there are unusual cir-
cumstances showing a clear abuse.” Alpine
View, 205 F.3d at 220. Seiferth had access to
the lease of the helicopter and the affidavit of
HAI’s president and failed to make even a pri-
ma facie showing of jurisdiction. Seiferth al-
leges that further discovery may disclose addi-
tional contacts HAI had with Mississippi such
as advertisements, phone calls, or e-mail in-
quiries. Such contacts, however, would sup-
port the exercise of general, not specific, juris-
diction, something Seiferth has not alleged in
this case. The district court did not abuse its
discretion.8

VI.

8
See Fielding v. Hubert Burda Media, Inc.,
415 F.3d 419, 429 (5th Cir. 2005) (“Because
they failed to argue that the district court
would have general jurisdiction over [defen-
dant], appellants cannot show that they were
prejudiced by the district court’s refusal to al-
low them to pursue the discovery.”).

9