United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
September 28, 2004
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
_____________________ Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
No. 03-30866
_____________________
WILLIE SENSLEY; WILLIAM WASHINGTON; RALPH HOLLEY; DAVID WINE,
Plaintiffs - Appellants,
versus
JABO ALBRITTON, In His Official Capacity as a Member of the
Union Parish Police Jury; JOHNNY BUCKLEY, In His Official
Capacity as a Member of the Union Parish Police Jury; KEITH
BYRAM, In His Official Capacity as a Member of the Union
Parish Police Jury; DEWAYNE HILL, In His Official Capacity
as a Member of the Union Parish Police Jury; JERRY HOLSON,
In His Official Capacity as a Member of the Union Parish
Police Jury; ANNA MILSTEAD, In Her Official Capacity as a
Member of the Union Parish Police Jury; JERRY RUGG, In His
Official Capacity as a Member of the Union Parish Police
Jury; DANNY SMITH, In His Official Capacity as a Member of
the Union Parish Police Jury,
Defendants - Appellees.
_________________________________________________________________
Appeals from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Louisiana
_________________________________________________________________
Before JOLLY, DAVIS, and JONES, Circuit Judges.
E. GRADY JOLLY, Circuit Judge:
Residents of Union Parish, Louisiana appeal the dismissal of
their vote dilution challenge under § 2 of the Voting Rights Act to
a redistricting plan for electing parish police jury members, a
plan that continued to provide two black-majority districts instead
of expanding to include three. The district court found that the
plaintiffs failed to prove that the African-American population of
the parish was sufficiently geographically compact to support an
additional black-majority district and, alternatively, found that
the plaintiffs had failed to prove that African-Americans in Union
Parish have less opportunity than other members of the electorate
to participate in the political process and elect representatives
of their choice. At the close of the case, the plaintiffs filed a
motion for the district judge to recuse himself. The motion was
filed under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a), § 455(b)(4), and § 455(b)(5)(iii),
alleging that the wife of the federal judge was employed as a state
assistant district attorney in the office that was representing the
defendants. The district judge declined to recuse. Because we
find no error in the district judge’s findings with respect to the
merits of this case and because we find no abuse of discretion in
his declining to recuse himself, we AFFIRM the judgment.
I
Union Parish is a political subdivision of Louisiana, which is
governed by a nine-member Police Jury. Each member is elected from
one of nine, single-member electoral districts. According to the
2000 Census, Union Parish has a population of 22,803 persons --
69.8% of whom are white and 27.9% of whom are black. Of that total
population, there are 16,952 persons of voting age -- 73.2% are
white and 24.8% are black. The 2000 Census showed a 10.2% increase
in the total population of Union Parish.1 The increase was
1
This increase apparently was not equally observed across
racial lines; over that same time period, African-American
2
greater in some geographical areas than others, which resulted in
population inequities among the nine districts. A redistricting
was thus required to satisfy the one person, one vote
constitutional standard. Consequently, the Police Jury and the
School Board hired David A. Creed, executive director of the North
Delta Regional Planning and Development District, Inc., to assist
them in re-apportioning the district.
Creed prepared fourteen different proposed redistricting
plans. In twelve of these plans, two of the nine districts were
majority black -- the same number as under the old plan. Two of
these plans contained three majority-black districts, albeit only
marginally.2 The Union Parish Police Jury ultimately adopted a
plan that maintained the existing arrangement of having two
majority-black districts. The adopted plan reflected only minor
changes to the district boundaries under the old plan. In
particular, Police Jury incumbents remained in their same districts
and the districts that were majority-black under the old plan
remained so under the new one.
Following the parish’s adoption of this plan, the plaintiffs
(“the Plaintiffs”) in this action brought this suit against the
members of the Police Jury (“the Defendants”), who were sued in
population increased by only 0.2%.
2
In each of these two proposed plans, the third minority-
majority district only had African-American populations of 53.97%
and 51.44%.
3
their official capacity as members of that body. The Plaintiffs
are African-American citizens of Union Parish who are registered to
vote. In addition, one of the Plaintiffs, Willie Sensley, is a
current member of the Police Jury, representing District 1. The
Plaintiffs alleged that the redistricting plan adopted by the
Parish violates § 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. §
1973, because, by creating only two instead of three majority-black
electoral districts, it dilutes the voting rights of African-
American citizens of the Parish.
At a trial held on July 30, 2003, both parties presented the
testimony of fact and expert witness in support of their positions.
The district court took the case under advisement and found in
favor of the Defendants on August 14, 2003. Specifically, the
court found that the Plaintiffs had been unable to make the
required threshold showing of “geographical compactness” under
Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986). In the alternative, the
district court found that their case still would fail under the
totality of the circumstances test outlined in Gingles because the
Plaintiffs failed to prove that under the adopted redistricting
plan, African-Americans “would have less opportunity than other
members of the electorate to participate in the political process
and elect representatives of their choice.” 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b).
The Plaintiffs assert three points of error. First, they
contend the district court erred in concluding that the African-
American voting age population was insufficiently compact. Second,
4
they argue that the district court erred in concluding that the
redistricting plan did not dilute the voting rights of the African-
Americans. Finally, they assert that the district judge abused his
discretion in failing to recuse himself.
II
A
We first turn to the contention relating to the merits:
Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, as amended, provides that: “No
voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard,
practice, or procedure shall be imposed or applied by any State or
political subdivision in a manner which results in a denial or
abridgement of the right of any citizen of the United States to
vote on account of race or color....” 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a). To
establish a § 2 violation, members of the protected class must
demonstrate that, based on the totality of circumstances, they
“have less opportunity than other members of the electorate to
participate in the political process and to elect representatives
of their choice.” 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b); see also Gingles, 478 U.S.
at 47 ("The essence of a § 2 claim is that a certain electoral law,
practice, or structure interacts with social and historical
conditions to cause an inequality in the opportunities enjoyed by
black and white voters to elect their preferred representatives.").
In Gingles, the Supreme Court held that a court should analyze
a § 2 claim under a two-part framework. First, plaintiffs must
satisfy, as a threshold matter, three preconditions. Specifically,
5
“[t]he minority group must demonstrate that: (1) it is
sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a
majority in a single-member district; (2) it is politically
cohesive; and (3) the white majority votes sufficiently as a bloc
to enable it -- in the absence of special circumstances -- usually
to defeat the minority's preferred candidates.” Clark v. Calhoun
County, Miss., 21 F.3d 92, 94-95 (5th Cir. 1994). Failure to
establish all three of these elements defeats a Section 2 claim.
Teague v. Attala County, Miss., 92 F.3d 283, 287 (5th Cir. 1996).
Second, if the preconditions are proved, plaintiffs must then prove
that “based on the totality of the circumstances,” they "have less
opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in
the political process and to elect representatives of their
choice." Clark, 21 F.3d at 94 (quoting 42 U.S.C. 1973(b)).
This court reviews de novo the legal standards the district
court applied to determine whether Section 2 has been violated.
N.A.A.C.P. v. Fordice, 252 F.3d 361, 364 (5th Cir. 2001). However,
because Section 2 vote dilution disputes are determinations
"peculiarly dependent upon the facts of each case that require an
intensely local appraisal of the design and impact of the contested
electoral mechanisms,” we review the district court's findings on
the Gingles threshold requirements and its ultimate findings on
vote dilution for clear error. Id. at 364-65, (quoting Gingles,
478 U.S. 30, 79) (quotations removed). We thereby “preserve[] the
6
benefit of the trial court's particular familiarity with the
indigenous political reality without endangering the rule of law.”
Gingles, 478 U.S. at 79. “[A] finding is clearly erroneous when
although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on
the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction
that a mistake has been made.” Houston v. Lafayette County, Miss.,
56 F.3d 606, 610 (5th Cir. 1995) (quoting Anderson v. City of
Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573 (1985))(quotations removed).
B
At trial, the parties stipulated that the second and third
Gingles preconditions are met in the present case. Thus, the
question before the district court was whether the Plaintiffs were
able to establish the first Gingles precondition: that the
African-American population in Union Parish is “sufficiently large
and geographically compact” to constitute a majority of the voting
age population in three single-member districts. Gingles, 478 U.S.
at 50.
In support of their position, the Plaintiffs offered at trial
two proposed redistricting plans prepared by their expert. Each of
these plans featured alternative redistricting configurations
wherein a third majority-minority district, District 6, was
created. Under these reconfigurations, District 6 would have a
total African-American voting age population of 50.5% and 50.1%,
respectively. After analyzing these proposed plans, the district
court concluded that the Plaintiffs were able to satisfy the size
7
element of the first Gingles precondition, i.e., they had proven
that the African-American voting age population of the parish was
large enough to constitute a majority of three configured electoral
districts. However, the court concluded that they were not able to
satisfy the “geographical compactness” element of that same
precondition. Accordingly, it dismissed their case.
The Plaintiffs contend this conclusion was clearly erroneous.
They argue that the district court’s compactness analysis was
inappropriately narrow, alleging that it focused primarily on the
shape of District 6 when it should have inquired more generally
into whether the reconfigured district had “take[n] into account
traditional districting principles such as maintaining communities
of interest and traditional boundaries.” Abrams v. United States,
521 U.S. 74, 92 (1997) (quotations removed). The Plaintiffs note
that in Lafayette County, this court criticized a district court’s
narrow application of the compactness standard. There, we stated:
The first Gingles precondition does not
require some aesthetic ideal of compactness,
but simply that the black population be
sufficiently compact to constitute a majority
in a single-member district. Moreover, the
question is not whether the plaintiff
residents' proposed district was oddly shaped,
but whether the proposal demonstrated that a
geographically compact district could be
drawn. Thus, although the edges of the
plaintiff residents' proposed district look
ragged in places, this does not automatically
mean failure to meet the first Gingles
precondition.
56 F.3d at 611 (citations and quotations removed).
8
The Plaintiffs contend the district court in this case
committed a similar error, concluding that District 6 was not
geographically compact on the basis of its shape alone.
First, we should note that to the extent the Plaintiffs are
suggesting that Lafayette County stands for the proposition that
the shape of a district is irrelevant, they are misreading the
case. For while Lafayette County may have made it clear that a
compactness determination should not hinge on the shape of a
district, the shape of a district certainly cannot be disregarded
in a compactness inquiry. In Gingles, the Supreme Court held that
establishing a Section 2 violation required a plaintiff to prove
that a minority population is “geographically compact” enough to
constitute an additional district. 478 U.S. at 50. That is,
“[Section] 2 does not require the state to create, on predominantly
racial lines, a district that is not reasonably compact.” Abrams
v. Johnson, 521 U.S. 74, 91-21 (1997) (quotations removed); see
also Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 979 ((1996) (“If, because of the
dispersion of the minority population, a reasonably compact
majority-minority district cannot be created, § 2 does not require
a majority-minority district....”) (emphasis added). As the
geographical shape of any proposed district necessarily directly
relates to the geographical compactness and population dispersal of
the minority community in question, it is clear that shape is a
significant factor that courts can and must consider in a Gingles
compactness inquiry.
9
The district court in this case gave appropriate weight to the
shape of the district here. Contrary to the Plaintiffs’ implicit
contention, the district court’s determination did not rely only on
the fact that the proposed additional majority-black districts were
not “aesthetically” compact. To be sure, the district court did
find the shape relevant, but only insofar as it was indicative of
the non-compactness of the minority population in those proposed
districts. Moreover, the district court grounded its conclusion on
a number of additional factors, including that both proposed
additional majority-black districts separated distinct communities
and disrupted relationships between incumbents and constituents,
which had existed over the years and continued to exist under the
Defendants’ new plan.
As we have noted, we owe deference to the district court on
these factual issues and none of these findings appear clearly
erroneous to us. As the district court indicated, the primary
obstacle the Plaintiffs face in crafting three “reasonably compact”
majority-black electoral districts is the uneven geographical
dispersal of the African-American population in Union Parish.
Specifically, in Union Parish, the African-American population is
largely grouped in three distinct locations: in the west-
northwestern portion of the parish, in the Town of Marion (in the
northeastern portion of the parish), and in the Town of Farmerville
(in the southern center of the parish). Of these three areas,
however, only two -- the west-northwest corner of the Parish, and
10
the Town of Farmerville -- have large enough African-American
populations to constitute a majority of an electoral district that
has some semblance of a center. And, under both the adopted and
former districting scheme, these two areas comprise their own
Police Jury majority-black electoral districts -- Districts 9 and
1, respectively. The Town of Marion also contains a high
concentration of African-Americans of voting age. No one disputes,
however, that its numbers are too small by themselves to constitute
a majority of an electoral district centered around it.
In line with this reality, both proposed plans crafted a third
majority-black district by removing the Town of Marion, in the
northeastern section of the parish, from District 2 and also
carving a portion of Farmerville, in the southern center of the
parish, out of District 1. These two areas of highly-concentrated
African-American population, which are roughly 15 miles apart from
one another, were then linked together by a narrow corridor of land
to form a new District 6. This narrow corridor was carefully drawn
to avoid areas of higher Caucasian population concentration so as
to ensure that African-Americans remained a majority in the
proposed district.3 The result in each proposed plan was an
3
The concentration of African-Americans in the west-northwest
corner of the Parish is too far from either of the other two areas,
is separated by too many precincts of high Caucasian concentration,
and in any event, does not contain enough of a surplus of African-
Americans of voting age from which to draw additional African-
Americans. Accordingly, it remains untouched under each of the
Plaintiffs’ proposed plans.
11
irregularly-drawn District 6 whose extended and distorted shape --
resulting specifically from excluding non-blacks while
simultaneously adding “excess” blacks from other communities --
constitutes strong evidence that the black minority populations
contained therein are not “reasonably compact.”4
But, as noted, the shape of the proposed districts is not the
only factor suggesting that the African-American population is
insufficiently compact to support three majority-minority electoral
districts in Union Parish. As the district court pointed out, in
order to connect these two towns together, the Plaintiffs were
required to ignore traditional districting principles such as
maintaining communities of interest and traditional boundaries.
See Abrams, 521 U.S. at 91 (“[T]he § 2 compactness inquiry should
take into account traditional districting principles such as
maintaining communities of interest and traditional boundaries.")
(quotations omitted). For example, the district court noted that
recrafting District 6 required the Plaintiffs to lump together two
groups of African-American citizens who were from two distinct
communities -- the Towns of Marion and Farmerville -- which are
separated by considerable distance (approximately 18 miles) and
4
The population dispersal of one of the resulting districts
resembles an electoral barbell: two areas of heavy African-
American concentration situated at each end and a narrow and
sparsely-populated rural corridor running approximately 18 miles
between these two communities, connecting them together. At some
points, this corridor appears to be less than a half-mile wide.
The other proposed District 6 is less narrow overall, but much more
narrow in parts, with some portions only a city block wide.
12
share few community interests. In addition, each of the proposed
plans split the Town of Farmerville in half, ignoring that
traditional municipal boundary and disrupting the core of the
preexisting electoral district (a black majority district), which
had recognized that boundary.5 Finally, because both of the
proposed plans require the serious reshaping of several Police Jury
districts located in the central portion of Union Parish, the
existing relationship between incumbents and constituents would be
significantly disturbed.
For these reasons, the district court’s conclusion that the
Plaintiffs failed to prove that the African-American population of
Union Parish was insufficiently compact was not clearly erroneous.
Because the failure to satisfy each of the Gingles preconditions
defeats a Section 2 claim, we AFFIRM the district court’s dismissal
of the Plaintiffs’ vote dilution claims.6 Teague, 92 F.3d at 287.
III
We now turn to the Plaintiffs’ contention that the district
judge who heard this case, Robert G. James, abused his discretion
by failing to recuse himself under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a), § 455(b)(4)
and § 455(b)(5)(iii). The Plaintiffs raised this objection
5
One of the proposed versions of District 6 split the town of
Marion in two as well.
6
Because we have concluded that the district court committed
no clear error in finding that the Plaintiffs had failed to meet
the Gingles threshold, we do not need to address the court’s
alternative holding that the Plaintiffs failed to prove vote
dilution under a Gingles totality of the circumstances analysis.
13
following the district court’s entry of judgment against them,
after discovering that Judge James’ spouse was an Assistant
District Attorney in the office of District Attorney Robert Levy,
whose office also represented the Defendants in this case.
A motion to disqualify brought under 28 U.S.C. § 455 is
“committed to the sound discretion of the district judge.”
Chitimacha Tribe v. Harry L. Laws Co., 690 F.2d 1157, 1166 (5th Cir.
1982). And, accordingly, this recusal motion will be reviewed for
abuse of discretion. Weinberger v. Equifax, Inc., 557 F.2d 456,
464 (5th Cir. 1977). Courts should take special care in reviewing
recusal claims so as to prevent parties from “abus[ing] § 455 for
a dilatory and litigious purpose based on little or no
substantiated basis.” Travelers Ins. Co. v. Liljeberg Enterprises,
Inc., 38 F.3d 1404, 1409 n.8 (5th Cir. 1994). Chief Justice
Rehnquist has noted, when considering a request for his own
recusal, that “a federal judge has a duty to sit where not
disqualified which is equally as strong as the duty to not sit
where disqualified.” Laird v. Tatum, 409 U.S. 824, 837 (1972).
A
As noted, the Plaintiffs identify three statutory bases for
their recusal motion: 28 U.S.C. § 455(a), § 455(b)(4), and §
455(b)(5)(iii). Under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a), “Any . . . judge . . .
of the United States shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in
which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” Courts
have interpreted this statute to require recusal if a reasonable
14
person, knowing all of the facts, would harbor doubts concerning
the judge’s impartiality. Liljeberg v. Health Serv. Acquisition
Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 860-61 (1988). In conducting this review, we
must ask how these facts would appear to a “well-informed,
thoughtful and objective observer, rather than the hypersensitive,
cynical, and suspicious person.” U.S. v. Jordan, 49 F.3d 152, 156
(5th Cir. 1995). Moreover, courts should be cautious and
discriminating in reviewing recusal motions. As the Seventh
Circuit has noted:
A thoughtful observer understands that putting
disqualification in the hands of a party,
whose real fear may be that the judge will
apply rather than disregard the law, could
introduce a bias into adjudication. Thus the
search is for a risk substantially out of the
ordinary.
In re Mason, 916 F.2d 384, 385-86 (7th Cir. 1990), cited with
approval in Jordan, 49 F.3d at 156.
In examining this question, we first note that there is no
evidence of any direct connection between Judge James and this
case. He has no direct financial interest in the outcome nor does
he have any relationships with any of the parties that would call
his impartiality into question. Mrs. James similarly lacks any
direct connection or direct financial interest in this case. There
is no social relationship between her and any parties to this
matter, including District Attorney Levy. Nor does Mrs. James, in
her position as assistant district attorney, have any professional
15
connection to the case.7 Finally, it is undisputed that she has no
financial or other interests directly at stake in this case.
Notwithstanding Judge James’s lack of any direct interest in
this case, either personally or through his wife, the Plaintiffs
nevertheless contend that Judge James (through Mrs. James) stands
indirectly to benefit from the outcome of this case. Specifically,
they point to Mrs. James’s position as an at-will employee in the
office of District Attorney Levy, arguing that this status creates
an incentive for her to ensure that District Attorney Levy -- her
employer -- is successful in this case.8 They assert that a threat
to Mrs. James’s job security would lead a thoughtful observer to
question Judge James’s impartiality in deciding this case.
7
Her duties within that office are limited solely to criminal
prosecution of domestic violence and sex crime cases; she currently
does not play and has never played any role in representing the
Union Parish Police Jury or advising District Attorney Levy or any
other attorneys in his office on matters related to the Police
Jury. This role is assigned to, and exercised exclusively by,
Assistant Civil District Attorney S. Andrew Shealy, who was
appointed by Levy to serve as lead counsel in this case. Moreover,
in Mrs. James’ position as prosecutor of domestic violence and sex
crimes -- almost all of which take place in another Parish (Lincoln
Parish) -- her only client has been the State of Louisiana; she has
never represented Union Parish in any matter.
8
The Plaintiffs also allege that political animosities exist
between Sensley and District Attorney Levy and that knowledge of
these animosities would, for a reasonable observer, raise questions
about Judge James’s impartiality. Whatever the nature of these
alleged political differences, however, they are far too attenuated
to implicate Judge James’s impartiality. To the extent that they
exist, they exist between Sensley and District Attorney Levy -- not
between Sensley and Judge James or even Sensley and Mrs. James.
Accordingly, we see no reason why they raise any questions
regarding Judge James’s impartiality in this case.
16
Thus reduced to its essence, the Plaintiffs are contending
that when an immediate family member is an at-will employee in the
office representing a party, the impartiality of the judge is
called into question. This court, however, has rejected a similar
argument in Weinberger, where we recognized that a relative’s mere
at-will employment relationship with an agency or law firm
representing a party before a district court judge in a particular
case is insufficient to require a judge to recuse himself.
Weinberger, 557 F.2d at 463-64. There, we held that a district
judge was not required to recuse himself where the judge’s son was
an associate in a law firm representing a party to the litigation
but had no involvement in the litigation at issue. Id. We
concluded that the son’s interest as an associate in the law firm
was too remote to require disqualification under the “reasonable
man” standard of 28 U.S.C. § 455(a). Id. Here, as the district
court noted, there is even a lesser need for recusal given the fact
that, unlike the law firm context, the family member here has no
direct financial interest in the outcome of the case. Accordingly,
it appears Judge James did not abuse his discretion in refusing to
recuse himself under § 455(a).
B
For similar reasons, it does not appear Judge James abused his
discretion in refusing to recuse himself under § 455(b)(4) or §
455(b)(5)(iii). Both of these statutes require recusal when a
judge or his spouse has a financial or other interest in the case
17
that could be substantially affected by the outcome of the
proceeding. Financial interest is defined as “ownership of a legal
or equitable interest, however small, or a relationship as
director, adviser, or other active participant in the affairs of a
party....” 28 U.S.C. § 455(d)(4). However, “where an interest is
not direct, but is remote, contingent or speculative, it is not the
kind of interest which reasonably brings into question a judge’s
partiality.” In re Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc., 861 F.2d 1307,
1313 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1102 (1989).
Here, the Plaintiffs make arguments similar to their at-will
arguments above. They do not contend that the outcome of this case
will directly affect any interest -- financial or other -- of Judge
James or his spouse. Instead, they argue that the outcome of the
case could possibly have an indirect impact on Mrs. James’s ongoing
status as an employee at the district attorney’s office. However,
they are only able to make this argument by layering several
speculative premises on top of one another to reach a speculative
conclusion: if District Attorney Levy loses this case, it might
adversely affect his political popularity; and if it adversely
affects his political popularity, he might lose his next election;
and if he loses his next election, Mrs. James might lose her job if
the new district attorney chose not to retain her. This edifice of
conjecture will not support an objective conclusion that Judge
James has a financial interest in the outcome of this case.
18
Similar conclusions regarding recusal under § 455 have been
reached by other courts presented with similar facts. See, e.g.,
Weinberger, 557 F.2d at 456; In re Kansas Public Employees
Retirement System, 85 F.3d 1353, 1364-65 (8th Cir. 1996) (finding
no abuse of discretion in denial of recusal where, inter alia,
during pendency of litigation judge’s daughter accepted defendant’s
offer of employment as associate attorney); see also Hunt v.
American Bank & Trust of Baton Rouge, 783 F.2d 1011 (11th Cir. 1986)
(holding that a judge’s law clerk’s acceptance of an employment
offer made by a firm representing a party before that judge did not
require recusal as that clerk was not participating in the case in
question). Cf. Jordan, 49 F.3d at 156-58 (holding that judge
abused her discretion in failing to recuse herself in criminal case
because of judge’s friendship with attorney whom defendant had
accused of criminal actions). See generally Judicial Conference of
the United States, Committee on Codes of Conduct, Adv. Op. 60
(April 16, 1979, revised May 27, 1994), at
http://www.uscourts.gov/guide/vol2/60.html. For these reasons, we
find no abuse of discretion here in the district judge's conclusion
that his impartiality could not reasonably be questioned.9
CONCLUSION
9
We note that it would have been helpful if the judge had made
a statement to the parties concerning his wife’s employment (even
if he might have reasonably thought that most of the people in this
small parish knew of his wife’s job) and her noninvolvement in
Police Jury matters.
19
In sum, we conclude that the district court did not commit
clear error in finding that the Plaintiffs had failed to satisfy
Gingles’ “geographically compact” precondition. In addition, we
hold that the district judge did not abuse his discretion in
refusing to recuse himself. Accordingly, the district court’s
judgment is in all respects
AFFIRMED.
20
Sensley v. Albritton
Court: Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
Date filed: 2004-09-28
Citations: 385 F.3d 591
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