F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
PUBLISH
AUG 12 2003
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
TENTH CIRCUIT
BRIAN SPEARS,
Petitioner-Appellee/
Cross-Appellant,
v. Nos. 01-6258
&
MIKE MULLIN *, Warden, 01-6267
Oklahoma State Penitentiary,
Respondent-Appellant/
Cross-Appellee.
DUDLEY ALLEN POWELL,
Petitioner-Appellee/
Cross-Appellant,
Nos. 01-6349
v. &
01-6354
MIKE MULLIN, Warden,
Oklahoma State Penitentiary,
Respondent-Appellant/
Cross-Appellee.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
*
Mike Mullin replaced Gary Gibson as Warden of the Oklahoma State
Penitentiary effective March 25, 2002.
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
(D.C. Nos. CIV-96-1862-M & CIV-97-516-M)
Seth S. Branham, Assistant Attorney General (W.A. Drew Edmondson, Attorney
General of Oklahoma with him on the briefs), Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for
Respondent-Appellant/Cross-Appellee.
Randy A. Bauman, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma,
for Petitioner-Appellee/Cross-Appellant Brian Spears.
Mark Henricksen (Lanita Henricksen with him on the briefs) of Henricksen
& Henricksen Lawyers, Inc., El Reno, Oklahoma, for
Petitioner-Appellee/Cross-Appellant Dudley Allen Powell.
Before TACHA , Chief Judge, LUCERO , and HARTZ , Circuit Judges.
LUCERO , Circuit Judge.
Convicted in the Oklahoma courts of the first-degree murder of Jimmy
DeWayne Thompson and sentenced to death, Brian Spears and Dudley Powell
each filed a 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition seeking relief from their convictions and
sentences. 1 After concluding that photographs introduced during the second stage
of trial rendered the sentencing stage fundamentally unfair, the federal district
court granted relief from both Spears’ and Powell’s death sentences, but denied
1
Another co-defendant Claiborne Johnson III, pled guilty to first-degree murder
and received a life sentence without possibility of parole in exchange for his
testimony against Spears and Powell.
2
relief on numerous other claims challenging both defendants’ convictions. We
now consider four appeals: the State appeals the district court’s grant of habeas
relief from the death sentences, and Spears and Powell cross-appeal the denial of
relief on the other claims. Because all four appeals arise out of the same set of
facts and present similar issues, we join them for disposition. Exercising
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253, we take the district court’s
view of the issues and affirm. 2
I
On the evening of September 21, 1990, the day Thompson died, Thompson,
age twenty-two, Spears, age twenty, and Spears’ then girlfriend, Vickie Hensley,
were cruising around Pauls Valley, Oklahoma, in Thompson’s truck. At Spears’
request, Thompson purchased alcohol and the three began drinking. During the
evening, they drank a cocktail of Kool Aid and Everclear from a gallon milk jug,
as well as whiskey and beer. They were joined at various times by Powell, age
eighteen, Claiborne Johnson III, age twenty-two, and Mickey Daniels, none of
whom had met Thompson before that evening. Sometime after Powell joined the
group, Spears began driving the truck because Thompson was intoxicated. During
2
Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”),
petitioners cannot appeal the denial of habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254
unless a certificate of appealability is granted (“COA”). In the instant case, a
COA was granted on all issues discussed in this opinion.
3
the course of the evening, they stopped at several places to refresh their supply of
alcoholic beverages. Later, they decided to continue imbibing at the Klondike
Cemetery, a popular drinking spot.
On the way to the cemetery, Powell and Spears discussed beating
Thompson and taking his truck. At the cemetery, all exited the truck. Powell told
Spears, Johnson, and Daniels that he was going to “jump” Thompson and that
they should join the beating. (3 Tr. at 712.) As the group walked along the
cemetery road, Powell hit Thompson in the head with his fist. With the first
blow, Thompson fell to the ground, where he lay “moaning” and “hollering.” (4
id. at 942.) Johnson began kicking Thompson, while Powell kicked and jumped
on Thompson’s head and chest. At some point, Johnson and Powell began hitting
Thompson with their fists. Spears also joined the beating and began jumping on
and kicking Thompson on the chest and possibly his head. The beating lasted
from three to ten minutes. Neither Daniels nor Hensley participated; after
observing the attack for sometime, they returned to the truck.
After the beating, Spears grabbed Powell and Johnson by their arms,
produced a knife, and said that they had to kill Thompson because he could testify
against them. Each stabbed Thompson several times. Sometime during the
stabbing attack, Powell momentarily returned to Thompson’s truck, where
Hensley and Daniels had retreated, and told them Johnson had stabbed Thompson
4
in the throat. Powell told them that Johnson intended to take Thompson’s truck to
Tulsa and sell it, and that Spears agreed with this plan. Powell then returned to
the crime scene.
Powell, Spears, and Johnson subsequently left Thompson’s body and
returned to the truck. Spears told everyone to listen to Johnson, who directed
them not to say anything about what had happened. Spears then told Hensley and
Daniels that if anyone asked them if they had seen Thompson that evening, they
should say that Thompson had taken them to a football game and dropped them
off after the game.
Upon leaving the cemetery, the group first took Hensley home. The
remaining four then went to the home of Johnson’s girlfriend, Lashonda Austin,
where Johnson told Austin that they had killed a man that night in self-defense
and where Spears confirmed the killing. After leaving Austin’s house, Powell
and Johnson dropped off Spears and Daniels. Much later, Johnson took Powell
home and eventually parked Thompson’s truck at an apartment building. The
following day, Johnson was arrested in a neighboring town while in possession of
Thompson’s truck and wallet. Spears and Powell were arrested soon thereafter. 3
At trial, the medical examiner, Dr. Larry Balding, testified that Thompson
3
Hensley and Daniels were held on a material-witness bond of twenty-five
thousand dollars.
5
died from blunt-force injury to the head, resulting in a skull fracture and bleeding
into and on the brain. According to Dr. Balding, a single blow could have caused
the head injury or death. While he did not know the actual number of blows to
Thompson’s head, he was certain Thompson sustained more than one blunt-force
blow to the body. However, Dr. Balding did not believe that any of the blows to
the body would have caused death, either individually or in combination.
Dr. Balding further testified that Thompson received fifty to sixty knife
wounds to his head, neck, chest, abdomen, and back. As a result of the stabbing,
six to eight inches of Thompson’s small intestine protruded. Parts of other
internal organs were visible through the chest. Apart from what were referred to
as two possible peri-mortem knife wounds, all other knife wounds were inflicted
post-mortem. 4
Any potentially fatal stab wounds were delivered post-mortem.
Neither Spears nor Powell testified or presented any evidence at the trial’s
first stage. Based on the State’s evidence, the jury found both guilty of first-
degree murder.
The State’s second-stage presentation was brief. After incorporating all
first-stage evidence, the State presented six photographs of Thompson’s body
4
Dr. Balding was uncertain whether a large cut on Thompson’s chest where there
was some hemorrhage was peri-mortem, because Thompson had received several
blows to the chest region which also caused hemorrhage. Likewise, because there
was massive head trauma with bleeding, Dr. Balding was uncertain whether the
stab wound to the right side of Thompson’s head was peri-mortem.
6
taken at the crime scene. Spears presented two mitigation witnesses. His sister,
Sharlene Flannery, testified that Spears dropped out of school in the tenth grade,
that he babysat her children, that he has one child, that she never saw him fight or
be so angry that he would hurt or kill someone, and that he regularly attended
church. Reverend John Stiger testified that he had ministered to Spears’ family
and had watched Spears grow up. He stated that Spears was a normal young man
with no prior convictions, who had positively influenced the lives of people in the
county jail. Other mitigation evidence emphasized Spears’ youth and his
intoxication at the time of the crime.
Powell also presented two mitigation witnesses. His mother, Connie Walls,
testified that Powell grew up without a father, experienced rejection from his
family, adored his three step-siblings and helped care for them, generally stopped
caring when his step-sibling twins’ father kidnapped them, regularly attended
church, stopped attending school in seventh grade after being held back due to his
learning disabilities, loved music, and has mechanical ability. Rachel Smith, who
had known Powell since he was six or seven, testified that she acted as a
surrogate grandmother to him, and he minded her when asked to do so. Other
mitigating factors included Powell’s youth, likelihood of rehabilitation, and
intoxication at the time of the crime.
Based on all of the evidence, the jury found, with respect to both Spears
7
and Powell, that Thompson’s murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel
and that the two committed the murder to avoid arrest or prosecution. The jury,
however, did not find that either would be a continuing threat to society. After
weighing the two aggravators against the mitigating evidence, the jury delivered
death sentences for both Spears and Powell.
The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals (“OCCA”) affirmed Spears’
conviction and sentence on direct appeal and denied his first application for
post-conviction relief. Spears v. State , 900 P.2d 431 (Okla. Crim. App.),
cert. denied , 516 U.S. 1031 (1995); Spears v. State , 924 P.2d 778 (Okla. Crim.
App. 1996). Spears then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in federal
district court. Identifying several issues as unexhausted, the district court abated
federal proceedings and directed Spears to return to state court to exhaust these
issues. He did so, and the OCCA denied relief on a second application for
post-conviction relief. Spears v. State , No. PC-99-1099 (Okla. Crim. App.
Oct. 13, 1999). Federal habeas proceedings then resumed. Granting Spears
habeas relief from his death sentence, the district court held that the introduction
of the crime-scene photographs at the trial’s second stage deprived him of a
fundamentally fair sentencing proceeding. However, the district court rejected all
other second-stage arguments and denied relief from Spears’ conviction.
Powell’s conviction and sentence were also upheld by the OCCA, and his
8
application for post-conviction relief was similarly denied. Powell v. State , 906
P.2d 765 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995), cert. denied , 517 U.S. 1144 (1996); Powell v.
State , 935 P.2d 378 (Okla. Crim. App. 1997). As with Spears, on federal habeas
review, the district court granted Powell relief from his death sentence due to the
constitutional error arising from admission of the photographs, but rejected all
other second-stage arguments and denied relief from Powell’s conviction.
The district court stayed enforcement of Spears’ and Powell’s judgments
pending appeals. The State, Spears, and Powell all appeal.
II
Because Spears and Powell filed their petitions for habeas relief after April
24, 1996, the effective date of AEDPA, AEDPA’s provisions apply to both
appeals. See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 326–27 (1997). Under AEDPA, if
a claim is adjudicated on the merits in state court, we will grant habeas relief to a
petitioner only if he can establish that the state court decision was “contrary to, or
involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as
determined by the Supreme Court of the United States,” or “was based on an
unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the
State court proceedings.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), (2). AEDPA requires us to
presume that state court factual findings are correct, and places the burden on the
petitioner to rebut this presumption by clear and convincing evidence.
9
§ 2254(e)(1).
If the state court did not decide a claim on the merits, and it is not
otherwise procedurally barred, we review the district court’s legal conclusions
de novo and its factual findings, if any, for clear error. See Hooker v. Mullin,
293 F.3d 1232, 1237 (10th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 975 (2003). When,
however, “the district court’s findings of fact are based merely on a review of the
state record, we do not give them the benefit of the clearly erroneous standard but
instead conduct an independent review.” Morris v. Burnett, 319 F.3d 1254, 1268
(10th Cir. 2003) (quotation and brackets omitted). We apply these standards to
determine whether the district court correctly assessed each issue before us on
appeal. See Darks v. Mullin, 327 F.3d 1001 (10th Cir. 2003).
III
A. State’s Appeals
The federal district court held that the State’s penalty-phase introduction of
crime-scene photographs showing Thompson’s mutilated body deprived Spears
and Powell of a fundamentally fair sentencing proceeding as guaranteed by the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. On appeal, the State argues that these
admittedly gruesome photographs were relevant to both the heinous, atrocious, or
cruel and continuing-threat aggravators, that their relevance outweighed any
danger of unfair prejudice, and that the photographs were therefore properly
10
admitted in evidence.
“Federal habeas review is not available to correct state law evidentiary
errors; rather it is limited to violations of constitutional rights.” Smallwood v.
Gibson, 191 F.3d 1257, 1275 (10th Cir. 1999) (citing Estelle v. McGuire,
502 U.S. 62, 67–68 (1991)); see also Willingham v. Mullin, 296 F.3d 917, 928
(10th Cir. 2000). When, as here, habeas petitioners challenge the admission of
photographic evidence as violative of the Constitution, this court considers
“whether the admission of evidence . . . so infected the sentencing proceeding
with unfairness as to render the jury’s imposition of the death penalty a denial of
due process.” Romano v. Oklahoma, 512 U.S. 1, 12 (1994); see also Bruton v.
United States, 391 U.S. 123, 131 n.6 (1968) (“An important element of a fair trial
is that a jury consider only relevant and competent evidence bearing on the issue
of [sentencing].”); Smallwood, 191 F.3d at 1275 (examining “whether the
admission of the photographs rendered the proceedings fundamentally unfair”);
Willingham, 296 F.3d at 928 (addressing whether admission of photographs was
“so grossly prejudicial that it fatally infected the trial and denied the fundamental
fairness that is the essence of due process” (quotation omitted)). “[B]ecause
a fundamental-fairness analysis is not subject to clearly definable legal elements,
when engaged in such an endeavor a federal court must tread gingerly and
exercise considerable self-restraint.” Duckett v. Mullin, 306 F.3d 982, 999
11
(10th Cir. 2002) (quotations omitted); see also Bullock v. Carver, 297 F.3d 1036,
1055 (10th Cir.) (recognizing that only a narrow category of infractions violates
fundamental fairness), cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 703 (2002); Jackson v. Shanks,
143 F.3d 1313, 1322 (10th Cir. 1998) (approaching fundamental-fairness analysis
with “considerable self-restraint” (quotation omitted)).
Although there are no clearly defined legal elements, the
fundamental-fairness inquiry requires us to look at the effect of the admission
of the photographs within the context of the entire second stage. See Duckett ,
306 F.3d at 988. We consider the relevance of the photographs and the strength
of the aggravating evidence against Spears and Powell as compared to the
mitigating evidence in their favor and decide whether admission of the
photographs could have given the State an unfair advantage. Ultimately, we
consider whether the jury could judge the evidence fairly in light of the admission
of the photographs. See id. at 989. Applying this fundamental-fairness standard
and mindful of the standards of review set forth by AEDPA, we conclude that the
federal district court appropriately granted habeas relief.
In Oklahoma, a murder is especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel if it was
“preceded by torture or serious physical abuse. Torture includes the infliction of
either great physical anguish or extreme mental cruelty, while physical abuse
requires evidence of conscious physical suffering.” Romano v. Gibson, 239 F.3d
12
1156, 1176 (10th Cir. 2001) (quotation omitted); see also Powell, 906 P.2d
at 779–80 (recognizing that it is critical for the State to prove the victim’s
conscious physical suffering before death); Spears, 900 P.2d at 443, 449 (same).
According to the State, because Thompson was alive for part of the
stabbing and three of the photographs depict his extensive head injuries, all six
photographs were relevant to prove he suffered serious physical abuse prior to
death. The OCCA decided the photographs were relevant and properly admitted
to prove Thompson suffered serious physical abuse prior to his death, in light of
testimony that Thompson moaned and suffered two peri-mortem stab wounds.
Powell, 906 P.2d at 780; Spears, 900 P.2d at 443.
That Thompson suffered serious physical abuse in the common sense of the
term is not in doubt. Rather, the question under Oklahoma law is whether the
photographs were relevant to show conscious physical suffering. See
Willingham , 296 F.3d at 929 (noting that when a “victim dies or loses
consciousness early on in an assault, photographs of all of [his] injuries might
involve irrelevant and/or unduly prejudicial material at the penalty phase, since
the [heinous, atrocious or cruel] aggravator focuses on the conscious suffering of
the victim” (citing Powell , 906 P.2d at 780)). On this point, the OCCA
questioned the relevance of the photographs to the jury’s finding of the heinous,
atrocious, or cruel aggravator:
13
These photographs are not . . . probative of whether Thompson was
conscious during the beating which is the critical inquiry in
determining whether a murder was especially heinous, atrocious or
cruel. The probative value of these photographs is very slight
especially in light of their gruesome nature. Their probative value
scarcely exceeds their prejudicial effect. We note the introduction of
the six photographs came very close to causing a second sentencing
hearing given the paucity of evidence supporting the aggravator
especially heinous, atrocious or cruel. Because such photographs
were not admitted in first stage, they were more shocking seen for
the first time in the punishment stage.
Spears, 900 P.2d at 443 (emphasis added); see Powell, 906 P.2d at 780 (setting
forth identical reasoning). Despite concerns about the photographs, however, the
OCCA decided that their probative value outweighed their prejudicial effect.
Powell, 906 P.2d at 780; Spears, 900 P.2d at 443.
Contrary to the OCCA, the federal district court held that the photographs
denied Spears and Powell a fundamentally fair sentencing proceeding because the
photographs’ prejudicial effect outweighed their probative value:
None of the stab wounds focused on in the photographs can be
considered probative of the question of conscious physical suffering,
the only injuries arguably being relevant to such a determination
being those from the beating. While the jury was not instructed that
it had to find “conscious physical suffering,” it was instructed it had
to find the victim’s death was preceded by torture or serious physical
abuse. . . . Because none of the stab wounds occurred while the
victim was conscious or preceded his death, such injuries cannot be
considered relevant to the question before the jury.
Spears v. Gibson , No. CIV-96-1862-M, slip op. at 44–45 (W.D. Okla. Oct. 15,
2001); Powell v. Ward , No. CIV-97-516-M, slip op. at 63 (W.D. Okla, Aug. 22,
14
2001). This improper evidence, along with the lack of evidence of conscious
physical suffering during the beating, caused the district court to conclude that the
second-stage proceedings were unconstitutionally infirm. 5
Having viewed the photographs and reviewed the entire record, we agree
with the district court that the introduction into evidence of the photographs
depicting Thompson’s numerous post-mortem stab wounds, large gash wounds,
exposed intestines and swollen face and black eye rendered the second stage
fundamentally unfair. Because the heinous, atrocious, or cruel aggravator focuses
on Thompson’s conscious suffering, and the evidence showed Thompson died or
lost consciousness early on in the beating, the photographs of all of his injuries
were unduly prejudicial at the second phase. See Willingham , 296 F.3d at 928–29
(citing Powell , 906 P.2d at 780). Instead, the gruesome photographs potentially
misled the jury, as they necessarily had a strong impact on the jurors’ minds.
Minimal evidence suggested Thompson was conscious or even alive during the
stabbing. 6
At most, two of the fifty to sixty stab wounds were peri-mortem.
5
The federal district court did find exhibit 50, showing Thompson’s black eye
and swollen face, to be probative of whether he endured physical abuse before
death, if he was conscious during the beating. However, even if this one
photograph did not render the trial fundamentally unfair, we conclude the others
did.
6
We note that the OCCA stated that there was a “plethora of evidence Thompson
endured serious physical anguish prior to death.” Spears, 900 P.2d at 449; Powell,
906 P.2d at 782. In the next sentence, however, the court states, “Further, there
(continued...)
15
Neither the peri-mortem stab wounds nor conscious suffering were connected to
the specific photographs. The photographs do not show any defensive wounds,
nor do they support, clarify, or illustrate any testimony indicating Thompson
consciously suffered physical abuse before his death. See Jackson , 143 F.3d at
1322; Hoxsie v. Kerby , 108 F.3d 1239, 1243 (10th Cir. 1997).
Even if the photographs were minimally relevant to the heinous, atrocious,
or cruel aggravator, the photographs’ prejudicial effect outweighed their
probative value. Important to this conclusion is the fact that the State waited
until the second stage to introduce the photographs. By contrast, the State
introduced comparatively innocuous photographs at the first stage, seeming to
deliberately await the second stage to present the more gruesome photographs
solely for their shock value. Because the photographs were the primary
aggravating evidence specifically presented at the second stage, they constitute a
major part of the State’s second-stage case.
6
(...continued)
was evidence Thompson was conscious during the beating,” suggesting that the
previous sentence was not meant to describe the evidence of conscious suffering.
Spears, 900 P.2d at 449; Powell; 906 P.2d at 782. Earlier, the court stated that
there was a “paucity of evidence supporting the [heinous, atrocious, or cruel]
aggravator.” Spears, 900 P.2d at 443; Powell, 906 P.2d at 780. In any event, had
the OCCA determined there was a plethora of evidence of conscious suffering,
our review of the record leads us to conclude that such a finding would be
unreasonable. We agree with the district court that the evidence offered to show
conscious suffering was weak.
16
As the OCCA observed, and as set forth above, a paucity of evidence
supported the heinous, atrocious, or cruel aggravator. See Powell , 906 P.2d
at 780; Spears , 900 P.2d at 443. As to the “avoid arrest or prosecution
aggravator” found by the jury, while there was some evidence to support the
aggravator, we agree with the district court that such evidence was not
particularly strong. 7
When viewed together with the mitigation evidence
presented by Spears’ and Powell’s respective trial counsel, including evidence of
Spears’ and Powell’s youth, intoxication at the time of the crime and their lack of
prior criminal history, we conclude that such evidence was not sufficiently strong
standing alone such that the jury would have returned a sentence of death. 8
7
As the district court noted:
While Hensley and Daniels did testify that a conversation occurred
on the way to the cemetery regarding taking the victim’s truck, a full
reading of the record also supports [Spear’s] theory that the motive
for the killing was Powell’s anger towards the victim on the evening
of the murder. Furthermore, the evidence that Johnson was the one
primary interested in disposing of the truck and selling it after the
murder lends some support to [Spears’] theory as to the motive for
the killing.
Spears v. Gibson, No. CIV-96-1862-M, slip op. at 47–48 (W.D. Okla. Oct.
15, 2001); Powell v. Ward, No. CIV-97-516-M, slip op. at 66 (W.D. Okla.
Aug. 22, 2001).
8
As noted above, the State argues that the six photographs were relevant to both
the heinous, atrocious, or cruel and continuing-threat aggravators. The OCCA did
not consider the relevance of the photographs to the continuing-threat aggravator.
See Powell, 906 P.2d at 779–80; Spears, 900 P.2d at 443. Our review of the
(continued...)
17
This highly inflammatory evidence fatally infected the trial and deprived
Spears and Powell of their constitutional rights to a fundamentally fair sentencing
proceeding. The OCCA’s decision that the photographs’ relevance exceeded their
prejudice was objectively unreasonable, see 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); see also
Woodford v. Visciotti , 123 S. Ct. 357, 360 (2002) (requiring a habeas applicant to
show that the state court applied Supreme Court law to the facts in an objectively
unreasonable manner and distinguishing unreasonable and incorrect applications
of law), and we conclude that the district court correctly decided that the
photographs rendered the second stage of trial fundamentally unfair. 9
To the
8
(...continued)
record shows that while the primary focus of the prosecution’s arguments during
the second stage was the relevance of the photographs to the heinous, atrocious,
or cruel aggravator, the prosecution did implicitly link the contents of the
photographs with its argument on the continuing-threat aggravator. However,
even assuming that the photographs were relevant to the continuing threat
aggravator, we conclude that the prejudicial effect of the photographs, as
described above, outweighs the probative value of this evidence.
9
After determining that the photographs caused the trial to be fundamentally
unfair, the federal district court then proceeded to conduct a harmless-error
analysis. This was unnecessary. The “substantive prejudice component[]”
inherent in fundamental-fairness review “essentially duplicate[s] the function of
harmless-error review.” Cargle, 317 F.3d at 1207. Thus, once a showing of
fundamental unfairness is made, a petitioner is entitled to habeas relief without an
assessment of harmless error. Id.; see, e.g., Wainwright v. Greenfield, 474 U.S.
284, 285, 289, 295 (1986) (holding that the use of defendant’s silence was
fundamentally unfair and warranted a new trial); Gonzales v. Lytle, 167 F.3d
1318, 1321 (10th Cir. 1999) (holding that a failure to permit the jury to consider
recanted testimony rendered the trial fundamentally unfair, warranting habeas
relief).
18
extent that the OCCA implicitly determined that the admission of the photographs
did not render the second stage fundamentally unfair, we conclude that this was
an unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court precedent. 10
10
Spears and Powell also argue that (1) the heinous, atrocious, or cruel
aggravator is not constitutionally valid, because the jury did not receive
instruction on the conscious suffering requirement; (2) insufficient evidence
supported a finding of the heinous, atrocious, or cruel aggravator; and (3)
insufficient evidence supported the avoid-arrest aggravator. Because we affirm
the district court’s grant of habeas relief with respect to the unconstitutional
admission of the photographs, we need not reach the first argument. As to the
second and third arguments, we need not reach the question of whether there was
sufficient evidence to support every aggravator. However, in order to allay any
Double Jeopardy concerns, we must determine whether there was sufficient
evidence to support at least one aggravator. See Poland v. Arizona, 476 U.S. 147,
156 (1986) (holding that only a finding “that no aggravating circumstance is
present is an acquittal barring a second death sentence proceeding” (quotation
omitted)); see also Cargle v. Mullin, 317 F.3d 1196, 1225 (10th Cir. 2003)
(applying Poland to the Oklahoma death-penalty scheme).
In reviewing petitioners’ claims, the OCCA concluded that there was
sufficient evidence to support the avoid arrest or prosecution aggravator. In
regard to Spears, the OCCA reasoned that
In the instant case the evidence showed Spears and Powell discussed
beating Thompson and taking his truck before they arrived at the
cemetery. At the cemetery Powell told Spears he would initiate the
beating and advised Spears and Johnson to join in. Spears and
Powell then carried out their plan to beat and rob Thompson. After
administering the severe beating, Spears grabbed Powell and Johnson
by the arm, produced a knife and said they had to kill Thompson
because he could testify against them. After stabbing Thompson,
Spears, Powell and Johnson took Thompson’s truck and wallet and
made plans to dispose of them along with Spears’ knife. Spears told
Hensley she better tell the alibi story he concocted or they would all
“get in trouble for all this.” From this evidence a rational jury could
find Spears had motive to rob Thompson, stopped at the cemetery to
commit the robbery, voluntarily joined in the beating and stabbing of
(continued...)
19
See, e.g. , Romano, 512 U.S. at 12; Donnelly v. DeChristoforo , 416 U.S. 637, 643
(1974); Bruton, 391 U.S. at 131 n.6.
B. Spears’ and Powell’s Cross-Appeals:
1. Bruton Error and Failure to Sever
Both Spears and Powell argue that the trial court improperly admitted out-
of-court statements that each of them made implicating the other, in violation of
10
(...continued)
Thompson to avoid arrest for the theft of Thompson’s truck, took
Thompson’s truck and wallet and directed disposal of the
incriminating evidence.
Spears, 900 P.2d at 447–48. In regard to Powell, the OCCA reasoned that
In the instant case the evidence showed Powell and Spears discussed
beating Thompson and taking his pickup truck before they arrived at
the cemetery. At the cemetery Powell told Spears, Johnson and
Daniels he would initiate the beating and then they should join in.
Powell then carried out his plan and struck Thompson. Powell
confessed “they” decided to steal Thompson’s pickup and to kill him.
After the murder Powell participated in discussions about selling
Thompson’s pickup in Tulsa and disposing of Thompson’s wallet and
the knife. From this evidence a rational jury could find Powell had
motive to rob Thompson, stopped at the cemetery to commit the
robbery, initiated the beating, killed Thompson to avoid arrest for the
theft of the truck, took Thompson’s truck and wallet and helped
dispose of incriminating evidence.
Powell, 906 P.2d at 781.
We agree with the district court that the OCCA’s determination that there
was sufficient evidence to support the avoid-arrest-or-prosecution aggravator was
not an unreasonable application of Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979).
Thus, we need not consider whether there was sufficient evidence to support the
remaining two aggravators. See Cargle, 317 F.3d at 1225.
20
their constitutional rights to a fair trial and to confrontation. See Bruton v.
United States , 391 U.S. 123 (1968). Additionally, both argue that introduction of
these statements resulted in a constitutionally unfair trial, and, therefore, the trial
court should have severed their trials. 11
Because Spears and Powell base their
severance claims on the Bruton errors, we first address the Bruton claims and then
the severance claims.
a. Bruton
In Bruton , the Supreme Court held that
a defendant is deprived of his rights under the Confrontation Clause
when his nontestifying codefendant’s confession naming him as a
participant in the crime is introduced at their joint trial, even if the
jury is instructed to consider that confession only against the
codefendant.
Richardson v. Marsh , 481 U.S. 200, 201–02 (1987); see also id. at 207; Cruz v.
New York , 481 U.S. 186, 187–88 (1987). Bruton applies, however, only if the
statement expressly implicates the defendant. See Richardson , 481 U.S. at 208.
“Richardson allows a court, despite the Confrontation Clause, to admit the
confession of a non-testifying co-defendant [that does not expressly implicate the
defendant]. The confession must be (i) redacted to eliminate any reference to the
non-confessing defendant, and (ii) accompanied by an appropriate limiting
11
Powell raised the severance and Bruton claims as separate issues, whereas
Spears treated them as a single issue. Nonetheless, both make similar claims,
thereby making it appropriate for us to consider their arguments together.
21
instruction that the confession is to be considered only against the confessor.”
Fowler v. Ward , 200 F.3d 1302, 1307 (10th Cir. 2000) (citing Richardson ,
481 U.S. at 211), overruled on other grounds by Moore v. Marr , 254 F.3d 1235,
1239 (10th Cir. 2001). “This is clearly a two-pronged requirement; a redaction,
no matter how perfect, nevertheless requires an appropriate limiting instruction
immediately following the admission of the confession.” Id.
i. Spears
Under Bruton , Spears first challenges Officer Wigley’s testimony
concerning Powell’s statement. Officer Wigley testified as follows:
A [Powell 12 ] said that he had been riding around Pauls Valley
drinking with some others.
Q Did he name those others?
A Yes, he did.
Q Okay. That’s fine.
A And they had been riding around Pauls Valley drinking, and they
had picked up various riders at different locations. And that they
ended up at the Klondike Cemetery at the cattle guard and gate area,
at the road leading up to the cemetery.
***
A He said that they got out of the pickup at the gate and stood
around drinking there for a little while. Then they proceeded to walk
up the road which leads to the cemetery. After they had traveled
some distance, he decided that he would whip [Thompson’s] ass or
12
In his testimony, Officer Wigley referred to Powell, Thompson, and Johnson
by their first names.
22
kick . . . [Thompson’s] ass.
***
A At which time [Powell] then struck [Thompson] in the face. And
[Thompson] went to the ground, at which time he began to kick and
stomp [Thompson] along with the others. They–they beat him for
sometime. I’m not sure of the time that they were there beating
on him.
Then they walked away from the body. And [Powell] said that it was
decided they would steal the pickup, and that they were going to have
to kill [Thompson]. They returned to the body, at which time a knife
had been produced, and that [Johnson] took the knife and began
stabbing [Thompson].
(4 Tr. at 1113–14.) Thus, in paraphrasing Powell’s out-of-court statement,
Officer Wigley made general reference to the group involved in the murder but
did not mention Spears by name.
Spears argues that given that: (1) both Hensley and Daniels had testified
and identified Spears as one of those persons who participated in the crime prior
to Officer Wigley’s testimony, and (2) Johnson testified immediately after Officer
Wigley and named Spears as part of the group, Officer Wigley’s references to
“others” and “they” were transparent, making it obvious that Officer Wigley was
referring to him.
Because Powell’s statement, as presented by Officer Wigley, was not
incriminating on its face, and became incriminating only after it was linked to
evidence introduced before and after Officer Wigley’s testimony, see Richardson ,
481 U.S. at 208, admitting Powell’s statement did not violate Bruton principles if
23
the statement was properly modified to eliminate any reference to Spears and the
trial court gave an appropriate limiting instruction. See Fowler , 200 F.3d at 1307
(citing Richardson , 481 U.S. at 211).
As the above-quoted testimony shows, Officer Wigley paraphrased Powell’s
statement to eliminate any reference to Spears by using the neutral pronouns
“others” and “they.” Although the Supreme Court has “express[ed] no opinion on
the admissibility of a confession in which the defendant’s name has been replaced
with a . . . neutral pronoun[,]” Richardson , 481 U.S. at 211 n.3, this court has held
that neutral pronouns are proper, if a defendant’s incrimination is by reference to
evidence other than the modified statement and the jury receives a proper limiting
instruction. See United States v. Verduzco-Martinez , 186 F.3d 1208, 1214 (10th
Cir. 1999); United States v. Green , 115 F.3d 1479, 1484–85 (10th Cir. 1997); see
also Gray v. Maryland , 523 U.S. 185,194-96 (1998) ( recognizing that proper
modification incriminates inferentially and does not point directly to defendant).
Because Officer Wigley did not mention Spears by name or description, any
inference connecting Spears to the statement could be made only after considering
additional evidence. See Verduzco-Martinez , 186 F.3d at 1214. Thus,
Powell’s statement was properly modified by Officer Wigley.
Despite the proper modification, however, Spears correctly argues that the
trial court failed to give a proper limiting instruction after admitting Officer
24
Wigley’s paraphrase of Powell’s confession. We agree that this failure resulted in
constitutional error. See Fowler , 200 F.3d at 1307. The general instruction given
at the end of the trial charging the jury to give separate consideration to each
defendant was insufficient to satisfy Richardson . Id. at 1307. “The Richardson
limiting instruction must be given immediately following the introduction of the
co-defendant’s confession to safeguard against inappropriate use of the
confession against the non-confessing co-defendant.” Id.
When faced with a Bruton error, harmless-error analysis applies to decide
entitlement to relief. Harmless error is assessed “in the context of the entire
case.” Lee v. Illinois , 476 U.S. 530, 547 (1986); cf. Fowler , 200 F.3d at 1307
(pre-AEDPA) (assessing harmless error under Brecht v. Abrahamson , 507 U.S.
619, 637 (1993)). The OCCA decided that any Bruton error was harmless, 13
and
we conclude that this holding was not contrary to or an unreasonable application
of Chapman v. California , 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967). 14
See Spears , 900 P.2d at 444
13
Although the OCCA decided that Powell’s statement, as modified, did not
incriminate Spears, it did not address whether the trial court gave an appropriate
limiting instruction. See Spears, 900 P.2d at 444. Instead, assuming the
statement was incriminating, the OCCA proceeded to consider harmless error.
See id.
14
The federal district court relied on Brecht in assessing harmless error. We have
held that federal courts do not review based on Brecht when the OCCA has
applied the harmless-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard set forth in Chapman.
See Willingham, 296 F.3d at 927 n.4. Here, there is a state-court-Chapman
determination to defer to under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Thus, we must decide
(continued...)
25
(applying without citing Chapman ); 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). Our review of the
record reveals nothing that would demonstrate actual prejudice. Officer Wigley
made no reference to Spears in restating Powell’s confession. More importantly,
Powell’s statement was not vitally important to the State’s case against Spears.
Rather, other independent evidence pointed to Spears’ involvement in the murder.
Three eye-witnesses—Hensley, Daniels and Johnson—testified about Spears’
participation in beating Thompson. Johnson testified about Spears’ participation
in the later stabbing. Therefore, the erroneously admitted statement was merely
cumulative to other uncontroverted evidence that was properly before the jury.
See Brown v. United States , 411 U.S. 223, 231 (1973). Furthermore, this case
was not so complex that the jury could not fairly evaluate the evidence against
each co-defendant. Nor would the jury have found the State’s case significantly
less persuasive had Officer Wigley’s testimony been excluded. See Schneble v.
Florida , 405 U.S. 427, 432 (1972).
Spears also argues that the testimony of Hensley and Daniels, implicating
him in the murder, violated Bruton . Specifically, he objects to Hensley’s
testimony that Powell asked the group, including Spears, who was going to hit
Thompson, and to Daniels’ testimony concerning a conversation about the
(...continued)
14
whether the state court’s finding of harmless error was contrary to or an
unreasonable application of Chapman.
26
stabbing that Daniels had with Powell while the two were in jail. Daniels’
testimony, according to Spears, was the only evidence corroborating Johnson’s
testimony concerning the stabbing.
Recognizing that Hensley’s and Daniels’ testimony relating Powell’s
statements, which inculpated Spears, should not have been admitted, the OCCA
nonetheless concluded that any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt
because “other evidence” showed Spears’ participation in the crime. Spears , 900
P.2d at 444 (applying without citing Chapman ). Assuming these statements
violated Bruton , we conclude that the OCCA’s harmless-error determination was
not contrary to or an unreasonable application of Chapman . 15 See 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(d)(1).
Spears argues that admission of these statements was not harmless error
because the “other evidence” to which the OCCA refers came from Hensley and
Johnson, and was not credible. Specifically, Spears contends Johnson had a deal
with the prosecutor and Hensley’s preliminary-hearing testimony differed from
her trial testimony because she and the prosecutor reached a deal resulting in her
release from jail. On this point, we note that the jury received sufficient
information to evaluate the credibility of both Hensley’s and Johnson’s testimony.
15
Again, we note that the district court incorrectly assessed harmless error under
the Brecht standard.
27
Hensley informed the jury that she had been required to post a material-witness
bond, and that the bond had been drastically reduced. She testified that the State
had given her no incentive to testify and that she had lied in her prior written
statements and during her preliminary-hearing testimony to cover up for her then-
boyfriend Spears. She knew she could yet be charged with perjury for giving
false statements. Moreover, she admitted at trial that she had just remembered
that Spears and Powell had talked in the truck on the way to the cemetery about
beating Thompson and taking his truck. Lastly, she informed the jury of her
confinement and later release from jail. Similarly, Johnson fully informed the
jury about the plea agreement, enabling the jury to evaluate the credibility of his
testimony. In sum, when taken in the context of the entire trial, any agreement
that Johnson and Hensley may have had with the prosecution does not establish
that any assumed Bruton error was harmful. Hensley, Daniels and Johnson all
testified consistently about the murder, and their testimony was uncontroverted.
As a final argument, Spears contends that the cumulative effect of the
Bruton errors identified by the OCCA deprived him of a fair trial. 16
Spears did
not raise this claim in state court. However, because the State does not contend
that this claim is procedurally barred, we consider Spears’ argument on its merits.
16
Because we affirm the grant of habeas relief from Spears’ sentence, we need
not decide Spears’ argument that failure to sever affected the trial’s second stage.
28
See Hooks v. Ward , 184 F.3d 1206, 1216–17 (10th Cir. 1999) (recognizing that
the State bears the burden of asserting procedural default). We may deny relief
on the merits of a claim even if that claim has not been exhausted in state court.
See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2).
Although each of the individual Bruton errors was harmless, “the
cumulative effect of two or more individually harmless errors has the potential to
prejudice a defendant to the same extent as a single reversible error.” Duckett ,
306 F.3d at 992 (quotation omitted). “A cumulative-error analysis merely
aggregates all the errors that individually have been found to be harmless, and
therefore not reversible, and it analyzes whether their cumulative effect on the
outcome of the trial is such that collectively they can no longer be determined to
be harmless.” Id. (quotation omitted). We conclude that the Bruton errors, even
when accumulated, did not have a sufficiently prejudicial effect to deny Spears a
fair trial. Strong, consistent evidence supported his conviction.
ii. Powell
Powell argues that he was deprived of his right to a fair trial and his right
to confront witnesses by the State’s introduction of Spears’ out-of-court
statement. See Bruton, 391 U.S. at 126. Specifically, Powell objects to
Johnson’s testimony that Spears told Johnson and Powell that they had to kill
29
Thompson because he could testify against them. 17
Concluding that the statement should not have been admitted as it violated
Bruton, 18 the OCCA nevertheless held that any error was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt because the properly admitted evidence was overwhelming and
the prejudicial effect of the statement was insignificant. Powell, 906 P.2d at
772–73 (citing, e.g., Cruz, 481 U.S. 186). In reaching this conclusion, the court
noted:
Powell admitted he had decided to “kick [Thompson’s] ass.” He
admitted he beat, kicked and stomped Thompson with the others.
Powell admitted after the beating it was decided that they would have
to kill Thompson. Given Powell’s confession and the testimony of
the other witnesses, it is inconceivable the admission of Spears’
statement contributed to the verdict.
Id. at 773. Assuming a Bruton error, we conclude, in light of the substantial other
evidence presented, that the OCCA’s harmlessness determination was not contrary
17
In light of our affirmance of the district court’s grant of habeas relief, we need
not address Powell’s contention that the State improperly relied on this challenged
statement to prove he committed the murder to avoid arrest and prosecution. Nor
do we reach Powell’s argument that the failure to sever also affected the trial’s
second stage.
18
The OCCA noted Johnson’s testimony that Spears told him and Powell that
they had to kill Thompson so that Thompson could not testify against them was
“an atypical Bruton problem because the statement was made to two other
co-defendants rather than the police and does not directly implicate Powell.”
Powell, 906 P.2d at 772. Recognizing the statement is circumstantial evidence of
intent to murder, the court decided the statement fell within the parameters of
Bruton. Id. at 772–73.
30
to or an unreasonable application of Chapman. 19 See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).
b. Severance
Spears and Powell both argue that the trial court violated their
constitutional right to a fair trial by failing to sever their trials. As evidence of
the prejudice resulting from the failure to sever, both point to the Bruton errors
discussed above. In reviewing these claims, we are mindful that “[w]hether the
trial court erred in denying severance is generally a question of state law that is
not cognizable on federal habeas appeal, . . . for a criminal defendant has no
constitutional right to severance unless there is a strong showing of prejudice
caused by the joint trial.” Cummings v. Evans, 161 F.3d 610, 619 (10th Cir.
1998). “Evidence that is probative of a defendant’s guilt but technically
admissible only against a codefendant . . . might present a risk of prejudice.”
Zafiro v. United States, 506 U.S. 534, 539 (1993) (citing Bruton). A Bruton
problem alone, however, is insufficient to require severance. See United States v.
Hill, 901 F.2d 880, 883 (10th Cir. 1990).
Because, as discussed above, any Bruton error was harmless, the joint trial
did not prejudice Powell or Spears. Even if there were a risk of prejudice, the
trial court properly instructed the jury that: (1) the State had the burden of
19
As previously noted, the federal district court incorrectly relied on Brecht in
assessing harmless error.
31
proving beyond a reasonable doubt that both Spears and Powell committed
first-degree murder; (2) the jury must give separate consideration to each
individual defendant; and (3) the jury should draw no inferences from Powell’s
and Spears’ decision not to testify. “These instructions sufficed to cure any
possibility of prejudice.” Zafiro, 506 U.S. at 541 (considering severance under
Fed. R. Crim. P. 14). Thus, neither Powell nor Spears can establish prejudice so
severe that they were denied their right to a fair trial. Accordingly, the OCCA’s
decisions upholding the joint trial were not unreasonable. See Powell , 906 P.2d
at 773; Spears , 900 P.2d at 444; see also 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).
2. Unanimous Guilty Verdict and Sufficiency of the Evidence
Spears and Powell argue that they were denied their constitutional right to a
unanimous jury verdict. The Bindover Information alternatively charged them
with two counts: first-degree malice murder and first-degree felony murder.
Although the trial court instructed the jury on the need for a unanimous verdict,
the court did not instruct the jury that its verdict must be unanimous on one count
or the other. Furthermore, the verdict form did not distinguish between the two
alternative counts and therefore did not indicate whether the jury believed Spears
and Powell committed first-degree-malice or felony murder or both. Thus, Spears
and Powell both contend that there was no unanimous verdict on either malice or
felony murder, and because insufficient evidence supported both murder theories,
32
the lack-of-a-unanimous-verdict problem remained.
a. Unanimous Guilty Verdict
While Spears and Powell acknowledge that the Supreme Court has held that
a non-unanimous first-degree-murder verdict under similar circumstances does
not violate the Constitution, Schad v. Arizona , 501 U.S. 624, 627, 645 (1991)
(plurality opinion), they nonetheless argue that their cases present extreme
examples not covered by Schad . Further, they contend Schad does not square
with the Supreme Court’s holdings in Apprendi v. New Jersey , 530 U.S. 466
(2000), that a jury must find all elements of a crime, or In re Winship , 397 U.S.
358, 364 (1970), that proof must be beyond a reasonable doubt. 20
Despite wishful thinking to the contrary, Schad is controlling. This court
has explained that “Oklahoma statutes have long defined the offense of ‘murder’
or ‘first degree murder’ as encompassing both malice aforethought murder and
felony murder. Consistent therewith, the OCCA has characterized malice
20
We need not consider Spears’ and Powell’s argument that Apprendi changes
this result because Apprendi does not apply retroactively. See United States v.
Mora, 293 F.3d 1213, 1219 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 388 (2002). Even
were we to consider this argument on its merits, we would conclude that Apprendi
does not change the result. Apprendi held that “[o]ther than the fact of a prior
conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed
statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable
doubt.” 530 U.S. at 490. Here, the State charged Spears and Powell with, and the
jury found them guilty of, first-degree murder, after finding that the State proved
that crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Apprendi does not indicate in any way that
it overrules Schad.
33
aforethought murder and felony murder as different theories for the same general
offense of first degree murder.” Hain v. Gibson , 287 F.3d 1224, 1232 & n.5 (10th
Cir. 2002) (recognizing this is consistent with Schad ) (footnote and citation
omitted), cert. denied , 123 S. Ct. 993 (2003); see Williamson v. Ward , 110 F.3d
1508, 1523 (10th Cir. 1997) (citing Schad and holding that there was no
deprivation of a constitutional right under similar factual circumstances).
Accordingly, we conclude that the OCCA reasonably decided that although “the
jury was not instructed to find unanimously that [they] had committed first degree
murder either with malice aforethought or during the course of armed robbery,”
Powell , 906 P.2d at 775; Spears , 900 P.2d at 441, Spears and Powell were not
denied due process. 21
Spears and Powell next challenge the OCCA’s determination that the
instructions actually required proof of both first-degree-murder alternatives.
21
The OCCA decided that Spears and Powell had waived all but plain-error
review and therefore the due process issue was not properly preserved for review.
Powell, 906 P.2d at 775; Spears, 900 P.2d at 441. Even if the issue had been
properly preserved, the court held that there was no due process violation when
the verdict did not indicate whether the jury found first-degree malice murder or
first-degree felony murder because the indictment charged a single crime of
first-degree murder and also because the State proved both malice and felony
murder. Powell, 906 P.2d at 775–76; Spears, 900 P.2d at 442. Because the state
court denied relief on the merits of the federal claim on plain-error review,
procedural-bar principles do not apply. See Cargle, 317 F.3d at 1206. Thus, the
state-court disposition is entitled to deference under AEDPA due to this “form of
merits review.” Id.
34
Powell , 906 P.2d at 775 n.11; Spears , 900 P.2d at 441 n.11; see also Romano v.
State , 909 P.2d 92, 121 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995) (presuming that the jury found
evidence sufficient to support both malice and felony murder where defendant
was charged alternatively with malice and felony murder and there were no
separate verdict forms for each type of murder). We need not address this
challenge to the jury instructions, because, as discussed below, sufficient
evidence supported a finding of each type of first-degree murder.
Lastly, Powell adds to this argument the claim that he was never charged
with an underlying felony and therefore there is no proof he was guilty of robbery
with a dangerous weapon. 22
According to Powell, this precludes a conviction for
felony murder. Although Powell did not raise this issue on direct appeal, we
consider and reject this claim on its merits. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2)
(permitting denial of relief on merits of unexhausted claim); Hooks , 184 F.3d at
1216–17 (requiring State to argue procedural bar).
Powell fails to cite Oklahoma authority, and we find none, establishing that
he must be charged with an underlying felony in order to be charged with or
22
Powell argues that his death sentence was constitutionally impermissible
because the jury could have convicted him of felony murder as merely an
accomplice to the robbery with a dangerous weapon, citing Tison v. Arizona,
481 U.S. 137 (1987), and Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 797 (1982). Because
we affirm the district court’s grant of habeas relief from Powell’s sentence, we
need not address this argument.
35
found guilty of felony murder. Although the Bindover Information did not charge
Powell with an underlying felony, in charging felony murder, it did clearly allege
robbery and provided relevant facts. ( See O.R. at 1.) Specifically, it alleged that
Powell was “engaged in committing the crime of Robbery by Force” “by
wrongfully taking and carrying away” the victim’s truck and billfold, which were
in the victim’s possession and immediate presence, “without [the victim’s]
consent and against his will” “by means of force and violence” at the time Powell,
Spears and Johnson killed the victim. ( Id. ; see also id. at 118 (indicating that the
underlying felony is “Robbery With A Dangerous Weapon” in first stage
Instructions 14 and 15)) . We conclude that this gave Powell sufficient notice of
the underlying felony.
b. Sufficiency of the Evidence
Spears and Powell argue that insufficient evidence existed to support a
finding of either malice murder or felony murder. It is settled that habeas
petitioners may challenge the sufficiency of the evidence in federal habeas corpus
proceedings. See Torres v. Mullin , 317 F.3d 1145, 1151 (10th Cir. 2003); see
also Jackson v. Virginia , 443 U.S. 307, 322 (1979) (“A challenge to a state
conviction brought on the ground that the evidence cannot fairly be deemed
sufficient to have established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt states a federal
constitutional claim.”). “[V]iewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
36
[State],” we will grant habeas relief only if “no rational trier of fact could have
found proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson , 443 U.S. at 319, 324.
The Jackson standard “gives full play to the responsibility of the trier of fact
fairly to resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw
reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts.” Id. at 319.
We review sufficiency of the evidence as a question of law. See Griffin v.
United States , 502 U.S. 46, 58–59 (1991) (indicating that insufficiency of proof is
legal error); see also Torres , 317 F.3d at 1151–52 (viewing, under circumstances
of that case, sufficiency of evidence as a legal question). Under AEDPA, our
review is limited to deciding whether the OCCA’s decisions that there was
sufficient evidence to support a jury’s finding of both malice murder and felony
murder for both Spears and Powell were contrary to or an unreasonable
application of Jackson . See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1); Powell , 906 P.2d at 773–75;
Spears , 900 P.2d at 438–40.
Oklahoma law provides the substantive elements of malice and felony
murder applicable to the sufficiency of the evidence standard. Torres , 317 F.3d
at 1152; see also Jackson , 443 U.S. at 324 n.16. In relevant part, the Oklahoma
first-degree murder statute provides:
A person commits murder in the first degree when that person
unlawfully and with malice aforethought causes the death of another
human being. Malice is that deliberate intention unlawfully to take
away the life of a human being, which is manifested by external
37
circumstances capable of proof.
A person also commits the crime of murder in the first degree,
regardless of malice, when that person or any other person takes the
life of a human being during, or if the death of a human being results
from, the commission of . . . robbery with a dangerous weapon . . . .
Okla. Stat. tit. 21, § 701.7A & B.
Additionally, Oklahoma designates as principals persons who aid and abet
the commission of a murder. Id. § 172.
The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals has specified that in order
to convict an aider and abetter as a principal in a first degree murder
prosecution, the prosecution must prove: (1) that the defendant
personally intended the death of the victim; and (2) that the
defendant aided and abetted with full knowledge of the perpetrator’s
intent. [A]iding and abetting involves acts, words or gestures
encouraging the commission of the offense, either before or at the
time of the offense. [M]ere mental assent to or acquiescence in the
commission of a crime by one who did not procure or advise its
perpetration, who takes no part therein, gives no counsel and utters
no word of encouragement to the perpetrator, however wrong
morally, does not in law constitute such person a participant in the
crime.
Wingfield v. Massie , 122 F.3d 1329, 1332 (10th Cir. 1997) (quotations and
citations to OCCA cases omitted); see also Torres , 317 F.3d at 1152–53. In
assessing intent on sufficiency of the evidence review, this court recognizes,
[f]irst, a jury is permitted to draw inferences of subjective intent
from a defendant’s objective acts. Thus, even when a defendant . . .
denies having the requisite intent, a jury may disbelieve the
defendant if [the defendant’s] words and acts in the light of all the
circumstances make [the defendant’s] explanation seem improbable.
Second, a jury is permitted to find that a defendant intends those
consequences which he announces a desire to accomplish.
38
Wingfield , 122 F.3d at 1333 (quotation and citations omitted); see also Torres ,
317 F.3d at 1153.
i. Spears and Malice Murder
Spears argues that there was insufficient evidence to support a
malice-murder conviction because all of the direct evidence of his intent to kill
came after Thompson was already dead. Applying the Jackson standard, the
OCCA concluded that the evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s finding
that Spears aided and abetted Powell in the commission of malice murder.
Spears, 900 P.2d at 438–39 (applying but not citing Jackson); see also Woodford,
123 S. Ct. at 360 (presuming that state courts know and follow the law and giving
the state-court decision the benefit of the doubt under AEDPA); Torres, 317 F.3d
at 1152 n.3 (assuming that the OCCA applied Jackson even though the court did
not cite it). In light of evidence that Spears believed Thompson was alive at the
time he said that he, Powell, and Johnson needed to kill Thompson, and both
Powell and Daniels heard noises coming from Thompson during the beating, the
OCCA concluded that the jury could have found that Thompson was still alive at
the time Spears entered the attack and Spears’ blows therefore contributed to
Thompson’s death. Spears, 900 P.2d at 438–39. The OCCA stated that
there was evidence Spears knew Powell was going to beat
Thompson and was present when Powell told Johnson and
Daniels to join in after he landed the initial blow. According
to Hensley, Daniels and Johnson, Spears willingly joined in the
39
attack on Thompson and beat, stomped and kicked him with
Johnson and Powell. Spears’ actions belie his assertion that he
did not aid and abet in the murder of Thompson. As we said in
Dumire v. State, 758 P.2d 829, 830-31 (Okla. [Crim. App.]
1988), “[i]t is irrelevant that the defendant may not have
actually struck the fatal blow. His voluntary participation and
cooperation in the attack established [his] guilt as an equally
culpable principal.”
Id. at 439.
Our review of the trial record supports the OCCA’s decision. Spears
anticipated and participated in a sustained attack against a helpless victim, who
did not provoke the fatal attack. Spears, Powell and Johnson repeatedly jumped
on and kicked Thompson’s head and body for at least three minutes, leaving
Thompson’s body next to the road at the cemetery. Johnson testified that,
although they did not start beating Thompson with the intent to kill, at some point
they developed the intent to kill and knew what they were doing. Moreover,
Spears was aware that they risked killing Thompson, and Daniels testified that he
thought at some point Thompson would die from the beating. See Hooks v. State ,
862 P.2d 1273, 1280 (Okla. Crim. App. 1993) (holding that where the victim was
a target of a sustained and relentless attack, and the victim received multiple
injuries, circumstantial evidence was sufficient to prove that the defendant, at
some point during the attack, formed the intent to kill the victim).
After the beating took place, Spears’ intent to kill became yet more
apparent. Spears said that they had to kill Thompson, because he could testify
40
against them. Spears provided the knife to stab Thompson, and there was
evidence that Thompson was alive at the time the stabbing began. Johnson
testified that when he first stabbed Thompson, blood squirted and hit him in the
eye, suggesting the presence of blood pressure. Powell verified that Thompson
was breathing right before Spears, Johnson and Powell stabbed him. Furthermore,
the medical examiner testified that two of the stab wounds may have been
peri-mortem. Additional evidence showed that Spears provided Hensley and
Daniels with an alibi story, and Spears never expressed remorse after the killing.
See Wingfield , 122 F.3d at 1333.
Viewing the evidence in its totality, we conclude that there was
considerable evidence of Spears’ involvement in Thompson’s murder. Given this
evidence, we cannot conclude that the OCCA’s application of Jackson was
objectively unreasonable. 23
See Torres , 317 F.3d at 1156; see 28 U.S.C.
23
Spears asserts that the OCCA altered the requirements for aider-and-abetter
liability in his case. At the time of Spears’ appeal, Oklahoma law required that
the aider and abettor (1) personally intended the death of the victim; and (2) aided
and abetted with full knowledge of the intent of the perpetrator. In denying
Spears post-conviction relief, the OCCA provided the following definition of
aiding and abetting:
Aiding and abetting in a crime requires the State to show that the accused
procured the crime to be done, or aided, assisted, abetted, advised or
encouraged the commission of the crime. While we have held mere
presence or acquiescence, without participation, does not constitute a
crime, only slight participation is needed to change a person’s status from
(continued...)
41
§ 2254(d)(1).
ii. Spears and Felony Murder
Spears argues that, because the evidence supporting the underlying felony
of robbery with a dangerous weapon was weak, the evidence supporting felony
murder was necessarily weak as well. The OCCA held that “a rational jury
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State could find the State
proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Spears participated in taking Thompson’s
pickup.” Spears, 900 P.2d at 439 (applying without citing Jackson). The OCCA
pointed to the following evidence to support Spears’ taking of the truck:
During the evening of September 21, 1990, Spears proposed the
group drive out to the Klondike Cemetery. Hensley and Johnson
testified as they drove out to the cemetery Powell and Spears
discussed beating Thompson and taking his pickup. When they
arrived at the cemetery, Powell told Spears, Johnson and Daniels he
would strike Thompson as they walked towards the cemetery and
advised the others to join in. The group started towards the cemetery
and Powell struck Thompson in the head. Johnson and then Spears
joined Powell in kicking, stomping and beating Thompson. When
Powell, Spears and Johnson returned to the pickup, they took the
pickup and Thompson’s wallet. Spears directed Johnson to take the
truck to Tulsa and sell it. While Spears may not have driven
Thompson’s pickup from the cemetery or taken it to Tulsa, we find
23
(...continued)
mere spectator into an aider and abettor.
Spears, 900 P.2d at 438 (citations omitted); cf. Wingfield, 122 F.3d at 1332. We
are not convinced that the OCCA altered the aider-and-abetter requirements, and a
state court may interpret its own laws. See Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157,
166 (1961); see also Willingham, 296 F.3d at 923.
42
directing its disposition certainly constitutes aiding and abetting. . . .
[This] evidence sufficiently proves Spears wrongfully took
Thompson’s pickup from him by force using his hands and feet as
dangerous weapons.
Id. (footnote omitted).
Recognizing that “killing may precede, coincide with or follow the robbery
and still be done in the commission of robbery with a dangerous weapon,” the
OCCA found that there was sufficient evidence to prove that Spears killed
Thompson during the commission of a robbery with a dangerous weapon:
Hensley and Johnson testified they heard Spears and Powell talking
about beating Thompson and taking his pickup. Spears and Powell
then carried out their plan by beating and later stabbing Thompson
and taking his truck. Spears directed Johnson to take Thompson’s
pickup to Tulsa and sell it. This evidence sufficiently established a
plan to rob and beat Thompson which was then carried out. Clearly,
Thompson was killed during the course of the robbery.
Id. at 440. Spears clearly participated in the beating and stabbing and in the plan
to dispose of the truck. Even though Spears did not personally take the truck, his
participation established his guilt under Oklahoma law. This leads to our
conclusion that the OCCA’s determination was not an unreasonable application of
Jackson. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).
iii. Powell and Felony Murder
Powell argues that there was insufficient evidence to show that robbery was
the motive for the murder or that he had the intent to commit robbery with a
dangerous weapon. According to Powell, the evidence showed that he intended to
43
beat Thompson, but did not intend to kill him or steal his truck or wallet. As
succor, Powell points to evidence that Thompson permitted others to drive his
pickup the night of the murder and that Johnson bought beer because Thompson
had no money. Powell also points to evidence indicating that, after the beating,
Daniels suggested taking Thompson’s wallet, and Powell did not want any of the
proceeds of the truck after Johnson sold it. Finally, Powell asserts that he was not
informed of a meeting between the prosecutor and Hensley held after the
preliminary hearing, during which Hensley, for the first time, remembered the on-
the-way-to-the-cemetery discussion between Powell and Spears about taking
Thompson’s pickup, and after which she was released from jail.
Considering the testimony of Hensley and Johnson, that they heard Powell
and Spears talking about beating Thompson and taking his truck before the attack,
the OCCA found that there was sufficient evidence to show that Powell intended
to rob Thompson. Powell , 906 P.2d at 773–74. We agree that this evidence,
viewed in the light most favorable to the State, is sufficient to show that robbery
was the motive for the homicide, and conclude that the OCCA’s decision
therefore was not an unreasonable application of Jackson . See 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(d)(1).
Further, Powell argues that there was insufficient evidence to show that the
murder occurred during the commission of a robbery with a dangerous weapon,
44
because the group had permission to drive Thompson’s truck and Thompson was
killed before anyone suggested taking his wallet. Powell also argues that, because
Thompson was dead before the robbery, there was no relationship between the
killing and the robbery.
Recognizing that in Oklahoma a “killing may precede, coincide with or
follow the robbery and still be done in the commission of robbery with a
dangerous weapon,” the OCCA decided that “a rational jury viewing the evidence
in the light most favorable to the State could find the State proved beyond a
reasonable doubt all of the essential elements of First Degree Felony Murder with
the underlying felony of Robbery with a Dangerous Weapon.” Powell , 906 P.2d
at 774 (applying without citing Jackson ). The court pointed to evidence
establishing a plan to rob and beat Thompson, which was then carried out:
Hensley and Johnson testified that as they drove out to the cemetery
Powell and Spears talked about beating Thompson and taking his
pickup. Hensley testified she heard Powell ask “[w]ho is going to hit
him first” as the group walked towards the cemetery. Powell, Spears
and Johnson then attacked Thompson. When Powell, Spears and
Johnson returned to the pickup, they took Thompson’s pickup and
retrieved his wallet. . . .
Additionally, Powell admitted he struck, stomped and kicked
Thompson. He confessed that after the initial beating he, Spears and
Johnson decided to steal Thompson’s pickup and kill Thompson.
They went back to where Thompson was lying and all three stabbed
him. Because two of the stab wounds were perimortem establishing
Thompson was not dead when the stabbing began, Powell’s
admission they decided to kill Thompson and steal his pickup is
sufficient to show they killed Thompson during their robbery plan.
45
Id. Based upon the totality of the evidence , we conclude that the OCCA’s
determination was a reasonable application of Jackson. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(d)(1).
Finally, Powell argues that there was no evidence that Thompson was killed
with Powell’s tennis shoes or a knife. Notably, on direct appeal and in his habeas
petition, Powell argued solely that there was no evidence that a knife was the
dangerous weapon. Indeed, on direct appeal, Powell argued that it was “arguably
supportable” that the shoes were a dangerous weapon. (Powell’s Direct Appeal
Br. at 34.)
The OCCA’s conclusion that Powell took the pickup by use of a dangerous
weapon, either by Powell’s hands or feet, or the knife, was reasonable. 24 See
Powell, 906 P.2d at 774–75; 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). Evidence at trial showed
that Thompson was alive when the stabbing began, as two of the stab wounds
were peri-mortem, and Johnson testified that with his first stab, blood squirted
into his eyes. Even if Thompson was not alive at the time of the stabbing, it is
undisputed that Powell used his hands and feet to inflict a beating.
iv. Powell and Malice Murder
24
Even assuming he had the intent to rob Thompson, Powell argues that the
robbery was merely a robbery by fear or force and his conviction therefore should
be modified to second-degree felony murder. The record does not support this
assertion.
46
Powell argues that the evidence was insufficient to show that he killed
Thompson with malice aforethought. Rather, he contends that the evidence shows
only that he had the intent to beat Thompson, but was forced to stab him. Powell
further argues that it was undisputed that Thompson was already dead when he
stabbed Thompson and that any intent Spears had to kill Thompson could not be
imputed to Powell. Lastly, Powell asserts that he could not form the specific
intent to kill because he was under the influence of alcohol at the time of the
incident.
Recognizing that a design to commit murder can be formed instantly, the
OCCA rejected Powell’s argument, deciding that a rational jury could find Powell
guilty of malice murder:
Powell told Hensley and Daniels he wanted to assault Thompson.
Powell admitted he repeatedly beat, stomped and kicked Thompson.
After the initial beating, Powell, Spears and Johnson decided to steal
Thompson’s truck and to kill him. They went back to Thompson’s
body and repeatedly stabbed him. Johnson testified they did not
initially intend to kill Thompson, but at some point they changed
their minds and intended to kill him. Both Daniels and Johnson
testified Powell instigated the beating of Thompson. Powell’s own
admissions support his conviction for First Degree Malice Murder.
Powell, 906 P.2d at 775.
We conclude that this determination constituted a reasonable application of
Jackson. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). In Oklahoma, external circumstances are
evidence of an intent to commit murder. See Okla. Stat. tit. 21, § 701.7(A); see
47
also O.R. at 118, Instruction No. 13 (indicating that “words, conduct, demeanor,
motive, and all other [external] circumstances” may be considered in determining
whether a defendant had intent to kill). Circumstantial evidence of Powell’s
intent to commit murder is compelling—most probative of his intent is the
duration and violence of the beating. Powell forcefully hit, jumped on and kicked
Thompson’s head and body for three to ten minutes, the beating continued after
Thompson was helpless, and the attackers left the body at the remote cemetery
site. After the beating and before he stabbed Thompson, Powell checked on
Thompson’s breathing and heartbeat. As the district court decided, a reasonable
interpretation of this evidence is that Powell formed an intent to kill during the
beating and, when under the impression that Thompson was still alive, Powell and
his co-defendants stabbed Thompson to ensure his death. See Okla. Stat. tit. 21, §
702 (“A design to effect death is inferred from the fact of killing, unless the
circumstances raise a reasonable doubt whether such design existed.”); id. § 703
(“A design to effect death sufficient to constitute murder may be formed instantly
before committing the act by which it is carried into execution.”). Regardless
whether Powell voluntarily stabbed Thompson and whether Thompson was dead
by the time Powell stabbed him, the jury reasonably could infer an intent to kill
from this beating. Furthermore, as discussed below, see infra Section III.B.3.,
Powell was not sufficiently intoxicated to preclude him from forming the intent to
48
murder.
3. Failure to Instruct on Voluntary Intoxication and Manslaughter
Powell contends that the trial court should have instructed the jury on
voluntary intoxication and first-degree diminished-capacity manslaughter—that
the evidence raises a reasonable doubt about his ability to form the specific intent
to commit malice murder due to the quantity of alcohol he consumed on the
evening of the homicide.
As to this allegation, the OCCA held that there was insufficient evidence to
support voluntary intoxication and first-degree manslaughter instructions because
there was no evidence that Powell was so intoxicated that he was unable to form
the necessary intent to commit first-degree malice murder. Powell, 906 P.2d at
778. To the contrary, the court found that the evidence showed that “Powell was
in control of his mental faculties and not in an advanced state of intoxication.”
Id. In so deciding, the court noted the following evidence:
Hensley, Daniels and Johnson described Powell as “feeling good” but
not drunk, half drunk and half sober, and having a “pretty good buzz
on.” Johnson testified he knew what he was doing and the risks of
his conduct and that at some point he, Spears and Powell intended to
kill Thompson. Further, Powell never told Officer Wigley during his
confession that he was drunk and did not intend to kill Thompson.
Id.
49
a. Voluntary Intoxication
There is no Supreme Court precedent establishing a constitutional right to
instructions regarding the defendant’s intoxication at the time of the crime. See
generally Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37, 39–40, 43, 51, 56 (1996) (holding
that a Montana statute precluding consideration of voluntary intoxication in
determining existence of a mental state that is an element of the criminal offense
does not violate the Due Process Clause). Under Oklahoma law, however, juries
may consider voluntary intoxication to determine if a defendant had the intent to
commit first-degree murder. See, e.g., Bland v. State, 4 P.3d 702, 715
(Okla. Crim. App. 2000); Fitzgerald v. State, 972 P.2d 1157, 1174 (Okla. Crim.
App. 1998); Lamb v. State, 767 P.2d 887, 889–90 (Okla. Crim. App. 1988).
“[A] defense of voluntary intoxication requires that a defendant, first, be
intoxicated and, second, be so utterly intoxicated, that his mental powers are
overcome, rendering it impossible for a defendant to form the specific criminal
intent or special mental element of the crime.” Toles v. Gibson, 269 F.3d 1167,
1177 (10th Cir. 2001) (quoting Jackson v. State, 964 P.2d 875, 892 (Okla. Crim.
App. 1998)), cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 1623 (2003).
On federal habeas review, we review the alleged error in failing to instruct
on voluntary intoxication in the context of the entire trial, only for the denial of
fundamental fairness and due process. See Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145,
50
156–57 (1977) (pre-AEDPA) (addressing the omission of a jury instruction on
causation); Foster v. Ward, 182 F.3d 1177, 1193–94 (10th Cir. 1999) (post-
AEDPA) (addressing the omission of an instruction on accomplice testimony,
which was required under state law but not mandated by federal Constitution).
“An omission, or an incomplete instruction, is less likely to be prejudicial than
a misstatement of the law.” Henderson, 431 U.S. at 155.
Illuminated by the high standards of review imposed by AEDPA, the trial
court’s failure to give voluntary-intoxication instructions did not render Powell’s
trial fundamentally unfair. 25 As the OCCA noted, little evidence supported a
voluntary-intoxication defense. Powell’s statement to Officer Wigley recounting
the details of the murder further belies his claim of voluntary intoxication. See
Toles , 269 F.3d at 1177. Although the evidence indicated that Powell consumed
alcohol before the murder, no evidence established that his judgment was so
impaired at the time of the murder such that it was impossible for him to form
malice aforethought. Accordingly, the OCCA’s decision that there was
insufficient evidence to support a voluntary-intoxication instruction
was reasonable. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).
25
Powell further suggests that failure to instruct on voluntary intoxication took
away the jury’s ability to consider a non-capital third option that was supported
by the law and the evidence. Schad, 501 U.S. 624; Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S.
625 (1980). However, the trial court did instruct on second-degree murder,
thereby giving the jury a third sentencing option. See Schad, 501 U.S. at 647–48.
51
b. Diminished-Capacity Manslaughter
Powell maintains that the trial court’s failure to instruct on first-degree
diminished-capacity manslaughter violated the mandates of Beck v. Alabama ,
447 U.S. 625 (1980). As recognized by the OCCA, Powell did not request a
first-degree manslaughter instruction. Powell , 906 P.2d at 777. Under our
precedent, this failure precludes Powell from prevailing on his Beck claim. See
Hogan v. Gibson , 197 F.3d 1297, 1303 n.3 (10th Cir. 1999); Hooks , 184 F.3d at
1234.
Furthermore, the State correctly asserts that because the trial court
instructed the jury on the lesser included offense of second-degree murder, Beck
is satisfied. Although, under Beck , the trial court need only instruct on one lesser
included offense, see Schad , 501 U.S. at 647–48, and the trial court did instruct
on second-degree murder, Oklahoma law requires instruction on all lesser degrees
of homicide, even when such instruction was not expressly requested, see James
v. Gibson , 211 F.3d 543, 555 (10th Cir. 2000). We may not issue the writ of
habeas corpus, however, on the basis of a perceived error of state law, “absent a
determination that the state law violation rendered the trial fundamentally unfair.”
Id. (citations omitted). Evidence presented at trial did not establish that Powell
was so intoxicated that his mental abilities were overcome or that the intoxication
prevented him from acting with malice. See Powell , 906 P.2d at 778. Under the
52
circumstances of this case, it was not fundamentally unfair for the trial court to
conclude that an instruction on first-degree diminished-capacity manslaughter was
unwarranted. See id.
4. Prosecutorial Comments
Powell challenges several comments that the prosecutor made during his
first-stage closing argument. 26 Because none of these challenged remarks
implicates a specific constitutional right, a prosecutor’s misconduct will require
reversal of a state court conviction only where the remark “so infected the trial
with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.”
Donnelly, 416 U.S. at 643; see also Duckett, 306 F.3d at 988. We address each of
the challenged comments in turn.
a. Evoking Sympathy for the Victim
During his opening argument, the prosecutor told the jury that “[t]he one
voice you will not hear is that of Jimmy Dewayne Thompson. A week from next
Monday, Jimmy Dewayne—he went by Dewayne—would have been 23 years old.
He was a young man just as these two [defendants] are young.” (3 Tr. at 486.)
This statement, Powell tells us, improperly sought to evoke sympathy for the
victim.
26
Powell also challenges several second-stage remarks. We need not address
those comments in light of our decision to grant Powell habeas relief from his
death sentence.
53
Powell also challenges the State’s presentation of victim-impact testimony
during the first stage, specifically when the victim’s mother testified about her
son. Judith Thompson testified that her son was a high school graduate; had
started vocational training; was a slow learner and attended special education
classes in high school; went to church every Sunday and Wednesday, as well as
special church functions; did not have many friends; and had recently broken up
with his girlfriend. In addition, Mrs. Thompson testified that her son was neat,
very obedient, and well mannered, never in trouble with the law. He did not make
friends easily, and was bashful, withdrawn, and easily led by others.
In his first-stage closing argument, the prosecutor further argued that the
victim
was a young man. . . . He was shy. . . . He wanted to belong.
He was susceptible to peer pressure. He was a good, decent kid. He was
out of his element with [the defendants] and that group. He represented no
threat socially or physically to these two [defendants]. He put up no fight
when the incident occurred, couldn’t defend himself.
Perhaps, he was socially awkward, but he was not deviant or delinquent in
any way. He gave no evidence of a depraved mind. He was the one that
used his vehicle to take everybody riding around.
. . . [T]here’s a kid that ain’t bad. . . . [H]e wanted to get along. He was
susceptible to peer pressure, and he did this drinking number with these
guys. But he wasn’t part of their group.
54
(5 id. at 1390–91.) The prosecutor emphasized what a “good kid” the victim was,
compared with the defendants, noting that the victim agreed to take the group
“riding around. . . . But I got to go by the hospital to see my grandmother. That
tells you a lot about the kid, right there,” id. at 1338; “[w]e’re trying to paint a
picture of a good kid,” id. at 1391–92; “[y]ou can’t tell whether he was a good kid
from looking at him laying dead on the side of the road,” id. at 1393.
Holding that the prosecutor’s remarks were in error, the OCCA stated that
“it is improper for the prosecution to ask jurors to have sympathy for victims” and
“it is error to introduce victim impact evidence in the guilt/innocence phase.”
Powell, 906 P.2d at 777. Nonetheless, the court determined that this error did not
deny Powell a fundamentally fair trial. See id. We conclude that the OCCA’s
decision on this issue was a reasonable application of established Supreme Court
precedent. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). We note that Mrs. Thompson’s personal
remarks about her son constituted but a brief portion of her otherwise relevant
testimony, during which she identified the clothing her son had worn the night he
was murdered, his personal effects, and his stolen truck, as well as detailing her
son’s activities preceding the murder, her search for him when he did not return
home that night, and her discovering his stolen truck the next morning. Any
improper comments, interspersed with this relevant evidence, did not affect the
jury’s verdict or deny Powell a fair trial. See, e.g., Duckett, 306 F.3d at 991–92
55
(rejecting habeas challenge to State’s first-stage victim-impact argument);
Hawkins v. Mullin, 291 F.3d 658, 677 (10th Cir. 2002) (rejecting a habeas claim
challenging the State’s first-stage evidence concerning the victim’s personal
history and her attributes as a mother), cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 1012 (2003).
Powell also contends that the prosecutor improperly dehumanized Powell
by indicating to the jury that, while the victim was a good kid, Powell and Spears
were bad people. Powell points us to these allegedly improper statements made
by the prosecutor:
These are things I think of when they administer a three-and-a-half to
five minute brutal beating of a man who is already defenseless.
Now, was he dead? Why does Mickey Daniels tell you that there was
screaming? Why was he screaming? He wasn’t saying words like:
Help me. Save me. Stop this. He’s screaming. His voice is gurgling
quite a little bit. This man is in misery. This man is dying a
gruesome, painful, lengthy death.
(5 Tr. at 1398–99.)
Without specifically addressing these remarks, the OCCA denied
Powell relief. See Powell, 906 P.2d at 776. We concur. The prosecutor’s
remarks were appropriate commentary on the evidence presented at trial. See
Hooper v. Mullin, 314 F.3d 1162, 1172 (10th Cir. 2002). Prosecution comments
as to the brutality of the beating were arguably in response to the defense
argument that this incident was a fight, rather than a sadistic beating.
56
b. Telling Jurors They Had a Moral Duty to Convict Powell
Powell challenges the prosecutor’s following statements to the jury, telling
them that they could
opt for Murder in the Second Degree. You can take an easy way out,
if that’s what you do. But you have told us in your voir dire
examination that you are willing to make the tough decisions.
It’s like Robert Kennedy once said, “If not us, who? If not now, when?”
Somebody has got to make these tough decisions. And we ask that you do
that.
(5 Tr. at 1340–41.) Along the same lines, the prosecutor later argued that
[w]e ask you find [Spears and Powell] guilty of Murder in the First
Degree. We don’t tiptoe up to the rail and ask daintily. We think
that justice cries out for it. If extremism in the defense of liberty is
no vice, as Barry Goldwater said, “Moderation in the pursuit of
justice is no virtue; let us not moderate.”
This is not a moderate crime, and these people aren’t moderately
guilty. They are guilty of the crime of Murder in the First Degree.
And we ask simply that you not let sympathy, sentiment, or
prejudice, interfere with that. Let not the consideration that you
might have to confront the death penalty keep you from your
appointed rounds, and find the defendants guilty of Murder in the
First Degree.
(5 id. at 1404–05.)
We hold that the OCCA’s decision denying Powell relief on this claim, see
Powell, 906 P.2d at 776, was not an unreasonable application of established
57
Supreme Court precedent, see 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Although “it is error for a
prosecutor to exhort a jury” to reach a guilty verdict based “on the grounds of
civic duty,” Viereck v. United States, 318 U.S. 236, 247–48 (1943), we cannot
say that these challenged remarks resulted in a fundamentally unfair trial. See
Le v. Mullin, 311 F.3d 1002, 1022 (10th Cir. 2002).
c. Cumulative Effect of Challenged Prosecutorial Comments
Cumulatively, Powell argues, the effect of these challenged prosecutorial
remarks resulted in a fundamentally unfair trial. Because the OCCA never
considered these remarks cumulatively, we consider this argument de novo.
Hooker, 293 F.3d at 1237. Even considering these remarks in the aggregate, we
cannot conclude that they resulted in a fundamentally unfair proceeding. See Le,
311 F.3d at 1023–24.
5. Ineffective Trial Representation
Spears and Powell assert that their attorneys’ first-stage trial representation
was ineffective. 27 To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, they must
establish both that their attorneys’ performance was constitutionally deficient and
27
Because we affirm the district court’s grant of habeas relief from Spears’ and
Powell’s capital sentences, we need not address their claims challenging their trial
attorneys’ second-stage representation, including Spears’ assertion that his trial
attorneys were ineffective for failing to obtain a mental-health expert for
sentencing purposes and Powell’s claim that his attorney should have requested a
second-stage instruction requiring the jury to determine his individual culpability.
58
that this deficient performance prejudiced their defense. Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). Counsel’s performance is deficient if it
falls below an objective standard of reasonableness. Id. at 687–88. The prejudice
prong is established if there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s
unprofessional errors, the jury would have had a reasonable doubt concerning
their guilt. Id. at 694–95. “A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to
undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. at 694.
In denying Spears relief on his ineffective-assistance claims, the OCCA
applied Strickland, but as further restricted by Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364
(1993): “A mere showing that a conviction would have been different but for
counsel’s errors would not suffice to sustain a Sixth Amendment claim,” without
an additional inquiry into the fairness of the proceeding. Spears, 900 P.2d at 445.
Application of this more onerous standard was contrary to the Supreme Court’s
clearly established precedent in Strickland. See Williams, 529 U.S. at 391–95.
Under AEDPA, we therefore do not afford any deference to the OCCA’s
determination and, instead, review Spears’ ineffective-assistance-of-counsel
claims de novo. See Revilla v. Gibson, 283 F.3d 1203, 1220 n.14 (10th Cir.),
cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 541 (2002).
By contrast, in reviewing Powell’s claims, the OCCA properly applied
Strickland. See Powell, 906 P.2d at 780. We therefore proceed to review the
59
OCCA’s decision in Powell’s case to determine whether or not it applied
Strickland in an objectively reasonable manner. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); see
also Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 122 S. Ct. 1843, 1852 (2002).
a. Trial Counsel Failed to Object to First-Stage Victim-Impact
Testimony
Spears and Powell challenge their attorneys’ failure to object to both the
victim-impact evidence presented during the trial’s first stage and the
prosecutor’s comments on this evidence throughout his first-stage argument. 28
Assuming attorney deficiency on this basis, 29 however, neither Spears nor Powell
can establish prejudice. We are unable to conclude that a reasonable probability
exists that, had their respective counsel timely and successfully objected to this
testimony and commentary, thus precluding it from going to the jury, the jury
would have acquitted the defendants of first-degree murder. As discussed above,
the victim’s mother’s testimony relating her son’s personal attributes was only a
small portion of her otherwise relevant first-stage testimony. Additionally, the
28
Because we affirm the district court’s granting Spears and Powell habeas relief
from their death sentences, we need not further address petitioners’ arguments
that prejudice from the State’s first-stage victim-impact evidence and comment
also tainted their capital sentences.
29
We recognize that some of the prosecutor’s remarks explaining how the victim
came to be in this group’s company were, in fact, relevant to the State’s case and
proper comment on admitted evidence.
60
State’s evidence overwhelmingly establishes that both Spears and Powell were
involved in the beating that resulted in the victim’s death and none of the
challenged comments and testimony went to the primary contested issue at trial,
intent to kill.
Under our de novo review, we conclude that Spears has not satisfied both
prongs of Strickland, and thus he is not entitled to habeas relief. On this same
basis, we conclude that the OCCA’s decision to deny Powell relief on this claim
was a reasonable application of Strickland. See Powell, 906 P.2d at 780-81.
b. Trial Counsel Failed to Object to Other Instances of
Prosecutorial Misconduct
Spears further asserts that his trial attorney was deficient for failing to
object when the prosecutor expressed his personal opinion about Spears’ guilt by
telling jurors that “justice cries out” for a guilty verdict and that convicting
Spears of only second-degree murder would be taking the easy way out. Even
assuming defense counsel was deficient in failing to make these objections,
Spears again cannot establish that, had the prosecutor not made these comments,
there is a reasonable probability that the jury would have acquitted him of
first-degree murder.
c. Trial Counsel Failed to Object to Flight Instruction
Spears argues that his counsel was deficient for failing to object to the
61
flight instruction given to the jury. Jurors were instructed that, if they found
beyond a reasonable doubt that Spears had taken flight soon after the crime, then
they could consider that fact in determining whether Spears was guilty of
first-degree murder. The jury instruction defined “flight” as a departure, with
consciousness of guilt, in order to avoid arrest. Id. Spears first asserts that his
attorney should have objected to this instruction because there was insufficient
evidence that he took flight after the murder. The OCCA, however, reasonably
determined that the State had presented sufficient evidence to support giving the
flight instruction. See Spears, 900 P.2d at 446. Spears’ counsel, therefore, was
not deficient in failing to object on that basis.
Spears further argues that trial counsel should have objected to this
instruction based upon Mitchell v. State, 876 P.2d 682 (Okla. Crim. App. 1993),
corrected by 887 P.2d 335 (Okla. Crim. App. 1994). Mitchell, decided after
Spears’ trial, held that the trial court should give this flight instruction only
“where the evidence [of flight] is controverted.” Id. at 685. On Spears’ direct
appeal, the OCCA acknowledged that “[b]ecause Spears did not testify at trial or
offer any explanation of his departure, giving the flight instruction under the
Mitchell rule would appear to be error.” Spears, 900 P.2d at 446. Nonetheless,
the OCCA denied Spears relief on this claim because Mitchell, interpreting state
law, applies only prospectively. See Rivers v. State, 889 P.2d 288, 291–92 (Okla.
62
Crim. App. 1995).
Spears asserts that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to make the
same objection to the flight instruction that later succeeded in Mitchell.
“Generally, [however,] counsel is not ineffective for failing to anticipate
arguments or appellate issues that only blossomed after defendant’s trial . . . .”
Sherrill v. Hargett, 184 F.3d 1172, 1175 (10th Cir. 1999). This principle applies
in the instant case as well. See Nguyen v. Reynolds, 131 F.3d 1340, 1356–57
(10th Cir. 1997) (holding trial and appellate counsel were not ineffective for
failing to raise a Mitchell claim before the OCCA decided Mitchell).
Mitchell had reversed “decades of [Oklahoma] jurisprudence dealing with the
flight instruction.” Pickens v. State, 910 P.2d 1063, 1070 (Okla. Crim. App.
1996); see also id. (noting that, “[a]s Mitchell points out,” the OCCA “had upheld
the flight instruction against numerous attacks” prior to Mitchell); Paxton v.
State, 867 P.2d 1309, 1317 (Okla. Crim. App. 1993) (“Evidence of a defendant’s
flight has long been held admissible as tending to show consciousness of guilt.”).
Therefore, trial counsel’s failure to foresee the OCCA’s Mitchell decision did not
fall below an objective standard of reasonableness. See Nguyen, 131 F.3d at
1357; see also, e.g., Ellis v. Hargett, 302 F.3d 1182, 1187–89 (10th Cir. 2002)
(holding appellate counsel was not objectively unreasonable in failing to raise a
claim where cases “on the books” at the time of direct appeal indicated that the
63
OCCA would not have been receptive to a contrary argument), cert. denied, 123
S. Ct. 1361 (2003); Bullock, 297 F.3d at 1051–52 (rejecting a claim that the trial
attorney should have objected to the victims’ hearsay testimony, based on a case
the state appellate court decided after the petitioner’s trial and noting that
effective representation does not require clairvoyance). For the foregoing
reasons, Spears is not entitled to habeas relief on this claim.
d. Trial Counsel Failed to Object to Spears’ Out-of-Court
Statement Implicating Powell
Given our conclusion above that the OCCA reasonably determined that any
Bruton error was harmless, we hold that the OCCA’s decision denying Powell
relief on his contention that his trial attorney should have objected to the State’s
introduction of Spears’ out-of-court statement implicating him was also a
reasonable application of established federal law. See supra Section III.B.1.a;
Powell, 906 P.2d at 780.
64
e. Trial Counsel Failed to Request Jury Instructions on
Voluntary Intoxication and Diminished-Capacity
Manslaughter
This same fate falls upon Powell’s claim that his trial counsel should have
requested instructions on a voluntary-intoxication defense and the lesser offense
of diminished-capacity manslaughter. We have already concluded that the state
appellate court reasonably held that the evidence did not support giving these
instructions. See supra Section III.B.3. For the same reasons, the OCCA
reasonably denied relief on these ineffective-assistance claims. See Powell, 906
P.2d at 780; see also id. at 777–78; cf. Le, 311 F.3d at 1026–27 (holding that
defense counsel was not ineffective for failing to request a self-defense
instruction, where the evidence did not permit such instruction under Oklahoma
law).
f. Cumulative Prejudice
Because the sum of various zeroes remains zero, the claimed prejudicial
effect of their trial attorneys’ cumulative errors does not warrant habeas relief.
See, e.g., Hawkins v. Hannigan, 185 F.3d 1146, 1158 (10th Cir. 1999)
(considering prejudice resulting from several instances of deficient performance).
As to Spears, we have concluded above that his trial attorney was not deficient in
failing to object to the flight instruction. Moreover, even assuming that his
65
attorney was deficient in not objecting to the victim-impact testimony and to the
prosecutor’s argument generally, the cumulative effect of those presumed errors
was insufficient to create a reasonable probability that, but for those errors, the
jury would not have convicted Spears of first-degree murder. Similarly, Powell
has failed to establish that the cumulative effect of any prejudice he may have
suffered as a result of his attorney’s allegedly deficient performance warrants
habeas relief.
6. Powell’s Ineffective-Assistance Claims Defaulted in State Court
Powell raised additional ineffective-trial-counsel claims in his first state
post-conviction application, claiming that his defense attorney (1) inadequately
advised him concerning the State’s plea offer, (2) failed to object to
victim-impact evidence, (3) failed to impeach Officer Wigley’s testimony that
Powell admitted to him that the group, including Powell, had intended to steal the
victim’s truck and that is why they had to kill Thompson, and (4) should have
obtained an expert who could have testified to Powell’s level of intoxication at
the time of the murder. 30 Because Powell failed to raise these particular claims on
direct appeal, however, the OCCA, relying on 1995 amendments to Oklahoma’s
30
Because we affirm the district court’s decision granting Powell habeas relief
from his capital sentence, we need not consider here his claims challenging his
trial attorney’s preparation for the capital sentencing proceeding, failure to
present additional mitigating evidence at that proceeding, and failure to object to
second-stage victim evidence.
66
post-conviction statute, deemed the claims procedurally defaulted. See Powell,
935 P.2d at 381–82 & 381 n.7.
To preclude federal habeas review, a state procedural bar must be adequate,
as well as independent from federal law. See, e.g., Lee v. Kemna, 534 U.S. 362,
375 (2002). In the case at bar, the district court held that Oklahoma’s procedural
bar was inadequate because the OCCA applied the 1995 post-conviction
amendments, even though they were not yet in effect at the time Powell’s
purported default occurred. “In determining whether a state procedural bar is an
adequate and independent ground to bar federal review of a constitutional claim, a
federal habeas court must [instead] apply the state’s rule in effect at the time of
the purported procedural default.” Barnett v. Hargett, 174 F.3d 1128, 1134
(10th Cir. 1999). After all, “a defendant cannot be expected to comply with a
procedural rule that does not exist at the time of the purported default.” Rogers v.
Gibson, 173 F.3d 1278, 1290 (10th Cir. 1999) (quotation omitted). Before
Oklahoma enacted the relevant 1995 amendments, however, Oklahoma courts
regularly and consistently barred claims a criminal defendant could have raised,
but failed to assert, on direct appeal. See, e.g., Neill v. Gibson, 278 F.3d 1044,
1054, 1057 (10th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 145 (2002); McCracken v.
Gibson, 268 F.3d 970, 976 (10th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 165 (2002).
The 1995 amendments, therefore, did not change that aspect of Oklahoma’s
67
procedural-default rule. See Cargle, 317 F.3d at 1201.
Nonetheless, Oklahoma’s procedural rules requiring a criminal defendant to
raise ineffective-trial-counsel claims on direct appeal are not adequate unless that
defendant is represented at trial and on appeal by different attorneys, and either
the defendant’s ineffective-trial-counsel claim could be resolved solely on the
trial record before the direct-appeal court or the defendant could have expanded
the direct-appeal record to present his ineffective-assistance claim adequately.
See English v. Cody, 146 F.3d 1257, 1263, 1264–65 (10th Cir. 1998); Hooks, 184
F.3d at 1214–15, 1216–17; see also, e.g., James, 211 F.3d at 556. Powell was
represented on appeal by a different attorney, and the State asserts that, in fact,
Powell could have adequately expanded and developed the direct-appeal record
sufficiently to permit him to raise these ineffective-trial-counsel claims on direct
appeal. Cf. Romano, 239 F.3d at 1180 (holding that the same procedural-bar rule
was inadequate without addressing whether the petitioner could have adequately
expanded the direct-appeal record). While we are mindful that the State bears the
ultimate burden of proving that its procedural mechanism was adequate, the
habeas petitioner must also allege with specificity why the state procedural rules
were inadequate to have permitted him to raise the omitted claim on direct appeal.
See Smallwood, 191 F.3d at 1268; Hooks, 184 F.3d at 1216–17. However,
because Powell does not address his alleged procedural default, let alone
68
challenge the adequacy of Oklahoma’s procedural rules, we conclude that
Oklahoma’s procedural bar is adequate to preclude our habeas review of these
particular ineffective-trial-representation claims. 31 Furthermore, Powell fails to
allege either cause excusing this default and prejudice, or that this court’s refusal
to consider the defaulted claims will result in a fundamental miscarriage of
justice. See, e.g., Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750 (1991). We
therefore decline to address the merits of these barred claims. See, e.g.,Cannon v.
Gibson, 259 F.3d 1253, 1265–66 (10th Cir. 2001) (declining to review
procedurally defaulted habeas claim, even though the district court had addressed
the merits of the claim), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 1080 (2002). Even were we to
address the merits of Powell’s defaulted claims, we are confident they do not
warrant habeas relief.
31
Hooks set forth the habeas petitioner’s burden to challenge the adequacy of a
state procedural bar. In Smallwood, we declined to presume an unchallenged
state procedural bar was adequate to preclude habeas review where the habeas
petitioner filed his § 2254 petition prior to this court’s Hooks decision, in July
1999. See Smallwood, 191 F.3d at 1268. Although, like the petitioner in
Smallwood, Powell filed his § 2254 petition prior to Hooks, Powell has failed to
assert before this court any challenge to the adequacy of Oklahoma’s
procedural-default rule. Under these circumstances, we conclude that he has
waived such a challenge.
69
7. Spears’ Procedurally Defaulted Ineffective-Trial-Counsel Claims
In his § 2254 petition, Spears asserted for the first time several additional
ineffective-trial-counsel claims, claiming that his attorney (1) failed to advise him
adequately concerning the State’s plea offer, (2) failed to obtain an expert witness
to testify that Spears was so intoxicated at the time the murder occurred that he
could not have formed the intent required for first-degree murder, and (3) failed
to introduce evidence that Spears did not have any blood on his clothes after the
murder. 32 To permit Spears to exhaust his state-court remedies as to those
particular ineffective-assistance claims, see 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1), the district
court abated Spears’ federal habeas petition. Accordingly, Spears asserted these
claims to the OCCA in a second state post-conviction application. Determining
that Spears defaulted these claims because he had failed to raise them in his first
post-conviction application, the OCCA denied Spears relief.
Spears now argues that the district court erred in requiring him to exhaust
his state-court remedies on these claims because Oklahoma’s state post-conviction
procedures are ineffective to safeguard his constitutional rights. See id.
§ 2254(b)(1)(B). Because Spears complied with, and did not appeal, the district
court’s directive to exhaust state-court remedies, however, this argument is moot
32
We need not address an additional claim, challenging Spears’ attorney’s
preparation for the capital sentencing proceeding.
70
as all previously unexhausted claims are now exhausted. See Odum v. Boone, 62
F.3d 327, 332–33 (10th Cir. 1995). We have previously rejected a similar
argument—that it is futile to require a petitioner to present unexhausted claims in
a post-conviction petition when the OCCA routinely deems such claims
procedurally barred if not presented first on direct appeal—on the basis that this
court already upheld the adequacy of this particular Oklahoma procedural bar.
See Cargle, 317 F.3d at 1212 n.15.
Spears contends, however, that the OCCA declined to review these
ineffective-trial-counsel claims, not because it deemed them barred, but because
it mistakenly believed Spears had previously raised these same claims in his first
state post-conviction application. In reviewing the OCCA’s decision, it is
apparent that the OCCA “clearly and expressly” applied the state
procedural-default rule, Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 263 (1989) (quotation
omitted), to Spears’ additional ineffective-trial-counsel claims. Spears’
contention is without merit.
In challenging Oklahoma’s procedural rule that claims not raised in a first
post-conviction petition are defaulted, Spears contends that Oklahoma’s
post-conviction proceedings do not provide sufficient review of his ineffective-
trial-counsel claims. While a state procedural bar will be inadequate if it deprives
a defendant of any meaningful review of his claims, see, e.g., Brecheen v.
71
Reynolds, 41 F.3d 1343, 1364 (10th Cir. 1994), we have previously upheld the
adequacy of this particular Oklahoma procedural rule. See, e.g., Cannon,
259 F.3d at 1266 (citing other cases).
Despite this authority, Spears argues that this particular procedural-default
rule is inadequate to preclude federal habeas review because the OCCA has, on
occasion, chosen to review the merits of a defaulted claim to prevent any
miscarriage of justice. A state procedural-default rule will be adequate if the
state courts apply it regularly and consistently. See, e.g., Johnson v. Mississippi,
486 U.S. 578, 587 (1988). Pivotal to our analysis “is whether the [state] courts’
actual application of the particular procedural default rule to all similar claims
has been evenhanded in the vast majority of cases.” Maes v. Thomas, 46 F.3d
979, 986 (10th Cir. 1995) (quotation omitted). To support his argument, Spears
relies on Valdez v. State, 46 P.3d 703, 704–05, 710–11 (Okla. Crim. App. 2002),
and unpublished decisions in Hawkins v. State, No. PC 96-1271 (Okla. Crim.
App. Mar. 18, 1998), Clayton v. State, No. PCD-2000-1618 (Okla. Crim. App.
Dec. 28, 2000), and Brown v. State, No. PCD-2002-781 (Okla. Crim. App. Aug.
22, 2002); see generally Revilla, 283 F.3d at 1210 n.3 (noting that Hawkins and
Clayton, unpublished opinions that may not be binding authority, “at the very
least . . . reflect that Oklahoma does not now invariably apply its default rules to
bar death-ineligibility issues”).
72
Hawkins, however, is not sufficiently analogous to Spears’ case because the
OCCA in that case reviewed the merits of Hawkins’ claim asserting that he was
legally ineligible for a death sentence, raised for the first time in his first state
post-conviction application. See Hawkins, No. PC 96-1271, slip op. at 1, 3–4; cf.
Steele v. Young, 11 F.3d 1518, 1521–22, 1222 n.5 (10th Cir. 1993) (recognizing
that, while Oklahoma courts have made clear that fundamental-error review is
available on direct appeal to review claims not raised in the trial court, such
fundamental-error review is not available where the defendant has not raised the
issue until his state post-conviction application). In Brown, the OCCA did stay
the petitioner’s execution and remand for a hearing on claims raised for the first
time in a second post-conviction application. Brown, however, appears to have
been based primarily on newly discovered evidence. See Brown, No.
PCD-2002-781, slip op. at 2–3, 2 n.4. We thus conclude that these two
unpublished decisions are not sufficiently analogous to inform our determination
of whether the OCCA regularly and consistently applies the specific procedural
bar it applied in Spears’ case.
In Valdez, however, the OCCA did “exercise its power to grant relief when
an error complained of has resulted in a miscarriage of justice, or constitutes a
substantial violation of a constitutional or statutory right” and did review the
merits of a procedurally defaulted claim asserted for the first time in a second
73
post-conviction application. 46 P.3d at 704–05, 710–11. Similarly, in Clayton,
the OCCA reviewed, for a fundamental miscarriage of justice, a procedurally
barred claim raised for the first time in a second post-conviction application. See
Clayton, No. PCD-2000-1618, slip op. at 2–5. Nonetheless, these cases appear to
be the only instances where the OCCA overlooked an analogous procedural
default in a second or successive state post-conviction application, and, standing
alone, these cases are insufficient to overcome Oklahoma’s regular and consistent
application of this procedural-bar rule in the “vast majority of cases.” Maes, 46
F.3d at 986 (quotation omitted); see also Andrews v. Deland, 943 F.2d 1162, 1190
(10th Cir. 1991).
Oklahoma’s procedural bar, therefore, remains adequate to preclude federal
habeas review unless Spears can establish cause excusing his default, and
resulting prejudice, or that this court’s refusal to review these claims will result in
a fundamental miscarriage of justice. 33 See Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750. Cause
excusing a procedural default must be some objective factor external to the
33
Spears does assert that this court’s refusal to consider the merits of his
defaulted claims will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice, but
apparently only as to his death sentence. Because we affirm the district court’s
decision granting Spears habeas relief from his sentence, we need not address
further his assertion of a fundamental miscarriage of justice as it relates to that
sentence. Even were Spears to allege that the fundamental-miscarriage-of-justice
exception applies to his defaulted first-stage ineffective-assistance claims, he has
not shown he is actually innocent of first-degree murder, as that exception would
require. See Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 321 (1995).
74
habeas petitioner, not fairly attributable to him, that impeded his efforts to
comply with the procedural rule in question. See id. at 753.
As cause for his default, Spears reprises his argument that Oklahoma’s state
post-conviction procedures are insufficient. Further, in conclusory fashion,
Spears asserts that “a conflicted defender organization selected and paid an
inadequate sum for Mr. Spears’s [first] post-conviction counsel.” (Spears Second
Br. at 70.) Spears fails to explain how better compensation for his attorney would
have led to a different result, and, in any event, ineffective representation in state
post-conviction proceedings is inadequate to excuse a procedural default. See
28 U.S.C. § 2254(i); see also Coleman, 501 U.S. at 752–53; Smallwood, 191 F.3d
at 1269. Just as Spears is unable to establish cause excusing his procedural
default, we are precluded from reviewing Spears’ defaulted ineffective-assistance
claims.
8. Evidentiary Hearing
Spears asserts that the district court should have conducted an evidentiary
hearing prior to denying relief on his ineffective-trial-representation claims. We
reject this argument. As discussed above, four of Spears’
ineffective-trial-counsel claims were defaulted, and Spears never requested an
evidentiary hearing in state court on his four remaining ineffective-assistance
claims. Having defaulted these claims, he must now meet 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2)
75
requirements before he will be entitled to an evidentiary hearing. Spears fails to
assert how he meets those requirements, and we deny Spears relief on this claim.
See, e.g. , Torres , 317 F.3d at 1161.
9. Spears’ Appellate Representation
Spears contends that his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to
raise his defaulted ineffective-trial-counsel claims on direct appeal. 34 He asserts
ineffective appellate representation both as a substantive claim and as additional
cause excusing his default of those ineffective-trial-counsel claims. Because
Spears failed to challenge his appellate representation until his second state
post-conviction proceeding, however, the state appellate court also deemed Spears
to have procedurally defaulted these claims. For the reasons discussed in Section
III.B.7. above, we are precluded from reviewing his substantive
ineffective-appellate-counsel claim. See generally Thomas v. Gibson, 218 F.3d
1213, 1221 (10th Cir. 2000) (recognizing this procedural bar’s adequacy).
Furthermore, Spears cannot rely on his procedurally defaulted
ineffective-appellate-counsel claim to provide cause excusing his barred
ineffective-trial-counsel claims, unless he can also establish cause excusing his
default of the ineffective-appellate-counsel claim. See Edwards v. Carpenter, 529
34
Again, we need not address this claim to the extent it concerns the capital
sentencing proceeding.
76
U.S. 446, 451–52 (2000). Spears has failed to do that here. 35
10. State’s Failure to Turn Over Exculpatory Material as Required
Under Brady v. Maryland 36
Finally, Powell contends that the State failed to turn over to his defense
counsel a typewritten summary of an audiotaped custodial statement Powell made
to authorities. The State responds that, because Powell did not raise this Brady
claim until he applied for state post-conviction relief, the OCCA deemed him to
have procedurally defaulted this claim. For efficiency, we address the merits of
Powell’s Brady claim. See, e.g., Romero v. Furlong, 215 F.3d 1107, 1111 (10th
Cir. 2000) (declining to address Colorado’s procedural bar to petitioner’s claims
“because the case may be more easily and succinctly affirmed on the merits”).
To succeed on a Brady claim, Powell must establish that the evidence at
issue is favorable to him; that the State suppressed this favorable evidence, either
willfully or inadvertently; and that prejudice ensued. See Strickler v. Greene,
527 U.S. 263, 281–82 (1999). By acknowledging that his defense counsel was
aware of and had listened to this audiotaped statement prior to trial, Powell
defeats his own claim. We have held that there can “be no suppression by the
35
Further, because Spears has defaulted this ineffective-appellate-assistance
claim, an evidentiary hearing is not warranted.
36
373 U.S. 83 (1963).
77
state of evidence already known by and available to [the defendant] prior to trial.”
United States v. Hernandez-Muniz, 170 F.3d 1007, 1011 (10th Cir. 1999)
(quotation omitted). Furthermore, while “[t]he government violates a
defendant’s due process rights when it fails to provide him with exculpatory
information, . . . due process does not necessarily require disclosure in
a specific form or manner.” Id. Powell’s Brady claim does not warrant habeas
relief.
IV
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s grant of habeas
relief as to both death sentences and AFFIRM the denial of any further habeas
relief.
78
Nos. 01-6258, 01-6267 - Spears v. Mullin
Nos. 01-6349, 01-6354 - Powell v. Mullin
HARTZ, Circuit Judge, concurring:
I concur in the result and join all of Judge Lucero’s opinion except part III
(A), which relates to the State’s appeals. Rather than grant relief because of the
photographs admitted into evidence during the penalty phase, I would set aside
the death penalties because no state decisionmaker—jury or judge—has found that
the victim consciously suffered while being murdered. Under Oklahoma law the
death penalty should not be imposed in this case unless the victim consciously
suffered. The evidence on the matter was hardly uncontroverted; indeed, one of
the government’s principal witnesses testified that the victim was rendered
unconscious by the first blows. Yet, remarkably, the jury was not instructed that
it had to find conscious suffering, nor did any court make the necessary finding.
First, Oklahoma law is clear that conscious suffering had to be proved. The
Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals (OCCA) recognized as much in its decision
resolving Mr. Spears’s appeal. The court wrote:
[T]he State bears the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt
the aggravating circumstances it elects to charge. We must now
determine whether there was any competent evidence to support the
jury's finding the murder was especially heinous, atrocious or cruel.
In order for a jury to find that a murder was especially heinous,
atrocious or cruel, the State must introduce competent evidence
indicating the victim's death was preceded by torture or serious
physical abuse, which may include the infliction of either great
physical suffering or extreme mental cruelty. Serious physical abuse
requires evidence of conscious physical suffering. As we stated in
Perry [v. State, 893 P.2d [521,] 534 [Okla. Crim. App. 1995], it is
critical the State prove the victim consciously suffered prior to death.
Prosecutors have proved this aggravator [in other cases] by
introducing evidence the victim suffered numerous defensive wounds
indicating that the victim was conscious and attempted to fight off
her attacker; statements from the defendant indicating the victim
consciously suffered serious physical abuse or extreme mental cruelty
prior to death; witness testimony that the victim was alive and
conscious at the time the physical abuse was inflicted; or medical
evidence that the victim was conscious during the infliction of
serious physical injury.
Spears v. State, 900 P.2d 431, 448-49 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995) (citations omitted;
second emphasis added).
Second, there was a real factual dispute concerning whether the victim had
consciously suffered. Claiborne Johnson, a participant in the murder who reached
a plea agreement with the prosecution, testified that the victim, Dewayne
Thompson, was knocked unconscious immediately after Mr. Powell struck the
first blows:
Q: All right. Now, did you ever see, at the time when you first
saw [Mr. Thompson] go down, did you ever see him assume
any kind of a defensive posture? That is to say, put his arms
up in this fashion (indicating) to defend himself?
A: No, I didn’t.
Q: Did you ever see him, at any time, whether it be standing up or
laying on the ground, take any defensive posture at all?
-2-
A: No I didn’t. Because the time that he hit the ground, he was
knocked out.
xvii. Okay. Now that is your supposition. You’re not a medical
doctor. You don’t know whether he was out or not, do you?
A: No, I don’t know whether or not for sure he was out or not. It
looked like it.
Q: All right.
A: The way from how I was looking at him, it looked like he was
out.
....
Q: Okay. Let me ask you a question here, okay? You thought
this guy was out; is that correct?
A: Yes, he wasn’t moving.
Trial Tr., Vol. 4, at 1165-66. Another eyewitness, Vickie Hensley, similarly
testified that Mr. Thompson fell directly to the ground after suffering the first
blows. Additionally, no evidence indicated that Mr. Thompson resisted the
beating: He had no defensive wounds, and none of the witnesses testified that he
tried to protect himself or that he called for assistance from bystanders.
Moreover, the medical examiner testified that the cause of death was trauma to
the brain that could have resulted from a single blow to the head. Indeed, the
-3-
OCCA spoke of “the paucity of evidence supporting the aggravator especially
heinous, atrocious or cruel.” Spears, 900 P.2d at 443.
To be sure, there was also contrary evidence; and I do not dispute the
determination by the OCCA that there was “testimony sufficient to allow a
rational jury to conclude Thompson was conscious during the beating which
preceded his death.” Id. at 449. My concern, rather, is that no one actually made
the finding that Thompson experienced conscious physical suffering.
The function of a criminal trial is not simply for the prosecution to put on
enough evidence that a jury could find the defendant guilty. The jury has a role to
play. The prosecution’s evidence counts for naught unless the jury is convinced
by it. People do not go to jail because the prosecution presented enough
evidence. They go to jail because their juries, after reviewing the evidence, find
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Likewise, people are not executed simply
because the prosecution put on enough evidence to justify the death penalty.
They can be executed only if the appropriate decisionmaker finds the necessary
factual predicates for the death penalty. The only significant difference in this
regard between the determination of guilt and the decision to execute is that, at
least prior to Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002), there was no right to have a
jury make the death-penalty finding, so the finding could be made by the trial
judge or even an appellate court. See Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738, 747-
-4-
50 (1990).
Here, we cannot say that the jury found conscious suffering. The term
“conscious suffering” appears nowhere in the jury instructions. With respect to
the “especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel” aggravator, the jury was instructed
only that the “phrase especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel is directed to those
crimes where death of the victim was preceded by torture or serious physical
abuse.” If we knew that the jury had found that the victim had been subjected to
torture, we could readily infer a finding of conscious suffering. But the jury was
instructed it need only find either torture or serious physical abuse. And the jury
might well have found serious physical abuse yet not found conscious suffering.
The evidence at trial could readily support the conclusion that the victim suffered
serious physical abuse (a severe beating and possibly some stab wounds) before
death (as required by the instruction) but after having lost consciousness. Thus,
in light of the instructions given here, a verdict that the crime was “especially
heinous, atrocious, or cruel” does not necessarily imply a finding of conscious
suffering.
The failure to instruct the jury on conscious suffering does not, however,
end the matter. Under pre-Ring law it was not necessary for a jury to find the
aggravating circumstance necessary for imposition of the death penalty. A judge,
even an appellate court, could make the finding. See Clemons, 494 U.S. at 747-
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50. But that was not done here. As previously noted, the OCCA in Spears’s case
determined only that there was sufficient evidence for a jury to find conscious
suffering. 900 P.2d at 449. It did not state what its own fact finding would
be—whether the court itself was convinced that Thompson had consciously
suffered. The OCCA made a similar determination in Powell’s appeal, see Powell
v. State, 906 P.2d 765, 781-82 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995), and similarly failed to
make a fact finding of its own.
I recognize that in Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 783 (1990), the Supreme
Court affirmed an Arizona death penalty on the ground that “a rational factfinder
could have found that respondent both relished the crime and inflicted gratuitous
violence on the victim”—apparently the same standard of review applied by the
OCCA in the Spears and Powell appeals. But there is a critical difference
between Lewis and the cases now on appeal. In Lewis the Court was reviewing
“the Arizona Supreme Court’s finding that respondent had relished the killing
[and] . . . . that respondent had inflicted gratuitous violence.” Id. at 783-84
(emphasis added). Thus, an appropriate decisionmaker in that case had already
made the requisite fact findings, something not done here.
This circuit’s decision in Moore v. Gibson, 195 F.3d 1152 (10th Cir. 1999),
upon which the State relies, does nothing more than follow the proposition in
Lewis that “‘federal habeas review of a state court’s application of a
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constitutionally narrowed aggravating circumstance is limited, at most, to
determining whether the state court’s finding was so arbitrary or capricious as to
constitute an independent due process or Eighth Amendment violation.’” 195
F.3d at 1176 (quoting Lewis, 497 U.S. at 780) (emphasis added). It further quotes
Lewis for the proposition that “‘[a] state court’s finding of an aggravating
circumstance in a particular case . . . is arbitrary or capricious if and only if no
reasonable sentencer could have so concluded,’” id. at 1176 (quoting Lewis, 497
U.S. at 783), and then continues, “[a]s discussed more fully below, that is not the
case here,” id. In other words, Moore started from the assumption that the state
court had found the factual predicates for the aggravating circumstance, thereby
limiting the circuit court’s role to determining whether the factfinding was
rational.
Likewise, Romano v. State, 909 P.2d 92 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995), cannot
support the State’s view, because in that case the court noted that the jury had
been instructed on conscious suffering, id. at 121 n.18.
The issue here is not a technicality. Nothing is more central to our system
of justice than having a factfinder decide the facts. It is not for this court to
decide whether Spears and Powell deserve the death penalty. But we must reverse
their sentences when no one has made the findings required by Oklahoma law.
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Spears v. Mullin
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