F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
PU BL ISH
June 8, 2006
UNITED STATES CO URT O F APPEALS Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
TENTH CIRCUIT
REX SHRUM ,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. No. 04-7037
CITY OF COW ETA, OKLAHOM A, a
M unicipal corporation; STEVEN C.
W HITLOCK, individually,
Defendants,
and
DERRICK PALM ER, individually,
Defendant-Appellant.
A PPE AL FR OM T HE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FO R TH E EASTERN DISTRICT O F O K LAH O M A
(D.C. NO . 03-CIV-465-W )
John Howard Lieber, James C. Hodges and Shannan Pinkham Passley of Eller &
Detrich, P.C., Tulsa, Oklahoma for Defendants-Appellants.
James Patrick H unt and Douglas D. Vernier of James R. M oore & Associates,
P.C., Oklahoma City, Oklahoma for Plaintiff-Appellee.
Before BRISCO E, M cW ILLIAM S, and M cCO NNELL, Circuit Judges.
M cCO NNELL, Circuit Judge.
Plaintiff-Appellee Rex Shrum is both a law enforcement officer and a
clergym an. A fter eight apparently successful years of juggling the two
responsibilities, his relationship with the management of the police department
soured, and the C hief of Police allegedly rearranged Officer Shrum’s work
schedule so it would conflict with his duties as a minister. Forced to choose
between his police and his ministerial responsibilities, Officer Shrum resigned
from the police department and filed this lawsuit. W e must now decide whether
the C ity of Coweta and the C hief of Police violated O fficer Shrum’s
constitutional rights to freedom of association, free exercise of religion, and
substantive due process.
I. FA C TUAL BACKGROUND
Rex Shrum has served as pastor of the C oweta Church of Christ, in eastern
Oklahoma, since April 1990. In 1994, he joined the police force of the City of
Coweta. He arranged with his new employer to give him W ednesday evenings
and Sundays off, so that he could continue to carry out his ministerial duties. H e
worked the day shift M onday through Friday as a detective. Officer Shrum was
also a member of the local lodge of the Fraternal Order of Police (FO P), which
was the certified bargaining agent for its members in the Coweta Police
Department.
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Problems arose over Officer Shrum’s time sheets. He was supposed to put
his time sheets in the report box of Assistant Chief of Police Derrick Palmer on
Friday night, before leaving for the weekend, so the time sheets would be
submitted by the 8:00 M onday morning deadline. Officer Shrum had repeatedly
turned in time sheets late and had been reprimanded several times. On M onday
morning, June 18, 2001, the records clerk in the Police Department could not find
Officer Shrum’s time sheet for the previous week. On this occasion Officer
Shrum denied any wrongdoing. Another officer, Sergeant M ike Sullivan, stated
that he saw Officer Shrum’s time sheet in Assistant Chief Palmer’s box.
Nevertheless, Officer Shrum was suspended by the Department for three days
without pay. His suspension was announced in a letter from Assistant Chief
Palmer, dated June 22, 2001, which warned that further infractions w ould lead to
“progressive disciplinary action.” Officer Shrum filed a grievance, which the
City denied and which was submitted to arbitration on September 12, 2001, in
accordance with the collective-bargaining agreement between the City and the
FOP.
On October 2, 2001, Officer Shrum was again suspended by Assistant Chief
Palmer. This time, for submitting his time sheet late, he was suspended for five
days without pay and put on probation for six months. Officer Shrum again filed
a grievance. This grievance was later settled, with the City agreeing to pay
Officer Shrum for the days he was suspended.
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In early 2002 Officer Shrum was reassigned to work as a patrolman under
Sergeant Joe Gist. In the new position he would continue on the day shift but
would not have Sundays off. To clear Sundays for his ministerial duties, Officer
Shrum asked Sergeant Gist for permission to move to the evening or midnight
shift. Sergeant Gist agreed, provided that Officer Shrum could arrange with the
evening or midnight shift supervisor to have an officer replace him on the day
shift. Officer Shrum made the necessary arrangements with Sergeant Sullivan,
who was the midnight shift supervisor and also the president of the FOP lodge.
Another officer moved to the day shift; Officer Shrum worked the midnight shift
and was off Sundays and M ondays.
On January 8, 2002, Officer Shrum received his semi-annual performance
review. In his review of Officer Shrum six months earlier, Assistant Chief
Palmer had marked two of the twelve evaluated areas as ones w here
“improvement is necessary”: “Adherence to Policy” and “Interpersonal
Relationship.” His new supervisor, Sergeant Gist, conducted the January 8
review and marked the same two areas “unsatisfactory.” In explaining the rating
for “Adherence to Policy,” Sergeant Gist noted that Officer Shrum had been
“disciplined this period. However, [he has] not had any problems recently.” For
“Interpersonal Relationship,” Sergeant Gist wrote that a “situation” with Officer
Shrum had “go[ne] bad with another supervisor in [the] presence of subordinate
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employees. Employee seems to have now resolved that situation.” Assistant
Chief Palmer signed and approved the performance review.
On January 29, 2002, the arbitrator reached a decision in the first time-
sheet dispute. The arbitrator found that Officer Shrum had not been late in
submitting his time sheet due on June 18, 2001, and that the City violated the
collective-bargaining agreement by suspending him. The arbitrator directed the
City to “rescind its discipline . . . in every respect,” to make Officer Shrum
whole, to “eliminate any record of this discipline” from his personnel file, and
never to consider the event to Officer Shrum’s detriment. Two weeks later,
Palmer, who had been promoted to Chief of Police, wrote to M r. W hitlock, the
city manager, advising him to resist the arbitrator’s decision until compelled by a
court to comply. In his letter to M r. W hitlock, Chief Palmer did not deny the
substance of Officer Shrum’s allegations; he insisted rather that the grievance was
not timely filed. M eanwhile, Officer Shrum continued to work the midnight shift
with Sundays and M ondays off, under the arrangement worked out with Sergeant
Gist and Sergeant Sullivan.
On M arch 15, 2002, Chief Palmer w rote to Sergeant Gist that he w as “very
concerned” about Officer Shrum’s “performance level.” Chief Palmer directed
Sergeant Gist to assign Officer Shrum to the day shift “for a minimum of 30
days” so he could receive “remedial training in supervision, ethics and
interpersonal relationships.” At his deposition, Chief Palmer could not recall the
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specific problems with Officer Shrum’s performance or the specific remedial
training that was needed. Chief Palmer did recall that if O fficer Shrum failed to
work Sundays under this new arrangement, he could be fired.
Remedial training was also ordered for Sergeant Sullivan, who had testified
in Officer Shrum’s favor at arbitration. Sergeant Sullivan received a negative
review in February 2002, was demoted and assigned remedial training in M arch
2002, and was fired in April 2002. An arbitrator ordered his reinstatement and
called the case “a classic example of what not to do when administering
discipline.” The arbitrator later reiterated the order and found that Sergeant
Sullivan’s halting reinstatement had been marked by “the taint of retaliation.”
On M arch 17, two days after the letter from Chief Palmer, Sergeant Gist
instructed Officer Shrum to begin working the day shift on M arch 19. Concerned
about a conflict with his ministerial duties, Officer Shrum asked Sergeant Gist
whether he could continue to have Sundays off. The parties dispute Sergeant
Gist’s answer. The Defendants maintain that Sergeant Gist told Officer Shrum
that he could not take Sundays off because a more senior officer had selected that
day, and according to the collective-bargaining agreement off-days were selected
by seniority. Officer Shrum’s evidence is quite different. He submitted a
deposition of Sergeant Gist to the effect that another officer was willing to trade
Sunday shifts with Officer Shrum. According to Sergeant Gist, Chief Palmer
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disapproved, insisting that Officer Shrum work on Sundays so that he could be
monitored.
On M arch 22, 2002, Officer Shrum wrote a resignation letter to Chief
Palmer, effective April 3, 2002. In the letter, Officer Shrum described his hiring
in 1994 as being done “with the understanding by both the chief of police, and the
city manager that my responsibilities at the Church had to be met,” and he
described the ease with which his ministerial duties had been accommodated.
According to Officer Shrum, in his eight years on the force he had created no
problems and caused no complaints from other officers. Nevertheless, Officer
Shrum said he was resigning because of Chief Palmer’s “continued religious
harassment”— “by forcing me to work on Sunday you have given me no other
choice.”
On August 22, 2003, Officer Shrum filed this suit in federal district court.
He brought many claims: violations of his federal constitutional rights of free
speech, freedom of assembly/association, and free exercise of religion; violation
of the Oklahoma Fire and Police Arbitration Act; wrongful termination against
public policy; violation of the Oklahoma Constitution; lack of substantive due
process; intentional infliction of emotional distress; and violation of the
Oklahoma Religious Freedom A ct. Officer Shrum sought actual and
compensatory damages from the City and actual, compensatory, and punitive
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damages from Chief Palmer and from the City M anager, M r. W hitlock, both of
whom he sued in their individual capacities.
By consent of the parties, the case was presided over by a M agistrate
Judge, whose decision will be referred to as that of the district court. See Fed. R.
Civ. P. 73; 28 U.S. C. § 636(c)(3). The Defendants moved for summary judgment
on all claims. The district court granted the motion in part, dismissing all claims
against M r. W hitlock on qualified immunity grounds, dismissing the First
Amendment free speech claim and the equivalent claim under the state
constitution, dismissing the claim under the Oklahoma Fire and Police Arbitration
Act, and dismissing the state tort law claims of wrongful termination and
intentional infliction of emotional distress. The district court allowed Officer
Shrum to proceed against the City and against Chief Palmer on three of his
federal claims— freedom of association, free exercise of religion, and substantive
due process— and on the state law claims that track them. Chief Palmer appeals
the partial denial of his motion for summary judgment on the federal
constitutional claims on qualified immunity grounds.
II. JURISDICTION AND STANDA RD O F REVIEW
Orders denying qualified immunity before trial are appealable only to the
extent they resolve abstract issues of law. Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299, 313
(1996). An interlocutory appeal is improper when the question is the sufficiency
of the evidence or the correctness of the district court’s findings with respect to a
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genuine issue of material fact. Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 313 (1995).
Because Chief Palmer argues that he is entitled to qualified immunity even under
the Plaintiff’s version of the facts, we have jurisdiction to hear this appeal
notw ithstanding its interlocutory character. DeAnzona v. City of Denver, 222
F.3d 1229, 1233 (10th Cir. 2000). Our inquiry on interlocutory qualified
immunity appeals is limited, however, to “abstract issues of law.” Johnson, 515
U.S. at 317. W e must “take, as given, the facts that the district court assumed
when it denied summary judgment” to the Defendant. Id. at 319.
Government officials are entitled to qualified immunity from liability for
civil damages under § 1983 when their “conduct does not violate clearly
established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would
have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). W e review de
novo a denial of a summary judgment motion raising qualified immunity
questions. Holland ex rel. Overdorff v. Harrington, 268 F.3d 1179, 1185 (10th
Cir. 2001). Once a defense of qualified immunity has been raised, we consider
two questions: (1) whether the alleged conduct violated a constitutional right, and
if so, (2) w hether the law was clearly established at the time of the defendant’s
actions. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U .S. 194 (2001). W e address each of these
questions for Officer Shrum’s claims of freedom of association, free exercise, and
substantive due process.
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III. FR EED OM O F A SSO CIA TIO N
Officer Shrum’s first claim against Chief Palmer is based on interference
with his First Amendment freedom of association— specifically, his association
with a labor union, the Fraternal Order of Police. He alleges that the Defendants
assigned him to Sunday duty in retaliation for his membership in the union and
his invocation of his collective bargaining rights. 1
In the slightly different context of free speech claims by public employees,
the Supreme Court has formulated the four-part balancing test of Pickering v. Bd.
of Education, 391 U.S. 563 (1968); see Connick v. M yers, 461 U.S. 138, 142
(1983). One requirement for such a claim is that the speech address a matter of
public concern. Id. at 568. Neither this Court nor the Supreme Court has
determined, as a general matter, whether Pickering’s public concern requirement
applies to freedom of association claims. See Schalk v. Gallemore, 906 F.2d 491,
498 & n.6 (10th Cir. 1990) (requiring public concern where the “association” was
“nothing more nor less than an audience” for the employee’s speech but explicitly
declining to hold that public concern is always required); Flanagan v. M unger,
890 F.2d 1557, 1564 n.7 (10th Cir. 1989) (expressing “some doubt whether the
1
Plaintiff raises no claims under the federal labor laws.
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Pickering test, particularly the public concern prong, applies in freedom of
association cases”). 2
That question has divided the C ourts of A ppeals. 3 In this case, however,
we need not reach the broader question. In the specific context of public
employee labor unions, this Court has rejected the requirement that a worker
demonstrate that his association with the union be a matter of public concern. In
Butcher v. City of M cAlester, 956 F.2d 973 (1992), we upheld a jury verdict in
favor of a public employee union member’s freedom of association claim without
applying the public concern test. Three firemen sued the city of M cA lester,
Oklahoma, for violating their First Amendment right to participate in union
activities. Id. at 975 (styling the constitutional interest a “first amendment right
2
W e have subsequently reserved the question in several unpublished
opinions. See, e.g., Lunow v. City of Oklahoma City, 61 Fed.Appx. 598, 606
(10th Cir. 2003).
3
Five Circuits have adopted the public concern requirement for freedom of
association claims and two have not. See Hudson v. Craven, 403 F.3d 691 (9th
Cir. 2005) (applying the public concern test to hybrid speech/association claims);
Cobb v. Pozzi, 363 F.3d 89, 102-103 (2d Cir. 2004) (applying the public concern
test to association claims); Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 249-50
(4th Cir. 1999) (same); Griffin v. Thom as, 929 F.2d 1210, 1214 (7th Cir. 1991)
(same); Boals v. Gray, 775 F.2d 686 (6th Cir. 1985) (same). But see Breaux v.
City of Garland, 205 F.3d 150, 157 n.12 (5th Cir. 2000) (not applying the public
concern test to association claims); Hatcher v. Bd. of Pub. Educ. and Orphanage,
809 F.2d 1546, 1558 (11th Cir. 1987) (same). See also Akers v. M cGinnis, 352
F.3d 1030, 1044 (6th Cir. 2003) (Clay, J., concurring and dissenting) (criticizing
the application of the public concern test to some associational claims); Balton v.
City of M ilwaukee, 133 F.3d 1036, 1040 (7th Cir. 1998) (suggesting that the issue
be reexamined).
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to peaceably assemble . . [and] to participate in the activities of Local 2284”).
Among other arguments, the city insisted that the firemen had no constitutional
claim because their union activities were not protected under Pickering. Id. at
979. W e rejected that argument. Id. at 979-80. See also M orfin v. Albuquerque
Pub. Sch., 906 F.2d 1434 (10th Cir. 1990) (reversing a grant of summary
judgment to a defendant on a union association claim without applying the public
concern test).
In these cases w e offered no lengthy explanation for not applying the public
concern test, but we did emphasize the self-imposed character of the collective-
bargaining agreement. W e noted that the city had “no license, where there is a
collective-bargaining agreement, to embark on union-busting activities.” Butcher,
956 F.2d at 979. The reason is apparent. The Pickering test is predicated on the
government’s “interests as an employer in regulating the speech of its
employees,” which “differ significantly from those it possesses in connection with
regulation of the speech of the citizenry in general.” Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568.
Those interests relate to “the efficiency of the public services it performs through
its employees.” Id. W here a public employer has negotiated with an employee
union and signed a collective-bargaining agreement, it has contractually agreed
to the legitimacy of the union and of its employees’ association with the union.
The public employer has presumably received the benefit of its bargain, and is
estopped from claiming that its “interests as an employer” are inconsistent with
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the freedom of its employees to associate with the union or to file grievances in
accordance with its procedures. See Butcher, 956 F.2d at 979 (once a public
employer signs a collective bargaining agreement, it no longer can assert a
“legitimate interest in whether its firefighters elected to join the union and
participate in its activities”). If a public employer retaliates against an employee
for engaging in acts protected by the collective-bargaining agreement— as Officer
Shrum alleges here— then the employer cannot rely on the Pickering test to avoid
First Amendment scrutiny.
Not only does the First Amendment freedom of association protect public
employees from retaliation for participation in a union with which their employers
have signed a collective-bargaining agreement, Butcher, 956 F.2d at 980, but as
this Court held in M orfin, 906 F.2d at 1439, “[t]he unconstitutionality of
retaliating against an employee for participating in a union [is] clearly
established.” W e therefore affirm the district court’s denial of summary judgment
on Officer Shrum’s freedom of association claim.
On remand, the district court should neither require “public concern” nor
engage in judicial balancing of the government’s interest in efficient operations
against the Officer Shrum’s interest in union association. The City of Coweta
already balanced those interests when it agreed to a collective bargaining
agreement. The Defendants are estopped from reneging on this agreement, either
by claiming that union association is not a matter of public concern or by saying
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that its interest in efficient operations outweighs Officer Shrum’s right to union
association.
IV . FR EE EXER CISE O F R ELIG IO N
The district court also denied Chief Palmer’s motion for summary judgment
on Officer Shrum’s free exercise claim, based on qualified immunity. The court
offered two rationales. First, it noted that “at least one court has found ‘any
religious activities of employees that can be accommodated without undue
hardship to the governmental employer, see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j), are also
protected by the first amendment.’” Order, at 13 (quoting Brown v. Polk County,
Iowa, 61 F.3d 650, 654 (8 th Cir. 1995) (en banc)). Second, the court noted that
there is a factual dispute regarding whether Officer Shrum’s “attempted exercise
of his religious freedoms guaranteed by the First Amendment, and Defendants’
know ledge of that attempt, was a motivating factor in the actions taken against
him.” Id. Chief Palmer urges two grounds for reversing the district court’s
denial of summary judgment.
A. Applicability of the Free Exercise Clause to Executive Action
Chief Palmer first offers the intriguing assertion that the Free Exercise
C lause protects citizens only from “enactment or enforcement of any law,
regulation or ordinance,” and not from the actions or decisions of an executive
official, such as the decision to move Officer Shrum to the day shift and to forbid
him from trading shifts with another officer. This argument is predicated on a
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narrow reading of the first and fifth words of the First A mendment: “Congress
shall make no law . . . .” U.S. Const., Amend. I. Congress is the legislative
branch, and the Amendment is directed at the making of “law.” Even after
incorporation of the First Amendment against the states, Appellant evidently is
arguing, the Amendment applies only to federal, state, and local legislative
activity and the direct enforcement thereof, and not to the independent exercise of
executive functions.
The Supreme Court has never explicitly held that the Free Exercise Clause
applies to executive action, though it has assumed on countless occasions that it
does. See, e.g., Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cem etery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439
(1988) (decision by Forest Service to build a road through territory sacred to
certain Indian tribes); Thom as v. Review Bd. of Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 450
U.S. 707 (1981) (decision by state unemployment compensation commission to
deny benefits to a worker unemployed on account of religious scruples); Cruz v.
Beto, 405 U.S. 319 (1972) (administrative actions by prison officials affecting
Buddhist prisoner); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 407 (1963) (denial of
unemployment compensation); cf. Pickering, supra (free speech claim arising
from executive personnel action); see also Axson-Flynn v. Johnson, 356 F.3d
1277 (10 th Cir. 2004) (reviewing executive action under the Free Exercise
Clause). Professor Leonard Levy posed the question without offering any clear
resolution:
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[T]he First Amendment, when read literally, raises the question whether
any special significance should be attached to the fact that the prohibition
on power was imposed exclusively upon Congress instead of upon the
government of the United States. Did the specification of Congress imply
that restraints were not intended to be imposed upon other federal
authorities?
Leonard W . Levy, Legacy of Suppression: Freedom of Speech and Press in Early
American History 233-34 (1960) (emphasis in original).
The answ er to C hief Palmer’s argument and Professor Levy’s question, we
believe, is that the First Amendment applies to exercises of executive authority no
less than it does to the passage of legislation. The drafters’ use of the term
“Congress” was a result of two structural decisions: to limit the reach of the First
Amendment (as well as other protections of personal rights in the first eight
amendments) to the federal government, and to set forth these freedoms as a
freestanding Bill of Rights, separate from the main body of the constitutional
document. Neither of these evinced any intention to confine the Amendment to
actions of the legislative branch.
The early state constitutions, on which the First Amendment was patterned,
uniformly applied their versions of the Free Exercise Clause to all branches of
government. See The Complete Bill of Rights: The Drafts, Debates, Sources, &
Origins 13-52 (Neil H. Cogan ed., 1997) (quoting the religious freedom
provisions in the constitutions and charters of all thirteen original states). The
Delaware Declaration of Rights of 1776, § 2, for example, provided “that no
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authority can or ought to be vested in, or assumed by any power whatever that
shall in any case interfere with, or in any manner controul the right of conscience
in the free exercise of religious worship.” Id. at 15 (emphasis added). The New
York Constitution of 1777, § XXXVIII, provided “[t]hat the free Exercise and
Enjoyment of religious Profession and W orship, without Discrimination or
Preference, shall forever hereafter be allowed within this State to all M ankind.”
Id. at 26. The Pennsylvania Constitution of 1790, Art. IX, § 3, adopted
contem poraneously with the First Amendment, provided “that no human authority
can, in any case whatever, controul or interfere with the rights of conscience.” Id.
at 33 (emphasis added).
The first draft debated in the House of Representatives of what was later to
be the Religion Clauses read: “N o religion shall be established by law , nor shall
the equal rights of conscience be infringed.” 1 Annals of Cong. 757 (Aug. 15,
1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834). It was proposed as an amendment to Article I, §
9, which sets forth limitations on the powers of the federal government. The
proposal came under criticism because of the fear that it might be interpreted as a
limitation on state governments, many of which then had establishments of
religion of some sort. M oreover, for independent reasons, the First Congress
decided that the proposed amendments should be attached to the end of the
document, rather than interpolated w ithin it; this exacerbated the federalism
problem because it was only the placement of the religion amendment within
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Article I, § 9 that confined its reach in any way to the federal government.
M adison suggested that the problem could be most easily resolved by adding the
word “national” to the proposal, so that it would read that “no national religion
shall be established by law,” 1 Annals of Cong. 758-59, but this idea encountered
opposition from those still sensitive to the consolidationist implications of the
word “national.” See id. at 759 (statement of Rep. Gerry). 4 The solution was to
employ the word “Congress,” thus making clear that the limitations of what is
now the First Amendment did not apply to the States. (That limitation to the
federal government, of course, was later abrogated by incorporation of the First
Amendment against the States through the medium of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-304 (1940).)
As this history shows, there was no intention to confine the reach of the
First Amendment to the legislative branch. Indeed, the first time anyone in
Congress explicitly argued that the strictures of the First A mendment applied only
to the passage of a “law”— in 1836, in connection with the right of petition 5 — the
suggestion was roundly rejected (“with ridicule,” according to the leading scholar
4
At the Constitutional Convention, in response to anti-nationalist
sensitivities, the Framers carefully deleted every mention of the words “nation” or
“national” that had appeared in the Randolph Plan. 1 Records of the Federal
Convention 335, 336, 404 (M ax Farrand ed., 1911).
5
12 Reg. Deb. 472, 475 (1936) (Sen. Gabriel M oore, arguing that the refusal
of Congress to receive petitions against slavery did not violate the First
Amendment right of petition because Congress was forbidden only to pass “laws”
and the refusal to receive a petition was not a law).
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on constitutional debates in Congress). See David P. Currie, The Constitution in
Congress: Descent Into the M aelstrom, 1829-1861, at 9 (2005).
One scholar has argued that the legislative history of the Establishment
Clause shows that “[t]he word ‘Congress’ was intentionally inserted to limit the
scope of the restrictions on the government to that single branch.” M ark. P.
Denbeaux, The First Word of the First Amendment, 80 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1156,
1169-70 (1986). Professor Denbeaux bases his argument on a remark by
Representative Huntington of Connecticut, a state that at the time had an
establishment of religion in the form of compulsory taxation for the support of
religion. See Thomas J. Curry, The First Freedoms: Church and State in America
to the Passage of the First Amendment 178, 183-84 (1986). Huntington feared
that the original version of the religion amendment would lead to federal law suits
preventing enforcement of the “bylaws” that had been enacted “for a support of
ministers, or building of places of worship.” 1 Annals of Cong. 758. The
substitution of the word “Congress” came shortly after Huntington’s remark and
can be seen as a response to it. See id. at 796. W e cannot agree with Professor
Denbeaux’s interpretation of this incident. Huntington’s concern stemmed from
uncertainty over whether the proposal would extend to state establishments, not
over any particular concern about a particular branch of the federal government.
At this juncture, the Judiciary Act had not yet been enacted, and Huntington
presumably assumed that the federal courts w ould be vested with the full
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jurisdiction implied by Article III— to all cases “arising under the Constitution.”
He thus w orried that an opponent of the Connecticut establishment could go to
federal court, invoke the proposed language “no religion shall be established by
law,” and obtain an injunction or other relief preventing enforcement of the
obligation to pay for support of ministers and buildings of worship. 6 His concern
was satisfied by confining the reach of the religion proposal to the federal
government. Indeed, after the proposal was further amended to forbid any “law
respecting the establishment of religion,” which prohibited the federal
government both from establishing religion at the federal level and from
interfering with establishments at the state level, see Akhil R. Amar, The Bill of
Rights: Creation and Reconstruction 32-33 (1998), confining the reach of the
amendment to the legislative branch would have been perverse from Huntington’s
point of view.
M oreover, even if the First A mendment itself applied narrowly only to
Congress and only to the making of “laws,” this would not be the end of the
matter. The Fifth Amendment, which undoubtedly applies to the executive
branch, provides that “no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property
6
Huntington made his remark on August 15, 1789. The House debate on
the Judiciary bill did not begin until August 24, 1 Annals of Cong. 812, and the
bill was not adopted until September 24, 1 Stat. 73. The Act did not vest the
federal courts w ith general federal question jurisdiction, and thus, under the Act,
Huntington’s feared lawsuit could not arise unless somehow diversity jurisdiction
could be contrived.
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without due process of law.” This means, among other less obvious things, that
executive officials cannot abridge a person’s liberty (including freedom of
religion) except in accordance with “law.” See Edward S. Corwin, The Doctrine
of Due Process of Law Before the Civil War, 24 Harv. L. Rev. 366 (1911);
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 US. 579, 646 (1952) (Jackson. J.,
concurring). Thus, if the First Amendment forbids the making of “law” that
infringes the free exercise of religion, and the Due Process Clause forbids the
executive from taking away liberties except pursuant to “law,” it follows that the
First A mendment protects against executive as well as legislative abridgement.
Indeed, because executive action that bears upon the private rights of individuals
is almost always grounded in some statutory authority, a challenge to the
executive action may be characterized as an as-applied challenge to the statute.
Cf. Denbeaux, 80 Nw. U. L. Rev. at 1157 n.1. In substance, Officer Shrum’s
challenge to the executive actions of Chief Palmer is a constitutional challenge to
the statutory grant of power to the Chief of Police to supervise employees, as
applied in the circumstances of this case.
For all of these reasons, we reject the argument that Chief Palmer’s actions
are not covered by the First Amendment because they did not constitute the
enactment or enforcement of any law, regulation, or ordinance.
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B. Neutrality and G eneral Applicability
Chief Palmer’s second argument for reversal is that the relevant regulations
and actions in this case were “neutral and generally applicable” within the
meaning of Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). “The transfer of
an officer to the day shift, without more, is neutral on its face,” and “[t]he CBA
[collective bargaining agreement] and its rank-takes-precedence rule for
determining days off are also religion-neutral.” Appellant challenges the district
court’s conclusion that the failure of a government employer to accommodate the
religious needs of an employee, short of undue hardship, is a violation of the First
Amendment. See Order, at 13. He argues that Brown v. Polk County, Iowa, 61
F.3d 650, 654 (8 th Cir. 1995) (en banc), on which the district court relied,
“contradicts the teaching” of this Court in United States v. Hardman, 297 F.3d
1116 (10 th Cir. 2002) (en banc), that “Smith creates a ‘safe harbor’ if the law is ‘a
valid and neutral law of general applicability.’” Appellant’s Br. 21.
W e agree with Appellant Palmer that the mere failure of a government
employer to accommodate the religious needs of an employee, where the need for
accommodation arises from a conflict w ith a neutral and generally applicable
employment requirement, does not violate the Free Exercise Clause, as that
Clause was interpreted in Smith. W e thus respectfully disagree with the Eighth
Circuit that “the first amendment protects at least as much religious activity as
Title VII does.” Brown, 61 F.3d at 654. The religious accommodation
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requirements of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j), extend beyond the dictates of the
Free Exercise Clause, as interpreted by Smith. 494 U.S. at 878-82. Thus, the
mere refusal of Chief Palmer and the Coweta police department to accommodate
Officer Shrum’s religious scheduling needs, without more, does not establish a
constitutional violation.
But that is not the crux of Officer Shrum’s case. Officer Shrum alleges that
he was moved to the day shift precisely because of Chief Palmer’s knowledge of
his religious commitment. If so, the decision to transfer was not “neutral,” but
rather motivated by Officer Shrum’s religious commitments. W e recognize that
Chief Palmer asserts neutral reasons for his decision to require Officer Shrum to
work the day shift: that he was concerned about Officer Shrum’s “performance
level” and he needed “remedial training.” But these asserted neutral reasons are
disputed. At his deposition, Chief Palmer could not recall any specific problems
with Officer Shrum’s performance or the specific remedial training that was
needed. R. 380-81. Officer Shrum presented evidence that another officer had
been willing to trade shifts with him but that Chief Palmer would not permit it, R.
259, 381, and thus that the decision was not merely a neutral application of the
“rank-takes precedence” rule of the CBA.
The district court concluded that the relevant “facts are disputed,” and the
ultimate outcome of the case will turn on whether Officer Shrum’s religious
comm itment “was a motivating factor in the actions taken against him.” Order, at
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13. For purposes of interlocutory appellate review, the question before us is not
whether Chief Palmer’s account is worthy of belief, or even if the district court
was correct that there was a disputed question of material fact on this point, but
only whether, assuming the district court’s evaluation of the record was correct,
Officer Shrum has stated a constitutional claim strictly as a matter of law. W e
hold that the district court was correct that Officer Shrum’s allegations establish a
violation of his clearly established constitutional rights under the Free Exercise
Clause.
To be sure, Officer Shrum does not allege that Chief Palmer held Officer
Shrum’s faith against him or acted from religious prejudice. Rather, the claim is
that religious discrimination was the means to an entirely secular end: Chief
Palmer w anted to force Officer Shrum out, and making him choose between his
duties as a police officer and his duties as a minister was the method at hand. But
the Free Exercise Clause is not limited to acts motivated by overt religious
hostility or prejudice. As its language suggests, the animating ideal of the
constitutional provision is to protect the “free exercise of religion” from
unwarranted governmental inhibition whatever its source. The first draft, as it
came from the pen of James M adison, was even more emphatic: “nor shall the full
and equal rights of conscience be in any manner, or on any pretext, infringed.” 1
Annals of Cong. 451 (June 8, 1789) (speech by Rep. M adison) (emphasis added).
Representative Daniel Carroll of M aryland— not coincidentally, as a Roman
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Catholic, the most conspicuous example in the First Congress of a member of a
religious minority— commented that “the rights of conscience are, in their nature,
of peculiar delicacy, and will little bear the gentlest touch of governmental hand.”
1 Annals of Cong. 757 (Aug. 15, 1789).
True to this history, the Free Exercise Clause has been applied numerous
times when government officials interfered with religious exercise not out of
hostility or prejudice, but for secular reasons, such as saving money, 7 promoting
education, 8 obtaining jurors, 9 facilitating traffic law enforcement, 10 maintaining
morale on the police force, 11 or protecting job opportunities. 12 Proof of hostility or
discriminatory motivation may be sufficient to prove that a challenged
governmental action is not neutral, Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of
Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 533 (1993); Axson-Flynn v. Johnson, 356 F.3d 1277, 1294
7
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
8
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
9
In re Jenison, 375 U.S. 14 (1963) (per curiam).
10
Quaring v. Peterson, 728 F.2d 1121 (8th Cir.1984), aff’d sub nom. Jensen
v. Quaring, 472 U.S. 478 (1985) (per curiam affirmance by an equally divided
Court).
11
Fraternal Order of Police Newark Lodge No. 12 v. City of Newark, 170
F.3d 359, 366-67 (3rd Cir. 1999) (Alito, J.).
12
Tomic v. Catholic D iocese of Peoria, — F.3d — , 2006 W L 851640 (7th
Cir. April 4, 2006); Rayburn v. General Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists,
722 F.2d 1164 (4th Cir. 1985).
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(10 th Cir. 2004), but the Free Exercise Clause is not confined to actions based on
animus.
This brings us to the question of whether the law on this constitutional
violation was clearly established. Chief Palmer’s argument for qualified
immunity reiterates his legal argument that his actions w ere neutral and generally
applicable, an argument which we have rejected as a matter of law. Chief Palmer
does not dispute that it was clearly established that non-neutral state action
imposing a substantial burden on the exercise of religion violates the First
Amendment. If Officer Shrum’s factual allegations are correct— that he was
singled out precisely because of Chief Palmer’s knowledge of his religious
commitment— then Chief Palmer’s claim of qualified immunity must fail. Only if
the finder of fact ultimately concludes, as a matter of fact, that Chief Palmer had
a neutral basis for his personnel actions, does he have a defense. This is thus a
case where the claim of qualified immunity collapses into the merits. The district
court was correct to hold that it should proceed to trial on the free exercise claim.
V. SUBSTANTIVE DUE PRO CESS
Officer Shrum’s final claim is that his substantive due process rights were
violated. W e have not yet decided which property interests in employment are
protected by substantive due process, see Hennigh v. City of Shawnee, 155 F.3d
1249, 1257 (10th Cir. 1998), and we need not decide the question today. Officer
Shrum’s substantive due process claim restates his other constitutional claims at a
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higher level of abstraction. W here a plaintiff has recourse to an “explicit textual
source of constitutional protection,” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395
(1989), a more general claim of substantive due process is not available. See
County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 842 (1998); Dubbs v. Head Start,
Inc., 336 F.3d 1194, 1203 (10th Cir. 2003). W ithout a constitutional claim, we
need not consider w hether the law was clearly established. See Butler v. Rio
Rancho Pub. Sch. Bd. of Educ., 341 F.3d 1197, 1200 (10th Cir. 2003).
W e A FFIR M the denial of summary judgment on the freedom of
association and free exercise claims, REV ER SE the denial of summary judgment
on the substantive due process claim, and REM AND for further proceedings not
inconsistent with this opinion.
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No. 04-7037, Rex Shrum v. City of Coweta, et al.
BR ISC OE, J., concurring:
I write only to address Chief Palmer’s textual argument that the free
exercise clause is not implicated because Shrum is not challenging the enactment
or enforcement of any law, regulation, or ordinance. I would reach the same
conclusion on the issue as the majority, but I would rely instead upon our
decision in Axson-Flynn v. Johnson, 356 F.3d 1277 (10th Cir. 2004), and prior
Supreme Court cases. Chief Palmer devotes a mere paragraph to his textual
argument, without citation to any legal authority other than the text of the First
A mendm ent. Shrum’s brief does not even respond to the argument. In my view ,
it is sufficient to note, as the majority has, that the Supreme Court has assumed on
several occasions that the free exercise clause is not as restricted as Chief Palmer
suggests here. M ore recently, in A xson-Flynn, we assumed that the free exercise
clause was not restricted to challenges involving a law, regulation, or ordinance.
There, the plaintiff brought a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against the staff of the
University of Utah’s Actor Training Program, alleging, in part, that the staff
forced her to say offensive words contrary to her religious beliefs in violation of
the free exercise clause. Id. at 1294. W e concluded that a genuine issue of
material fact existed as to whether the staff’s requirement that students perform
acting exercises as written was pretextual or a neutral rule of general
applicability. Id. In a footnote, we clarified that our “use of the word “rules” . . .
mean[t] a state’s or state actor’s laws, regulations, or other policies which act on
private persons.” Id. at 1294 n.17. As is evident from Axson-Flynn, government
conduct is subject to the free exercise clause’s protections.
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Shrum v. City of Coweta
Court: Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
Date filed: 2006-06-08
Citations: 449 F.3d 1132
Copy CitationsCombined Opinion