Staelens v. Dobert

United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit

No. 02-1473

AARON STAELENS; NADINE STAELENS,

Plaintiffs, Appellants,

v.

LYNN DOBERT; RONALD DOBERT,

Defendants, Appellees.

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

[Hon. Michael A. Ponsor, U.S. District Judge]

Before

Torruella, Circuit Judge,
Stahl, Senior Circuit Judge,
and Howard, Circuit Judge.

G. David Sharp, with whom Corash and Zurn, LLP was on brief,
for appellants.
John S. Ferrara, with whom Dalsey, Ferrara, & Albano was on
brief, for appellees.

February 5, 2003
 STAHL, Senior Circuit Judge. This case involves a motor

vehicle accident, in which defendant-appellee Lynn Dobert struck a

gasoline tanker driven by plaintiff-appellant Aaron Staelens, who

three to five hours after the collision injured his knee when he

tripped over a piece of equipment left by a state employee

investigating the accident. Staelens and his wife sued Dobert and

her husband, alleging that Dobert's negligence proximately caused

Staelens's injuries. The district court granted summary judgment

in favor of the Doberts; we affirm.

I.

As this case comes to us on a grant of summary judgment,

we relate the facts in the light most favorable to the Staelens,

drawing all reasonable inferences in their favor. Crawford v.

Lamantia, 34 F.3d 28, 31 (1st Cir. 1994). At approximately 6:00

p.m., on December 17, 1997, Dobert negligently drove her automobile

into a gasoline tanker driven by Staelens. State Police, including

an accident reconstruction team, firefighters, and an ambulance

arrived on scene. Although Staelens escaped injury from the

impact, Dobert did not, and was transported from the scene by an

ambulance. After the reconstruction team completed its

investigation, a Department of Transportation ("DOT") inspector

arrived to inspect the tanker. Finished with inspecting the

tanker's lights, the DOT inspector told Staelens that he could turn

them off. As Staelens approached the door to the cab, he stepped

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on a creeper,1 which had been left out by the DOT inspector, fell

onto his back, and injured his knee. Staelens's fall occurred

three to five hours after the initial impact.

After limited discovery, the Doberts filed a motion for

summary judgment, contending that the DOT inspector's negligence

was an intervening and superseding cause that relieved the Doberts

of liability. The district court agreed and granted the motion

solely on that ground.2

II.

Under Massachusetts law, "[i]n addition to being the

cause in fact of the injury [the but for cause], the plaintiff must

show that the negligent conduct was a proximate or legal cause of

the injury as well." Kent v. Commonwealth, 437 Mass. 312, 320, 771

N.E.2d 770 (2002). To establish proximate cause, a plaintiff must

show that his or her injuries were within the reasonably

foreseeable risks of harm created by the defendant's negligent

conduct. Id.; Poskus v. Lombardo's of Randolph, Inc., 423 Mass.

637, 639-41, 670 N.E.2d 383 (1996). Generally, intervening

negligent conduct of a third person will not relieve the original

tortfeasor from liability where such conduct was reasonably

1
A creeper is a flat board with underlying wheels used to
inspect the underside of a vehicle.
2
The negligence of the relevant actors--Dobert, the DOT
inspector, and Staelens--was not an issue before the district
court.

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foreseeable. Poskus, 423 Mass. at 639-40, 670 N.E.2d 383; Jesionek

v. Mass. Port Authority, 376 Mass. 101, 105-06, 378 N.E.2d 995

(1978).

Although the question of proximate cause--i.e., whether

a risk of harm was reasonably foreseeable--is ordinarily for the

jury, summary judgment may be appropriate when the evidence and the

reasonable inferences drawn therefrom lead to but one conclusion.

Kent, 437 Mass. at 320-22, 771 N.E.2d 770; Poskus, 423 Mass. at

636-41, 670 N.E.2d 383; Young v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 400 Mass.

837, 842, 512 N.E.2d 272 (1987). This is such a case: no jury

could conclude that it was reasonably foreseeable that, three to

five hours after the collision, Staelens would trip over a piece of

equipment brought to the scene sometime after the accident by a

state employee inspecting the tanker. Staelens suffered no injury

from the collision itself nor from any risk of harm resulting

therefrom; e.g., he did not slip on fluids or trip over debris from

the vehicles involved in the accident. Instead, Staelens's injury

resulted from an independent agency, the DOT inspector's conduct,

after the risks of harm resulting from Dobert's negligent conduct

had come to rest. Indeed, as we have said, three to five hours

passed without incident.

To find in favor of Staelens would be to substantially

extend the scope of reasonable foreseeability as set forth in

Massachusetts case law and stretch the concept beyond reason, a

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course we decline to follow. Dobert did not become an insurer of

Staelens's safety against all conceivable harms merely because she

struck the tanker he was driving. As instructed by the

Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, "[t]here must be limits to

the scope or definition of reasonable foreseeability based on

considerations of policy and pragmatic judgment." Poskus, 423

Mass. at 640, 670 N.E.2d 383; see also Kent, 437 Mass. at 320-21,

771 N.E.2d 770; Dan B. Dobbs, The Law of Torts, ch. 10, § 180, at

443 (2001) ("The proximate cause issue, in spite of the

terminology, is not about causation at all but about the

appropriate scope of responsibility."). Otherwise, liability would

extend endlessly, one harm leading inevitably to others. In sum,

the undisputed facts would not permit a fair-minded jury to

conclude that Staelens's injuries were within the reasonably

foreseeable risks of harm resulting from Dobert's negligent

conduct.

Affirmed, costs to appellees.

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