Smith v. U.S. Department of Justice

                  United States Court of Appeals

               FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

         Argued May 7, 2001       Decided June 12, 2001 

                           No. 00-5211

                         Gregory Smith, 
                            Appellant

                                v.

                  U. S. Department of Justice, 
                             Appellee

          Appeal from the United States District Court 
                  for the District of Columbia 
                         (No. 99cv00784)

     Sidney A. Rosenzweig, appointed by the court, argued the 
cause as amicus curiae on the side of appellant.  With him on 
the brief was Robert S. Litt.

     Gregory Smith, appearing pro se, was on the brief for 
appellant.

     Lisa Barsoomian, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the 
cause for appellee. With her on the brief were Wilma A. 
Lewis, U.S. Attorney at the time the brief was filed, and R. 
Craig Lawrence, Assistant U.S. Attorney.

     Before:  Williams, Ginsburg, and Rogers, Circuit Judges.

     Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge Ginsburg.

     Ginsburg, Circuit Judge:  While incarcerated at a federal 
correctional institution, Gregory Smith placed several calls to 
his attorney.  Although an unmonitored telephone was avail-
able for this purpose, Smith used a telephone line on which he 
knew all calls were monitored and recorded pursuant to a 
policy of the Bureau of Prisons.  Smith claims that during the 
conversations the attorney effectively acknowledged that he 
had not provided Smith with constitutionally adequate assis-
tance.

     Smith later asked the Bureau of Prisons, under the Free-
dom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. s 552, for copies of the 
recordings it made of the conversations.  The Government 
denied the request on the sole ground that the recordings fall 
within Exemption 3 of the FOIA because Title III of the 
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act, 18 U.S.C. 
ss 2510 et seq., bars their disclosure.  When Smith sought 
judicial review, the district court granted summary judgment 
for the Government.  As we read Title III it is inapplicable to 
the recordings at issue.  Therefore, under the FOIA Smith is 
entitled to the recordings.  Smith -- who appeared pro se 
and briefed the case creditably both in the district court and 
here -- is now aided by an amicus curiae we appointed for 
the occasion;  we make no further distinction between Smith's 
arguments and those of the amicus.

                             Analysis

     Exemption 3 of the FOIA makes the general requirement 
of disclosure inapplicable to materials

     specifically exempted from disclosure by statute ... pro-
     vided that such statute (A) requires that the matters be 
     withheld from the public in such a manner as to leave no 
     
     discretion on the issue, or (B) establishes particular 
     criteria for withholding or refers to particular types of 
     matters to be withheld.
     
5 U.S.C. s 552(b)(3).  We have held that Title III, 18 U.S.C. 
ss 2510 et seq., which limits the electronic interception and 
disclosure of various communications, is just such an exempt-
ing statute because it "refer[s] to particular types of matters 
to be withheld."  Lam Lek Chong v. DEA, 929 F.2d 729, 733 
(1991).  Accordingly, Smith concedes that if the non-
disclosure provisions of Title III apply to the recordings he 
seeks, then so does Exemption 3 of the FOIA.  Whether the 
district court correctly granted summary judgment for the 
Government therefore turns upon whether Title III pro-
scribes disclosure of the recordings.

     Subject to certain exceptions, Title III makes it unlawful 
for a person to "intercept" "any wire, oral, or electronic 
communication."  18 U.S.C. s 2511.  The Government here 
contends that the prison authorities, by recording the conver-
sations Smith had with his attorney, "intercepted" those 
communications and did so lawfully, as authorized by the 
consent exception in 18 U.S.C. s 2511(2)(c) ("person acting 
under of color of law [may] intercept ... where ... one of the 
parties to the communication has given prior consent").  The 
Government then reasons that because Title III expressly 
permits certain specifically-described types of disclosure (for 
example, in court testimony) of communications obtained "by 
any means authorized" in Title III, 18 U.S.C. s 2517, it 
implicitly forbids any other type of disclosure, including dis-
closure pursuant to the FOIA.

     Smith correctly identifies the fundamental defect in the 
Government's argument:  the recordings he seeks were not 
the product of an "interception," consensual or otherwise, 
governed by Title III;  therefore, they are not subject to 
whatever limitations Title III places upon the disclosure of 
information that does result from a covered interception.  
Here " 'intercept' means the aural or other acquisition of ... 
any wire, electronic, or oral communication through the use of 
any electronic, mechanical, or other device."  8 U.S.C. 

s 2510(4).  "[E]lectronic, mechanical, or other device," in 
turn,

     means any device or apparatus which can be used to 
     intercept a wire, oral, or electronic communication other 
     than--
     
          (a) any telephone or telegraph instrument, equipment 
          or facility, or any component thereof, ... 
          
               (ii) being used ... by an investigative or law en-
               forcement officer in the ordinary course of his 
               duties.
               
18 U.S.C. s 2510(5) (emphasis supplied).  The latter defini-
tion consists first of an inclusionary clause specifying the 
equipment associated with a proscribed interception, and then 
of an exclusionary provision -- of which s 2510(a)(ii) is 
part -- specifying "acquisitions" that remain outside the 
statutory definition of an "interception."  We have no doubt 
that the recordings Smith seeks fall under the exclusionary 
terms of s 2510(5)(a)(ii):  They were obtained by "law en-
forcement officers" (the prison authorities) who "used," "in 
the ordinary course of [their] duties," some telephone "instru-
ment, equipment or facility, or [a] component thereof."

     In fact, the Government said as much before the district 
court:  "The ... provisions of Title III," here citing 
s 2510(5)(a)(ii) and the consent exception, "ma[d]e the taping 
of these calls legal."  Government's Statement of Material 
Facts Not in Genuine Dispute at p 9.  Evidently, the Govern-
ment (and the district court) overlooked the point Smith made 
in his own motion for summary judgment, namely, that 
s 2510(5)(a)(ii) does not 'authorize' the recordings but instead 
excludes them entirely from the coverage of the statute.  
Now that Smith drives the point home, the Government has 
changed its position.

     The Government's current position, that the recordings do 
not satisfy the terms of s 2510(5)(a)(ii), is contradicted by a 
consistent line of cases admitting into evidence recordings 
made by prison authorities who routinely monitor inmates' 
conversations.  Those cases hold that such recordings are not 
unlawful under Title III because they come within the exclu-

sionary terms of s 2510(5)(a)(ii).  See, e.g., United States v. 
Van Poyck, 77 F.3d 285, 292 (9th Cir. 1996);  United States v. 
Daniels, 902 F.2d 1238, 1245 (7th Cir. 1990);  United States v. 
Feekes, 879 F.2d 1562, 1565-66 (7th Cir. 1989);  United States 
v. Paul, 614 F.2d 115, 117 (6th Cir. 1980).  Indeed, that was 
the position of the Government in each of the cited cases.

     The Government nonetheless posits two reasons 
s 2510(5)(a)(ii) does not embrace (and hence does not exclude 
from Title III) the recordings here at issue;  neither has real 
bite.  First, the Government asserts that the exclusion pro-
vided in s 2510(5)(a)(ii) "applies only to use of a telephone to 
listen, not to use of a tape recorder to record."  That con-
struction conflicts with the distinction, which is implicit in 
Title III, between intercepting ("acqui[ring] the contents of 
any ... communication," s 2510(4)) -- for which some prison 
telephone "instrument, equipment or facility, or [some] com-
ponent thereof" was almost certainly used in this case -- and 
recording that communication -- for which a separate device 
well may have been used.  See 18 U.S.C. s 2518(8) (a) 
("contents of any ... communication intercepted by any 
means authorized by this chapter shall, if possible, be record-
ed on tape or wire or other comparable device") (emphasis 
supplied).  We say "almost certainly" because the Govern-
ment introduced no evidence whatsoever regarding the equip-
ment it used to monitor the calls;  more to the point, the 
Government failed to prove that the means of intercepting the 
calls did not involve use of the prison's telephone system or a 
component thereof.  Because the Government bears the bur-
den of showing that an exemption from the FOIA applies, see 
Maydak v. DOJ, 218 F.3d 760, 764 (D.C. Cir. 2000), that 
failure of proof alone forecloses its first argument.

     Second, the Government asserts that "section 2510(5)(a)(ii) 
applies only when the telephone is 'being used by ... an 
investigative or law enforcement officer,' i.e. the officer is the 
person using the telephone, not when the telephone is being 
used by someone else and the officer is just using the tape 
recorder."  The statute is not susceptible to that construction 
because it embraces use not only of a telephone but of any 
telephone "equipment or facility, or any component thereof," 

18 U.S.C. s 2510(5);  clearly, the law enforcement officer need 
not be using the telephone itself, wherefore he need not be 
participating in the conversation either.  Moreover, 18 U.S.C. 
s 2511(2)(c) separately authorizes "a person acting under 
color of law to intercept a ... communication where such 
person is a party to the conversation";  as the requirements of 
that section are automatically met when a law enforcement 
officer actually participates in the conversation, the Govern-
ment's reading would render s 2510(5)(a)(ii) superfluous.

     Finally, the Government requests in the alternative that we 
remand this case to the district court so it can there for the 
first time raise certain other exemptions from the FOIA.  
That avenue is barred:

     We have plainly and repeatedly told the government 
     that, as a general rule, it must assert all exemptions at 
     the same time, in the original district court proceed-
     ings....  FOIA was enacted to promote honesty and 
     reduce waste in government by exposing an agency's 
     performance of its statutory duties to public scrutiny....  
     As we have observed in the past, the delay caused by 
     permitting the government to raise its FOIA exemption 
     claims one at a time interferes both with the statutory 
     goals of "efficient, prompt, and full disclosure of informa-
     tion," ... and with "interests of judicial finality and 
     economy."
     
Maydak, 218 F.3d at 764.  The Government identifies no 
"extraordinary circumstance" or "interim development" of 
facts or of law, id. at 767, to warrant our departing from this 
rule.  Therefore, it must produce the recordings notwith-
standing any other FOIA exemptions it may assert in a 
future case of this sort.

                            Conclusion

     For the foregoing reasons, we hold that Smith is entitled to 
the recordings he requested pursuant to the FOIA.  The 
judgment of the district court is, accordingly,

                                                             Reversed.