STATE BD. OF REG. FOR PROF. ENG. v. Eberenz

Attorneys for appellants

Jeffrey A. Modisett
Attorney General of Indiana

Jon Laramore
K.C. Norwalk
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana

Attorney for Appellee

C. Gregory Fifer
Clarksville, Indiana

IN THE
INDIANA SUPREME COURT

STATE BOARD OF REGISTRATION FOR PROFESSIONAL ENGINEERS, and INDIANA
PROFESSIONAL LICENSING AGENCY,
Appellants (Defendants below),

v.

DAVID R. EBERENZ,
Appellee (Plaintiff below).

)
) Supreme Court No.
) 10S04-0002-CV-90
)
) Court of Appeals No.
) 10A04-9805-CV-237
)
)
)
)
)

APPEAL FROM THE CLARK SUPERIOR COURT
The Honorable Cecile A. Blau, Judge
Cause No. 10D02-9706-CP-156

ON PETITION TO TRANSFER

February 10, 2000
SULLIVAN, Justice.

The state board that licenses professional engineers in Indiana denied
an out-of-state engineer=s application to practice here on grounds that he
did not satisfy the board=s educational requirements. A trial court and
the Court of Appeals held that the board did not have authority under the
out-of-state engineer licensing statute to impose the educational
requirements. We find the educational requirements within the board=s
authority and its decision otherwise proper.

Background

Eberenz has been registered as a professional engineer in Kentucky
since early 1995. In late August or early September of 1996, Eberenz filed
with the Indiana Professional Licensing Agency (AAgency@) his application
for comity registration as an Indiana professional engineer. In a letter
dated October 7, 1996, the State Board of Registration for Professional
Engineers (ABoard@) denied Eberenz=s application, citing his failure to
satisfy the education requirements established by the Board and outlined in
Indiana=s Administrative Code. See Ind. Admin. Code tit. 864, r. 1.1-2-
2(c) (1996). Eberenz had not completed the curriculum in calculus that is
required for licensing as a professional engineer in Indiana, specifically
lacking three hours of advanced calculus and three hours of calculus-based
physics. Eberenz sought administrative review of the Board=s decision to
deny his application.

On March 25, 1997, an administrative law judge (AALJ@) issued an order
denying Eberenz=s application finding that he suffered from a Alack@ of
education credit. Eberenz then sought review of the ALJ=s decision before
the full Board. On May 30, 1997, the full Board issued its final order in
which it affirmed and adopted the ALJ=s order.

Eberenz then petitioned the trial court for judicial review of the
full Board=s final order. He subsequently filed a motion for summary
judgment. In his brief supporting that motion, Eberenz requested that the
trial court reverse the Board=s final order and also decree that he be
registered, pursuant to the principle of comity, as an Indiana professional
engineer. On February 12, 1998, the trial court granted Eberenz summary
judgment in an order which was supported by enumerated findings and which
held, among other things, that the Board=s decision was not in accordance
with law and was not supported by the evidence. The trial court then
remanded the cause both to the Agency and the Board Awith instructions to
take the appropriate action regarding [Eberenz=s] comity application
consistent with the findings of this order.@ (R. at 172.)

The Board appealed the trial court=s grant of summary judgment,[1] and
the Court of Appeals affirmed. State Bd. of Registration for Prof=l Eng=rs
v. Eberenz, 701 N.E.2d 892, 902 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998).

Discussion

Indiana Code ' 25-31-1-21 (1993) provides the rule of law for
Areciprocal@ or Acomity@ registration of out-of-state professional
engineers. It states in relevant part that the
[B]oard may, upon application and payment of a fee established by the
[B]oard in the [B]oard=s rules, issue a certificate of registration as
a professional engineer to an individual who holds a valid certificate
of registration as a professional engineer, issued to the applicant by
the proper authority of any state or territory or possession of the
United States if the requirements for registration of professional
engineers that the certificate of registration was issued under do not
conflict with the provisions of this chapter.

Id. (emphases added). Therefore, we must determine whether the Board
properly applied the relevant Aprovisions@ or Arequirements for
registration,@ when it denied Eberenz his comity application on the grounds
that he obtained his Kentucky engineer license under provisions or
requirements which Aconflict@ with those established for registration in
Indiana.

I

The Court of Appeals determined that the Board did not act in
accordance with Indiana law in denying Eberenz=s comity application because
A[n]o language in Indiana Code Section 25-31-1-21 indicates the existence
of an additional education requirement [outside the statute] for comity
registration.@ Eberenz, 701 N.E.2d at 897. Thus, the Court of Appeals
reasoned, the Board improperly Aengraft[ed] such a requirement into this
statute by insisting that Eberenz satisfy the strictures of Indiana
Administrative Code title 864, rule 1.1-2-2.@ Id.[2] The Board counters
that it Ais permitted to promulgate rules@ prescribing the appropriate
educational requirements because the legislature A[did] not specify exactly
what educational requirements are necessary for licensure,@ leaving that
determination to the Board=s rule-making authority. See Appellants= Br. in
Support of Transfer, at 8-9. We agree with the Board.

A

We begin our analysis by identifying Indiana=s basic licensing
requirements. Indiana Code ' 25-31-1-12(a) (1993) establishes the minimum
evidence, or Arequirements for registration,@ that must be demonstrated by
an applicant in order to qualify for registration as a professional
engineer. The statute reads as follows:

(a) The following under either subdivision (1) or (2) shall be
considered as minimum evidence that the applicant is qualified for
registration as a professional engineer:

(1) All of the following:

(A) Graduation in an approved engineering curriculum of
four (4) years or more.

(B) A specific record of four (4) years or more of
progressive experience on engineering projects of
sufficient quality acquired subsequent to graduation, which
experience indicates that the applicant is qualified to be
placed in responsible charge of engineering work requiring
the exercise of judgment in the application of engineering
sciences to the sound solution of engineering problems.

(C) The successful passing of an examination as provided
for in section 14 of this chapter.

(2) All of the following:

(A) A specific record of eight (8) years or more of
engineering education and experience in engineering work,
which indicates that the applicant has acquired knowledge
and skill and practical experience in engineering work
approximating that required for registration as a
professional engineer under subdivision (1).

(B) The successful passing of an examination as provided
for in section 14 of this chapter.[[3]]

Id. (emphases added).

Eberenz acknowledges that because he has not obtained a degree Ain an
accredited engineering curriculum,@ his claim for comity registration rests
solely on the provisions or requirements for registration of Asubdivision
(2).@ See Br. of Appellee in Opposition to Transfer at 6-7. By the plain
language of the statute, Eberenz must present evidence that he has acquired
A[a] specific record of eight (8) years or more of engineering education
and experience in engineering work.@ Ind. Code § 25-31-1-12(a)(2)
(emphasis added.)

B

Our legislature created the Board to Aenforce and administer@ Indiana
Code ' 25-31-1, specifically directing that it Ashall adopt rules
establishing standards for the competent practice of engineering.@ Id. '
25-31-1-7(a) (1993). The Board=s rule-making authority is necessary for it
A>to make reasonable rules and regulations,=@ for without this authority,
A>it would be impossible in many instances to apply and enforce the
legislative enactments, and the good to be accomplished would be entirely
lost.=@ Podgor v. Indiana Univ., 178 Ind. App. 245, 251, 381 N.E.2d 1274,
1279 (1978) (quoting Financial Aid Corp. v. Wallace, 216 Ind. 114, 121, 23
N.E.2d 472, 475 (1939)). And while Aan administrative agency has only
those [express] powers conferred on it by the General Assembly,@ Fort Wayne
Educ. Ass=n v. Aldrich, 527 N.E.2d 201, 216 (Ind. Ct. App. 1988), it is
nonetheless Aa well-settled principle of law that an administrative agency
. . . also has such implicit power as is necessary to effectuate the
regulatory scheme outlined by the statute,@ Barco Beverage Corp. v. Indiana
Alcoholic Beverage Comm=n, 595 N.E.2d 250, 254 (Ind. 1992) (collecting
cases).

In carrying out its legislative mandate to regulate Athe competent
practice of engineering,@ the Board adopted Administrative Rule 1.1-2-2,
which provides as follows:

(a) This section establishes the minimum education and experience
requirements under IC 25-31-1-12 for admission to the professional
engineer examination.

(b) The following table establishes provisions for evaluating combined
education and experience to determine if it is sufficient to satisfy
minimum registration requirements under IC 25-31-1-12 for professional
engineer registration applicants holding the stated degrees:

* * *

(c) The education of all applicants except those who have obtained a
baccalaureate in an approved engineering curriculum must include the
following:

(1) At least twelve (12) semester credit hours in college level
mathematics, excluding college algebra and trigonometry, which
must include a minimum of nine (9) semester credit hours of
calculus and a minimum of three (3) semester credit hours of
advanced calculus based mathematics.

(2) At least eight (8) semester credit hours in college level
courses in the physical sciences which must include a minimum of
three (3) semester credit hours of calculus based physics and a
minimum of three (3) semester credit hours of laboratory-based
chemistry.

(3) At least twelve (12) semester credit hours of engineering
sciences which require calculus as a prerequisite or
corequisite.

* * *

Ind. Admin. Code tit. 864, r. 1.1-2-2 (1996) (emphases added).

As set forth under Background, supra, the Board denied Eberenz=s
comity application on the basis that he did not satisfy the education
requirements outlined above in requirements (1) - (3) of subsection (c).
See also Eberenz, 701 N.E.2d at 895-96. Eberenz emphatically argued to the
Court of Appeals[4] that the Board has Awholly failed . . . to address the
delimiting nature of subsection (a),@ see Br. of the Appellee at 16, thus
misconstruing its own regulation to Aostensibly justify its refusal to
grant Eberenz the registration to which he is entitled,@ id. at 17.
Phrased differently, Eberenz claims that Athe educational requirements
established for >applicants= under subsection (c) of [the] regulation is
[sic] for applicants to the professional engineer examination, and not for
applicants for comity registration under the statutory provisions of IC 25-
31-1-21 and IC 25-31-1-12.@ Id. at 17 (emphases added). And because
Eberenz passed the nationally administered professional engineer
examination, he contends the entire regulation is inapplicable to his
application.

B-1

As an initial matter, we agree with Eberenz that subsection (a)
plausibly appears to delimit or control the remaining subsections,[5]
however, A[w]hen the meaning of an administrative regulation is in
question, the interpretation of the administrative agency is given great
weight unless the agency=s interpretation would be inconsistent with the
regulation itself.@ State Bd. of Tax Comm=rs v. Two Market Square Assocs.
Ltd., 679 N.E.2d 882, 886 (Ind. 1997).

The Board=s position to the contrary is that each regulation
subsection operates independently so that subsection (a) does not
necessarily control or delimit the scope of subsection (c). Eberenz=s
argument clearly stands or falls on the meaning of the term Aapplicant@ as
it is used in subsection (c). We look to the regulation=s ADefinitions@
section to determine the meaning of the word Aapplicant.@ There, it is
defined as Amean[ing] any individual whose application has been received by
the [B]oard for consideration to be registered as an engineer . . . in the
state of Indiana.@ Ind. Admin. Code tit. 864, r. 1.1-1-1.

Applying this definition, we find nothing sinister, contrived or
inconsistent about the Board=s contention that the minimum education
requirements outlined in subsection (c) apply to Eberenz Awhose application
has been received by the [B]oard for consideration to be registered as an
engineer . . . in the state of Indiana.@ Id.; see Indiana Dep=t of Public
Welfare v. Payne, 622 N.E.2d 461, 465 (Ind. 1993) (AIn interpreting an
administrative regulation, the rules applicable to construction of a
statute apply to construction of the regulation.@) (collecting cases),
reh’g denied; Poehlman v. Feferman, 717 N.E.2d 578, 581 (Ind. 1999) (AClear
and unambiguous statutory meaning leaves no room for judicial
construction.@); Consolidation Coal Co. v. Indiana Dep=t of State Revenue,
583 N.E.2d 1199, 1201 (Ind. 1991) (AWhere the General Assembly has defined
a word, this Court is bound by that definition . . . .@).

B-2

Even if we were not able to conclude by looking at the wording of the
statute that subsection (c) sets minimum requirements that apply to all
applicants, including those seeking comity registration, there is
persuasive case law construing a nearly identical statute for licensing
land surveyors[6] that convinces us of this result.

In State Board of Registration for Land Surveyors v. Bender, 626
N.E.2d 491 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993), Bender=s application to take the land
surveyors examination was denied by the State Board of Registration for
Land Surveyors (ASurveyor Board@) because Bender lacked educational
requirements that the Surveyor Board had established in the Indiana
Administrative Code. When Bender sought administrative review of the
Surveyor Board=s decision, his application was again denied, initially by
an ALJ and subsequently by the full Surveyor Board. Bender petitioned the
trial court for review of the administrative action. The trial court
vacated the Surveyor Board=s decision, instructing the Board to permit
Bender to take the examination. The Surveyor Board appealed.

Among the issues on appeal was whether the trial court erred in
holding that the educational requirements established by the Surveyor Board
were in excess of its statutory authority. The Surveyor Board=s statutory
authority was set forth in an Indiana Code section (which is nearly
identical in wording to that currently before this Court) that stated in
part:

The following shall be considered as minimum evidence that the
applicant is qualified for registration as a land surveyor:
. . . .
. . . A specific record of eight (8) years or more of land
surveying education and experience in land surveying work, which
indicates that the applicant has acquired knowledge and skill and
practical experience in land surveying work approximating that
required for registration as a professional land surveyor. . . .

Bender, 626 N.E.2d at 494 (emphasis added) (citing a section of the Indiana
Code recodified at Ind. Code ' 25-21.5-5-2).

Similar to the case currently before this Court, there existed
additional education requirements in an Indiana Administrative Code rule
adopted by a regulatory board. Among the rule=s requirements was the
successful completion of college level credit hours in the fundamentals of
land surveying, mathematics, and the physical sciences.

Not unlike Eberenz, Bender had conceded that he did not have the
requisite college curriculum required by the regulatory board=s
administrative rule, but that the board=s statutory authority merely
required that an applicant have a combination Aof eight (8) years or more
of land surveying education and experience.@ Id. at 495 (emphasis added).
As Eberenz has argued in this appeal, Bender had likewise contended that
the college courses required by the administrative rule were not required
by statute and that the regulatory board, Aby adopting a requirement to the
contrary[,] . . . ha[d] attempted to impose additional and different
minimum educational requirements.@ Id. (emphasis added).

Finding that the educational requirements established by the Surveyor
Board were within its statutory authority, the Court of Appeals reversed
the trial court, observing the following:

ALand Surveyor@ is defined as a Aperson who, by reason of his
special knowledge of mathematics and surveying principles and methods
which are acquired by education and practical experience, is qualified
to engage in the practice of land surveying as attested by his
registration as a land surveyor.@[[7]] The Legislature has authorized
the State Board of Registration [for Land Surveyors] to Aadopt rules
establishing standards for the competent practice of . . . land
surveying.@ Those standards necessarily include specific educational
requirements. It is true, as Bender asserts, the enabling legislation
requires noncollege graduates to have a combination of eight (8) years
or more of land surveying education and experience. However, other
than stating that the education must indicate that an applicant has
acquired the knowledge, skill, and practical experience in land
surveying work approximating that required of a degreed applicant, the
statute is silent on the quality, quantity, or meaning of a Aland
surveying education.@ If the [Surveyor] Board had not adopted
ascertainable educational standards, then any decision denying an
applicant the opportunity to take the Land Surveyors Examination on
educational grounds would violate due process. The requirement of
ascertainable standards is designed to make certain that
administrative decisions are fair, orderly and consistent rather than
irrational and arbitrary.

By adopting a regulation outlining specific educational
requirements, the [Surveyor] Board acted within the scope of its
statutory authority.

Id. at 495-96 (final two emphases added).

We fail to see how the facts of this case differ from those addressed
in Bender. There, it was determined that an administrative regulation
imposing educational requirements for land surveyors C not specifically set
forth by the legislature C was valid because it was Areasonable and
consistent with and necessary to carry out the purposes of the [licensing]
statute.@ Bender, 626 N.E.2d at 496.

We acknowledge that the Bender court was concerned with the validity
of non-statutory, regulatory educational requirements as applied to persons
taking a licensing examination, while this appeal concerns similar
educational requirements as applied to comity registration, but the
reasoning is the same: the statutes in both instances are silent on the
quality, quantity, or meaning of a Aland surveying education@ and
Aengineering education@ respectively. In both instances, the regulatory
boards adopted ascertainable educational standards so that any decision
denying applicants the opportunity to ultimately become licensed in the
respective professions would not violate due process. And in both
instances, the boards acted within the scope of their respective statutory
authority by adopting regulations outlining specific educational
requirements.

After reviewing the statutory language before us and case law
interpreting nearly identical language, we agree with the Board=s position
that Indiana=s requirements for comity registration necessarily include
those educational requirements found in Indiana Administrative Code, tit.
864, r. 1.1-2-2.

II

We assume a more limited role in reviewing the Board=s decision that
Eberenz obtained his Kentucky engineer license under requirements which
Aconflict@ with those established for registration in Indiana.

Proceedings before the Board and judicial review thereof are governed
by the Administrative Orders and Procedures Act (AAOPA@). See Ind. Code ''
4-21.5-1-1 et seq. (1993). Under the AOPA, the scope of a court=s judicial
review is limited to a consideration of (1) whether there is substantial
evidence to support the agency=s finding and order and (2) whether the
action constitutes an abuse of discretion or is arbitrary or capricious.
Indiana Dep=t of Envtl. Management v. Conard, 614 N.E.2d 916, 919 (Ind.
1993). In reviewing an administrative decision, this Court will not try
the facts de novo nor substitute its own judgment for that of the agency.
Id.

It follows from our analysis in Part I of this opinion that we now
find there existed substantial evidence to support the Board=s finding that
Eberenz Alack[ed]@ the requisite educational credits. The Board properly
concluded that Indiana=s requirements for comity registration included
those educational requirements established in its own regulation, and we
will not second-guess the Board=s finding that Eberenz did not present
evidence satisfying this standard. See Indiana State Ethics Comm=n v.
Nelson, 656 N.E.2d 1172, 1174 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995) (AThe court on judicial
review of an agency decision is governed by the presumption that the
agency=s decision is correct in view of its expertise.@), transfer denied.

As for the determination that a Aconflict@ existed between Kentucky=s
and Indiana=s licensure requirements, we recognize that the Board
anticipated a need to define the term Aconflict@ in the context of
A[c]omity registration standards.@ Thus, Rule 1.1-5-1 provides that
[u]nder IC 25-31-1-21, one (1) requirement for an individual who is
registered as a professional engineer out-of-state to become
registered in Indiana is that the requirements under which the out-of-
state registration was issued do not conflict with IC 25-31-1. One
(1) such provision is that all other requirements for registration be
completed before taking the principles and practice examination.
Therefore, an applicant must have obtained the qualifying work
experience following graduation and prior to the taking of the
principles and practice examination. Any other sequence of events
shall be considered to be in conflict with IC 25-31-1.

Ind. Admin. Code tit. 864, r. 1.1-5-1 (emphases added).
At first blush, this language appears only marginally helpful in the
context of this case: the single example (or A(1) such provision@) provided
therein concerns an applicant needing to take the nationally administered
principles and practice examination.[8] We nonetheless acknowledge and
accord great weight to the Board=s consistent and obvious concern
throughout its rules that all applicants complete the Arequirements for
registration.@ See Indiana State Bd. of Registration for Prof=l Eng=rs &
Land Surveyors v. Nord, 600 N.E.2d 124, 128 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992) (AWhen an
agency interprets its own statute, the reviewing court should accord the
agency interpretation great weight, but is not bound thereby.@) As such,
we find that the Board=s determination that a conflict existed with
Eberenz=s comity application was not an abuse of discretion, nor arbitrary
or capricious.

Finally, we note that it is axiomatic that a state licensing board
will occasionally deny a comity application on the basis of one or both of
any state=s most significant requirements for licensure: education and work
experience. After all, these two requirements logically distinguish
licensed professionals from the remainder of society, and Hoosiers and
Kentuckians alike have a stake and an interest in seeing that regulatory
boards are free to enforce and administer the competent practice of
professionals in their respective states.[9]

Conclusion

We hold that the Board acted in accordance with Indiana law when it
denied Eberenz=s comity application on the basis that he did not present
evidence establishing A[a] specific record of eight (8) years or more of
engineering education and experience in engineering work,@ as defined by
the Board. Furthermore, the Board did not abuse its discretion in
determining that a conflict existed between Kentucky=s and Indiana=s
licensure requirements.

We therefore grant transfer, vacate the opinion of the Court of
Appeals, reverse the trial court=s judgment, and remand to the Board for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

SHEPARD, C.J., and BOEHM and RUCKER, JJ., concur.
DICKSON, J., concurs as to Part I but dissents as to Part II.

-----------------------
[1] After filing a praecipe for appeal, the Board, pursuant to Indiana
Trial Rule 62, asked the trial court for a stay of its summary judgment
order pending appeal. On May 12, 1998, the trial court denied the Board=s
motion for a stay and ordered the Board Ato enter in [its] official records
the registration by comity of [Eberenz] as an Indiana professional
engineer, within ten (10) days after entry of this order.@ (R. at 201.)
On June 24, 1998, the Board issued Eberenz an Indiana professional engineer
license.
On June 25, 1998, the Board filed a motion for stay pending appeal
with the Court of Appeals. The motion specifically requested a stay of (1)
the trial court=s summary judgment order of February 12, 1998, and (2) the
trial court=s May 12, 1998, order denying the Board=s motion for a stay
pending appeal. After hearing oral argument, the Court of Appeals denied
the motion on July 21, 1998.

[2] To justify its determination that the Board did not act in
accordance with the law in requiring Eberenz to meet non-statutory
education standards, the Court of Appeals cited two tax cases for the Awell-
settled principle that an administrative board >may not by its rules and
regulations add to or detract from the law as enacted.=@ Eberenz, 701
N.E.2d at 897 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Indiana Dep=t of State Revenue v.
Best Ever Cos., 495 N.E.2d 785, 787 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986) (quoting in turn
Indiana Dep=t of State Revenue v. Colpaert Realty Corp., 231 Ind. 463, 479-
80, 109 N.E.2d 415, 422-23 (1952))).
We believe reliance on this quotation, Amay not by its rules and
regulations add to or detract from the law as enacted,@ was inappropriate
here because the context of the Best Ever and Colpeart Realty cases was
different. In those cases, the Department of Revenue promulgated
additional regulations which were inconsistent with specific requirements
already addressed in the legislatively enacted statutes. Indeed, the full
paragraph in the Colpaert Realty opinion begins:
An administrative board has the undoubted right to adopt rules and
regulations designed to enable it to perform its duties and to effectuate
the purposes of the law under which it operates, when such authority is
delegated to it by legislative enactment. But it may not make rules and
regulations inconsistent with the statute which it is administering, [and]
it may not by its rules and regulations add to or detract from the law as
enacted . . . .
231 Ind. at 479-80, 109 N.E.2d at 422-23 (emphases added) (citations
omitted).
As we will demonstrate infra, Indiana Code ' 25-31-1 is silent as to
the quality, quantity, or meaning of an Aengineering education@ as required
by Indiana Code ' 25-31-1-12(a). As such, the Best Ever and Colpaert
Realty cases are inapplicable.

[3] This requirement of subsection (B) is not at issue in this case
because the Board did not require Eberenz to submit to an additional
examination as permitted by Ind. Code ' 25-31-1-14(g). (R. at 16; Eberenz
Pet. & 39.) (R. at 144; Board Answer & 25.)

[4] Eberenz presents the same argument to this Court. See Br. of
Appellee in Opposition to Transfer at 8 (A[T]he Board has yet to set forth
in any pleading or brief in this cause any plausible construction of the
delimiting initial subsection of the subject regulation.@).

[5] Eberenz insists that a reviewing court Ais bound to apply the
plain and ordinary meaning . . . of [subsection (a)] to restrict the
applicability of the remainder of that regulation to those persons seeking
admission to the engineering examination in Indiana.@ See Br. of Appellee
at 17 (internal quotations and citation omitted). As we demonstrate infra,
a court should not look to the Aplain and ordinary meaning@ of
determinative words when the regulation or statute defines them. Cf. State
v. D.M.Z., 674 N.E.2d 585, 588 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996) (Only A[u]ndefined
words in a statute are given their plain, ordinary and usual meaning.@)
(citing Ind. Code ' 1-1-4-1(c)), transfer denied.

[6] The current statute (Ind. Code ' 35-21-1) was implemented and the
current regulation (Ind. Admin. Code tit. 864) was adopted to address the
combined AState Board of Registration for Professional Engineers and Land
Surveyors.@ The statute remains entitled as such (AProfessional Engineers
and Land Surveyors@) even though a separate statute now addresses land
surveyors (AArticle 21.5. Land Surveyors@). The name of the regulation
was changed (ATitle 864: State Board of Registration for Professional
Engineers@) effective July, 1, 1991. See P.L. 23-1991, sec. 42.

[7] AProfessional engineer@ is similarly defined as a Aindividual who,
by reason of that individual=s special knowledge of mathematical and
physical sciences and the principles and methods of engineering analysis
and design which are acquired by education and practical experience, is
qualified to engage in the practice of engineering as attested by that
individual=s registration as a professional engineer.@ Ind. Code ' 25-31-1-
2(b) (emphasis added to mirror the Court of Appeals=s emphasis in Bender).

[8] We note that Rule 1.1-5-1 appears to be the Board=s regulatory
response to clarify another issue decided by the Court of Appeals in
Bender, where the court was required to parse a series of events dealing
with Bender=s qualifying work experience. See Bender, 626 N.E.2d at 496-
97.

[9] This Court has recognized the wide discretion that a licensing
board enjoys in determining whether a conflict exists concerning the
meaning of the Indiana Code. Cf. Sutto v. Board of Med. Registration &
Examination, 242 Ind. 556, 563, 180 N.E.2d 533, 537 (1962) (AWhether or not
the qualifications and requirements provided by the law of the [s]tate
where the applicant has previously been licensed are substantially
equivalent to those required by the Chiropractic Act of Indiana is a
question of fact to be determined by the Board.@).