United States Court of Appeals,
Fifth Circuit.
No. 97-60104
Summary Calendar.
Bobby L. STAFFORD, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
TRUE TEMPER SPORTS, also known as Emhart Industries, a Black and
Decker Company, Defendant-Appellee.
Sept. 25, 1997.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Mississippi.
Before REYNALDO G. GARZA, SMITH and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
This is an appeal from a district court ruling which granted
summary judgment in favor of the Appellee, True Temper Sports
("True Temper"). Upon review of the pleadings, briefs, and the
record on file, we AFFIRM the decision of the district court.
Background
The Appellant, Bobby Stafford ("Stafford") challenges the
summary judgment. Stafford states that the district court erred by
granting summary judgment in favor of True Temper. Stafford states
that the district court erred by precluding him from litigating his
ERISA claims. The district court held that a decision by the
Mississippi Employment Security Commission ("MESC"), which was
reviewed by the Circuit Court of Lee County, Mississippi, had
collateral estoppel effect, thereby preventing Stafford from
relitigating certain issues at the core of his claim. Stafford
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further alleges that the district court erred by granting summary
judgment in favor of True Temper on the pendant state claims.
The background facts and history are as follows. Bobby
Stafford was hired by True Temper in 1990 as an employee in its
Amory, Mississippi facility. Stafford was suspended from his post
and fired in February of 1995. True Temper alleged that Stafford
manipulated factory machinery in order to make it appear that he
worked a greater amount of hours than he actually worked, for the
purpose of receiving more pay. Such an act, aside from being
dishonest, is a violation of company policy, and Stafford was
fired.
Stafford sought unemployment benefits through the MESC.
Stafford was initially disqualified by the claims examiner assigned
to his case, and Stafford appealed. The appeals referee, after
conducting a hearing, reversed the findings of the claims examiner.
Subsequently, a three member board of review concluded that
Stafford intentionally manipulated the machinery to make it appear
that he was working longer hours than he actually had worked, and
reinstated the decision of the claims examiner, disqualifying
Stafford from unemployment benefits. Stafford appealed to the
Circuit Court of Lee County, Mississippi, and he lost there, too.
The Circuit Court affirmed the decision of the board of review.
At the time he was fired, Stafford was three (3) weeks away
from being vested in True Temper's pension plan. Stafford's
daughter suffers from Gaucher's disease, and her medical expenses
(paid for under the company health care plan) are substantial.
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Also, Stafford underwent heart surgery in 1993, surgery which was
expensive and paid for by the company health care plan. Stafford
filed suit alleging that True Temper fired him in retaliation for
his substantial (present and future) medical expenses and to
prevent the vesting of his pension benefits, in violation of True
Temper's duties under ERISA. Stafford also made claims for
intentional infliction of emotional distress and defamation arising
from the allegations made by True Temper, allegations which
Stafford claims were a pretext for his dismissal. The case went
before Judge Glen H. Davidson, United States District Judge for the
Northern District of Mississippi (Eastern Division), and Judge
Davidson, in a succinct and well-drafted opinion, granted summary
judgment in favor of True Temper.
Standard of Review
We review a summary judgment de novo. Thompson v. Georgia
Pacific Corp., 993 F.2d 1166, 1167 (5th Cir.1993). Summary
judgment is appropriate if "the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment
as a matter of law." FED.R.CIV.P. 56(c). A mere allegation by the
nonmovant that a dispute over material facts exists between the
parties will not defeat a movant's otherwise properly supported
motion for summary judgment. A dispute about a material fact is
genuine only if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could
return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Hanks v.
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Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp., 953 F.2d 996, 997 (5th
Cir.1992).
Discussion and Analysis
The central point in this case is whether Stafford's claims
are precluded under collateral estoppel. If they are, then he will
be unable to relitigate whether the factors surrounding his
termination were true or false. If the decisions of MESC and the
Circuit Court of Lee County are accepted, he really has nothing
left to stand on, because the factors in question are central to
all his claims. True Temper's actions would therefore be
considered to be a nonpretextual, legitimate reason for
termination, and the door would be closed on Stafford's claims.
The federal courts must give an agency's fact finding the
same preclusive effect that they would a decision of a state court,
when the state agency is acting in a judicial capacity and gives
the parties a fair opportunity to litigate. University of
Tennessee v. Elliott, 478 U.S. 788, 799, 106 S.Ct. 3220, 3226, 92
L.Ed.2d 635 (1986). This is done for the purposes of judicial
economy, and because "a losing litigant deserves no rematch after
a defeat fairly suffered, in adversarial proceedings, on an issue
identical in substance to the one he subsequently seeks to raise."
Astoria Federal S. & L. Assn. v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104, 107, 111
S.Ct. 2166, 2169, 115 L.Ed.2d 96 (1991). However, if Congress
manifests an intent, pursuant to a statutory scheme, that state
administrative decisions have no such preclusive effect, collateral
estoppel is not to be applied. Such intent need not be explicit,
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and can be implied if, for example, Congress created its own
administrative scheme to deal with the matter in question. Id. at
111, 111 S.Ct. at 2171 (in Astoria, the fact that Congress created
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") to deal with
the alleged discrimination in question was central to the
analysis). However, as the district court pointed out succinctly,
the instant case is not one of those exceptional cases, because
ERISA is not governed by any scheme enforced by the EEOC or any
like agency, and hence, collateral estoppel can be applied.
Stafford tries to distinguish the case at bar by stating that
he did not truly have a full and fair opportunity to litigate the
matter, thereby creating separate due process issues, and he makes
certain bare and unsubstantiated allegations about the veracity of
the witnesses. First of all, as the district court pointed out,
Stafford had ample opportunity to litigate his claim before the
MESC, given that he was able to present evidence, be represented by
counsel, and involve himself in the elaborate administrative review
process (which, it should be pointed out, went through many layers
before the matter got to the federal courts). The fact that he may
not have used certain strategies or litigated to the extent that
(in hindsight) he and his attorney now believe he should have is
immaterial. This is just the sort of "defeat fairly suffered"
Justice Souter wrote of in Astoria. Astoria, 501 U.S. at 107, 111
S.Ct. at 2169.
Further, as pointed out by the district court, this decision
comes from a judicially reviewed action by an administrative body,
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and as such, the judgment comes not just from MESC, but from the
Circuit Court of Lee County. Such a judgment is entitled to "the
same full faith and credit in every court of the United States ...
as [it has] by law or usage in courts of such State," and has
preclusive effect. 28 U.S.C. § 1738. State administrative
proceedings which are reviewed by a state court have preclusive
effect and a federal court can apply state rules of issue
preclusion in determining whether a matter litigated in state court
may be relitigated in federal court. Marrese v. Amer. Acad. Ortho.
Surgeons, 470 U.S. 373, 382, 105 S.Ct. 1327, 1332-1333, 84 L.Ed.2d
274 (1985). As far as Mississippi is concerned, the decisions of
MESC have preclusive weight in Mississippi courts, are appealable
through the Mississippi court system, and even have the potential
for review by the United States Supreme Court. Miss.Code Ann. §
71-5-531(1996 Supp.). Any concerns about lack of oversight or lack
of local preclusive effect are misplaced, indeed.
Under Mississippi law, four factors must be shown for a prior
judgment to have a collateral estoppel effect. The party must be
seeking to relitigate a certain issue, that issue must already have
been litigated in a prior action, the issue must have been
determined in the prior suit, and the determination of the issue
must have been essential to the prior action. Raju v. Rhodes, 7
F.3d 1210, 1215 (5th Cir.1993), cert. denied 511 U.S. 1032, 114
S.Ct. 1543, 128 L.Ed.2d 194 (1994). Also, the fact-finding
tribunal should be careful in its decision-making and in its
determination of the findings of fact essential to the issue in
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question for the purposes of application of collateral estoppel, so
as to eliminate any suspicion about the proceedings.M.E.S.C. v.
Philadelphia Mun. Sep. Sch. D., 437 So.2d 388, 397 (Miss.1983). In
the case at bar, the key issue in question is whether Stafford
manipulated his machine to falsely reflect time worked and whether
that was the reason he was fired. Both of these issues were
litigated, in the MESC proceedings and Circuit Court of Lee County,
these issues were determined and essential to the findings, and we
have no reason to doubt the abilities and level of care of the MESC
fact-finders. Stafford claims that the ERISA case was not the
issue litigated, so collateral estoppel does not apply, but the
fact that the ERISA issue presupposes and includes certain
determinations about the machine manipulation issue means that the
primary issue has been previously dealt with and collateral
estoppel applies.
This application of collateral estoppel is fatal to
Stafford's ERISA claim. Under § 510 of ERISA, Stafford has to
establish a prima facie case that True Temper fired him with a
specific discriminatory intent to retaliate for exercising an ERISA
right or to prevent attainment of benefits which he would become
entitled to under the plan. 29 U.S.C.A. § 1140; Rogers v.
International Marine Terminals, Inc., 87 F.3d 755, 761 (5th
Cir.1996); Hines v. Mass. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 43 F.3d 207, 209
(5th Cir.1995); McGann v. H & H Music Co., 946 F.2d 401, 404 (5th
Cir.1991), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 981, 113 S.Ct. 482, 121 L.Ed.2d
387 (1992). The plaintiff in such an ERISA employment
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discrimination test need not prove that the discriminatory reason
was the only reason for discharge, but he must show that the loss
of benefits was more than an incidental loss from his discharge,
and this inference of discrimination can be proven by
circumstantial evidence. Carlos v. White Consol. Indust. Inc., 934
F.Supp. 227, 232 (W.D.Tex.1996). To dispel the inference of
discrimination which would arise from a prima facie case, True
Temper must articulate a non-discriminatory reason for its actions,
and then the burden shifts to Stafford to prove this reason is a
pretext and the real purpose was denial of ERISA benefits. Lehman
v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 74 F.3d 323, 331 (1st Cir.1996).
The district court rightly determined that while the evidence
does allow for a prima facie case, True Temper articulated a
perfectly appropriate non-discriminatory reason for its actions,
and Stafford failed to prove that this is a pretext. Stafford does
nothing more than make bare allegations and attempt to argue that
a few minor discrepancies in the record constitute proof of
improper motive. This simply will not suffice, and because
collateral estoppel precludes Stafford from relitigating the matter
of his manipulation of the machinery in the plant, the district
court properly granted summary judgment for True Temper on this
issue.
As both parties pointed out in their briefs, the district
court did not rule on whether the pendant state claims of
intentional infliction of emotional distress and defamation were
preempted by § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act ("LMRA").
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29 U.S.C.A. § 185. The record does not show any evidence that
either party brought this fact to the district court's attention
after the summary judgment was granted. Upon consideration of the
arguments put forth by the parties, we find that the pendant state
claims in this case are preempted.
Regarding intentional infliction of emotional distress, this
Circuit has stated that the "LMRA preempts state-law emotional
distress claims if those claims are related to employment
discrimination." Barrow v. New Orleans S.S. Ass'n, 10 F.3d 292,
300 (5th Cir.1994). The emotional distress claim is clearly part
of the same matter as the employment discrimination claim, and
would likely never have come into existence but for the original
dispute over whether Stafford manipulated the machinery, and is far
from peripheral to the central employment issue, so preemption is
warranted. Brown v. Southwestern Bell Tele. Co., 901 F.2d 1250,
1256 (5th Cir.1990). As the Fourth Circuit pointed out in
McCormick v. AT & T Technologies, 934 F.2d 531, 538 (4th
Cir.1991)(en banc), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1048, 112 S.Ct. 912, 116
L.Ed.2d 813 (1992), in situations such as this, it is appropriate
for a court to look at the collective bargaining agreement to see
if an employer's actions are reasonable. The collective bargaining
agreement empowers True Temper to direct and manage its employees,
which includes the investigation of employee misconduct and allows
for discharge of employees for proper cause. The company's
Employee Guide, which is incorporated by reference in the
collective bargaining agreement, clearly states that the actions
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Stafford was accused of are subject to immediate suspension and
discharge. Thus, True Temper's actions are consistent with the
collective bargaining agreement, and because this matter is
intertwined with the employment issue, the state law claim is
preempted and properly dismissed.
Regarding the defamation issue, once again the state law
claim is preempted under the LMRA. Stafford claims that the reasons
given for his termination constitute defamation. The reasons given
for his dismissal arose under the employment relationship between
Stafford and True Temper, were a part of the investigation into the
appropriateness of his dismissal, and were in accordance with the
terms of the collective bargaining agreement. Bagby v. General
Motors Corp., 976 F.2d 919, 921 (5th Cir.1992). Therefore, as in
the matter of the emotional distress claim, the matter is under the
LMRA and preempted, and dismissed.
At any rate, even if there was no preemption, Stafford loses
these claims under Mississippi law anyway. First of all, the fact
that Stafford is precluded from relitigating the issue of whether
he actually did what True Temper accused him of doing causes his
case on the state claims to fail. All Stafford has claimed to
overcome this is a bare statement that the issue is whether the
witnesses are telling the truth, and that is enough to survive
summary judgment. The truthfulness of a witness can always be
questioned, and if simply stating that a person may not be telling
the truth (without any hard evidence proving that assertion) is the
standard to overcome summary judgment, no summary judgment would
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ever be proper, so this argument fails.
Further, under Mississippi law, Stafford must show that True
Temper's actions were "extreme and outrageous," and "beyond all
possible bounds of decency" to win a claim of intentional
infliction of emotional distress. Burroughs v. FFP Operating
Partners, L.P., 28 F.3d 543, 546 (5th Cir.1994); Leaf River Forest
Prods. v. Ferguson, 662 So.2d 648, 658 (Miss.1995). Firing someone
for dishonesty and tampering with equipment for the purpose of
getting undeserved income is hardly outrageous or indecent. Given
the above, and the fact that Stafford cannot relitigate the issue,
Stafford loses on this claim.
Similarly, regarding defamation, an essential element of the
claim of defamation is the falsity of the statement. Blake v.
Gannett Co., 529 So.2d 595, 603 (Miss.1988); Fulton v. Mississippi
Publishers Corp., 498 So.2d 1215, 1217 (Miss.1986). Here, the
allegation is dishonesty and cheating, both of which were proven in
the MESC hearings, affirmed by the Circuit Court of Lee County, and
are precluded from relitigation due to collateral estoppel. Once
again, Stafford loses, and we would dismiss even if there were no
preemption.
Conclusion
For these reasons, we AFFIRM the district court's grant of
summary judgment in favor of the Appellant, True Temper.
AFFIRMED.
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