The defendant in error . (hereinafter called the plaintiff) brought suit against the plaintiff in error (hereinafter called the defendant), alleging that the defendant was a corporation having an office and doing business in the county fn which the suit was brought, and was “indebted to petitioner in the sum of one
1. The defendant made a motion to dismiss the action, on the ground that the petition “contained no allegation showing any legal liability of the defendant for the payment of the account sued on, and that the pleadings did not set forth a prima facie case of liability of defendant for the payment of the account sued on.” Exceptions pendente lite were filed to the ruling of the court overruling'this motion, and error was assigned thereon in the bill of exceptions. The court committed no error in overruling the motion to dismiss the petition. The plaintiff had the right to bring the suit upon an account, attaching to his petition a bill of particulars or statement of the account, and to recover upon proof of an express or implied promise to pay the same. If, as in this ease, the account be against a corporation, and it was not in fact incurred by it, or was incurred by one of its agents not authorized to bind it in that regard, there can be no recovery. If the account was incurred by some agent authorized to bind the corporation, but not its agent to make payment, it would be the duty of the agent- to notify the proper authorities of the corporation to discharge it; and if the agent failed to so notify them, they would nevertheless be charged with knowledge of its existence, knowledge of the acts of an agent within the scope of his authority being in law imputed to his principal. Hnder either view, the corporation can not require more specific pleading in a suit against it of this character than would be required of a plaintiff bringing a like suit against an individual defendant. It was unnecessary to set forth in the petition the
2. Upon the trial of the case, part of the evidence in favor of the plaintiff was substantially as follows: The plaintiff operates a hotel at Cornelia, Ga. On March 16, 1907, Gordon Logan and Tom Brock were injured on the railroad of the defendant, and were taken to the hotel of the plaintiff. Dr. Crawford, a physician residing in Cornelia, operated 'on one of them, and a short time thereafter they were removed by Dr. Crawford to the hotel of the plaintiff. Subsequently and dxxring the same day Dr. Hathcock, the surgeon of the defendant, came to the hotel, and he and other physicians performed other operations on Brock and Logan. Dr. Hathcock contracted with the plaintiff to care for Brock and Logan and to board and lodge the nurses and other persons attending them, and that the railroad would pay for the same. He boarded Brock, Logan, and others, under this agreement, and the account sued upon is for such board and lodging. “On the-day of -, 190 — ,” Hathcock notified the plaintiff that Brock had sued the railroad company, and that the latter would'no longer be responsible for the board and lodging of Brock or any of the others. , Hathcock testified, upon the trial of the case, that he went to Cornelia to attend Brock and Logan by virtue of a message .from the officers of the railroad company to do so; that he made no contract with the plaintiff on behalf of the company to board and lodge Brock and Logan, or any other person; that he had no authority to make such a contract; that under his contract with the railroad company his authority as surgeon or agent of the company was so limited that he had no authority to bind the company by virtue of any contract which the plaintiff contended was made, and that he made no such contract. The defendant introduced the contract between it and its surgeon Hathcock. The brief of evidence sets forth the following provisions of the contract as being the ones material to be considered: “Said contract, after being a contract entered into January 1, 1902, between the Southern Railway Co. and Jiles Hathcock, as surgeon of said road, fixing the fees fox-services, and regulations governing said surgeons when employed
There was no testimony to show that Hathcock was a general agent of the railroad company. The evidence shows that when he was sent by the company to attend Brock and Logan (injured on its railroad), the written contract between him and the company was in force. This contract shows that Hathcock was a special agent of the company when he rendered services for it to the injured parties. Under this contract “without specific authority” from one of those referred to in the contract, he had no authority to make a contract by which the company would be bound to pay for the board and lodging of the injured persons, or of any one nursing or otherwise rendering them services in a “hospital or private quarters.” By the express terms of the contract such au^ thority was denied him. The contract provides: “No case of injury must be admitted to • hospital or private quarters on ac
3. Complaint is made that the court erred in admitting the following testimony of a witness for the plaintiff: “I had a conversation with Dr. Ilathcock about Tom being here at the Grant Hotel. He told me that he was an agent of the Southern Railroad. I don’t know as I can say in what capacity. lie said he was railroad agent or doctor for the railroad.” It was error to admit this testimony, as the fact that one is agent for another can not be proved by the declarations of the former.
Complaint is also made that the court erred in admitting the following testimony of the plaintiff: “The Southern Railway paid the expenses of Addison staying at my house at the time lie' 'was hurt.” It appears from the testimony that, before Brock and Logan were injured, one Addison was injured and was taken to the hotel of the plaintiff, who was paid for boarding him by the defendant on the recommendation of Hathcock after he left the hotel. This testimony was irrelevant and should have been excluded. There was no effort to show, nor any contention, that it was the custom of the company to pay for boarding injured persons and those attending them, or that it had ever done so except in the instance above referred to, where Addison was injured by the company and it paid his board upon the recommendation of Hathcock.
Judgment reversed.