United States Court of Appeals,
Fifth Circuit.
No. 93-3082.
Gregory SOCKWELL, Raymond Rochon, and John Crittle, Plaintiffs-
Appellants, Cross-Appellees,
v.
Betty Halbert PHELPS, spouse, personal representative, and
testamentary executrix of decedent, C. Paul Phelps, Jr. and Frank
Blackburn, Defendants-Appellees, Cross-Appellants.
May 10, 1994.
Appeals from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of Louisiana.
Before POLITZ, Chief Judge, GARWOOD, Circuit Judge, and PARKER*,
District Judge.
ROBERT M. PARKER, District Judge:
Plaintiffs-Appellants Gregory Sockwell, Raymond Rochon and
John Crittle (the Prisoners)1 filed this action pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendants-Appellees C. Paul Phelps (Phelps),
former Secretary of the Louisiana Department of Public Safety and
Corrections, and Frank Blackburn (Blackburn), former Warden of the
Louisiana State Penitentiary, alleging that Phelps and Blackburn,
in their individual capacities, violated their constitutional
rights by racially segregating the prison's two-man cells. After
a de novo review of the record, the district court adopted all
except the amount of the punitive damage award of the report and
*
Chief Judge of the Eastern District of Texas, sitting by
designation.
1
John Crittle has been subsequently released from
incarceration.
1
recommendation of the magistrate judge, holding that Phelps and
Blackburn violated the Prisoners' right to equal protection under
the Fourteenth Amendment by knowingly permitting the continued
assignment of prisoners to segregated two-man cells based solely on
their race. The court awarded the Prisoners nominal damages of
$1.00 each, and ordered Phelps and Blackburn to pay punitive
damages of $2,000.00 each2 plus attorney's fees. All parties
appeal the judgment of the district court. We AFFIRM.
FACTS
The parties do not dispute the facts of this case as reflected
in the testimony received from two evidentiary hearings before the
magistrate judge. A court order was issued in Williams v.
McKeithen, CA 71-98 (M.D.La.1975), enjoining racial discrimination
in the operation or administration of the Louisiana State
Penitentiary (Angola) and ordering prison officials to immediately
correct any effects of past racial discrimination and to maintain
Angola as a completely integrated facility. Deputy Warden Richard
Peabody testified, however, that even after the court order was
issued it remained the policy and general practice at Angola not to
mix black and white prisoners together in the same two-man cell.
He further stated that the segregation of prisoners in two-man
cells was not racially motivated but, instead, motivated by
security concerns and the past incidents of violence between black
2
The district court's order reduced the magistrate judge's
recommended amount of $5,000.00 each to $2,000.00 each, and
appointed a team to monitor the new warden's desegregation
policy.
2
and white prisoners. He was able to testify as to two incidents,
one in 1976 and one in 1977, where violence erupted between black
and white prisoners who were placed together in administrative
lockdown cells. However, he did not testify as to whether either
of these incidents were investigated or whether either incident
developed from racial tension. Despite his testimony regarding
security concerns and past experiences of violence between black
and white prisoners, Warden Peabody did admit that the rest of
Angola had been completely integrated.
Phelps testified that he was familiar with the court order,
and that he understood it to mean that segregating prisoners by
race alone is unconstitutional. Although he toured the cell blocks
in Angola on a regular basis, he could not say that he was or was
not aware of the general policy of racial segregation of the
two-man cells. He did testify, however, that he did not believe
that the past incidents of violence in the cell blocks had racial
overtones, but that such incidents usually involved sex or money.
Blackburn testified that while he was warden he became aware
of the court order, but that he did not recall ever seeing a white
and black prisoner housed together in a two-man cell. He stated
that it was his belief that the two-man cells were racially
segregated because of the feeling that there was a need for
security, although he could not recall any specific incidents that
would have justified a need for security.
The Prisoners testified that while they were confined at
Angola they were never housed in a two-man cell with a white
3
prisoner, nor did they ever see a black and white prisoner housed
together in a two-man cell. They also testified that white
prisoners in two-man cells received preferential treatment over the
cells occupied by black prisoners. For example, white two-man
cells were called to showers and to sell plasma first, enjoyed
better telephone and store privileges, and had a better view of the
televisions.
In addition, the Prisoners testified that when a prisoner
awaits assignment to a two-man cell, his privileges are suspended.
This temporary suspension of privileges, called "administrative
lockdown," was prolonged at Angola due to the general policy of
racial segregation. As a result, the Prisoners were damaged
because they were deprived of privileges such as work, plasma
donation, etc. for a longer period of time because they could not
be assigned until a two-man cell with another black prisoner became
available.
In October 1990, after the Prisoners filed this lawsuit, the
present warden at Angola issued a written memorandum in which he
terminated the general policy and practice of racially segregating
two-man cells.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
A trial court's findings of fact are accepted unless clearly
erroneous or grounded on an erroneous view of the law, or an
incorrect legal standard. See Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S.
273, 289, 102 S.Ct. 1781, 1789-90, 72 L.Ed.2d 66 (1982); see also
Branch-Hines v. Hebert, 939 F.2d 1311, 1320 (5th Cir.1991). Where
4
there exists two permissible views of the evidence, a fact finder's
choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous, even if the
reviewing court would have weighed the evidence differently.
Branch-Hines v. Hebert, 939 F.2d at 1321. A finding of fact is
clearly erroneous only if the reviewing court, after reviewing the
entire record, is convinced that the trial court made a mistake.
Texas Pig Stands, Inc. v. Hard Rock Cafe Int'l, Inc., 951 F.2d 684,
693 (5th Cir.1992). Questions of law, however, are reviewed de
novo. Branch-Hines v. Hebert, 939 F.2d at 1320.
EQUAL PROTECTION
The Prisoners contend that the segregation of two-man cells by
race at Angola violated their right to equal protection under the
Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. In Lee v.
Washington,3 the United States Supreme Court held that segregation
of the races in prisons and jails violates the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court recognized, however,
"that prison authorities have the right, acting in good faith and
in particularized circumstances, to take into account racial
tensions in maintaining security, discipline, and good order in
prisons and jails." Lee v. Washington, 390 U.S. at 334, 88 S.Ct.
at 995.
In Williams v. Treen,4 this Circuit confirmed the Supreme
Court's decision, stating:
We believe that the right to be free from general policies of
3
390 U.S. 333, 88 S.Ct. 994, 19 L.Ed.2d 1212 (1968).
4
671 F.2d 892 (5th Cir.1982).
5
racial segregation in prison housing and administration was
clearly established in the opinions rendered by Judge Johnson
in Washington v. Lee, 263 F.Supp. 327 (M.D.Ala.1966), and the
Supreme Court's per curiam affirmance in Lee v. Washington,
390 U.S. 333, 88 S.Ct. 994, 19 L.Ed.2d 1212 (1968).
Williams v. Treen, 671 F.2d at 902. The exception for
"particularized circumstances," however, has not been specifically
defined by this Court. Phelps and Blackburn argue that prison
security, not discriminatory purpose or intent, formed the
foundation of Angola's general policy of racial segregation in its
two-man cells, which remained in effect until 1990. They further
argue that because racial tensions factor into administrative
decisions regarding security, the general policy of segregation in
the two-man cells met the "particularized circumstances" exception
in Lee v. Washington, and that, absent bad faith, this Court should
not substitute its views for those of the prison authorities.
To justify the general policy of limited segregation, Phelps
and Blackburn cite five factors which contributed to the need for
increased security through racial segregation in the two-man cells:
(1) prison guards were unable to visually monitor each two-man cell
at all hours of the night; (2) the prisoners placed in Angola are
the "worst of the worst"; (3) two instances occurred in which
black and white prisoners housed together became violent; (4)
racial supremacy groups existed within the prison ranks; and (5)
interracial conflicts may have triggered more generalized racial
violence. In support of the policy, they add that the low number
of two-man cell assaults were a direct result of its success.
Although this Court has not specifically defined the
6
"particularized circumstances" exception in Lee v. Washington, the
general rule is clear: a generalized or vague fear of racial
violence is not a sufficient justification for a broad policy of
racial segregation.5 The five factors Phelps and Blackburn argue
fail to prove the existence in Angola of an unusual situation in
which security and discipline would have demanded segregation. If
violent disruptions did occur, we would expect the prison officials
to take appropriate action against the offending prisoners, black
or white. Even the racial segregation of offending individual
prisoners would be acceptable if, based on an individualized
analysis, the prison officials determined such action would be
needed to stifle particular instances of racial violence.6
Although we respect the need for security at Angola, the argument
that integrated two-man cells may lead to more violence between
black and white prisoners is not tenable, given that the rest of
the prison was integrated pursuant to the court order in Williams
v. McKeithen. Therefore, we hold that the general policy of
segregating two-man cells in effect at Angola until 1990 was
unconstitutional. We further hold that Phelps and Blackburn are
not protected under qualified immunity, due to their knowing and
intentional participation in a general policy of racial segregation
5
The Tenth Circuit specifically held that a vague fear that
desegregation may result in violence is not enough to meet the
"particularized circumstances" exception in Lee v. Washington.
United States v. Wyandotte County, Texas, 480 F.2d 969, 971 (10th
Cir.1973).
6
See McClelland v. Sigler, 456 F.2d 1266, 1267 (8th
Cir.1972).
7
which remained in effect until 1990 and violated a court order
mandating full integration of the prison facility.
COMPENSATORY DAMAGES
Compensatory damages awarded pursuant to § 1983 are governed
by common law tort principles. Keyes v. Lauga, 635 F.2d 330, 336
(5th Cir.1981). Absent an error of law, the reviewing court will
sustain the amount of damages awarded by the fact finder, unless
the amount is clearly erroneous or so gross or inadequate as to be
contrary to right reason. Thompkins v. Belt, 828 F.2d 298, 301
(5th Cir.1987).
The district court upheld the magistrate judge's
determination that the Prisoners were entitled to $1.00 each in
compensatory damages on grounds that the Prisoners failed to
present evidence that they suffered any real harm or quantifiable
loss as a result of their prolonged deprivation of privileges. We
agree with the lower courts. The Prisoners failed to present
evidence in the record that while they were confined without
privileges in administrative lockdown, vacancies existed in two-man
cells occupied by white prisoners. Without such evidence, the
Prisoners have not proved that they suffered any actual damages,
and they may not be awarded damages based solely upon the abstract
value or importance of the constitutional right violated by Phelps
and Blackburn. See Russell v. Harrison, 736 F.2d 283, 291 n. 17
(5th Cir.1984). Therefore, we hold that the district court's
judgment was not clearly erroneous.
PUNITIVE DAMAGES
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As for the punitive damages awarded, the Prisoners challenge
the $2,000.00 award on two fronts: they contend that the original
award of $5,000.00 each by the magistrate judge was too small and
argue that the district court erred when it reduced that amount to
$2,000.00 each. Phelps and Blackburn argue that they had no evil
intent in following the segregation policy, and that they did not
act with reckless or callous indifference to the Prisoners'
constitutional rights.
Under § 1983, punitive damages may be awarded only if the
official conduct is "motivated by evil intent" or demonstrates
"reckless or callous indifference" to a person's constitutional
rights. Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 103 S.Ct. 1625, 1640, 75
L.Ed.2d 632 (1983); see also Thompkins v. Belt, 828 F.2d at 301-
02. However, even if a party has made a proper showing to justify
an award of punitive damages, the trier of fact's decision whether
to award such damages is discretionary. Creamer v. Porter, 754
F.2d 1311, 1319 (5th Cir.1985). The reviewing court may not
reverse the award of punitive damages absent an abuse of
discretion.
The magistrate judge awarded punitive damages for Phelps' and
Blackburn's reckless or callous indifference in their knowing
perpetuation of an unconstitutional prison policy in violation of
the court order issued in Williams v. McKeithen. The district
court reduced the amount of punitive damages recommended by the
magistrate judge, noting that Phelps and Blackburn were no longer
associated with Angola. The purpose of punitive damages under §
9
1983 is to deter future egregious conduct in violation of
constitutional rights. Creamer v. Porter, 754 F.2d at 1319. The
district court concluded that the elimination of racial segregation
would be better served by the threat of future contempt sanctions
against the present warden than by the extraction of money from
people no longer affiliated with Angola.
We agree with lower courts' finding of reckless or callous
indifference. Phelps and Blackburn knowingly participated in the
violation of a court order which resulted in the violation of the
Prisoners' constitutional rights. Their failure to present any
evidence showing that the violence or risk of violence in Angola
was race related can only lead to the conclusion that their actions
constituted reckless or callous indifference to the constitutional
rights of the Prisoners. Nevertheless, the district court's
reduction of the punitive damage award must be given deference, and
nothing in the record indicates an abuse of discretion. Therefore,
we hold that the district court in its discretion properly awarded
punitive damages under the circumstances for the total amount of
$4,000.00.
ATTORNEY'S FEES
The Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, 42
U.S.C. § 1988, provides that courts may award reasonable attorney's
fees to a prevailing party in a § 1983 action. Kirchberg v.
Feenstra, 708 F.2d 991, 995 (5th Cir.1983). Attorney's fees may be
recovered unless special circumstances render such an award unjust.
Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402, 88
10
S.Ct. 964, 966, 19 L.Ed.2d 1263 (1968). Having upheld the judgment
of the district court that Phelps and Blackburn violated the
Prisoners' constitutional rights by racially segregating Angola's
two-man cells, the Prisoners are entitled to an additional award of
reasonable attorney's fees. The Prisoners contend that an award of
$5,000.00 in additional attorney's fees is reasonable under the
circumstances of this case, while Phelps and Blackburn argue that
the decision should be deferred until an evidentiary hearing can be
held on the matter.
The question of what constitutes reasonable attorney's fees is
a question of fact to be determined by the fact finder. Jerry
Parks Equip. Co. v. Southeast Equip. Co., Inc., 817 F.2d 340, 344
(5th Cir.1987). Therefore, we hold that the district court is to
receive evidence and thereafter determine a fair and reasonable
amount of attorney's fees for the proper preparation, trial, and
appeal of this matter.
CONCLUSION
We AFFIRM the judgment on the basis of the district court's
order, and REMAND the matter of the award of attorney's fees for
further proceedings consistent herewith.
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