IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
_____________________
No. 98-30301
_____________________
JAMES J. SIBLEY, SR.,
Plaintiff - Appellant-Cross-Appellee,
versus
RAYWOOD J. LEMAIRE, Sheriff;
HUBERT P. TRAHAN; FREDDIE NOLAN,
Defendants - Appellees-Cross-Appellants.
_________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Louisiana
_________________________________________________________________
August 24, 1999
Before REAVLEY, JOLLY, and EMILIO M. GARZA, Circuit Judges.
E. GRADY JOLLY, Circuit Judge:
James J. Sibley appeals the dismissal of his claims that
officers operating the Vermillion Parish Correctional Center
(“prison”) were liable for horrible injuries he inflicted on
himself while a pretrial detainee. Sibley was arrested for assault
and battery. He underwent a psychotic episode while being detained
in an isolation cell. During this psychotic episode he physically
blinded himself by plucking out his eyes. For this injury, he sued
the sheriff, chief deputy, and a deputy under both 42 U.S.C. § 1983
and Louisiana negligence claims. He won a jury verdict. The
defendants then moved for a judgment as a matter of law (“JML”) or
new trial. The district court initially denied the motions, but
then reconsidered in the light of two newly released opinions and
granted a new trial. The defendants then moved for summary
judgment. The district court granted the motion for summary
judgment on the § 1983 claims and dismissed without prejudice the
remaining state claims. Sibley appeals the district court’s
rulings and the judgment dismissing his complaint. The defendants
cross-appeal, arguing that the district court should have granted
a JML instead of a new trial and that they were entitled to a JML
on the state negligence claims. Finding no error on the part of
the district court, we affirm.
I
As we have indicated, this case involves the particularly
bizarre and shocking injuries Sibley inflicted upon himself during
a psychotic episode while detained at the Vermillion Parish
Correctional Center. Sibley was arrested on November 22, 1990,
when the sheriff’s department responded to a complaint made by
Sibley’s father-in-law. At the time he was arrested, his relatives
pressed charges but requested that the charges be dropped as soon
as he received medical attention. At that point, Sibley had
developed severe psychological problems, which were exacerbated by
his not taking prescribed medication. It is unclear the extent to
which the sheriff’s department was informed of his history of
mental problems.
At the correctional center, Sibley was placed in a holding
cell and then, after erratic behavior, he was placed in an
isolation cell. Sibley could only be observed by looking through
2
a slot in the door. There was no closed circuit camera in the
room. The district court concluded at trial that there was
evidence that Sheriff Lemaire, who was in charge of the
correctional center, had a policy of placing violent prisoners in
the isolation cell and, if necessary, placing them in shackles.
There was also evidence that prisoners with mental problems who
exhibited violent behavior were not treated differently from other
violent prisoners. The evidence at trial further shows that
Lemaire instituted a policy whereby prisoners in isolation cells
were to be checked every ten to fifteen minutes.
The Parish Coroner, Dr. Ardley Hebert, examined Sibley on
November 23, and concluded that he should be transferred to
Acadiana Mental Health (“AMH”). Because AMH did not have any
available beds, Dr. Hebert put Sibley on the waiting list and left
him at the correctional institute.
On November 24, Deputy Nolan notified the correctional
center’s nurse that Sibley needed to see a doctor. Dr. Brian Amy,
who was taking calls for Dr. Hebert, examined Sibley and also
concluded that he should be transferred to AMH. Again, there were
no beds available and Dr. Amy therefore left Sibley on the waiting
list. During his visit, Dr. Amy filled out a Physician’s Emergency
Commitment form (“PEC”).
Dr. Amy’s notes on the PEC are telling. He noted that Sibley
could be having delusions. In the section querying whether the
patient is homicidal, suicidal, or violent, Dr. Amy wrote, “patient
3
not violent on exam, did get arrested for battery.” In dictated
notes from his visit, Dr. Amy further noted: “I was called to see
patient at the jail for grossly bizarre behavior. On arrival,
patient was pacing around his cell reading an upside down Bible
with photographs lined up on the bed like he was holding services.
Patient had a very bizarre affect.” In a handwritten note at the
bottom of the copy of Dr. Amy’s typewritten, dictated notes, he
wrote in hand: “He is on the list at Acadiana Mental Health &
really needs to go there.”
Dr. Amy left with instructions that he should be called if
necessary. Sibley concedes that, up to that point, “[a]lthough
[his] conduct was strange and indecorous, there was no suggestion
of any potentially self-harming behavior prior to or during Dr.
Amy’s visit.”
Throughout this time period, Sibley’s behavior was erratic--he
was observed holding his Bible upside down while appearing to read
from it, cleaning the walls of his cell with toilet paper, and
lying next to his toilet and staring into it. On Sunday,
November 26, Sibley was found kicking the door to his cell. There
is a factual dispute about what happened after that. Because of
the procedural posture of this case, we present the facts in the
light most favorable to Sibley’s arguments. The testimony provides
the basis for concluding that Sibley was placed in leg shackles and
that the shackles were left on him until the evening of Monday,
4
November 27.1 The reason for placing Sibley in shackles was either
to punish him for disruptive behavior or to prevent him from
hurting himself.
On Monday, November 27, a deputy discovered that Sibley had
urinated on himself and his mattress, thrown his food around, and
thrown his Bible and family pictures into the toilet. He was
removed to another cell while his cell was cleaned. He was offered
a shower but declined one because he apparently believed the devil
would come up through the drain. He was then placed back in his
cell and left there shackled and nude. A deputy testified that he
checked on him at 9:15 p.m. and observed him sitting on his bed
chanting. At 9:30 p.m. that evening, the same deputy discovered
him plucking his eyes out with his fingers.
There was a delay of approximately an hour before Sibley was
transported to a hospital. Deputy Nolan indicated that he believed
he needed to speak to Dr. Amy before Sibley was moved and that his
efforts to reach him were the cause for the delay. When Sibley was
admitted to the hospital, his left eye was completely ruined and
his right eye was severely damaged. He has not recovered any sight
in his right eye.
The evidence at trial did not link either Lemaire or Trahan to
any actions taken with respect to Sibley. Furthermore, there is no
evidence in the record that anyone communicated to Lemaire
1
Sibley has not alleged a constitutional violation based on
being kept in shackles. Nor is there any evidence that Sibley
suffered any injury because of the use of shackles.
5
information that might lead them to think that Sibley posed a risk
to himself. Nor did Lemaire issue any orders with respect to how
Sibley should be treated. Lemaire can therefore only be held
responsible for policies that may have led to Sibley’s self-
mutilation. Similarly, Trahan can only be held responsible for
either a policy or his failure to properly supervise the deputies
handling Sibley.
With respect to Nolan, there is no evidence that he did
anything that physically exacerbated Sibley’s condition. Although
he did put Sibley in shackles, there is no evidence that the
shackles, in and of themselves, brought about Sibley’s psychotic
episode. Besides applying the shackles to Sibley, Nolan did
nothing else that could have had any physical effect on Sibley.
There is, however, evidence that he observed Sibley’s apparently
worsening condition without calling Dr. Amy for additional medical
consultation. He therefore can only be liable for neglecting to
seek additional medical help for Sibley, in the light of Sibley’s
increasingly erratic conduct--conduct which arguably led Nolan to
shackle Sibley to protect himself from himself.
II
Sibley first filed a claim for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
against Sheriff Lemaire in federal district court in 1990. He
asserted that Sheriff Lemaire was responsible for the Vermillion
Parish Jail and that Sibley had been denied psychiatric care in
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. He also filed claims in
6
state court asserting negligence claims under Louisiana Civil Code
articles 2315, 2316, and 2320 against Sheriff Lemaire and others,
including Dr. Hebert, Dr. Amy, and the Vermillion Parish Police
Jury.2 The trial in district court was held in abeyance pending
the state court proceedings. By late 1994, all state court actions
against Dr. Hebert, Dr. Amy, and the Police Jury had been dismissed
with prejudice.3
In 1996, Sibley amended his complaint in district court. In
part, the amended complaint alleged that there was a persistent,
widespread practice that amounted to a policy of using isolation
cells and shackles against patients with mental problems.
According to the amended complaint, that policy violated Sibley’s
right to substantive due process. The complaint also alleged that
Lemaire failed to provide constant observation of mental patients
or to train the prison staff to recognize symptoms of serious
mental illness. Sibley’s amended complaint also added Chief Deputy
Hubert Trahan and Deputy Nolan as defendants. Sibley also
successfully moved to consolidate the Louisiana state claims with
the § 1983 claims. The case was tried to a jury in September 1996.
Thus, the federal trial proceeded against Sheriff Lemaire and
his two deputies Trahan and Nolan. At the close of Sibley’s
2
In the state court there were a number of medical review
panels that were convened pursuant to Louisiana’s Medical
Malpractice Act, La. R.S. 40:1299.41 et seq.
3
Dr. Hebert was removed from the suit because he was bankrupt,
Dr. Amy prevailed on the merits, and the Vermilion Parish Police
Jury settled.
7
evidence, Lemaire moved for a JML under Fed.R.Civ.P. Rule 50(a), in
part requesting dismissal of the policymaker claims. The district
court held that the written and/or customary policy of using the
isolation cell for disruptive inmates, including mentally ill
inmates, was not unconstitutional on its face but could nonetheless
be unconstitutional as applied. The district court concluded that
whether there was a policy that was unconstitutional as applied was
a matter for the jury to decide and deferred ruling on the motion.
At the close of testimony, Lemaire again renewed his motion and the
district court again deferred ruling. At that time, Trahan and
Nolan moved for a determination of qualified immunity. The
district court deferred ruling on the motion.4
The jury decided in Sibley’s favor with respect to Chief
Trahan and Sheriff Lemaire on the § 1983 claims. The jury found
that Nolan was not liable under the § 1983 claims. The jury
further decided in Sibley’s favor with respect to all of the
defendants on the Louisiana negligence claims. The jury found that
Lemaire helped “develop a governmental custom, policy, ordinance,
regulation or decision that violated . . . Sibley’s constitutional
rights.” The district court entered judgment on March 7, 1997. On
June 19, 1997, the district court denied Lemaire, Trahan, and
Nolan’s rule 50 and rule 59 motions.
4
On November 27, 1996, the trial judge denied Trahan’s motion
for a JML on the basis of qualified immunity, concluding that a
jury could reasonably conclude that Trahan reacted with deliberate
indifference to Sibley’s worsening condition.
8
On March 17, 1997, the defendants filed a post-trial motion
for a JML or for new a new trial or remittitur. On June 19, 1997,
the district court granted a new trial based on our en banc
decision in Scott v. Moore, 114 F.3d 51 (5th Cir. 1997), and on a
recent Louisiana Supreme Court decision, Keith v. United States
Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 694 So.2d 180 (La. 1997). The defendants
then moved for summary judgment on the § 1983 claims in the
subsequent proceedings, and the district court granted the motion,
dismissing the state claims without prejudice.
III
At the outset, we note that resolving this appeal is greatly
complicated by the quite unusual procedural posture of the case.
The case went through a complete trial at the end of which the
district court granted a motion for a new trial (denying a motion
for a judgment as a matter of law in the process) only to then
grant summary judgment. Both sides now take full advantage of the
lengthy procedural history of the case to point out numerous
perceived errors along the way. Sibley argues that the district
court erred by granting a new trial or, failing that, by granting
the motion for summary judgment that finally terminated the case.
The defendants argue that the district court erred in failing to
grant its various motions for judgment as a matter of law, for
permitting various errors during the course of the trial, and in
not also granting summary judgment on grounds other than those the
district court did rely on in disposing of the case.
9
We address only those issues necessary to resolve this case as
expediently as possible. Those issues are: (1) whether the
district court erred in granting the defendant’s motion for a new
trial; (2) whether the district court erred in granting summary
judgment for the defendants on the § 1983 claims; and (3) whether
the district court abused its discretion in dismissing the
remaining state claims without prejudice. We hold that the
district court did not err in granting a new trial. A Fifth
Circuit en banc opinion and a Louisiana Supreme Court opinion
mandated a new trial with respect to the § 1983 and state
negligence claims. We also find that, although a new trial was
mandated, the district court did not err when it denied the
defendant’s motion for judgment as a matter of law. We further
hold that the district court did not err in granting summary
judgment for the defendants on the § 1983 claim. Finally, having
concluded that a new jury trial was necessary and that no federal
questions remained, the district court did not err in electing not
to exercise pendent jurisdiction.
IV
The first issue we address is whether the district court erred
in granting a new trial. Under Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(a), the district
court has authority to grant a new trial “to all or any of the
parties and on all or part of the issues . . . for any of the
reasons for which new trials have heretofore been granted in
10
actions at law in the courts of the United States.” We review the
district court’s decision for abuse of discretion:
Courts do not grant new trials unless it is reasonably
clear that prejudicial error has crept into the record or
that substantial justice has not been done, and the
burden of showing harmful error rests on the party
seeking the new trial. Ultimately the motion invokes the
sound discretion of the trial court, and appellate review
of its ruling is quite limited.
Del Rio Distributing, Inc. v. Adolph Coors Co., 589 F.2d 176, 179
n.3 (5th Cir. 1979) (quoting 11 Wright & Miller, Federal Practice
& Procedure § 2803, at 31-33 (3d ed. 1973)).
To determine whether the district court abused its discretion,
we must address whether it was error to grant a new trial with
respect to each of Sibley’s principal claims--the § 1983 claim and
the state negligence claims. With respect to the state negligence
claims, we assess first whether there is any basis for disturbing
the jury verdict and, then, if we find such a basis, whether it was
more appropriate to grant a new trial or simply grant the
defendants’ motion for a JML. We thus turn to our analysis of
these issues.
A
Sibley asserted a somewhat confusing § 1983 claim at a time
when our law on the subject was less than clear. Sibley’s claim
was that the defendants were responsible for perpetuating a policy
that denied mentally disturbed patients reasonable medical care.
After a lengthy review of the record, our best formulation of their
claim is as follows: There was evidence that the officers in the
11
prison routinely used the isolation cell and shackles to restrain
violent prisoners. As a result, the guards did not distinguish
between sane and mentally ill prisoners. By failing to do so, the
guards hampered their ability to assess whether the condition of a
prisoner who was mentally ill was worsening. According to Sibley,
this policy--uniform treatment of all violent prisoners--is not
reasonably related to a legitimate government goal.
The district court expressed considerable skepticism about
whether Sibley’s theory amounted to a constitutional violation.
However, holding that it was bound by a recent Fifth Circuit
opinion, Scott v. Moore, 85 F.3d 235 (5th Cir. 1996), the district
court concluded that the question of whether a prison policy was
reasonably related to a legitimate government objective was a
factual question for the jury to decide.
After the district court entered judgment, we issued our en
banc opinion in Scott v. Moore, 114 F.3d 51 (5th Cir. 1997). In
that opinion, we made it clear that in a case such as Sibley’s, the
appropriate analysis was not whether the conditions of confinement
were responsible for Sibley’s injuries. Rather, his case should be
examined as an “episodic act or omission” case:
In an “episodic act or omission” case, an actor usually
is interposed between the detainee and the municipality,
such that the detainee complains first of a particular
act of, or omission by, the actor and then points
derivatively to a policy, custom, or rule (or lack
thereof) of the municipality that permitted or caused the
act or omission.
12
Id. at 53. With respect to an “episodic act or omission” case, we
had previously established that the plaintiff must show that an
official acted with subjective deliberate indifference. To hold
superiors liable, the plaintiff must then show that “the employee’s
act resulted from a municipal policy or custom adopted or
maintained with objective deliberate indifference to the detainee’s
constitutional rights.” Id. at 54 (quoting Hare v. City of
Corinth, 74 F.3d 633, 649 n.4 (5th Cir. 1996)).
In the light of our en banc decision, the district court
therefore correctly concluded that, in this case, it was error to
submit the amorphous question of whether the prison’s policy was
reasonably related to a legitimate government objective to a jury.
Instead, the court first had to determine that, based on the record
before it, a specific employee had acted with deliberate
indifference to Sibley’s medical condition. We therefore find no
error in the district’s court’s conclusion that this error required
a new trial on the § 1983 claim.5
B
5
Because we find that the district court did not err in
subsequently granting summary judgment, the issue of whether the
district court erred when it denied the defendants’ various motions
for judgment as a matter of law with respect to the § 1983 claims
is mooted. Regardless, given the unique facts of this case, the
judge’s decision to grant a new trial was reasonable. Our en banc
opinion in Scott reshaped the court’s analysis of the case, and it
is understandable why the judge would choose to provide the parties
a further opportunity to brief the issues in the light of Scott
prior to ultimately ruling on them.
13
The district court granted a new trial with respect to the
state negligence claims because it concluded that, under
La.Civ.Code art. 2323, as amended, it had erred when it did not
instruct the jury to quantify the fault of the doctors (who were
not defendants in the federal case but who were sued, along with
the defendants here in the state case). In its earlier ruling on
the issue, the court relied on the Louisiana Supreme Court’s
holding in Cavalier v. Cain Hydrostatic Testing, Inc., 657 So.2d
975 (La. 1995), to conclude that the jury need not quantify fault
to non-parties.
After the decision in Cavalier was announced, the Louisiana
legislature passed an amendment to art. 2323 in the 1996
Extraordinary Legislative Session of the Legislature requiring a
determination of “the degree or percentage of fault of all persons
causing or contributing to the injury, death or loss.” In Keith v.
United States Fidelity & Guarantee Co., 694 So.2d 180 (La. 1997),
which was issued after the final judgment was entered in this case,
the court held that the amendment to art. 2323 is procedural in
nature and therefore should be applied retroactively.
In the light of Keith, it is apparent that the district court,
through no fault of its own, incorrectly refused to permit the
quantification of fault among the doctors. On appeal, Sibley
argues that actions involving the doctors have already been tried
and absolved of fault in state court and that the district court
should therefore be collaterally estopped from assigning fault to
14
the doctors in this lawsuit. Sibley is correct that Dr. Amy has
been absolved of any wrongdoing in this matter and it would
therefore be inappropriate for the jury to assess whether he is at
fault. With respect to Dr. Hebert, however, there was no
determination that Dr. Hebert was not in part responsible for
Sibley’s injuries. It was therefore not error on the part of the
court to grant a new trial.
The defendants argue that instead of granting its motion for
a new trial, the district court should have granted their motion
for a JML, because there is no legal cause in fact. Their argument
is essentially that, given the extreme nature of the injuries
suffered here, there is no way that the result could be legally
caused by the guards neglecting a duty. This conclusion is not
altogether clear. The relevant duties here are the duty to provide
reasonable medical care and the duty protect the detainee from
foreseeable harm.6 In this case, the defendants arguably failed in
that duty when they did not make a follow-up call to either Dr.
Hebert or Dr. Amy, despite Sibley’s apparent worsening condition.
If, in those circumstances, they breached either duty, the harm
6
A corollary to the defendants’ argument that the defendants’
action did not proximately cause Sibley’s injuries is that the harm
was not foreseeable. However, unlike the fact pattern in the now
famous case of Palsgraf v. Long Island R. Co., 248 N.Y. 339 (N.Y.
1928), where the type of harm that occurred was completely
unforeseeable, in this case, it was not the type of harm--self-
inflicted injuries--which was unforeseeable but rather the extent
of the harm. It is a well established principle of tort law that,
if a defendant has breached a duty of care, the defendant must
“take his victim where he finds him.” E.g. Perniciaro v. Brinch,
384 So.2d 392, 395-96 (La. 1980).
15
that resulted, although perhaps unexpected and far more damaging
than usual, would fall within the kind of harm from which the
defendants would have had a duty to protect Sibley.
V
We turn next to the issue of whether the district court erred
in granting summary judgment. As we explained in our en banc
opinion in Scott, in order to make out a § 1983 claim, Sibley must
first show that the deputies (Nolan and Trahan) acted with
deliberate indifference. It is well settled that “negligent
inaction by a jail officer does not violate the due process rights
of a person lawfully held in custody of the State.” Hare v. City
of Corinth, MS, 74 F.3d 633, 645 (5th Cir. 1996). Instead, a
plaintiff must establish that an official acted with deliberate
indifference. In Hare, id. at 648, we adopted the same deliberate
indifference standard for pretrial detainees as the one articulated
by the Supreme Court in Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994), for
convicted prisoners:
It is, indeed, fair to say that acting or failing to act
with deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of
serious harm to a prisoner is the equivalent of
recklessly disregarding that risk.
That does not, however, fully answer the pending
question about the level of culpability deliberate
indifference entails, for the term recklessness is not
self-defining. The civil law generally calls a person
reckless who acts or (if the person has a duty to act)
fails to act in the face of an unjustifiably high risk of
harm that is either known or so obvious that it should be
known.
Id. at 836. Under our deliberate indifference standard, then, it
is not enough to demonstrate that Nolan and Trahan were negligent
16
in not calling Dr. Amy when Sibley’s condition appeared to worsen.
Instead, Sibley must show that Nolan and Trahan were either aware
or should have been aware of an unjustifiably high risk that Sibley
would hurt himself and failed to act.
Having reviewed the record, we find that, although it is
possible that Nolan and Trahan’s activity could amount to
negligence, there is no evidence that their actions were so
reckless as to amount to deliberate indifference. Nolan and the
other deputies under Trahan’s care monitored Sibley and attempted
to care for him when he started kicking the door. Although
Sibley’s actions seem to have become increasingly erratic, nothing
he did so clearly indicated an intent to harm himself that the
deputies caring for him could have only concluded that he posed a
serious risk of harm to himself.7 The record does clearly
establish that Sibley’s actions in blinding himself are highly
unusual and unpredictable, even for someone suffering a psychotic
episode. The district court did not err in concluding that none of
the prison officials acted with deliberate indifference with
respect to Sibley. Having concluded that none of the guards acted
with deliberate indifference, their actions are objectively
7
We note here the difference between negligence and deliberate
indifference. A reasonably prudent man may well have deemed it
necessary to call Dr. Amy in the light of Sibley’s worsening
condition. To be deliberately indifferent, however, the deputies
would have had to have chosen not to call Dr. Amy with the
expectation that some harm would result to Sibley.
17
reasonable and the prison officials are entitled to qualified
immunity. Sibley’s § 1983 claim therefore fails.
VI
We turn finally to whether the district court erred in
dismissing the state claims without prejudice. A district court
may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction if the court has
dismissed all claims over which it had pendent jurisdiction. 28
U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). We review such decisions for abuse of
discretion. Wong v. Stripling, 881 F.2d 200, 204 (5th Cir. 1989).
In this case, both federal and state courts had engaged in lengthy
proceedings regarding the alleged facts of this case. At the point
that the district court granted summary judgment on the § 1983
claims, there remained the need for a full-blown jury trial on the
state negligence claims. We find no abuse of discretion in the
district court’s decision not to conduct that trial in federal
court.
VII
This case presents a particularly contorted procedural
history. Having carefully reviewed the record, we conclude that
the district court correctly recognized that new case law mandated
a new trial and acted accordingly. Having reached that decision,
the district court provided both sides an opportunity to argue the
applicability of the law as set forth in our opinion in Scott to
the case at hand, before finally ruling that the defendants were
entitled to summary judgment on the § 1983 claims, and that the
18
remaining state negligence claims should be dismissed without
prejudice. Finding no error on the part of the district court, we
A F F I R M.
19
Sibley v. Lemaire
Court: Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
Date filed: 1999-08-24
Citations: 184 F.3d 481
Copy CitationsCombined Opinion