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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
JANET SELLARD : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
v. :
:
GEORGE E. SHOWERS AND DEAN R. :
SHOWERS, SR., IN THEIR CAPACITIES :
AS CO-EXECUTORS OF THE ESTATE OF :
ANNA R. SHOWERS, DECEASED :
: No. 716 MDA 2017
APPEAL OF: GEORGE E. SHOWERS :
AND DEAN R. SHOWERS, SR. :
Appeal from the Order Entered March 29, 2017,
in the Court of Common Pleas of Union County
Civil Division at No. 10-8084
BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., KUNSELMAN, J., AND FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.
MEMORANDUM BY FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.: FILED MAY 25, 2018
George E. Showers and Dean R. Showers, Sr., purport to appeal from
two orders entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Union County on
March 29, 2017. We quash.
The orphans’ court set forth the following:
The matter before the Court is a dispute between the
three children of the Decedent, Anna R. Showers.
Anna R. Showers die[d] testate on January 31, 2010.
Her Last Will and Testament dated April 22, 1978 left
her entire Estate to her three children, George E.
Showers, Jr., Janet M. Sellard and Dean R.
Showers, Sr. and his children. There were no specific
bequests in the Will.
The main asset of the Estate was a farm. The
Decedent’s daughter, Janet M. Sellard ([a]ppellee
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herein) resided on the farm with her mother, both
before and after Ms. Showers’ death. Appellee’s
husband also resided with her.
George E. Showers, Jr. and Dean R. Showers, Sr.
([a]ppellants herein) worked the farm to various
degrees during their mother’s lifetime.
At the time of this litigation, much of the farm was in
disrepair with weeds growing throughout it and farm
implements and vehicles sitting rusting in the weeds.
Although [a]ppellee was initially listed in the Will to
be the Executrix, for reasons not relevant to
the this [sic] appeal, [a]ppellee was not appointed as
Executrix and [appellants] were appointed as
Executors. Disputes arose between the parties and
on April 30, 2015 [a]ppellee filed a Petition for First
and Partial Accounting and also a Petition Seeking
Specific Performance of Estate Settlement
Agreement. Significant conflict existed between the
parties regarding Estate assets and the management
of the Estate. On September 24, 2015, [a]ppellee
filed a Petition to Remove Appellants as Executors of
the Decedent’s Estate. On December 30, 2015 after
a hearing, the parties agreed that [a]ppellants would
be removed as Co-Executors and an independent
Executor would be appointed by the Court. On
January 26, 2016, Attorney Sara Hudock was
appointed to be Executrix of the Estate.
On August 22, 2016, [a]ppellants filed a Motion to
Compel Rental Payments to be paid by [a]ppellee
who was still residing in the Estate residence. On
September 28, 2016 [a]ppellee filed a Motion to
Strike the Appellants’ Motion to Compel Rental
Payments. On October 25, 2016 a hearing was held
and the Court granted [a]ppellee’s Motion to Strike
Appellants’ Motion to Compel Rental Payments.
The Executrix had been directed by the Court to
obtain appraisals of the farm. The parties argued
that they had initially agreed to a division of the
acreage regarding the property. Appellee was to get
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the residence and a smaller portion of acreage while
[a]ppellants were to receive a majority of the
acreage.
After the appraisals, the Executrix was directed by
the Court to conduct a private sale between the
parties. This was done and the Executrix determined
that [a]ppellee was the high bidder. On January 5,
2017, [a]ppellants filed a Petition to remove the
Execut[rix] and for surcharge. Then on January 9,
2017, [a]ppellants filed a Petition for a Preliminary
Injunction seeking to prohibit the Executrix and the
parties from disposing of any Estate assets including
the real estate. The Executrix had notified the parties
that [a]ppellee was the high bidder on the real
estate and intended to transfer/sell the real estate to
[a]ppellee for the amount set forth in the bid.
The Court scheduled a hearing on the Motions for
March 20, 2017. The hearing was continued until
March 28, 2017.
At the March 28, 2017 hearing the Court denied
[a]ppellants[’] Petition to remove the Executor and
impose a surcharge and the Court granted the
Petition for an injunction in part but denied it in part.
The Court permitted the Executrix to transfer the
Estate real estate to [a]ppellee.
Orphans’ court opinion, 7/13/17 at 1-3.
The record reflects that on March 29, 2017, the orphans’ court entered
three orders on the docket. The first order granted appellee’s oral motion to
withdraw her petition to seek specific performance of estate settlement
agreement. The second order denied appellants’ petition to remove the
executrix and for surcharge. The third order denied in part and granted in
part appellants’ petition for an injunction. The orphans’ court denied the
appellant’s petition for an injunction as to the transfer of estate real property
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and authorized the executrix to execute a sales agreement and deed in order
to transfer the estate real property to appellee for $681,000. On April 27,
2017, appellants filed a notice of appeal to this court “from the order
entered in this matter on the 29th day of March 2017.” (Notice of appeal,
4/27/17.) In that notice of appeal, appellants failed to identify which of the
three orders entered on March 29, 2017, from which they sought to take an
appeal.1
Thereafter, in their civil docketing statement filed with this court,
appellants attached only the order that denied in part and granted in part
their petition for an injunction as the order from which they appealed.
(Appellants’ civil docketing statement, 6/8/17.) In the description of appeal
section that directs an appellant to describe the action and result below,
appellants’ counsel wrote, “My clients stepped down as executors after trial
court stopped hrg. Executor appointed who violated court order for timely
accounting, negotiations by parties, failure to collect rent from beneficiary
living on estate property, engaging in a private sale of estate prop.” (Id. at
unnumbered p. 2, § E, ¶ 1.) Appellants’ counsel left blank that section of
the civil docketing statement that directs an appellant to set forth the issues
to be raised on appeal.
1We note that on May 3, 2017, the orphans’ court ordered appellants to file
a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to
Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). Appellants timely complied.
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On June 12, 2017, appellee filed an application to quash and dismiss
appeal from interlocutory order. Thereafter, appellants filed a response. On
July 3, 2017, appellants filed an “amended civil docketing statement.” In
that amended statement, appellants identified the issue to be raised on
appeal as, “Did the trial court err in allowing a private sale of the estate real
property?” (Appellants’ amended civil docketing statement at unnumbered
p. 2, § E, ¶ 1.) Appellants also wrote on the amended docket sheet that
they “previously attached” the order from which this appeal is taken.
(Appellants’ amended civil docketing statement at unnumbered p. 2.)
On July 27, 2017, this court entered an order denying appellee’s
application to quash appeal without prejudice to her right to again raise the
issues in her brief or, if her brief had already been filed, in a new application
to quash. (Order of court 7/27/17.) On January 16, 2018, appellee filed her
brief and again raised the issue of appealability.
In appellants’ brief to this court, appellants contend that they are now
appealing the orders of “December 30th, 2015, October 25, 2016, July 12,
2017 and March 28, 2017.”2 (Appellants’ brief at 1.) The orders of
2 We note that the three orders entered on the docket on March 29, 2017,
are dated March 28, 2017.
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December 30, 2015;3 October 25, 2016;4 and July 12, 2017,5 however, are
not properly before us. See Pa.R.A.P. 903(a) (requiring that a notice of
appeal be filed within 30 days after entry of the order from which the appeal
is taken).
With respect to appellants’ seeming attempt to appeal two of the
March 29, 2017 orders6 in one appeal, the courts of this Commonwealth
have specifically disapproved of this practice. See Gen. Elec. Credit Corp.
v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 263 A.2d 448, 452-453 (Pa. 1970) (holding that
one appeal from several judgments is discouraged as unacceptable practice
and stating that the supreme court has quashed such appeals where no
meaningful choice between them could be made); see also Egenrieder v.
Ohio Cas. Group, 581 A.2d 937, 940 (Pa.Super. 1990) (holding separate
appeals were required to be filed by each appellant where trial court entered
separate orders denying each appellant’s motion on different grounds).
3 Our review of the record reveals that the order of December 30, 2015,
ordered the removal of appellants as co-executors.
4 Our review of the record reveals that the order of October 26, 2016,
denied appellants’ motion to compel rental payments.
5We note that the order of July 12, 2017, post-dates the orders entered on
March 29, 2017, that appellants purport to appeal from.
6 Nothing in the record before us indicates that appellants purport to appeal
from the March 29, 2017 order that granted appellee’s oral motion to
withdraw her petition to seek specific performance of estate settlement
agreement.
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Here, because appellants filed only one notice of appeal from the two
separate orders, quashal on this basis is appropriate.
Even assuming arguendo that appellants properly appealed from the
March 29, 2017 order that denied that part of their petition for injunction
regarding the transfer of the estate real property and authorized the
executrix to execute a sales agreement and deed in order to effectuate the
sale and transfer of that property, the appeal would be quashed.
Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 341 provides generally that
an appeal may be taken as of right only from a final order. Pa.R.A.P. 341. A
final order is any order that “disposes of all claims and of all parties,” or “is
entered as a final order pursuant to [Rule 341(c)].” Id. at 341(b). “In a
decedent’s estate, the confirmation of the final account of the personal
representative represents the final order, subject to exceptions being filed
and disposed of by the court.” In re Estate of Habazin, 679 A.2d 1293,
1295 (Pa.Super. 1996) (citation omitted). Here, the March 29, 2017 order
of the orphans’ court, authorizing executrix to sell the estate real property,
is not a final order because it is not an appeal from the confirmation of the
final account of executrix. That, however, does not end the analysis
because Rules 313 and 342 qualify Rule 341.
Rule 313 provides that an appeal may be taken as of
right from a collateral order, which is “an order
separable from and collateral to the main cause of
action where the right involved is too important to be
denied review and the question presented is such
that if review is postponed until final judgment in the
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case, the claim will be irreparably lost.”
Pa.R.A.P. 313(b). Rule 342 (“Appealable Orphans’
Court Orders”), provides, in relevant part, as follows:
(a) General rule.—An appeal may be taken
as of right from the following orders of
the Orphans’ Court Division:
***
(6) An order determining an
interest in real or personal
property . . . .
Pa.R.A.P. 342. We begin our review with Rule 342.
In In re Estate of Stricker, 602 Pa. 54, 977 A.2d
1115 (Pa. 2009), our Supreme Court held that an
orphans’ court’s order to sell real estate in
connection with the disposition of an estate was an
interlocutory order that was not appealable under
Rule 313 or former Rule 342. In that case, two
tracts of land constituted the bulk of the decedent’s
estate, which was to be disposed of by two
co-executors, one of whom was the appellant, in
favor of approximately ten beneficiaries. One tract
was subject to a third party’s option to repurchase
the property, which the third party had exercised.
The remaining tract was put up for auction, where
John Fulton made the highest bid. The orphans’
court directed the estate to deliver that tract to
Fulton. Id. at 1116-17.
Before the auction occurred, the appellant co-
executor had made multiple below-market value
offers to buy both tracts. His co-executrix and the
beneficiaries rejected the offers. Although the
appellant participated in the public auction for the
unrestricted property, Fulton’s bid not only exceeded
the appellant’s, but indeed exceeded the appellant’s
prior offers for both tracts combined. The appellant
thereafter refused to cooperate in transferring either
tract. The co-executrix then petitioned the court to
compel the appellant to sign the agreement of sale
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transferring the tract purchased by Fulton. The
orphans’ court entered an order so directing, and the
appellant appealed that order. This Court quashed
the appeal as interlocutory. On remand, the
orphans’ court ruled that the co-executors were
bound to take the necessary steps to consummate
the sale of one tract. The orphans’ court also
directed the co-executors to take the steps
necessary to complete the sale of the other tract to
Fulton. Id. at 1117.
Once again, the appellant sought relief in this Court,
and once again this Court quashed the appeal for
want of jurisdiction. First, we held that the orders
were not final because a final accounting of the
estate had not been rendered. Second, we held that
the orders appealed from were not appealable under
the collateral order doctrine as embodied by
Rule 313. Id.
The Supreme Court granted the appellant’s petition
for allowance of appeal to address whether the
orders in question were final pursuant to Rules 341
and 342 or were collateral orders that were
appealable as of right pursuant to Rule 313. Id.
The Court made the following observations:
Rule 342 allows Orphans’ Court judges to
designate as final (and therefore
immediately appealable) an order
“making a distribution, or determining an
interest in realty or personalty or the
status of individuals or entities.”
Pa.R.A.P. 342. It does not require that
any particular class of orders be treated
as final, but instead leaves the
determination of finality of orders not
disposing of all claims and all parties up
to the Orphans’ Court judge.
Pa.R.A.P. 342(1). Certification under
Rule 342 is wisely left to the discretion of
the Orphans’ Court[ judges], who are in
the best position to take the facts of the
case into account when deciding whether
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an immediate appeal would be
appropriate.
“It is fundamental law in this
Commonwealth that an appeal will lie
only from final orders, unless otherwise
expressly permitted by statute.” T.C.R.
Realty, Inc., v. Cox, 472 Pa. 331, 372
A.2d 721, 724 (Pa. 1977). An appeal
from an order directing the administrator
of a decedent’s estate to sell real estate
belonging to the decedent is
interlocutory and must be quashed.
In re Maslowski’s Estate, 261 Pa. 484,
104 A. 675 (Pa. 1918); In re Estate of
Habazin, 451 Pa. Super. 421, 679 A.2d
1293 (Pa. 1996); see also Appeal of
Snodgrass, 96 Pa. 420, 421 (Pa. 1880)
(holding that an order directing sale of
real estate for payment of decedent’s
debts is not definitive, and an appeal will
not lie therefrom: “Why should the
proceeding be brought here by
piece-meal when the whole may be
reviewed on an appeal from the final
confirmation?”).
Id. at 1117-18 (citations modified).
The appellant argued that, if he was not afforded an
immediate appeal, “the tracts [would] be sold, his
claims regarding the properties [would] be lost, and
therefore the orders should be considered final.” Id.
at 1118. Our Supreme Court disagreed in an
instructive passage:
It is true that the real estate will no
longer be available to [the appellant]
once a sale to another party is
accomplished. But [the appellant] was
not bequeathed the tracts themselves.
Instead, [the appellant] is entitled only
to a share of the decedent’s estate after
it has been liquidated. Therefore, his
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claim that an immediate appeal is
necessary to protect his interests fails.
Indeed, [the appellant] has no greater
rights with respect to this property than
any potential buyer. Moreover, if [the
Court] accepted [the appellant’s]
argument that any claim on or about
property that might be sold during the
probate process should be immediately
appealable, the appellate court system
would be flooded with such appeals and
the administration of decedents’ estates
would be unreasonably delayed.
Id. at 1118; cf. id. at 1119-21 (Saylor, J.,
concurring) (positing that immediate appeal in
certain circumstances might expedite disposition of
the estate). The Court went on to explain that “an
order is not final and appealable merely because it
decides one issue of importance to the parties.” Id.
at 1118 (quoting 3 Patridge-Remick, Practice &
Procedure in the Orphans’ Court of Penna. § 26.04);
see In re Estate of Quinn, 2002 PA Super 243,
805 A.2d 541, 543 (Pa. Super. 2002) (noting that
“the confirmation of the final account of the personal
representative represents the final order, and
deeming an appealed distribution order interlocutory
because the orphans’ court had not confirmed a final
accounting and the estate “remain[ed] under
administration”).
After Stricker, the Supreme Court amended
Rule 342. No longer was the question of
appealability vested strictly in the orphans’ court’s
discretion. Rather, the revised rule identified certain
orders that would henceforth be appealable as of
right, independent of any orphans’ court finding
regarding the nature of the order and its place in the
proceedings. Locke argues that subsection (a)(6) of
Rule 342 applies in this case. This subsection
designates as immediately appealable an orphans’
court order that “determines an interest in real or
personal property.” Pa.R.A.P. 342(a)(6).
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In In re Estate of Ash, 2013 PA Super 241, 73
A.3d 1287 (Pa. Super. 2013), this Court interpreted
and applied Rule 342 in its current form. In Ash,
the will at issue made specific cash bequests and
directed that the remaining personal and real
property be sold, with the proceeds to be divided
among three residual beneficiaries. The appellant,
Joseph Heit, was named executor; the remaining two
beneficiaries were his brother, James Heit, and
Duane Fetter. As executor, the appellant conveyed
to himself (as an individual) a tract of land referred
to as Tract 1, which he contended was consistent
with an agreement of sale entered into with the
decedent prior to his death. The orphans’ court set
aside the sale, removed the appellant as executor,
and appointed an administratrix in the appellant’s
place. The appellant did not appeal that order. Id.
at 1288.
Thereafter, Fetter indicated that he had entered an
agreement with the decedent to purchase an
adjoining tract (“Tract 2”), and signaled to the
administratrix that he was willing to buy Tract 2 as
well as the two adjoining tracts, Tract 1 and Tract 3.
It appeared from the record that the administratrix
intended to sell these tracts to Fetter. Thereafter,
the appellant filed a “Petition to Force Sale of Real
Estate,” wherein he asserted that he was willing to
buy Tract 1. He also contended that Tract 1 would
be landlocked unless an easement were granted over
Tract 2. He asked the court to grant an order
directing the administratrix to grant the easement
over Tract 2 and stay the sale of Tract 1 until the
parties’ disputes regarding the property were
resolved. The administratrix, however, indicated
that it would be in the best interests of the estate to
sell all three tracts to Fetter, both because the net
proceeds would be greater and because it would
avoid the prospect of litigation with Fetter. The
orphans’ court entered an order denying the
appellant’s petition and authorizing the
administratrix to enter into an agreement selling all
of the tracts to Fetter, and the appellant appealed.
Id. 1288-89.
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We found the facts in Ash to be apposite to those in
Stricker, notwithstanding the intervening
amendments to Rule 342:
The order on appeal before us authorizes
the administratrix to sell real estate
formerly belonging to [Ash] in order to
accomplish the eventual division of the
estate assets (i.e., the sale proceeds)
among the beneficiaries as directed by
Ash’s will. Pursuant to Stricker, we
conclude this order is neither final nor
collateral but, instead, is
interlocutory. . . .
In reaching our result, we are mindful
that the Rules of Appellate Procedure
addressing the appealability of Orphans’
Court orders have changed somewhat
since Stricker was decided. . . .
Effective February 13, 2012, the
Supreme Court deleted from Rule 342
the provision concerning the ability of an
Orphans’ Court to make determinations
of finality and, instead, listed various
orders that would be immediately
appealable. See Pa.R.A.P. 342(a).
Among the orders listed in Rule 342 is an
order determining an interest in real
property. Pa.R.A.P. 342(a)(6).
We do not believe the order before us is
one of the appealable orders set forth by
Rule 342, whether in Subsection (6) or
otherwise. Consequently, we do not
believe Subsection (6) and/or any other
post[-]Stricker change(s) to Rule 342
negate Stricker and render the order
before us appealable. We understand
the effect of the instant order will be to
allow the realty sale and, if the
administratrix sells the tracts, Fetter will
come to own them. Thus, if the sale is
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completed, the order will eventually lead
to a change in the ownership interest of
the realty. Nevertheless, the Orphans’
Court decision now on appeal did not
involve the court having to resolve some
dispute about who had or has an interest
in the tracts: The estate obviously owns
them. The court’s decision was about
. . . the propriety of her plan to reduce
the estate assets to cash by sale to a
particular party, the goal being to
distribute the sale proceeds in
accordance with the will. The court’s
decision was not about determining an
interest in the subject realty.
Accordingly, Stricker controls this case.
Id. at 1289-90 (citations modified; footnotes
omitted). In a footnote, we acknowledged that
certain language in the comment to the rule as
amended, which drew upon Justice Saylor’s
concurring opinion in Stricker, perhaps complicated
the analysis. However, we concluded that if “the
changes to Rule 342 were indeed meant to abrogate
Stricker and . . . to transform an order such as the
one before us into an order determining an interest
in realty under Subsection (6), ... that
pronouncement should be made by the Supreme
Court. At present, we will follow Stricker.” Id. at
1290 n.5.
....
In Ash, we acknowledged that “the effect of the
[challenged order would] be to allow the realty sale,”
which eventually would “lead to a change in the
ownership interest of the realty.” Ash, 73 A.3d at
1290. Nonetheless, we effectively held that
subsection (a)(6) applied only when the orphans’
court enters an order that “resolve[s] some dispute
about who had or has an interest in the tracts” at
issue”; there, because “the estate obviously
own[ed]” the property in question, subsection (a)(6)
did not apply. Id.
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Estate of Cherry, 111 A.3d 1204, 1207-1210 (Pa.Super. 2015) (footnote
omitted).
Here, the order of the orphans’ court denied appellants’ petition for
injunctive relief as to the transfer of the estate real property and permitted
the sale of that property. The order did not resolve a dispute as to any
ownership interest in the estate real property because the estate owned the
property. Consequently, the order that permitted the sale did nothing more
than reduce the estate real property to cash which was then to be
distributed to the residual beneficiaries pursuant to the will. Therefore, that
part of the order that denied appellants’ petition for injunctive relief would
not be appealable under Rule 342(a)(6).
We now address whether the order would qualify as a collateral order
that is appealable as of right under Pa.R.A.P. 313.
As noted, supra, Rule 313 provides that an appeal
may be taken as of right from “an order [that is]
separable from and collateral to the main cause of
action where the right involved is too important to be
denied review and the question presented is such
that if review is postponed until final judgment in the
case, the claim will be irreparably lost.”
Pa.R.A.P. 313(b).
The Stricker Court held that the order in question in
that case was not a collateral order entitled to
immediate review under Rule 313. Noting that, “to
qualify as collateral, an order must be separable
from the main cause of action,” and that the
collateral order doctrine “is to be construed narrowly
to preserve the integrity of the general rule that only
final orders may be appealed,” the Court held that “it
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is not possible that an order to sell estate property
in pursuit of” the final accounting and distribution
of the estate provided for by the will could be
“collateral to the main cause of action.” Id. at 1119
(emphasis added). To the contrary, the Court found,
it was “central to the main cause of action.” Id.
(emphasis in original). Thus, the order in question
did not qualify for immediate appeal as a collateral
order under Rule 313.
Estate of Cherry, 111 A.3d at 1211.
Likewise, the estate real property in this case is central to the estate.
Disposition of the estate real property aids in the completion of the final
accounting and distribution of the residual estate to the residual
beneficiaries. Therefore, because the estate real property is “central to the
main cause of action,” the order denying appellants’ injunctive relief with
respect to the sale would not qualify as a collateral order subject to
immediate appeal.
Appeal quashed.7
7 Although appellants have not raised a question regarding our jurisdiction to
consider this appeal under Pa.R.A.P. 311(a)(4), we may raise the issue of
jurisdiction sua sponte. Commonwealth v. Blystone, 119 A.3d 306, 312
(Pa. 2015). With certain exceptions not applicable here, an appeal may be
taken as of right from an interlocutory order denying an injunction pursuant
to Rule 311(a)(4).
A party seeking a preliminary injunction must
establish each of the six following prerequisites and
the failure to establish any one of them is fatal to the
request:
First, a party seeking a preliminary
injunction must show that an injunction
is necessary to prevent immediate and
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irreparable harm that cannot be
adequately compensated by damages.
Second, the party must show that
greater injury would result from refusing
an injunction than from granting it, and,
concomitantly, that issuance of an
injunction will not substantially harm
other interested parties in the
proceedings. Third, the party must show
that a preliminary injunction will properly
restore the parties to their status as it
existed immediately prior to the alleged
wrongful conduct. Fourth, the party
seeking an injunction must show that the
activity it seeks to restrain is actionable,
that its right to relief is clear, and that
the wrong is manifest, or, in other
words, must show that it is likely to
prevail on the merits. Fifth, the party
must show that the injunction it seeks is
reasonably suited to abate the offending
activity. Sixth and finally, the party
seeking an injunction must show that a
preliminary injunction will not adversely
affect the public interest.
Duquesne Light Co. v. Longue Vue Club, 63 A.3d 270, 275 (Pa.Super.
2013) (quotations and citation omitted).
Here, in their petition for preliminary injunction to enjoin the transfer
of the estate real property and at the hearing on that petition, appellants
failed to allege facts pertaining to, let alone establish, any of the
six prerequisites. (Appellant’s petition for preliminary injunction, 1/9/17;
notes of testimony, 3/28/17). Therefore, even if appellants raised the issue
of appealability under Rule 311(a)(4), any claim that the trial court abused
its discretion in denying the petition would be waived because appellants
failed to establish any of the necessary prerequisites below. See
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Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 05/25/18
Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) (providing that “[i]ssues not raised in the lower court are
waived and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal[]”).
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